FAKING IN PERSONALITY ASSESSMENTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF A METHOD FACTOR MEASURE OF FAKING

By

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ABSTRACT

The goal of this study was to assess the efficacy of a newly developed "method factor" measure of faking to control for the effects of faking when personality tests are used to predict performance criteria. Traditional measures of faking, such as social desirability scales, have not been found to adequately control for faking. This study assessed the adequacy of the newly developed measure. When controlling for faking, as measured by the method factor, the validity of conscientiousness as a predictor of undergraduate GPA was larger. Additionally, the nature of the method factor across experimental conditions was investigated. The method factor was found to be positively correlated with self-esteem and negatively correlated with depression in an honest condition. It was positively correlated with cognitive ability in an instructed faking condition. However, no clear evidence identifying the faking factor was found in an incentive-to-fake condition.

DEDICATION

I would like to first dedicate this thesis to my parents, Raymond and Loistine Worthy, and my sister, Danielle Williams, who have always encouraged me to pursue my dreams. I would also like to dedicate this thesis to my entire family and my close friends.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of personality assessments has grown dramatically over the past 30 years (Hough & Oswald, 2008). However, there are advantages and disadvantages to using personality assessments as a means for personnel selection. Advantages include the potential for reduced adverse impact when personality assessments are used with or instead of other types of assessments (e.g., cognitive ability tests) (Neuman & Lyon, 2009). Additionally, personality assessments provide an objective measure of personality that can be easily interpreted and compared across individuals (Costa, 1996). Selection specialists have developed methods to employ personality assessments in the workplace effectively, using these instruments to select better employees and create professional development plans for employees based on their strengths and weaknesses. Some disadvantages of using personality assessments concerns the low criterion-related validity of personality assessments, thus making selection specialists and organizations face the trade-off between high validity of cognitive ability tests and low adverse impact of personality assessments (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, and Schmitt, 2007). Additionally, faking of personality tests is a pressing concern of selection specialists (Peterson, Griffith, & Converse, 2009). When individuals fake on personality test, the validity of the tests may be decreased, making the test less useful for the selection of employees who will be hired for an organization and stay with that organization.

The identification of the Big Five personality dimensions (Goldberg, 1993) has given selection specialists a framework from which to predict applicant performance, and the general absence of adverse impact associated with personality tests has afforded protection of minority applicants from test bias in the selection process. Although the Big Five personality dimensions have been most frequently studied, other personality inventories have been used in organizations, including the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Briggs & Myers, 1998) and the Hartman Value Profile (Hartman, 1973). When studying personality, conscientiousness and emotional stability have been linked to performance in multiple jobs, exhibiting correlations of about .20; however, the links between other Big Five constructs and criteria variables have been only modest (Trapmann, Hell, Hirn, & Schuler, 2007).While this is the case, personality is visible and has a great deal of appeal in the workplace. Managers intuitively feel that personality works and there is growing research to support the Big Five framework in the study of personality.

One of the major issues with personality is that it is primarily assessed through self-report measures. Because prospective employees know that employers are looking for certain traits, they have the potential to fake their responses in a way that would get them into a desired position. There have been two general concerns about faking. The first concern stems from the possibility that the existence of faking may decrease test validity – the correlation between test scores and criterion scores (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990). This concern stems from the assumption that one's score on a personality dimension, such as agreeableness, is the sum of his/her actual agreeableness in addition to a faking distortion. This faking distortion is the basis of this concern. If the distortion is uncorrelated with the criterion, then it will decrease validity. Hough et al. (1990) found that respondents successfully distorted their self-descriptions when instructed to do so and validity scales were responsive to different types of distortion. The

second concern is the effect of faking on the rank order of applicants in top-down selection situations (Christiansen, Rozek, & Burns, 2010; Peterson et al, 2009).

Winkelspecht, Lewis, and Thomas (2006) found that those instructed to fake were often over-represented at the top of the score distributions as instructions to fake resulted in higher scores both between and within groups in a test-retest situation. There was significantly lower correspondence between participants' honest scores and their faked scores as well as multiple instances where participants with unfavorable honest scores subsequently produced the most favorable scores when faking. Response distortion may remain a serious threat to the use of personality test scores in selection.

Peterson et al. (2009) found that the combinations of conscientiousness and cognitive ability resulted in as much as a 13.50% reduction in hiring fakers compared to a conscientiousness measure alone although most of these differences were not statistically significant. However, the use of cognitive ability–conscientiousness combinations did result in significant reductions in hiring discrepancies, suggesting that the use of multiple predictors is effective in reducing the impact of faking on hiring discrepancies over the use of a personality measure alone, this reduction may not be large enough to eliminate concern over the occurrence of faking.

Christiansen et al. (2010) assessed practitioners working in the area of selection and assessment. The participants read descriptions of a managerial position and the assessment profiles of two hypothetical candidates who were finalists for a job. In the candidate profiles, there were scores from cognitive ability and personality tests, which included information on socially desirable responding. There were three conditions: no social desirability scores, differing social desirability scores between candidates, and elevated social desirability scores for both

candidates. The results indicated that elevated social desirability scores were used as personality information and the practitioners would infer that candidates were less sincere and the candidates were judged less hirable. Additionally, with the presence of this information, less weight was given to the personality assessment**.** However, even when social desirability scores were elevated, personality test results had more influence on hiring judgments than scores on the cognitive tests. If the faking distortion is added to each potential candidate's trait scale score, those who distorted the most, better fakers, will have the highest scores and be selected first. This would mean that in the presence of individual differences in faking, those who faked the most would be most likely to be hired.

Practitioners are trying to combat this issue in different ways. Goffin and Christiansen (2003) found that those who were experienced in using personality tests for industrial-organizational purposes (e.g., personnel selection), generally favored the use of faking corrections, 69% favoring such corrections, typically social desirability scores. Practitioners have tried to create conditions in which the respondents will not fake by implementing warning instructions within the assessment to make sure that applicants know faking can be detected and there will be consequences for such behavior (e.g., McFarland, 2003). In an effort to reduce faking on personality tests, McFarland (2003) tested the theory that applicants may be warned that a social desirability scale is embedded in the test because this procedure of controlling for faking had been shown to substantially reduce faking, but there was no research addressing the how the applicant would react to such instructions. Using an organizational justice framework, this study examined the effect of warning on procedural justice perceptions, finding that the warning did not negatively affect test-taker reactions and seemingly has positive consequences when using personality measures. However, such instructions have the potential to decrease

scores, causing honest applicants to respond in a way to avoid consequences because there were differences across warned conditions and unwarned conditions in relation to the personality constructs.

There are also methods of designing tests that are not subject to faking, e.g., by using forced-choice items or other types of items that are difficult to fake (Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006); however, all tests cannot be designed in such a way. An alternative area of research is that geared toward measuring faking and controlling for faking. It may be advantageous to embrace the fact that there will be response distortion, especially in high stakes conditions, measure it, and use it as a predictor. This study was designed to provide information that may be necessary to achieve that goal.

There are, however, concerns with measuring faking. Two forms of faking should be defined regarding this study. Ordinary faking is that which occurs when respondents are asked to respond honestly, but distort their responses. This distortion can occur for a number of reasons, including the incentives associated with the test or individual personality characteristics. Instructed faking, on the other hand, occurs when a respondent is given instructions to fake good, to intentionally distort responses for the sake of the research at hand. This study employed both an instructed faking condition and a condition in which an incentive to fake good was provided.

