5-2019

“Liberation from what?”: French Muslim women’s bodies as a site of national boundaries and identity

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“Liberation from What?”: French Muslim Women’s Bodies as a Site of National Boundaries and Identity

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Departmental Honors Thesis
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Examination Date: November 12, 2018

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Abstract

This thesis examines how dominant French discursive frames conceptualize Muslim and French-Algerian women's gender performance as related to their level of assimilation into France politically and socially. It examines how these modern discursive derive from colonial sentiments and policies towards Muslim Algerian women. Then, I outlines the specific frames used in discussion of French-Muslim women's bodies and consider the international and national political contexts in which these frames developed. Finally, the thesis presents four interviews that I conducted in June 2018 with French-Algerian women, providing them a space to respond to elite framings of their decisions about how to present themselves as women, how to interact with men, and personal religious decisions.
Introduction

In April 2018, one of France’s highest courts, the State Council [Conseil d’État] decided in favor of officials who had chosen to deny an Algerian woman French citizenship because of her refusal to shake the male immigration officers’ hands at her naturalization ceremony on religious grounds. According to the State Council, her refusal to shake hands with men indicated “a lack of assimilation” incompatible with French citizenship (as cited by Breeden, 2018). The decision did not cite her religious beliefs as a reason for the denial of citizenship but made clear that in this case a particular performance of gender relations superseded religious reservations.

This case forms one instance within a broader, decades-long debate about the compatibility of particular forms of Muslim gender performance with French republican values. Examples of these include 1990s debates about Muslim girls wearing the headscarf/hijab in public schools, the 2010 law banning the niqab\(^1\) in public spaces, and most recently local French towns banning the burkini\(^2\) on public beaches in 2016. Each of these debates focused on ways in which Muslim women chose to comport themselves either in terms of their physical appearance and their interactions with men. At the heart of these debates is thus a gendered, ethnicized, and racialized conception of Muslim women and what their comportment means for France.

Within elite discourse among national media and political actors, these debates about Muslim women’s gender performance were conceptualized as a symbolic battle between Islamist fundamentalism and the French Republic. Without context, it may be difficult to understand how the question of whether Muslim girls can wear a headscarf to school became a national debate

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\(^1\) The niqab is a garment worn by some Muslim women that covers the neck, ears, hair, and face, leaving only the eyes visible.

\(^2\) A burkini, the term a hybrid of ‘burqa’ and ‘bikini,’ is a style of bathing suit that resembles a wetsuit that some Muslim women wear.
framed as a battle between Islamic fundamentalism and French Republican values. Indeed, the intensity of these debates has often confused and even disturbed foreign observers (Sommier, 2017). This dichotomy between Islam and France is both historically grounded and the product of particular modern contexts. Historically, the dichotomy of Islam and France has roots in the colonial period, when French colonists relied on binaries to distinguish themselves from colonial subjects. As anticolonial resistance became more fervent and violent, Muslim women’s practices — especially the practice of wearing a hijab to cover the hair and neck — increasingly symbolized anti-French sentiment to both Algerian nationalists and French colonists. In the last few decades, events such as the Iranian Revolution and terrorist attacks committed in the name of Islamist fundamentalism have given the hijab the connotation of Islamist fundamentalism in French elite discourse. In this discourse, the hijab is seen as representing religious extremism and challenging the foundational tenets of French republicanism.

Since the Third Republic (1870-1940), French republicanism has been one of the primary ideologies underlying French governance and political discourse. Centered on Enlightenment ideals and codified in the context of early late 19th century anti-clericalism, republicanism focuses on the liberty of and equality between individuals. The focus of French republicanism on individuals impacts its conceptualization of nationhood. Whereas the Anglo-Saxon model embraces the notion of a multicultural nation, French republicanism rejects the existence of communities within the nation as dangerous to national unity. The state grants rights on an individual basis, not a group basis, with the notable exception of women’s rights. Since the women’s rights movement, gender equality has also become an important part of French republican ideology. In the French context, gender mixing [mixité] is seen as the primary way of
producing gender equality. Like liberalism in the U.S., republicanism is not the only politically significant ideology in French politics and governance but still forms the basis of many French institutions and laws.

In national debates and rulings on issues such as the headscarf in public schools or the 2018 citizenship case, Muslim women who choose to cover themselves or not to practice gender mixing are construed as opposed to foundational French republican values such as liberty, equality, fraternity, and laïcité, among others. Laïcité, which roughly translates to ‘secularism,’ is a French concept enshrined by the 1905 law of the Separation of Churches and State. The 1905 law was passed at a peak of French anti-clericalism and therefore designed to protect the state from the influence of the Catholic Church. As such, laïcité has certain particularisms not common to, for example, the U.S. First Amendment. Some conceptualize the difference between the two system as a negative secularism in the U.S. versus a positive secularism in France. In this view, because the U.S. focuses primarily on not allowing the state to infringe on the practice of religion, it is a negative secularism; France, on the other hand, actively enforces secularization, thereby enacting a positive secularism (Zimmerman, 2015, p. 52). Even so, the 1905 law includes provisions for freedom of religious expression and affiliation. Another French republican value, anti-communitarianism, is rooted in the Third Republic ideal of one French nation, centralized and indivisible. The Third Republic pursued this ideal by creating a mandatory and centralized public education system, eliminating regional languages, and imposing a culture of French republicanism from Paris outwards. French culture does not present
itself as a melting pot or hotbed of multiculturalism. Instead, the mainstream French understanding of nationhood is premised on a nation of individuals not divided into groups.\(^3\)

In the same way that French elites’ mobilization of the language of French republicanism highlights the historical context of the Third Republic, the terms used to refer to the headscarf and the people associated with it reveal other significant contexts in which these debates took place. Elite commentators referred to the headscarf as: a veil [le voile, le voile islamique], a headscarf [le foulard], a tchador [le tchador], and less commonly, a hijab [un hijab]. The same commentators referred to those associated with the headscarf most often as Muslims or immigrants, and more rarely as Arabs. Further, The term ‘veil,’ like the term ‘Arab,’ recalls the long period in which France colonized North Africa, when images of the Muslim woman first came into elite French discourse.

France first colonized North Africa when it invaded Algeria in 1830. During the colonial period, the veiled Muslim woman in French discourse represented the archaism of the natives and the possibility of conquest (Fanon, 1959; Scott, 2007). Because Algeria was a settler colony, it also provided the most opportunities for French civilians to interact with and form images of ‘Arab culture,’ often embodied by the veiled woman. Algeria was also the last North African country to win independence and the only one to do so through warfare. The Algerian War (1954-1962) was a brutal conflict that dramatically impacted France culturally and politically (Shepard, 2006). During the war, the French Army orchestrated public unveiling ceremonies of Algerian women to garner support for the war effort. Additionally, because weapons were sometimes hidden in headscarves by pro-independence women or men posing as women, the

\(^3\) For more on the legacies of Third Republic era French republicanism, see Scott, 2007, pp.
headscarf also became a symbol of violent anti-French resistance. In the decades after the war, immigration from Algeria to France continued. Though colonization ended, France and Algeria remained economically interdependent, and post-war France needed labor. To this day, the majority of French Muslims have origins in the Maghreb, and the largest share have specifically Algerian origins (Laurence & Vaïsse, 2007). As a result, France’s experience in Algeria weighs heavily on discourse about Muslims. In this thesis, the terms French Muslim, French-Maghrebin, and French-Algerian are at times used interchangeably because of the interconnectedness of these identities in the French context.

Both the history of French colonization and republicanism are critical to understanding the framing of debates on Muslim women’s gender performance as it relates to French national identity and citizenship. The histories of these concepts and terms are not important because they are ahistorical. As Chabal (2016) writes, “it is not necessarily productive to see every social disturbance involving young ethnic minorities as a replay of the Algerian War” (p. 68). Rather, understanding these terms in their historical contexts is important because it also allows one to see how these terms are transformed and instrumentalized by actors in modern French discourse.

The laïcité invoked by elite actors in the headscarf affairs is not the same as that of the 1905 law; the headscarf-wearing girls expelled from their school in Creil in 1989 are not the same as the Muslim women that French colonists encountered in 19th century Algiers. Rather, these events and arguments are highly modern with discursive roots in centuries of French colonialism and nation-building.

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4 ‘Maghreb’ refers to the North African countries of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, all of which were colonized by France in the 19th and/or 20th century.
Beyond examining the roots and transformations of these discourses, this thesis also seeks to explore how French Algerian and Muslim women themselves conceptualize these issues, their citizenship, and their decisions about religion and religious expression. Within elite discourse, French Algerian and Muslim women are often conceptualized as subjects of Muslim patriarchy and culture rather than agents making individual decisions for themselves. This thesis demonstrates through both the literature and four interviews that I conducted with French Algerian and Muslim women that, contrary to this elite conception of Muslim women, their conceptualizations of these issues are highly individual and take into account a variety of internal and external factors.

Throughout this thesis, I conceptualize these debates as focusing on Muslim women’s bodies, rather than on Muslim women’s fashion, for a few primary reasons. Firstly, in some cases, these debates are directly concerned with the body. For example, the Algerian woman was denied citizenship in 2018 because of her refusal to physically interact with male immigration officers. Secondly, some Muslim women disagree with the notion that the headscarf or other religious symbol is separate from the body, seeing the symbol as an extension of their own body. Some of the girls at the heart of the headscarf affairs claimed that they could not remove it during class because “the headscarf is part of myself” (as cited by Scott, 2007, p. 125). The notion that religious expression is separate from the secular self is connected to the broader French republican image of the self as secular and individual. Finally, regulation of the headscarf constitutes regulation of Muslim women’s bodies because French discourse racializes the veil and naturalizes its qualities to the body (Al-Saji, 2010). Just as the headscarf limits the view of the onlooker, the covered Muslim woman is presumed to be herself limited; thus, the limits of
the gaze are naturalized to Muslim women’s bodies (Al-Saji, 2010, p. 887). Through laws like those passed in 2004 and 2010, the French state further connects the headscarf and French Muslim women’s bodies by limiting their mobility in public spaces when they choose to wear the headscarf, niqab, burkini, or refuse to engage in particular forms of gender mixing. For these reasons, among others, the regulations discussed here, ranging from restrictions on naturalization to wearing the headscarf, are conceptualized as regulations of French Muslim women’s bodies.

This thesis seeks to understand how these contexts, actors, and events come together to form the discursive frames in which debates on the Frenchness of Muslim women’s gender performance took place. This thesis then presents the responses of some French Algerian and Muslim women to these elite frames and arguments. The first chapter explores changes in the French understanding of the headscarf as a symbol and Muslim gender relations throughout the colonial period and into the post-independence era. The second chapter examines how French elite actors, including politicians and mainstream media, have framed debates on Muslim women’s gender performance from the headscarf affairs to the niqab to the burkini. Finally, the third chapter presents my findings from interviews with four French-Algerian women that I conducted in June 2018. In these interviews, I ask these four individuals to respond to the characterization of French Muslim and French-Algerian women in mainstream discourse, policies such as the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols in schools, and to describe how they construct their own identities within a binary-driven discourse. Their responses shed light on the diversity of thought and identity among French-Algerian and French Muslim women, and they point to potential avenues for future research.

I have inexpressible gratitude to these four incredible individuals for their time, thoughtfulness, and openness.
Shifting Meanings of Veiling in the Colonial Context

As France and its relationship to Algeria has changed, so too have official understandings of symbols associated with Islam and North Africans. Early in France’s colonial project in Algeria, French officials identified the headscarf that many Muslim women in urban centers wore as a symbol for the uncivilized and archaic nature of indigenous peoples. In French official and public discourse, the headscarf represented practices ranging from child marriage to Islamic inheritance laws to polygamy. Though there are continuities in French representations of the Muslim headscarf over time, its meaning changed and continues to change. This chapter explores the evolution of the headscarf as a symbol throughout colonial and early postcolonial history – from a sign of insurmountable difference, to one of a threat to French power, and finally to one of the inassimiability of France’s Muslims in the modern day.