There is consistency regarding the idea that faking exists, and the notion that this distortion occurs in the form of positive distortion (Hough, 1998); however, there is no consistency or agreement on the proper way to measure faking. There have been, primarily, three methods used to measure and statistically control for faking. These methods are the use of social desirability scales, difference scores, and factor scores as a means to measure faking and then control for it. Social desirability is defined as the tendency of respondents to respond to a

measure in a way that is viewed as socially acceptable (Paulhus, 1984). Theoretically, controlling for the tendency of a person to bias his response in a way that is more socially acceptable versus his true response should serve as a means to control for the faking distortion.

The use of difference scores involves comparing the mean responses of participants in faking conditions with mean responses on participants in honest responding conditions (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). The theoretical underpinning is that those in the faking conditions would have scores that are statistically higher than those that are in the honest conditions.

The third method of controlling for faking involves using factor scores as a means to control for the distortion (Schmit & Ryan, 1993). By using a structural equation model and estimating the factor scores of the participants based on the model, the faking distortion can be controlled for (Biderman & Nguyen, 2004). The Big Five factor scores estimated from the structural equation model, which incorporates a faking factor, are presumably "purer" estimates of their respective dimensions.

Social Desirability as a Measure of Faking

There has been some research suggesting that social desirability, the tendency of respondents to respond to a measure in a way that is viewed as socially acceptable, should be used as the method of controlling for faking. Ordinary faking is often conceptualized as social desirability (e.g., Jo, 2000) and therefore used as a measure of faking propensity. However, the use of social desirability measures to examine the issue of applicant faking has a long but rather unproductive history (Griffith & Peterson, 2008).

Theoretically, those scoring high on socially desirability measures would be more likely to fake when responding to personality questionnaires. Goffin and Christiansen (2003) reviewed

a number of personality tests commonly used for personnel selection and found that some of the more popular tests provide a potential correction for faking, using social desirability scores. Jo (2000) developed a methodology for controlling social-desirability bias, using direct and indirect questioning to create methods factors within a structural-equation modeling context.

While the use of social desirability scales as a means for controlling for faking has gained popularity, there is still mixed support for the use of the construct as a control for faking. In a meta-analysis examining the relationship between social desirability and measures of personality and performance, Ones, Viswesvaran, and Reiss (1996) examined whether social desirability functions as a predictor for a variety of criteria, as a suppressor, or as a mediator and found that it served as neither. They provided evidence that social desirability scales did not predict school success, task performance, counterproductive behaviors, and job performance. Furthermore, they argued that social desirability is not as much of a problem as some of the literature makes it out to be and not controlling for such a measure leaves the validity of personality measures intact.

Ellingson, Sackett, and Hough (1999) evaluated the efficacy of a social desirability correction in approximating an individual's honest score on a self-response measure. Using a within-subjects design, they compared honest, faked, and corrected scores and found that correcting personality test scores using social desirability measures did not produce scores that were comparable to honest scores. Later, Kurtz, Tarquini, and Iobst (2008) found that social desirability scores were positively correlated with extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness as rated by the self, roommate, and parent and that higher scores did not indicate lower validity of self-ratings, suggesting that social desirability measures of faking are contaminated with characteristics other than the propensity to distort responses.

Ellingson, Smith, and Sackett (2001) noted that social desirability alters the factor structure of personality measures. Therefore, they brought together four large data sets wherein different organizational samples responded to different personality measures and conducting four separate yet parallel investigations. Within each data set, individuals identified through a social desirability scale as responding in an honest manner were grouped together, and individuals identified as responding in a highly socially desirable manner were grouped together. Using various analyses, the fit of higher-order factor structure models was compared across the two groups. Results were the same for each data set. Social desirability had little influence on the higher order factor structures that characterized the relationships among the scales of the personality measures.

There are additional issues with the use of social desirability scales in the measurement of faking in applicant settings. If social desirability measures are administered during the assessment process, it will lengthen the testing process and thus may measure the applicant at a different time, and possibly in a different cognitive state, than when assessed by the personality assessment.

Difference Scores as Measures of Faking

The use of difference scores involves comparing the mean responses of participants in faking conditions with mean responses on participants in honest responding conditions (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). In these studies, within-subjects designs are used and one or more difference scores are computed for each respondent by subtracting the mean of responses in the honest condition from the mean in the faking condition for each participant. Because a score is available for each respondent, the two-condition within-subjects design allows for the

opportunity to assess the relationships of faking to characteristics of individuals that might vary within conditions. Although such designs are advantageous for research purposes, inclusion of an honest response condition in a selection situation is difficult to accomplish.

McFarland and Ryan (2000) noted that there were discrepant findings in the literature regarding the effects of applicant faking on the validity of noncognitive measures, possibly because of the failure of some studies to consider individual differences in faking. Therefore, they demonstrated considerable variance across individuals in the extent of faking 3 types of noncognitive measures – personality test, biodata inventory, and an integrity test. Participants completed measures honestly and with instructions to fake and the results indicated some measures were more difficult to fake than others. Using difference scores, the authors found that integrity, conscientiousness, and neuroticism were related to faking. In addition, individuals faked fairly consistently across the measures.

McFarland and Ryan (2006) tested a model that integrated the theory of planned behavior with a model of faking presented by McFarland and Ryan (2000) to predict faking on a personality test. In the first study, the theory of planned behavior explained sizable variance in the intention to fake. In Study 2, the theory of planned behavior explained both the intention to fake and actual faking behavior. They used both difference scores and social desirability scales and found that both resulted in similar conclusions, but the difference scores were more strongly related to the variables in the model.

There are some advantages to the difference score method because there is a score for each person and it does not require separate questionnaires to perform the analysis. This method directly assesses faking of the questionnaire under consideration.

The disadvantages associated with this method are that it assumes no faking in the honest condition, which is not necessarily correct. If this assumption is violated, difference scores represent only faking in excess of possible faking in the honest condition. Even if no faking occurs in the honest response condition, variability of behavior in that condition adds error variance to the difference scores, reducing reliability and decreasing the power to detect relationships of difference scores with other variables (Edwards, 2001). Additionally, this method is not usable in real world situations in which there is only a single applicant sample.

Factor Scores as Measures of Faking

Among the first studies to identify a potential faking factor was Schmit & Ryan (1993). They noted that the stability of 5-factor model of personality in job applicant populations has not been determined, citing conceptual and empirical evidence suggesting that similar factor structures should not be assumed across testing situations that have different purposes or consequences. They conducted a study that used exploratory factor analysis to examine the fit of the 5-factor model to NEO Five-Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1989) test data from student and applicant samples. The 5-factor structure fit the student data but did not fit the applicant data. However, in an EFA of an applicant sample, they found that a six-factor solution fit the data best and that the sixth factor shared cross-loadings with four of the Big Five dimensions. They labeled the sixth factor an "ideal employee" factor.

Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, and Klawsky (1996) extended Schmit and Ryan's (1993) study by using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to estimate a sixth first order factor on which indicators from all of the Big five dimensions loaded. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to compare a five versus six-factor model in an applied setting. Cellar et al. (1996) found that

adding the sixth factor significantly improved fit of the CFA to both questionnaire (the NEO-PI) and bipolar adjective checklist data, although the sixth factor did not predict the criterion used in their study; Scales from the NEO-PI were significantly correlated with measures of training success, whereas scales from the bipolar inventory were not.

Biderman and Nguyen (2004) compared model on data in which a situational judgment test and measures of the Big Five were administered under honest and fake good instructions. A model with latent variables representing the six measures and a seventh latent variable representing faking ability proved to be a useful representation of the data.

Bäckström (2007) compared several models using the IPIP 100-item Big Five five-factor personality inventory with a sample of 2,019 participants tested on the Internet. The models were compared using confirmatory factor analysis. The criteria for parsimony favored a model with one general factor on which all items loaded and five personality factors. In this study, the single general factor was found to be related to social desirability in a subsample of 196 subjects.