Justifying Segregation

Despite France’s reputation as an assimilationist colonial power, French policy and practice in Algeria explicitly distinguished between and segregated the Arab Other and French Self, providing few opportunities for the former to gain the status of the latter. It remains unclear whether French statesmen ever imagined that those they considered Arab Others would assimilate fully into Frenchmen. Some policymakers imagined that the Muslims of Algeria would one day gain full citizenship. The vast majority, however, conceptualized “assimilation” as the increased imposition of taxes, the imposition of French language, and some cultural change, but did not support any eventual right to representation. One delegate of the 1889 Congrès Colonial National [National Colonial Congress] warned their colleagues that the extension of citizenship to the natives of the colonies could create situation whereby “Arabs,
Annamites, the tribes of the African coast would dictate to us our laws” (as cited by Lewis, 1962, p. 152). Such comments call into question the validity of officials’ promises to eventually grant citizenship, as many claimed would happen after natives were cleansed of their archaic traditions and religious fanaticism. In his reflections on French colonial policy, Lewis (1962) goes so far as to claim that the French “preserved [assimilation] as a constitutional fiction” (p. 150) without any genuine effort to realize their promises.

The preservation of this ‘constitutional fiction’ became especially important after 1870 when the France formed the Third Republic (1870-1940). Unlike the empire that preceded it, the Third Republic was founded on the ideals of the 1789 Revolution: democracy, rights, and republican values. Simultaneously, France expanded its colonial presence throughout Africa, including Algeria. To reconcile the apparent contradiction between republican ideals and the realities of colonization, French officials relied on the orientalist idea that native people were too irrational and blinded by religious fanaticism to be ready for citizenship. Only after the purging of their irrational traditional values, a process that the French state would encourage, could natives take on the duties and privileges of full citizenship. This notion of ‘eventual citizenship’ explained and allowed for the dissonance between the rhetoric of equality and reality of segregation and exploitation.

In the case of Algeria, the headscarf worn by many women in urban centers became a powerful symbol of the allegedly irreconcilable cultural difference that justified segregation. In her analysis of the racialization of the Muslim headscarf, Alia Al-Saji (2010) describes the headscarf as “a focal point in the othering of Islam” (p. 887). To the colonial gaze, the headscarf signified the backwardness and repression of gender relations within Islam.
This othering manifested as segregation in many arenas, one of the most notable being the division of legal systems. From the start of French colonization of Algeria in 1830, the French state recognized separate legal systems for different types of individuals: a Koranic system for those with Muslim (or “local”) status, a Mosaic system for those with Jewish status, and a common civil system for those with “French” or “European” status. When used by French officials and in policy, the demarcations “Muslim” and “Jewish” were not religious but rather legal in nature. One was born with Muslim/local, Jewish, or French status and could not change this status through conversion or marriage. Though this division of legal systems ostensibly granted the legally defined “Muslim” community more autonomy, it was used in practice to deny Muslims political rights and to enforce two different standards of law in Algeria (Seferdjeli, 2007, pp. 24-25). Legal separation served as a primary justification and instrument of inequality and exploitation.

Those born legally “Muslim” faced high barriers to citizenship and stringent, discriminatory laws that gave French law enforcement in Algeria significant discretion. France first opened a pathway to citizenship for Muslims in Algeria through the 1865 *Sénatus-Consulte*, a directive that allowed some Muslim men to gain French citizenship if they chose to forgo their Muslim status. The cost of forgoing Muslim status was high; doing so forbade Muslim men from marrying within their communities and maintaining rights within their communities, thereby alienating them from their community and family. In 1919, to reward Muslim Algerians’ sacrifice in World War I, France made the pathway to citizenship more accessible but still required Muslim men to sacrifice their Muslim status in order to become citizens. Once in place, French officials made little effort to encourage those with Muslim/local status to forgo their legal
status to gain citizenship. In fact, many bureaucrats on the ground in Algeria refused to grant naturalization to the small minority of Muslim men who applied for citizenship, facing “few sanctions when they ignored ‘race-blind’ French laws and regulations” (Shepard, 2006, p. 34). The alleged incompatibility of Muslim status and French citizenship demonstrates the extent to which colonial France conceptualized Muslim and French identities as binary and mutually exclusive: Muslim or French, Other or Self.

The division of legal statuses between Muslims and the French did not mean that Muslim communities operated autonomously of French rule. On the contrary, the French state burdened Muslims with discriminatory, often arbitrary, regulations and demands on their labor and bodies. The 1887 Code de l’indigénat, or ‘native code,’ which applied only to people with local (Muslim) civil status, set harsh punishments for thirty-three infractions ranging from murder to disrespect of France and its symbols (Shepard, 2006, p. 31). Because of the abstract nature of many of the infractions, the native code also provided law enforcement and other French officials with a broad discretion to punish those with Muslim civil status as they saw fit. In addition to heavy policing, France relied on Muslim Algerian bodies in World Wars I and II. Between 1914 and 1919, 300,000 native Algerians participated in World War I either in combat or in factories (Zack, 2006, p. 210). Likewise, in World War II, native Algerians were critical to the French war effort. The 2006 film Les Indigènes [released in English as Days of Glory] follows four North African soldiers through their experience of World War II. In addition to portraying the inequalities within the military suffered by North African soldiers, Les Indigènes also shows that, after the war, North African veterans also suffered the indignity of France
withholding their pensions until 2006, when public outcry forced the French government to pay pensions to those veterans still living.

The World Wars devastated Muslim Algerian communities and exposed soldiers and migrant wartime workers to the staggering inequality between Muslim Algerians and metropolitan French citizens. As a result, the World Wars sparked the development of Muslim Algerian activism. This activism led to the aforementioned 1919 citizenship reform, which, because it still required the forfeiture of Muslim legal status, was a far more marginal reform than native Algerians had demanded. After its passage, a leading native activist group called the Young Algerians, which had originally fought for reforms, demanded the repeal of the 1919 law (Zach, 2006, p. 212). Within ten years, many reformists turned to Algerian nationalism. In 1926, a group of working-class native Algerians living in metropolitan France founded the Étoile Nord-Africaine [North African Star], “the first movement to go beyond a critique of the colonial and racist order in Algeria and to demand national independence for Algeria [in 1927]” (Shepard, 2006, p. 39). This new generation of nationalist activists advocated for an independent Algeria founded on Arabic language, Islamic religion, and Muslim culture. It would be another 20 years before France substantially responded to either Algerian reformist demands or Algerian nationalism. Nevertheless, the shift toward Algerian nationalism had more immediate effects on the French colonial interpretation of Muslim behavior and symbols, especially the headscarf.

**Burning Veils, Winning Hearts and Minds**

As Algerian nationalism spread in the late 1920s, the headscarf became an increasingly political symbol to both the French and the native population. In his essay *Algeria Unveiled*, Frantz Fanon traces the public unveilings, popular during the Algerian War for Independence,
back to the 1930s in response to growing Algerian nationalism. According to Fanon, French officials orchestrated these public unveilings of Muslim women “to bring about the disintegration, at whatever cost, of forms of existence likely to evoke a national reality directly or indirectly” (Fanon, 1959, p. 37). Through forced assimilation and physical subjection to French modes of gender performance, the French believed themselves to be diminishing the nationalist spirit quickly spreading in Algeria. For nationalists, too, the headscarf became a symbol of political resistance and anti-colonialism. While the headscarf had historically been worn heterogeneously for purposes ranging from religion to respectability to covering clothing tattered by poverty, wearing the headscarf became more common in large part as “a response to the conquest and penetrations of Europeans... [and] a way in which indigenous peoples could express their separation and cultural resistance” (MacMaster, 2009, p. 125). In this context, the Muslim women’s body increasingly became a battlefield whereby both Algerian nationalists and the French fought for dominance and sovereignty over Algeria.

Indeed, the Algerian woman’s body was a major battlefield of the Algerian War for independence. The war started when members of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) conducted a series of coordinated attacks throughout Algeria; the French refer to these attacks as _Toussaint Rouge_, or Bloody All Saints Day. Several grievances drove FLN members to violent nationalism, especially the too long delayed promise of full citizenship and equality under the law. In 1944, France extended French citizenship to all native Muslim Algerians, declaring that Muslim legal status would no longer be a barrier to citizenship. The French largely voided citizenship of its meaning, however, by denying those with Muslim status the political rights that had historically accompanied French citizenship (Shepard, 2006, p. 45). The 1944 laws
extending French citizenship had little impact: those with Muslim status remained underrepresented in positions of power, were often denied the right to vote, and were still heavily policed. Driven by the belief that the French would never deliver on the promise of full citizenship, many turned to nationalism.

In response, the French state and army pursued a two-part strategy of repression and reform informed by their experience of revolutionary warfare in Vietnam, where they had suffered a humiliating loss at Dien Bien Phu just months before Toussaint Rouge. Through France’s experience of war against Vietnamese nationalists, French army officers recognized that civilians, especially women, were providing critical support to nationalist fighters without which they would not have succeeded. From the beginning of the war, FLN fighters received support from peasant women who clothed, fed, and housed them. The FLN also recruited women to serve as nurses, intelligence operatives, and even as fighters. To the surprise of the French, who had long seen Muslim women as passive and controlled, women also took more active roles as militant nationalists. For example, women in the FLN shocked the French when, in the bloody Battle of Algiers (1956-57), they transported weaponry and planted car bombs (MacMaster, 2009, p. 99). As women’s role in the nationalist movement became increasingly visible, pressure mounted for the French to recruit Muslim women to support French Algeria. Thus, the women’s emancipation agenda became increasingly vital to French war strategy.

Starting in 1956, social and economic development programs that the French government had started two years prior began to explicitly target women and families. Whereas from 1954 to 1956, officials like Resident Minister Soustelle assumed that more broad programs addressing education, agriculture, housing, and health would implicitly improve the lives of women, the
government became increasingly interested in women’s welfare only after 1956. The first of these programs, led by the counter-insurgency arm of the government in Algeria called the Fifth Bureau, was Operation Pilot, launched in January 1957. A large part of Operation Pilot was the development of EMSI teams, groups led by European women and ‘evolved’ Algerian women intended to earn the trust of native Muslim women through childcare, medical support, and education. EMSI teams were intended to model modern, French womanhood to native women, and demonstrate the benefits of loyalty to France. The education that the EMSI team provided to Muslim women primarily focused on domestic skills, thus perpetuating both classic orientalist understandings of Muslim women and the French ideal of domestic femininity. Because the French had long perceived native Muslim women as the main transmitters and bearers of Algerian Muslim identity, the Fifth Bureau believed that EMSI teams formed a critical part of the integration that would preserve French Algeria.

The May 1958 coup that collapsed France’s Fourth Republic and led to Charles De Gaulle’s subsequent return to power increased investment in integration and development programs targeting women. Within his first few months back in power, De Gaulle presented his Plan de Constantine, a strategy to increase the general welfare of Muslim Algerians through increased access to employment, education, and civil service jobs. The plan also directly addressed the importance of empowering, emancipating, and improving the standard of living of Muslim girls and women. The plan, implemented in 1960, also set the goal of enrolling all Algerian girls and women in school within eight years of its passage. By 1959, it was clear that the plan, though not fully implemented, was already facilitating the introduction of more Muslim girls into school (Seferdjeli, 2007, p. 28). Additionally, the plan promoted Muslim women’s
access to employment and civil service jobs. The *Plan de Constantine* is just one part of a larger program of what Todd Shepard goes so far as to call “French ‘affirmative action’” (Shepard, 2006, p. 50). Under this system, the French government mandated quotas throughout the civil sector that required Muslim Algerians to fill 10 to 70 percent of public jobs.

These social programs also targeted the small minority of Muslim Algerian women living in metropolitan France. French authorities quickly realized that financial support from Muslim Algerian migrant workers in France was critical for the nationalist movement, and that integrating and recruiting Muslim Algerian communities in France would cut off a major source of support for the FLN. Interestingly, though single men working as post-WWII reconstruction labor composed the vast majority of Muslim Algerians in France, social programs still often targeted women and families. Amelia H. Lyons’ 2006 article provides an overview of these programs. Organizations like the North African Family Social Service and Aide to Overseas Workers sought to help Muslim women adapt to ‘modern life’ through domestic skills, French language courses, and civics lessons (Lyons, 2006, p. 506). Though many of the female social workers conducting these courses worked outside the home, the ‘modern femininity’ they sought to transmit to Muslim Algerian women was based primarily on a domestic vision of womanhood. Women were divided into categories based on their level of “adaptation” and held accountable for their families’ overall level of “adaptation.” To be considered “adapted,” Muslim women needed to demonstrate both the will and skill to cook, rear children, and comport themselves in the French style. Women who resisted the intervention of social workers or refused to leave the house unless veiled were considered “‘withdrawn’ or refusing to evolve” (Lyons, 2006, p. 509). As throughout the colonial project, the willingness or refusal of Muslim women to assimilate
into French modes of gender performance was the measuring stick of their family and culture’s fitness for integration.