Bäckström, Bjorklund, and Larsson (2009) found that the factors in self-report inventories measuring the five-factor model (FFM) correlate with one another although they theoretically should not. In the first study, they found that across three different FFM-questionnaires, almost all of the common variance between factors can be attributed to a single general factor related to social desirability. In the second study, they found that rephrasing the items from a FFM-questionnaire made them substantially less socially desirable, while the inventory's empirical (five-factor) structure remained the same. Participants who scored low in social desirability demonstrated negligible difference between how they responded to the original items versus how they responded to the neutral items. For participants who were high in

social desirability the difference was considerably larger, suggesting that reducing social desirability in self-rating inventories could serve as a potential cure for the faking concern.

Biderman and Nguyen (2009) investigated measuring faking propensity as a method factor estimated from a single condition. Faking propensity demonstrated convergent validity with difference score measures of faking and moderate convergent validity with social desirability measures. Faking propensity, as represented by the method factor, was unrelated to cognitive ability, indicating discriminant validity.

Wrensen and Biderman (2005) defined the ability to fake the Big Five personality dimensions as a method factor from a structural equation model. Faking ability was positively related to cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, and integrity and was negatively related to social desirability. It was not related to any of the Big Five dimensions after controlling for cognitive ability. This result, when compared with the results of Biderman and Nguyen (2009) suggests that in different contexts the nature of the method factor shifts. Although the above studies are certainly encouraging, only a small subset of the literature has investigated whether using factor analytic methods yield measures of faking. The factor analytic methods has the potential to be useful in the assessment of personality, and thus, the goal of this study was to replicate previous studies, adding to that body of evidence, and providing further evidence for this method of controlling for faking.

Nature of the Method Factor

The behavior considered to be dissimulation or faking may differ according to the condition a given person is responding in. Ellingson, Sackett, and Connelly (2007) compared individual responses provided in an organizational context with high motivation to distort

(selection) and those provided in an organizational context with low motivation to distort (development). Seven hundred and thirteen individuals were identified as having completed the assessment twice: once for selection purposes and once for development purposes or twice for the same purpose. Scale-score analyses both within and across contexts revealed a limited degree of response distortion. While the distortion may have been limited, it is possible that it was contaminated because the reason to distort varies across conditions.

Goffin and Boyd (2009) noted that personality testing is a particularly valuable preemployment assessment tool when one matches personality traits to job requirements. The authors suggested that personality testing's contribution to personnel selection could be leveraged if more were known about the psychological process underlying applicant faking behavior, thus, as the secondary goal of this study, we aim to provide insight into the nature of faking behavior.

In honest conditions, the faking factor scores have been found to correlate positively with self-esteem and negatively with depression (Biderman, Nguyen, & Cunningham, 2011). This finding suggests that when there are no incentives or instructions to fake, the method factor is an indication of how a person feels about themselves – their self-concept.

Biderman & Nguyen (2004) found that when instructions were given, the faking factor correlated with cognitive ability. This finding suggests that when there are instructions to fake, the method factor is not necessarily an indication of self-concept or faking propensity. Instead, the method factor relates to cognitive ability, because of the problem-solving nature associated with receiving instructions and following those instructions well. Clark and Biderman (2006) obtained measures of several personality variables in a repeated measures design employing honest, incentive, and instructed-faking conditions. Application of a structural equation model

found faking propensity and faking ability latent variables to be uncorrelated. Faking ability was related to cognitive ability in this study.

Biderman & Nguyen (2009) found that when incentives were given, the method factor correlated with social desirability, both the self-deception and impressions management scales, indicating that when incentives are involved, the method factor is related to faking propensity, as measured by social desirability scores.

The purpose of the present study was to investigate this third way of measuring faking, which has been given less attention in the published literature on faking than social desirability or difference score measures, investigating the utility of measuring faking as a first-order factor in a confirmatory factor analytic.

The Present Study

For the present study, we explored the use of factor analytic techniques as a means of measuring faking, including a method bias as a factor along with the other personality factors in a confirmatory factor analytic model of Big Five personality data. Theoretically, Big Five scale scores (e.g., extraversion, conscientiousness) are contaminated with a common method bias. However, the source of this method bias is not identical for each situation in which a personality assessment may be administered. Using three conditions, honest responding, instructed faking, and incentive to fake, we assessed differences in this method bias across conditions.

We had two major goals. The first goal was to assess the extent to which accounting for the new measure of faking would affect validity of conscientiousness. Specifically – would controlling for the new faking measure increase validity of conscientiousness as a predictor? Conscientiousness was used because it is the scale that has consistently shown a relationship

with performance criteria (Trapmann et al., 2007). This study assessed validity of conscientiousness scale scores and then assessed it again with conscientiousness factor scores, in which effects of faking had been removed.

Hypothesis 1: Validity of factor scores in which effects of faking have been removed will be larger than validity of scale scores.

The second goal of the study was based on the previous results of studies of the faking factor. We state the following hypotheses concerning the relationship of the faking factor to self-esteem (SE), Depression (Dep), Cognitive Ability (CA), Social Desirability – Self-Deception (SD), and Social Desirability – Impression Management (IM).

In the honest condition, respondents' self-concept, as measured by a depression measure and a self-esteem measure will be assumed to determine the nature of the method bias.

Hypothesis 2a**:** In the honest condition, factor scores will correlate positively with self-esteem scores and negatively with depression scores.

Hypothesis 2b**:** In the instructed faking and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the self-esteem scores will be negligible and the correlations between the factor scores and the depression scores will be negligible

In the instructed faking condition, we believe that the problem solving nature of the task will overshadow individual differences in self-concept to the extent that those differences will no longer account for the method bias (Biderman &Nguyen, 2004; 2009). Instead, it is hypothesized that individual differences in problem solving ability, because of the instructions to fake, will control the differences in faking. Because of the nature of problem solving, it can be related to a measure of cognitive ability.

Hypothesis 3a: In the instructed faking condition, factor scores will correlate positively with cognitive ability scores.

Hypothesis 3b: In the honest and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the cognitive ability scores will be negligible.

In the incentive conditions, it is assumed here that self-concept and cognitive ability are taken out of the equation and no longer account for the method bias (Biderman, Nguyen, 2004; 2009). Instead, it is hypothesized that in the incentive to fake condition, because of the instructions to fake in order to receive a prize, the method bias is then a measure of faking propensity.

Hypothesis 4a: In the incentive condition, factor scores will correlate positively with social desirability scores.

Hypothesis 4b*:* In the honest and instructed faking conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the social desirability scores will be negligible.

The last hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

Predicted Correlations (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4)

	Condition		
	Honest	Faking	Incentive
Depression	**Negative**	None	None
Self-Esteem	**Positive**	None	None
Cognitive Ability	None	**Positive**	None
Self-Deception	None	None	**Positive**
Impression Management	None	None	**Positive**

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Participants

Participants were 216 undergraduate students enrolled in various psychology classes at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. Regarding race, 74.40% (*n* = 160) were Caucasian, 19.50% (*n* = 42) were African American, 3.30% (*n* = 7) were biracial/multiracial, 1.40% (*n* = 3) Asian, and 1.40% (*n* = 3) Hispanic. Regarding sex, 72.60% (*n* = 156) were female and 27.40% (*n* = 59) were male. The mean age of the participants was 20.13 years old (*SD* = 5.20). The mean number of undergraduate course hours taken was 34.60 hours (*SD* = 32.49).