In addition to social programs, French officials made reforms in the war period to fulfill the guarantee of universal suffrage codified in 1947, though the results and motives of this shift were questionable. Although Muslim Algerian women legally had the right to vote since the passage of the Algerian Statute in 1947, the vast majority of Muslim Algerian women voted for the first time in the 1958 referendum concerning the approval of the constitution that became the foundation for the Fifth Republic. In reality, the Algerian Statute was never put into practice largely because several portions of it required approval from the Algerian Assembly, which, dominated by those with French civil status, failed to reach the two-thirds majority necessary for the implementation of the voting provisions of the statute. In 1956, the right to vote was finally extended to professional women above a certain age, and in 1958, the Loi-cadre finally reformed structure of the Algerian Assembly and granted the right to vote to all adult women (Seferdjeli, 2007, p. 25). When Muslim Algerians participated in their first election in September 1958, which was a referendum on the new constitution, their high turnout overwhelmingly supported the new constitution, which was interpreted as a “yes” to French Algeria. However, given that, as Seferdjeli (2007) points out, the majority of Muslim Algerian women were “illiterate and only a few spoke French” (p. 26) in 1958, the passage of the referendum is better understood as a manipulation of Muslim women under the guise of democracy rather than a real expression of democracy. Indeed, many army officers were ordered, “to explain to women that voting ‘yes’ was voting for a freer life and the desire for the emancipation of women” (Seferdjeli, 2007, p. 26). The 1958 referendum reflects the capacity of the army to manipulate Muslim women to
form the appearance of political support, which was a trend throughout French colonial rule and military strategy.

The public unveilings of Muslim women further demonstrate the extent to which the French Army manipulated native women as part of a broader military and political strategy. On May 13, 1958, generals in the French Army took advantage of political instability to enact a bloodless coup that ended the Fourth Republic. The leaders of the coup sought to restore to power De Gaulle, who had served as head of the Provisional Government of the French Republic from 1944 to 1946. However, De Gaulle insisted that he refused to take power in the context of a military dictatorship, and that he would only take office in a democratic context. In order to convince De Gaulle both to accept the President’s nomination to Prime Minister and to believe in the war effort for French Algeria, army officers realized the importance of public demonstrations in favor of both De Gaulle and French Algeria.

As a part of this effort, the French Army helped to orchestrate seemingly spontaneous ‘fraternization’ demonstrations, wherein Muslim Algerians proclaimed their commitment to becoming and remaining French (MacMaster, 2009, p. 144). These demonstrations, which took place throughout the days and weeks following May 13, 1958, were gendered. In the demonstrations of women, the most famous of which occurred on May 17th and 18th, Muslim women publicly removed all or part of their veils, and certain women gave speeches about the importance of unveiling to their fellow Muslim women in both French and Arabic. Like the French Army and officials, the Muslim women articulated the importance of unveiling in terms of assimilation and the liberation of women. Apparently accepting the colonial dichotomy of
Muslim and French, these women expressed their aspirations to French identity by stripping away their veils and performing gender in a way that the French deemed more ‘civilized.’

In reality, these demonstrations were not the clear-cut call for French Algeria and assimilation that they appeared to be. Understandings of the meaning of these demonstrations differed between even individual women participating in them. According to MacMaster (2009), the women participating can be broadly divided into two groups: poor women, often domestic servants or prostitutes, who were easily manipulated by the French Army into participating, and a small minority of more ‘evolved’ young women who had access to resources and had been educated in French institutions (p. 137). Even for those who chose to unveil themselves, and sometimes burned their veils, these unveilings did not signify a permanent change in behavior. Rather, many who participated did not wear the veil to begin with, and many were observed replacing their veils as they left the demonstrations (MacMaster, 2009, p. 139). Furthermore, extensive evidence supports the claims that the army played a large role in organizing these demonstrations, including a telex sent to three army corps reading, “SUPPORT TO MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION FEMALE POPULATION FROM ALL BACKGROUNDS IN ALL MASS DEMONSTRATIONS” and “ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION OF UNVEILED MUSLIM WOMEN” (MacMaster, 2009, p. 132). Recognizing the importance of Muslim women appearing as a united front in favor of de Gaulle and French Algeria, the army took pains to create just such an illusion.

De Gaulle accepted his appointment to Prime Minister in June 1958, one month after the unveiling demonstrations, and acceded the presidency six months later. Even as de Gaulle continued to lead the war effort in Algeria, he expressed doubt about the capacity of Muslims to
assimilate as Frenchmen. After gaining power, de Gaulle claimed in one interview in December 1958 that, “The Arabs are the Arabs. They are not people like us,” and in another that, “We can assimilate individuals, families, little groups; and still, to a certain extent only” (as cited by Seferdjeli, 2007, p. 46). In addition to doubting the ability of Muslims to assimilate into Frenchmen, De Gaulle also publicly doubted its desirability. Firstly, as throughout the colonial period, there remained the fear that, should Muslims have full rights as citizens, Muslims in Algeria may govern those ‘of European origin’ because they constituted the vast majority of the total population in Algeria. De Gaulle also expressed fear that, with rights as full citizens, Muslims may flood into metropolitan France in search of resources, jobs, and education. In March 1959, he warned his fellow Frenchmen:

The Arabs are the Arabs, the French are the French. You believe that France can absorb ten million Muslims, who tomorrow will be twenty million and the next day forty? If we undertake integration, if all the Arabs and Berbers are considered French, how will we stop them from moving here to metropolitan France, in order to gain a higher standard of living? My village will no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises [Colombey-the-Two-Churches] but rather Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées [Colombey-the-Two-Mosques]! [translation mine]

Leading up to and after the end of the war in 1962, when the FLN and the French government negotiated the terms of Algeria’s independence, this logic of “racialized ethnicity,” or the notion that the Muslims were simply too different from the beginning to ever become fully French, became the hegemonic understanding of why France lost Algeria in a process we now
call ‘decolonization.’ In the aftermath of the war, when the exodus of French Algerians ‘of European origin’ into metropolitan France began, de Gaulle sent orders to “cease all initiatives linked to repatriation of the harkis” (as cited by Shepard, 2006, p. 230). When Muslims did move to France in this period, they were more often considered in official documents to be “temporary refugees” and, later, “immigrants,” rather than “repatriates.” Additionally, despite original promises that those who wished to maintain French citizenship would be able to, very few Muslims, now “Algerians,” were able to keep their citizenship even if they desired to do so. In this process, the French established that Muslims were so different from Frenchmen that only in the most extreme circumstances could the most exceptional individuals gain access to France and French citizenship. Though the exact number is unknown, it is certain that thousands of harkis, denied entry into France, were killed in the newly independent Algeria when the war ended in 1962 (Daum, 2015).

According to the logic of racialized ethnicity, Muslim Algerians living in France would have returned en masse to Algeria. Indeed, this is clearly what de Gaulle imagined would happen when he framed the loss of Algeria as a solution to an influx of Muslim immigration into France. On the contrary, the migration of Muslim migrants into metropolitan France continued throughout the 1960s. Indeed, it was not only the European descendants and the harkis who immigrated; Algerian laborers continued to flow into France with sanctions from France and Algeria, both of which economically depended on the French employment of Algerian Muslims. The numbers of Algerian Muslims in France grew each year, from 350,000 in 1962, to 500,000 in 1968, to 800,000 just years later (Témime, 1999, p. 85). In 1973, the oil crisis led to the

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6 “Harki” was a term used to describe Muslim Algerians who fought for France in the Algerian War
implementation of many anti-immigration policies and efforts to convince Algerian laborers to ‘go home’ to Algeria as the unemployment rate soared. These economic trends also drove support for the Front National, a far-right anti-immigrant party founded in 1972 that became increasingly popular throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

Despite these policies, the Algerian population continued to grow as families came to join their fathers, sons, and brothers who had moved for employment. Family reunification was driven in large part by recommendations from the Council of Europe, demonstrating the impact of France’s role in an increasingly pan-European Europe. This led to the first major introduction of Muslim women into metropolitan France as, “immigration for work became immigration to settle” [translation mine] (Témime, 1999, p. 86). In addition to family reunification, Muslims in France also began to establish more permanent prayer spaces and planned for the construction of mosques, indicating that they intended to stay permanently even as the political atmosphere in France became increasingly anti-immigrant. Nevertheless, many French officials still considered this migration temporary and made provisions for Arabic language classes and religious instruction “thereby encouraging the differences that became grounds for discrimination” (Scott, p. 68). Tensions grew as it became increasingly clear that migrants intended to stay and send their children to French schools. In the next chapter, this essay explores the French government’s attempts to police the French Muslim woman’s body, producing public debates that expose these ongoing tensions.

**Representations of Muslim Women in Elite French Discourse**

In July 2016, 30 different French coastal towns banned the burkini, a style of swimsuit worn by some Muslim women that closely resembles a wetsuit. These local bans were the most
recent in a decades-long series of public debates about the acceptable public presentation of Muslim women in public. The first and most famous of these debates, called the headscarf affairs (1989-2004), concerned whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the headscarf in public schools. Though the resulting 2004 law banned all ‘conspicuous’ signs of religiosity, including the kippah and turban but excluding a ‘small cross,’ the debates that preceded the law’s passage made it clear that policymakers were primarily concerned with symbols of Muslim religiosity. Since then, French national discourse has also been captivated by the niqab affair in 2010 and the burkini affair in 2016. In 2008, national debates erupted over whether Muslim women should be permitted to wear the niqab, a garment that covers all of the face except for the eyes, in any public space. This produced a national law in 2010 banning the covering of the face in public spaces. The burkini affair, on the other hand, began when a conservative French mayor prohibited wearing the burkini. Though the Constitutional Court overturned this and other burkini bans like it a few months later, the discourse surrounding the ban retains a powerful presence in French discourse. As with the headscarf affairs, these debates produced a national law that, though it did not explicitly target Muslim women, clearly stemmed from debates hyper-focused on Muslim women.

This chapter examines the frames used within elite discourse, including statements by French officials and politicians, major French news outlets, and highly visible French commentators and intellectuals. Trends within elite discourse are important for three primary reasons. First, they set the frames of the debate within which others must respond. For example, when French politicians decried the headscarf as a sign of the oppression of Muslim girls, those who opposed a headscarf ban were obliged to respond to that allegation, which overshadowed
attempts to frame the debate in terms of racism or post-colonialism. Second, the dominant frames within elite discourse often produce institutional and policy change. In the French case, these changes are clear in all three branches of government. At the executive level, for example, one of President Nicolas Sarkozy’s first actions once in office was to establish the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity. The name itself reflects a discourse wherein ‘national identity’ is homogeneous and definitive, outside of which there are ‘immigrants.’ Legislatively, these debates produced the 2004 law banning ‘conspicuous’ signs of religiosity in public schools, the 2003 changes to the code of nationality, and the 2010 ban on covering one’s face in public, among others. At the judicial level, as Bowen (2011) demonstrates, court decisions regarding citizenship and the niqab from 2008 to 2010 demonstrate a shift since 1990s court rulings on headscarves in public schools. These more recent court rulings reflect the court’s adoption of language originally used by French politicians in earlier debates about the headscarf affairs (Bowen, 2011, p. 326). Finally, elite discourse is one of many ways that racial and ethnic minorities experience discrimination (Fredette, 2014, p. 25). When French politicians and commentators refer broadly to ‘immigrants’ in their commentary, they ignore that many of the people to whom they refer were born in France. This perpetuates the notion of a racially, ethnically homogeneous nation by excluding Maghreb-descended and/or Muslims from the possibility of full citizenship. For these reasons, understanding the parameters of elite discourse becomes especially important to understanding the inflections of seemingly color-blind laws and politico-legal developments.

The first section of this chapter outlines the economic, political, and international contexts that surround these debates and color how French elites interpret symbols and events.
The second section examines a few of the primary frames that dominated elite discourse on the presentation of Muslim women: laïcité [French-specific notion of secularism], individualism, gender equality, and the maintenance of public order.