Design

Participants were given a battery of assessments. They were randomly assigned to the honest, instructed faking, and incentive conditions. IRB approval was obtained for this study (Appendix A)

Procedure

All participants filled out an informed consent form and a page of demographic information. After completion of the above forms, the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT: Wonderlic, 1999) was administered. The students were then directed to two websites; the first website contained three measures and the second contained five measures. In the first website, the students were instructed to complete the Hartman Values Profile, the IPIP 50- item Big-Five

personality inventory, and the Myers-Briggs Personality type indicator. After completing the three surveys on the first website, the students were directed to a second website that contained five measures. All participants completed the Rosenberg Self-Esteem (RSE) measure, followed by the Costello and Comrey measure, and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). Order of administration of the scales was the same for all participants.

After those were completed, the participants received instruction in one of three conditions: honest, faking, and incentive. After receiving instructions, the participants responded to a second IPIP 50- item Big-Five personality inventory and then completed the Work Traits assessment. All students were given the opportunity to be entered into a drawing for one of two gift certificates to a local mall.

Condition Instructions

The instructions for each condition were as follows.

Honest condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a personality assessment. Please respond to all of the questions on the measure as honestly as you can. Remember, your responses are for research purposes only and will be held in strict confidence, not to be shared with anyone.

Instructed faking condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a personality assessment. Please respond to all of the questions on the measure as if you were applying for the job of customer service representative. Some examples of customer service jobs include bank teller and call center representative. Respond to the measure in a way that would guarantee that you would get the customer service job. In other words, you are asked to respond

as if you were someone who needed the job so bad that if stretching or embellishing yourself a bit would get you the job, you would go ahead and do it. Remember, your responses are for research purposes only and will be held in strict confidence, not to be shared with anyone.

Incentive condition. In this part of the study, you will be asked to complete a personality assessment. All individuals who fill out the Prize Drawing Form at the end of the experiment will be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift certificate to Hamilton Place Mall. Based on the responses to this section, the twenty participants who would make the BEST candidates for employment will be entered into another drawing for an additional $50 gift certificate. The winners will be notified by email. Remember, your responses are for research purposes only and will be held in strict confidence, not to be shared with anyone.

Measures

The following measures were analyzed for this study.

Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT). The WPT Form II (Wonderlic Inc., 1999) was given to all participants prior to any other questionnaires. The WPT is is a twelve-minute, fifty-question test used to assess the aptitude of prospective employees for learning and problem-solving in a range of occupations. The score is calculated as the number of correct answers given in the allotted time. A score of 20 is intended to indicate average intelligence.

IPIP Big Five (100 items). The 100-item questionnaire available on the IPIP web site was administered to participants in two 50-item portions. There is a 50-item questionnaire, and the 100-item questionnaire adds 50 additional items to the questionnaire used for two equivalent parts (Appendices B, C). In the first portion the study, the participants responded to the first 50-

item questionnaire on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate”. In the second portion of the study, the participants responded to the second 50-item questionnaire on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate”. In the first portion of the study, items were displayed one-at-a-time using a web-delivered survey. In the second portion of the study, items were displayed with a maximum of 20 items to a page. In both portions, participants responded by clicking on a check box indicating the preferred response.

Rosenberg Self-Esteem measure (RSE). According to Rosenberg (1965), self-esteem is a unidimensional construct reflecting positive or negative attitudes toward the self. For this reason, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale, RSE was originally designed to assess global self-esteem as one factor based on 10 items which are a combination of positively and negatively worded items (Marsh, Scalas, & Nagengast, 2010). The participants responded to the measure on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing “Very inaccurate” and 7 representing “Very accurate” (Appendix D). All items were displayed on the screen at the same time.

Costello and Comrey Depression measure (CCD). This 14-item self-report questionnaire was designed specifically to measure intensity of depressive affect, or "a person's tendency to experience a depressive mood" and a combination of low self-esteem and a negative self-concept, which are cited as prominent features of depression (Costello & Comrey, 1967). The participants responded to the measure on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item

described them with 1 representing "Very inaccurate" and 7 representing "Very accurate" (Appendix E). All items were displayed on the screen at the same time.

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). In the second portion of the study, the BIDR Version 6 – Form 40 was administered before the Big Five given under instructions to respond honestly. The BIDR has two scales composed of 20 items each. The first twenty items are representative of self-deceptive responding (SD) and the second twenty items are representative of impression management (IM). Paulhus has investigated social desirability construct and asserts that socially desirable responding is composed of two separate factors: *self-deception* and *impression management* (Paulhus, 1984). The self-deception factor represents response distortion resulting from an unconscious tendency to provide inflated, positive self-reports. The respondents truly feel that their responses are indicative of their actual personality traits and view those responses as part of their internal perception of themselves. The impression management factor represents response distortion that is due to intentional faking or what the respondent consciously does as a means to ensure they are viewed as socially acceptable. The participants responded to the measure on a 7-point scale indicating how accurately each item described them with 1 representing "Not true and all" and 7 representing "Very true" (Appendix F). Up to 20 items were displayed on the screen at a time.

Criterion. Because of the use of undergraduate students in this study, undergraduate grade point average (GPA) was used as the criterion variable, indicative of the student's performance at the university level.

Screen shots of websites 1 and 2 are provided in Appendices G and H respectively.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

To permit comparison with other research involving the same personality questionnaires, means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability coefficients of Big Five dimension scores, Costello and Comrey depression scores, Rosenberg self-esteem scores, Wonderlic cognitive ability scores, BIDR Self Deception and Impression Management scores for all three conditions are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

Inspection of the means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables indicates the extent to which the instructional manipulations in the faking and incentive conditions resulted in response distortion. In general, if instructions to fake good or incentives to fake are given, we expect that the mean of responses to the each dimension will be larger in the instructed faking condition than in the honest response condition (Hough, 1998). Examination of the means in Tables 2, 3, and 4 across conditions indicate an increase in responses from the honest condition to the instructed faking and incentive conditions. Thus, the increases in mean response from the honest to the instructed faking and incentive conditions suggest that the faking manipulations were successful.

Table 2.

Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Honest Condition.

Dimension	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 H E	(.896)														
2 H A	.240	(.760)													
3 H C	.107	.307	(.860)												
4 H S	.232	-.102	.053	(.903)											
5 H O	.365	.239	.151	.048	(.821)										
6 H2 E	.823	.289	.245	.281	.338	(.861)									
7 H2 A	.433	.682	.298	.202	.205	.527	(.703)								
8 H2 C	.147	.345	.823	-.193	.202	.248	.298	(.848)							
9 H2 S	.325	.074	.106	.834	.191	.416	.272	-.073	(.862)						
10 H2 O	.517	.259	.330	.184	.735	.508	.376	.380	.319	(.758)					
11 Dep	-.236	.044	-.161	-.266	-.047	-.236	-.126	-.132	-.199	-.207	(.954)				
12 SE	.229	-.052	.201	.224	.087	.216	.056	.190	.266	.186	-.688	(.911)			
13 CA	.037	-.065	-.077	-.097	.213	.125	-.062	-.050	.013	.167	-.084	-.021	(.691)		
14 SD	.404	.174	.375	.523	.208	.495	.357	.250	.574	.307	-.245	.414	-.222	(.559)	
15 IM	.069	.286	.523	.093	.157	.217	.343	.445	.154	.267	-.040	.038	.038	.283	(.637)
Mean	4.749	5.710	4.864	4.409	5.065	4.869	5.445	4.833	4.536	4.891	1.927	5.432	21.510	4.379	3.878
SD	1.060	.711	.934	1.103	.772	.995	.694	.993	1.022	.759	1.014	1.124	4.379	.514	.602

Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five. H2 scales are from the honest condition (n = 75). Reliabilities for each scale are presented on the diagonal.

Table 3

Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Instructed Faking Condition.

Dimension	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 H E	(.888)														
2 H A	.360	(.828)													
3 H C	-.040	.242	(.791)												
4 H S	.054	.038	.025	(.861)											
5 H O	.222	.380	.198	.347	(.844)										
6 F E	.391	.349	.126	-.061	.297	(.858)									
7 F A	.109	.485	-.010	.011	.322	.717	(.848)								
8 F C	-.083	.251	.338	-.028	.194	.713	.665	(.905)							
9 F S	-.085	.035	.045	.219	.258	.607	.637	.746	(.919)						
10 F O	.063	.199	.090	.098	.482	.684	.700	.719	.789	(.881)					
11 Dep	-.221	-.375	-.041	-.491	-.256	-.063	-.137	-.060	-.064	-.043	(.921)				
12 SE	.239	.343	.141	.566	.265	.027	.094	.048	.012	.030	-.751	(.914)			
13 CA	-.022	-.108	-.253	.138	.057	.250	.211	.211	.406	.310	.206	-.174	(.736)		
14 SD	.118	.068	.392	.404	.290	.249	.043	.243	.115	.203	-.318	.387	-.067	(.755)	
15 IM	.052	.217	.042	.327	.185	.065	.110	-.002	.021	.081	-.288	.286	-.006	.374	(.729)
Mean	4.769	5.770	5.020	4.087	5.143	5.128	5.993	5.779	5.226	5.461	1.927	5.477	22.800	4.422	3.776
SD	1.053	.752	.807	1.036	.795	.946	.789	1.028	1.308	1.001	.765	1.070	5.219	.655	.770

Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five. F scales are from the instructed faking condition (n = 70). Reliabilities for each scale are presented on the diagonal.

Table 4.

Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of whole-scale scores for the Big Five dimensions – Incentive Condition.

Dimension	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 H E	(.880)														
2 H A	.076	(.783)													
3 H C	.093	.061	(.839)												
4 H S	.145	-.002	-.044	(.875)											
5 H O	.157	.111	.257	.219	(.861)										
6 I E	.734	.315	.165	.261	.336	(.789)									
7 I A	.277	.657	.144	.014	.227	.621	(.765)								
8 I C	.179	.291	.618	.053	.365	.462	.495	(.847)							
9 I S	.131	.056	-.144	.652	.136	.445	.246	.216	(.877)						
10 I O	.188	.297	.174	.360	.766	.564	.480	.498	.442	(.833)					
11 Dep	-.228	-.001	-.102	-.259	-.126	-.086	.036	.059	-.145	-.085	(.940)				
12 SE	.187	-.039	.257	.268	.235	.144	-.062	.106	.155	.158	-.816	(.917)			
13 CA	-.068	.157	-.193	.210	.299	.109	.141	.093	.176	.372	.048	-.031	(.783)		
14 SD	.260	.057	.475	.379	.323	.354	.087	.317	.277	.298	-.288	.420	-.099	(.594)	
15 IM	.012	.302	.256	.218	.076	.066	.222	.208	.067	.120	-.039	.039	-.212	.296	(.735)
Mean	4.773	5.710	4.868	4.307	4.900	5.117	5.674	5.176	4.754	4.992	1.883	5.747	21.13	4.455	3.793
SD	.980	.724	.851	1.035	.864	.771	.719	.918	1.052	.893	.982	1.074	5.557	.529	.687

Note. H scales are from the first administration of Big Five. I scales are from the incentive condition (n = 71). Reliabilities for each scale are presented on the diagonal.

Goodness-of-Fit

Two models were tested. A confirmatory factor analysis was performed as a multigroup model with the method factor, M, indicated by all items in the personality assessment (Figure 1). The other model was a simple CFA model without the method factor (Figure 2). Table 5 represents goodness-of-fit statistics for the models in figures 1 and 2. The first characteristic to note is that the goodness of fit statistics did not meet the recommended thresholds of acceptability. Although the fit measures of Model 1 are better, they do not reach acceptable levels for these measures of goodness-of-fit. There is accumulating evidence suggesting that goodness-of-fit is positively related to the coarseness of the indicators (e.g., Kenny & McCoach, 2003); therefore, the poor values from the models applied to individual indicators were treated as reflecting idiosyncratic, item-specific deviations rather than systemic failures of the model. The chi-square (χ^2) difference test indicates that Model 1 is a significantly better fit ($\Delta\chi^2 = 748.876$; $df = 152$, $p < .001$)

Table 5

Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Models 1 and 2

Model	Chi-Square	Df	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR
1 (With M)	6803.940***	3454	0.556	0.116	0.113
2 (Without M)	7552.816***	3606	0.476	0.123	0.168

Note. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual.
*** p < .001.


E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
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E9
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A1
A2
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A4
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Figure 1. CFA with one method bias factor as applied to the IPIP 50-item questionnaire.


M

Figure 2. CFA without method bias factor applied to the IPIP 50-item questionnaire.

Parameter Estimates

Mean loadings are presented in Table 6 for Model 1. For this model, all mean loadings of items on the Big Five factors were positive with means from the incentive condition about equal to those in the honest condition. Mean loadings on the method factors were also positive. The mean loading on the method factor for the instructed faking condition was the largest at 0.785 indicating the elevation in positive responses associated with the instructed-faking condition. Additionally, mean r^2 estimates for the model are provided in Table 7.

Table 6

Mean Trait Loadings

	Dimensions					
Condition	E	A	C	S	O	M
Honest	.760	.639	.828	.871	.407	.467
Faking	.561	.507	.387	.735	.470	.785
Incentive	.519	.552	.762	.455	.667	.428

Table 7

Mean R-Square Statistics

	Dimensions				
Condition	E	A	C	S	O
Honest	.540	.327	.434	.407	.366
Faking	.496	.443	.544	.582	.502
Incentive	.353	.274	.412	.544	.354

Hypothesis Tests

Hypothesis 1. Regression analyses were performed to test hypothesis 1. The regression analyses provided support for H1. When controlling for cognitive ability, as measured by the WPT, $\beta = .082$, $p = .232$ for conscientiousness scale scores and $\beta = .131$, $p = .052$ for conscientiousness factor scores, neither of which are significant. When controlling for cognitive ability and experimental condition, $\beta = .113$, $p = .128$ for conscientiousness scale scores and $\beta = .143$, $p = .038$ for conscientiousness factor scores. The regression analyses indicated that conscientiousness factor scores were more valid than scale scores, supporting H1.

Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. The results are presented in Table 8. Hypotheses 2a and 2b were supported. In the honest condition, factor scores were correlated positively with self-esteem scores and negatively with depression scores (H2a). In the faking and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the self-esteem scores were negligible and the correlations between the factor scores and the depression scores were be negligible (H2b).

Table 8

Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 2

	Measures	
Condition	Depression	Self-Esteem
Honest	**-.273***	**.341****
Faking	-.061	.093
Incentive	-.118	.182

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 3. The results are presented in Table 9. Hypotheses 3a and 3b were supported. In the instructed faking condition, factor scores were correlated positively with cognitive ability scores (H3a). In the honest and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the cognitive ability scores were negligible (H3b).

Table 9

Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 3

Condition	Cognitive Ability
Honest	.123
Faking	**.261**[a]
Incentive	.119

Note. * $p < .05$

Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Correlation analyses were performed to test hypotheses 4. The results are presented in Table 10. Hypotheses 4a and 4b were not supported. In the incentive condition, factor scores were not correlated positively with social desirability scores, failing to show support for H4a. In the honest and instructed faking conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the social desirability scores were not negligible, failing to show support for H4b.