**Timing and context**

In 2004 when the National Assembly passed the law banning ‘conspicuous signs of religious affiliation’ in public schools, the urgency and intensity with which advocates of the law discussed the issue was disproportionate to its real scope. From 1994 to 2003, the number of teachers’ complaints about the headscarf issue halved from 300 to 150. This drop was in large part due to the work of Hanifa Chérifi, who was appointed as an official mediator for headscarf related disputes. Apart from the work of Chérifi as a nationally appointed mediator, these disputes were increasingly handled at the local level. Likewise, in 2010 when the National Assembly banned garments covering the face in public spaces, a law clearly aimed at the niqab, only an estimated two thousand of France’s 64 million inhabitants wore the niqab (Tissot, 2011, p. 39). Given these empirical trends, it is unclear why debates on Muslim women’s clothing took such prominence in public discourse and subsequently produced national laws. Two primary factors drove the timing of these debates, the frames used within them, and the problem definitions that they produced: (1) ideological shifts in French political discourse that began in the early 1970s that were driven by economic factors and political entrepreneurs, and (2) focusing events that led the French public and politicians to increasingly associate Islam and immigrants with Islamist fundamentalism.

The discursive frames used in debates on Muslim women’s clothing resulted from ideological shifts of the 1980s and 1990s. Emile Chabal (2017) terms the new ideology that
emerged from these decades ‘neo-republicanism.’ Beginning in the 1980s, the left (and later the right) wing French politicians framed their positions as a defense of French republicanism. Their arguments conceptualized republicanism as an ahistorical set of values and moral truths: the importance of laïcité (the French separation of church and state), the importance of the French school for instilling republican values, civic participation, equality, and liberty. Contrary to this claim, French politicians’ instrumentalization of these republican values from the 1980s and 1990s to present day has been distinctly modern, that they have “sought to reclaim and repackage republicanism” (Chabal, 2017, p. 68). Historically, French republicanism sought centralization, assimilation, and the creation of French republicans through public institutions. For example, it was under the republicanism of the Third Republic that the French state led a series of assimilation campaigns by banning the use of regional languages and dialects and establishing widespread public schooling. As a result, French politicians in the 1980s and 1990s found it easy to retool republicanism to address racially driven fears that immigrants may threaten French national identity and ‘Islamize’ France.

These fears, and French politicians’ instrumentalization of them, become more salient and visible during periods of economic downturn. Emile Tissot (2011) goes so far as to call this “obsession with ‘national identity’... [a] broader response to the declining cultural, economic, and political role of France” (p. 44). By focusing on national identity and immigration, French politicians detract attention from increased unemployment and avoid accountability for a weak economy. For example, anti-immigrant rhetoric became more pervasive when the 1973 oil crisis ended les Trentes Glorieuses [The Glorious Thirty], a period of rapid post-war economic growth. As a result, France restricted labor immigration. Restricted flow of labor, in addition to the 1974
law that allowed already migrated laborers’ families to join them in France, led many immigrants who had intended to return to North Africa to instead reside permanently in France. The fact that many immigrants began to see their residence in France as permanent is evident by the increase in applications to build mosques and the enrollment of their children in French schools during the 1970s. Many French political parties blamed immigrants, increasingly visible and no longer economically desirable to the French state, of taking jobs from real Frenchmen. A few years after the economic recession of 1977-78, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing urged immigrants to return home to make more jobs available to Frenchmen (Scott, 2007, p. 69). Thus, 1970s anti-immigrant rhetoric and focus on national identity often had a basis in a sense of economic entitlement among French whites. Within a few years, politicians and national media shifted the language of anti-immigrant sentiment from that of economic concern to the threat of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism among the Muslim (immigrant) population.

In addition to the rise of neo-republicanism, several focusing events prompted this shift in rhetoric from economically-based anti-immigrant reasoning to one focused on the incompatibility of Islam with republican values. Though France’s experience of colonization and the Algerian War had already facilitated an association of Islam with violence in French discourse, the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution triggered fears that immigrants posed the same threat of Islamist fundamentalism that overtook Iran (Scott, 2007, p. 69). Research by Thomas Deltombe (2005) demonstrated a direct link between the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and French representations of Islam. Deltombe termed the resulting French image of Islam an ‘imaginary Islam,’ detached from the actual practices of Muslims in France. Many of these representations reinforced colonial understandings of Islam, rights, and women: repressed women forced to veil
themsevles, patriarchal and archaic tradition, and practices like forced marriage. In this context of heightened fear of the ‘Islamization’ of France, the far-right party le Front National surged popularity in the early 1980s by stoking racial fears about immigrants and threats to French national identity.

Eight months before the first headscarf affair started in October 1989, Iran returned to French elite discourse when Ayatollah Khomeini released a fatwa calling for the death of controversial author Salman Rushdie and his publishers. The same year, the French celebrated the bicentennial of the French Revolution. This dichotomy of events — violent repression of free speech by the Islamic Republic on the one hand, and the celebration of French republicanism on the other — helped to cement the dichotomy between Islam and republicanism with French discourse. Discourse around the first headscarf affair reflected this notion of a conflict between republican values and Islam, understood through the lens of Iran. The first headscarf started when three girls were expelled in Creil, France for refusing to remove their headscarves upon entering the classroom. Among the many terms used to describe the headscarf worn by Muslim girls (e.g. veil, hijab), some commentators called it a ‘tchador,’ the article of clothing mandated by the Iranian state after the Iranian Revolution and a symbol considered in France to be synonymous with the repression of women (for example Le Monde, 1989b). Empirically, the headscarf worn by some French girls differed greatly from the tchador. Whereas the tchador is a full-body garment, the headscarf covered only the neck, hair, and ears. Symbolically, using the word ‘tchador’ implied that French girls wearing the headscarf were, like in Iran, forced to do so and that their behavior signified an Islamic fundamentalist threat to France. Principal Eugène Chenière, the school principal who prompted the first headscarf affair, described the girls’
wearing of the headscarf as a threat to the school’s public order and to “la sérénité laïque”
[“secular peace”] (*Le Monde*, 1989a). The girls’ wearing of the headscarf was seen by school
administrators and many French elites who echoed this language as a threat to the fundamentals
of French republicanism.