Table 10

Correlation Analyses of Hypothesis 4

	Social Desirability Scale	
Condition	Self-Deception	Impression Management
Honest	**.522*****	**.286***
Faking	**.307****	.084
Incentive	**.309****	.009

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .01$

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

As predicted, the results confirmed Hypothesis 1–validity of conscientiousness is slightly larger when faking, operationalized as a first order factor, is taken into account. That is, presence of faking moderates the conscientiousness–performance relationship. Morgeson et al. (2007) noted that personality was long thought to be unrelated to job performance, but research in the early 1990s provided evidence that personality could predict job performance. However, they stated that there are numerous potential problems associated with the current operational use of personality. They concluded that faking on self-report personality tests cannot be avoided and the issue is not necessarily the faking but is more so the very low validity of personality tests for predicting job performance. They also noted that whatever contributes to faking might also contribute to job performance; therefore, it is important to extract the components of the method factor of faking and determine the nature of it across various situations that may occur within the selection and development realm.

One of the primary concerns of the faking correction literature has been determining whether there is an impact on the validity of personality assessments (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998); if there is no impact, the faking correction is not a concern. This study is one of the first to find that accounting for faking can affect validity of personality tests, suggesting that that faking must be measured appropriately for its effects on validity to become apparent. Though some research has suggested that response distortion has little impact on the construct validity of

personality measures used in selection contexts (e.g., Smith and Ellingson, 2002), the method of detecting response distortion used in such studies (i.e., social desirability scores) are contaminated with other factors that cloud the impact on the validity of personality factors. Using this "pure" method of faking corrects for this contradiction. Furthermore, a "little" impact on the validity of personality tests could be the tipping point in deciding whether one should use such a measure in a selection system, or whether they should employ other methods.

Results partially confirmed the set of hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Hypotheses 2 was fully supported. In the honest condition, factor scores were correlated positively with self-esteem scores and negatively with depression scores (H2a) and in the faking and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the self-esteem scores were negligible and the correlations between the factor scores and the depression scores were be negligible (H2b). This result is consistent with the Biderman et al. (2011) finding. In honest conditions, the faking factor scores correlate positively with self-esteem and negatively with depression, suggesting that when there are no incentives or instructions to fake, the method factor is an indication of how a person feels about themselves–their self-concept. Conceptually, this theory implies that the way a person feels about themselves at a given time is the bias possibly associated with the honest condition. Because this has been identified as a portion of the variance associated with the method factor of faking, future attention can focus on identifying and testing other characteristics of the method factor, outside of faking.

Hypotheses 3 was fully supported. In the instructed faking condition, factor scores were correlated positively with cognitive ability scores (H3a) and in the honest and incentive conditions, the correlations between the factor scores and the cognitive ability scores were negligible (H3b). This result is consistent with the Biderman & Nguyen (2004) finding; when

instructions were given the faking factor correlated with cognitive ability, suggesting that when there are instructions to fake, the method factor shifts and relates to cognitive ability, because of the problem-solving nature associated with receiving instructions and following those instructions well. The results found here extend the results of Biderman and Nguyen (2004) showing that it is not just faking in general, but specifically, instructed faking that is correlated with cognitive ability. This result implies that those who are higher in cognitive ability are better fakers, which suggests that fakers could have some positive characteristics. However, it is important to note the situational nature of this correlation and the cognitive ability-method factor relationship could disappear outside of the research condition of instructed faking.

Hypothesis 4 was not supported. In the honest, faking, and incentive conditions, the self-deception scale of the social desirability measure correlated positively significantly in all three conditions. Additionally, there was a positive correlation in the honest condition with the impression management scale of the social desirability measure. This finding is not consistent with the Biderman & Nguyen (2009) results, which found that when incentives were given, the method factor correlated with social desirability, suggesting that when incentives are involved, the method factor is related to faking propensity. The self-deception scale correlated positively in all conditions with the factor scores. A potential explanation of this concerns the nature of the self-deception scale, which is response distortion resulting from an unconscious tendency to provide inflated, positive self-reports. Because the response distortion is unconscious, it is possible that it has a positive relationship with the method factor across conditions, because of the additional variance in the method factor that has not been determined to date. Additionally, this result speaks to the unreliability of social desirability scores to serve as a consistent measure of faking propensity.

There are definite advantages to using the factor analytic approach as a measure of faking. Using this method, faking scores are available as predictors. Biderman, Nguyen, Mullins, and Luna (2008) found the method factor to be the only predictor of subjective criteria, which are the primary source of performance data used to establish criterion-related validity in many selection tools. Furthermore, the method is free–it only requires re-analysis of already existing data and there is no time associate with extending the length of the assessment process to measure the faking factor. Finally, the method may have benefits beyond measurement of faking–identifying people who are depressed, for example, when the Big Five questionnaire is administered with honest instructions. Such predictors could serve to enhance further the predictive nature of personality tests, above and beyond of the constructs they direct measure.

Limitations

The use of student samples limits the external validity of the results. Because the students are given instructions to fake and are not necessarily in the selection context, generalizabilty of these results is a primary limitation of the study. Regarding that matter, the majority of the students in the present study were freshmen (57.7%), restricting the range of hours they had taken to 24 hours and below (which impacts their GPA) and impacted the effectiveness of the GPA criterion variable. For example, the weight of the criterion variable for a freshman who has take 15 hours and earns a 4.0 GPA is weaker than that of a senior who has 90 hours and earns a 4.0.

Another limitation involves the sample size. Because of the smaller sample size, approximately 70 people per condition, the goodness-of-fit criteria associated with the model did not reach the acceptable thresholds. Ideally, a sample size of 600 would provide the power need,

allowing for approximately 200 per condition. While our results did indicate a difference in the hypothesized direction, an increase in sample size could drastically improve those goodness-of-fit statistics. Furthermore, in the present study, we encountered a few commonly found numerical analysis problems associated with structural equation modeling. Although both of the models converged, such estimation problems could slow the movement to factor analytic-based analyses.

Finally, the models were applied to IPIP Big Five questionnaire data. The IPIP is a commonly used questionnaire, but other questionnaires assessing the Big Five as well as other personality constructs should be used to determine how well the proposed faking method factor generalized to those constructs.

Future Research

The present study is one in a sequence of studies that have been done to establish the method factor as a pure measure of faking. However, much of the research has been conducted on convenience samples, such as the undergraduates that were assessed in this study. Though the use of student has been great in determining the theoretical underpinnings of the method factor, future research should focus on using incumbents to replicate the application of model in Figure 1. If the method factor is replicated in the practical realm, it is possible that more weight will be given to the conclusions drawn from the studies on factor-analytic techniques as a means to measure faking.

Future directions of research should also focus on improving the strength of the incentive condition. Competing for a $50 gift card, as is the case in this context, may not have a strong enough effect to show a significant difference in the incentive condition. However the construction of effective incentive conditions could prove to be beneficial in the literature.

Additionally, future studies should explore the factors used in the studies as indicators of the method factors to increase the evidence for these characteristics. Additionally, there is still a great deal of variance unaccounted for in the method factor because it is groundbreaking. Therefore, exploratory studies are needed to dissect the method factor and understand the behavioral characteristics associated with the method factor.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

One of the main primary concerns regarding the study of faking has been the lack of a useful measure of faking obtainable in applicant settings. McFarland and Ryan (2006) noted that it is critical that a construct-valid measure of faking behavior be developed for applicant samples. Measures of social desirability were often used in such contexts, but the use of social desirability has routinely provided mixed results regarding it ability to measure and control for faking. Similarly, difference scores, though valid as measures of faking, are not feasible in most applicant settings. The future of the faking research lies in finding a method of measuring faking that is theoretically sound and feasible within the selection paradigm. Through this investigation of the method factor of faking, it follows that the method factor measures considered here, though the method has not received much empirical attention, may be usable in such a context.

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APPENDICES

A. IRB Approval Memorandum

B. Big Five Questionnaire from Website 1

C. Big Five Questionnaire from Website 2

D. Rosenberg Self-Esteem Measure

E. Costello and Comrey Depression Measure

F. Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) Measure

G. Screen Shots from Website 1

H. Screen Shots from Website 2

APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Michael Biderman **IRB # 10 – 123**
Raven Worthy
Rizwan Khan

FROM: Lindsay Pardue, Director of Research Integrity
Dr. Bart Weathington, IRB Committee Chair

DATE: October 18, 2010

SUBJECT: IRB # 10-123: Personality Scale Comparison: Assessing the Relationship between the Big Five, Meyers Briggs Type Indicator, and Hartman Values

The Institutional Review Board has reviewed and approved your application and assigned you the IRB number listed above. You must include the following approval statement on research materials seen by participants and used in research reports:

The Institutional Review Board of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (FWA00004149) has approved this research project # 10 - 123.

Please remember that you must complete a Certification for Changes, Annual Review, or Project Termination/Completion Form when the project is completed or provide an annual report if the project takes over one year to complete. The IRB Committee will make every effort to remind you prior to your anniversary date; however, it is your responsibility to ensure that this additional step is satisfied.

Please remember to contact the IRB Committee immediately and submit a new project proposal for review if significant changes occur in your research design or in any instruments used in conducting the study. You should also contact the IRB Committee immediately if you encounter any adverse effects during your project that pose a risk to your subjects.

For any additional information, please consult our web page http://www.utc.edu/irb or email instrb@utc.edu

Best wishes for a successful research project.

APPENDIX B

BIG FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM WEBSITE 1

		Rating Scale						
		SD	MD	D	N	A	MA	SA
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1	I am the life of the party.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	I feel little concern for others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	I am always prepared.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	I get stressed out easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	I have a rich vocabulary.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	I don't talk a lot.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	I am interested in people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	I leave my belongings around.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	I am relaxed most of the time.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11	I feel comfortable around people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12	I insult people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13	I pay attention to details.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14	I worry about things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
15	I have a vivid imagination.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
16	I keep in the background.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
17	I sympathize with others' feelings.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
18	I make a mess of things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
19	I seldom feel blue.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
20	I am not interested in abstract ideas.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
21	I start conversations.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
22	I am not interested in other people's problems.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23	I get chores done right away.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24	I am easily disturbed.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25	I have excellent ideas.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26	I have little to say.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27	I have a soft heart.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28	I often forget to put things back in their proper place.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29	I get upset easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30	I do not have a good imagination.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
31	I talk to a lot of different people at parties.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
32	I am not really interested in others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
33	I like order.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
34	I change my mood a lot.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
35	I am quick to understand things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
36	I don’t like to draw attention to myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
37	I take time out for others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
38	I shirk my duties.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
39	I have frequent mood swings.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
40	I use difficult words.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
41	I don’t mind being the center of attention.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
42	I feel others’ emotions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
43	I follow a schedule.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
44	I get irritated easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
45	I spend time reflecting on things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
46	I am quiet around strangers.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
47	I make people feel at ease.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
48	I am exacting in my work.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
49	I often feel blue.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
50	I am full of ideas.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX C

BIG FIVE QUESTIONNAIRE FROM WEBSITE 2

		Rating Scale						
		SD	MD	D	N	A	MA	SA
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1	I make friends easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	I am indifferent to the feelings of others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	I am hard to get to know.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	I am not easily bothered by things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	I have difficulty imagining things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	I find it difficult to approach others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	I neglect my duties.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	I waste my time.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	I often feel uncomfortable around others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	I avoid difficult reading material.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11	I take charge.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12	I inquire about others' well-being.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13	I do things according to a plan.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14	I rarely get irritated.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
15	I seldom get mad.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
16	I try to avoid complex people	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
17	I know how to comfort others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
18	I do things in a half-way manner.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
19	I get angry easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
20	I will not probe deeply into a subject.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
21	I know how to captivate people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
22	I love children.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23	I continue until everything is perfect.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24	I panic easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25	I carry the conversation to a higher level.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26	I feel at ease with people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27	I bottle up my feelings.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28	I am on good terms with nearly everyone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29	I find it difficult to get down to work.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30	I feel threatened easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
31	I catch on to things quickly.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
32	I have a good word for everyone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
33	I make plans and stick to them.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
34	I get overwhelmed by emotions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
35	I can handle a lot of information.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
36	I am a very private person.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
37	I show my gratitude.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
38	I leave a mess in my room.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
39	I take offense easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
40	I am good at many things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
41	I wait for others to lead the way.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
42	I think of others first.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
43	I love order and regularity.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
44	I get caught up in my problems.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
45	I love to read challenging material.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
46	I am skilled in handling social situations.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
47	I love to help others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
48	I like to tidy up.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
49	I grumble about things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
50	I love to think up new ways of doing things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX D

ROSENBERG SELF-ESTEEM MEASURE

		Rating Scale						
		SD	MD	D	N	A	MA	SA
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1	I feel I have a number of good qualities.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	I wish I could have more respect for myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	I feel like I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	I feel I do not have much to be proud of.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	I take a positive attitude toward myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	I certainly feel useless at times.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	All in all, I am inclined to feel I am a failure.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	I am able to do things as well as most other people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	At times I think I am no good at all.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX E

COSTELLO AND COMREY DEPRESSION MEASURE

		Rating Scale						
		SD	MD	D	N	A	MA	SA
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
1	I feel that life is worthwhile.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	When I wake up in the morning I expect to have a miserable day.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	I wish I were never born.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	I feel that there is more disappointment in life than satisfaction.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	I want to run away from everything.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	My future looks hopeful and promising.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	When I get up in the morning I expect to have an interesting day.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	Living is a wonderful adventure for me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	I am a happy person.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	Things have worked out well for me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11	The future looks so gloomy that I wonder if I should go on.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12	I feel that life is drudgery and boredom.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13	I feel blue and depressed.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14	When I look back I think life has been good to me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX F

BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING

		Rating Scale						
		SD	MD	D	N	A	MA	SA
		1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Self Deception								
1	My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2	It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3	I don't care to know what other people really think of me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4	I have not always been honest with myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5	I always know why I like things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6	When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7	Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8	I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9	I am fully in control of my own fate.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10	It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11	I never regret my decisions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12	I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13	The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14	My parents were not always fair when they punished me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
15	I am a completely rational person.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
16	I rarely appreciate criticism.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
17	I am very confident of my judgments.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
18	I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
19	It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
20	I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Impression Management								
21	I sometimes tell lies if I have to.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
22	I never cover up my mistakes.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23	There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24	I never swear.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25	I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26	I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27	I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28	When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29	I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30	I always declare everything at customs.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
31	When I was young I sometimes stole things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
32	I have never dropped litter on the street.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
33	I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
34	I never read sexy books or magazines.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
35	I have done things that I don't tell other people about.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
36	I never take things that don't belong to me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
37	I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
38	I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
39	I have some pretty awful habits.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
40	I don't gossip about other people's business.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX G

SCREEN SHOTS FROM WEBSITE 1

Big Five Questionnaire Instructions



Big Five Questionnaire




Online Application
Help
Sign Out
48 Questions Remaining
I feel little concern for others.
a. Completely Accurate
b. Very Accurate
c. Probably Accurate
d. Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate
e. Probably Inaccurate
f. Very Inaccurate
g. Completely Inaccurate
Next
47 Questions Remaining
I am always prepared.
46 Questions Remaining
I get stressed out easily.
45 Questions Remaining
I have a rich vocabulary.
44 Questions Remaining
I don't talk a lot.
43 Questions Remaining
I am interested in people.
42 Questions Remaining
I leave my belongings around.
41 Questions Remaining
I am relaxed most of the time.
40 Questions Remaining
I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.

39 Questions Remaining

I feel comfortable around people.

38 Questions Remaining

I insult people.

37 Questions Remaining

I pay attention to details.

36 Questions Remaining

I worry about things.

35 Questions Remaining

I have a vivid imagination.

34 Questions Remaining

I keep in the background.

33 Questions Remaining

I sympathize with others feelings.

32 Questions Remaining

I make a mess of things.

31 Questions Remaining

I seldom feel blue.

30 Questions Remaining

I start conversations.

29 Questions Remaining

I am not interested in abstract ideas.

28 Questions Remaining

I am not interested in other people's problems.

27 Questions Remaining

I get chores done right away.

26 Questions Remaining

I am easily disturbed.

25 Questions Remaining

I have excellent ideas.

24 Questions Remaining

I have little to say.

23 Questions Remaining

I have a soft heart.

22 Questions Remaining

I often forget to put things back in their proper place.

21 Questions Remaining

I talk to a lot of different people at parties.

20 Questions Remaining

I get upset easily.

19 Questions Remaining

I do not have a good imagination.

18 Questions Remaining

I am not really interested in others.

17 Questions Remaining

I like order.

16 Questions Remaining

I change my mood a lot.

15 Questions Remaining

I am quick to understand things.

14 Questions Remaining

I don't like to draw attention to myself.

13 Questions Remaining

I take time out for others.

12 Questions Remaining

I shirk my duties.

11 Questions Remaining

I don't mind being the center of attention.

10 Questions Remaining

I have frequent mood swings.

9 Questions Remaining

I use difficult words.

8 Questions Remaining

I feel others' emotions.

7 Questions Remaining

I follow a schedule.

6 Questions Remaining

I get irritated easily.

5 Questions Remaining

I spend time reflecting on things.

4 Questions Remaining

I am quiet around strangers.

3 Questions Remaining

I make people feel at ease.

2 Questions Remaining

I am exacting in my work.

1 Questions Remaining

I often feel blue.

0 Questions Remaining

I am full of ideas.

APPENDIX H

SCREEN SHOTS FROM WEBSITE 2

Welcome Screens





Rosenberg Self-Esteem Measure



Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project I

Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements about how people may feel about themselves.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately the statement describes you.

	Completely Inaccurate	Very Inaccurate	Probably Inaccurate	Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate	Probably Accurate	Very Accurate	Completely Accurate
1. I feel I have a number of good qualities.							
2. I wish I could have more respect for myself.							
3. I feel like I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.							
4. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.							
5. I take a positive attitude toward myself.							
6. I certainly feel useless at times.							
7. All in all, I am inclined to feel I am a failure.							
8. I am able to do things as well as most other people.							
9. At times I think I am no good at all.							
10. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.							

Previous Next

Costello and Comrey Depression Measure



Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project III

Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements about how people may feel in general.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately the statement describes you.

	Completely Inaccurate	Very Inaccurate	Probably Inaccurate	Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate	Probably Accurate	Very Accurate	Completely Accurate
1. I feel that life is worthwhile.							
2. When I wake up in the morning I expect to have a miserable day.							
3. I wish I were never born.							
4. I feel that there is more disappointment in life than satisfaction.							
5. I want to run away from everything.							
6. My future looks hopeful and promising.							
7. When I get up in the morning I expect to have an interesting day.							
8. Living is a wonderful adventure for me.							
9. I am a happy person.							
10. Things have worked out well for me.							
11. The future looks so gloomy that I wonder if I should go on.							
12. I feel that life is drudgery and boredom.							
13. I feel blue and depressed.							
14. When I look back I think life has been good to me.							

Previous Next

Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding (Self-Deception Scale)



Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project III — Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements about how people may describe themselves.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately the statement describes you.

	Not True at All	Mostly Not True	Probably Not True	Sometimes True, Sometimes Not True	Probably True	Mostly True	Very True
1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4. I have not always been honest with myself.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5. I always know why I like things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9. I am fully in control of my own fate.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11. I never regret my decisions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
15. I am a completely rational person.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
16. I rarely appreciate criticism.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
17. I am very confident of my judgments.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Balance Inventory of Desirable Responding (Impression Management Scale)



Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project III — Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements about how people may describe themselves.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately the statement describes you.

	Not True at All	Mostly Not True	Probably Not True	Sometimes True, Sometimes Not True	Probably True	Mostly True	Very True
21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
22. I never cover up my mistakes.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24. I never swear.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30. I always declare everything at customs.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
32. I have never dropped litter on the street.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
36. I never take things that don't belong to me.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
39. I have some pretty awful habits.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
40. I don't gossip about other people's business.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Condition Instructions – Honest



Condition Instructions – Instructed Faking



Condition Instructions – Incentive



IPIP 50-Item Big Five Questionnaire

Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project III — Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements that might describe people in general.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately each statement describes you.

PLEASE REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE.

	Completely Inaccurate	Very Inaccurate	Probably Inaccurate	Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate	Probably Accurate	Very Accurate	Completely Accurate
1. I make friends easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
2. I am hard to get to know.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
3. I do things according to a plan.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
4. I am not easily bothered by things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
5. I try to avoid complex people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
6. I often feel uncomfortable around others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
7. I am indifferent to the feelings of others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
8. I waste my time.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
9. I rarely get irritated.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
10. I have difficulty imagining things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
11. I find it difficult to approach others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
12. I inquire about others' well-being.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
13. I neglect my duties.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
14. I seldom get mad.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
15. I avoid difficult reading material.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
16. I take charge.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
17. I know how to comfort others.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
18. I do things in a half-way manner.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
19. I get angry easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
20. I will not probe deeply into a subject.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project III — Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements that might describe people in general.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately each statement describes you.

PLEASE REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE.

	Completely Inaccurate	Very Inaccurate	Probably Inaccurate	Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate	Probably Accurate	Very Accurate	Completely Accurate
21. I know how to captivate people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
22. I love children.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23. I continue until everything is perfect.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24. I panic easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25. I carry the conversation to a higher level.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26. I feel at ease with people.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27. I bottle up my feelings.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28. I am on good terms with nearly everyone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29. I find it difficult to get down to work.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30. I feel threatened easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
31. I catch on to things quickly.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
32. I have a good word for everyone.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
33. I make plans and stick to them.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
34. I get overwhelmed by emotions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
35. I can handle a lot of information.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
36. I am a very private person.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
37. I show my gratitude.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
38. I leave a mess in my room.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
39. I take offense easily.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
40. I am good at many things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Worthy, Biderman, Khan - PS Project I

Exit this survey

Below is a set of statements that might describe people in general.

Place a check mark in the bubble that represents how accurately each statement describes you.

PLEASE REMEMBER THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS PAGE.

	Completely Inaccurate	Very Inaccurate	Probably Inaccurate	Sometimes Accurate, Sometimes Inaccurate	Probably Accurate	Very Accurate	Completely Accurate
41. I wait for others to lead the way.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
42. I think of others first.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
43. I love order and regularity.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
44. I get caught up in my problems.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
45. I love to read challenging material.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
46. I am skilled in handling social situations.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
47. I love to help others	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
48. I like to tidy up.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
49. I grumble about things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
50. I love to think up new ways of doing things.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Incentive Page (Prize Drawing Form)



Final Page (Thank You)