The second of the headscarf affairs began when in September 1994 when the Minister of
Education, François Bayrou, issues a decree banning ‘ostentatious’ signs of religious affiliation
in all public schools. As with the first affair, these debates took place in the an international
context of growing Islamist movements and conflict with majority Muslim nations. France’s
participation in the Gulf War (1990-1991) three years before the Bayrou decree created another
context reducible by French media to France versus Islam. Two years before the decree, civil
war broke out in Algeria (1992-1995) after a military coup against the newly elected Islamist
government. During the war, Islamists killed secular Algerian and French citizens in Algeria and,
in 1995, attacked railway stations and buildings in France. At the same time, riots broke out in
predominantly North African immigrant suburbs in protest of endemic poverty, unemployment,
and exclusion in their communities. Though these riots had no clear connection to Algerian
Islamists, French media organizations nevertheless claimed that the two were related (Scott,
2007, p. 72). It was also in this context that the National Assembly passed a law changing the
code of nationality so that children of foreign born parents in France were no longer guaranteed
citizenship, and children of Algerians born before the independence had to demonstrate proof of
their “*enracinement*” [“rootedness”] in French society. In the midst of these various conflicts,
French politicians were able to easily portray the Bayrou decree as a necessary defense of
republicanism against rising global Islamism.
Terrorist attacks abroad and domestically have also intensified French fears of Islamic fundamentalism. After the September 2001 attacks, French commentators began using the phrase ‘clash of civilizations’ to describe a broad conflict between Islam and the West. In this post-9/11 context, the National Assembly passed another law in 2003 changing the code of nationality, this time allowing government officials to deny citizenship within naturalization procedures for reasons other than formal, legal requirements (Bowen, 2011, p. 332). The same year, President Chirac appointed a commission, led by Bernard Stasi, to explore the feasibility of a law banning religious symbols in public schools. The commission recommended a law, and the National Assembly passed a law banning ‘conspicuous’ signs of religious affiliation in 2004.

More recently, the 2015 and 2016 Islamist-led terrorist attacks had profound impacts on French policy and discourse around Islam. After the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, President François Hollande declared a state of emergency, which the French government extended six times over a two-year period. On November 1, 2017, the same day that the state of emergency expired two years after it was declared, the National Assembly enacted a series of anti-terror measures that made several aspects of the state of emergency permanent: border checks, security perimeters around places such as railway stations and airports, and government officials being allowed to place individuals on house arrest and to shut down places of worship if their preachers promote radical ideology (BBC, 2017). Two weeks after the Nice terrorist attacks, the conservative mayor of Cannes, a nearby coastal town, banned the burkini, citing issues of hygiene, threats to public order, and the importance of protecting laïcité. In his analysis of the burkini controversy, Dimitri Almeida (2017) explains that representations of the burkini and women who wear it “were rooted in the discursive regime of the state of emergency” (p. 24). As
with the headscarf affairs, the burkini ban was embedded within a broader frame of Islam versus republicanism.

**Frames**

Distinct discursive frames within French elite discourse emerged from the development of neo-republicanism and the geopolitical context in which these debates were situated. This section examines some of the principal discursive frames that structured debates on the presentation of Muslim women: laïcité, anti-communalism, gender equality, and public order. Within these frames, the gender performance and gender relations of Muslim women are seen as linked to the defense of these fundamental French values. This relationship between gender performance and national identity with French discourse is such that some Muslim women have described sexuality as “the measure of difference, of the distance Muslims [must] traverse if they were to become fully French” (Scott, 2007, p. 166). For a Muslim woman to be French — and therefore secular, autonomous, free, and respectful of public order — Muslim women must expose themselves. Importantly, the operationalization of these values in recent debates on headscarves and niqabs has been neo-republican, not purely republican (Chabal, 2016, p. 69). This means that, though many French elites have framed opposition to headscarves in public schools and niqabs in public places as a defense of immemorial French values, their actual operationalization of these values have been historically and contextually specific.

Throughout these debates on Muslim women’s presentation, French politicians and elite commentators focused on whether wearing a religious article of clothing violated and therefore French laïcité. In 1989, for example, the prominent center-right politician Charles Millon
declared that if France permits the “veil or the tchador,” then it will prompt “war in the French public school” (Le Monde, 1989c). On the other end of the political spectrum, then head secretary of the Socialist Party Pierre Mauroy said in the same year that, “it is necessary to respect the laïcité of the French school,” and further, that “exaggerated forms of religious expression” should not be “tolerated” (Le Monde, 1989c). Both sides of the political spectrum framed their positions in terms of respect for laïcité, presented as a static value of French republicanism.

In reality, the interpretation that individual presentation has some bearing on laïcité was, at the time, an innovation by French elite actors. The concept of laïcité derives from the 1905 law of the Separation of Churches and State. Passed during the Third Republic at a peak of French anti-clericalism, French statesmen at the time designed the law to protect the state from religious influence. The law has provisions prohibiting the government from subsidizing religious institutions, limiting religious instruction in public schools, and makes provision for freedom of conscious and exercise of religion. The 1905 law has almost no provisions regarding the actions of individuals within specific spaces or institutions, with exceptions such as stating that religious leaders cannot spread defamation from the pulpit (Legifrance). During the headscarf debates, French politicians transformed the concept of laïcité into one that seeks to “secularize its citizens, especially Muslim ones, rather than to secularize the state” (Bowen, 2011, p. 344). In 2010, during the niqab affair, the French state took this interpretation of laïcité again farther by mandating individual secularization in all public spaces, whereas the headscarf affairs focused only on the space of the public school. As such, the operationalization of “laïcité”
by French elites during these debates was and is neo-republican in nature, reflecting a transformation rather than a replication of Third Republic era republican values.

Moreover, many of those who Muslim girls’ wearing the hijab in schools on the grounds of laïcité did not apply the same measure of scrutiny equally to all religious symbols, and neither did the 2004 law that these debates produced that banned ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols. To this day, students are permitted to wear a small cross to school but not a headscarf. Unable to frame their arguments as explicitly anti-Islam, French politicians and, after 2004, French law distinguished between religious symbols based on how ‘ostentatious,’ ‘conspicuous,’ or ‘discreet’ they are. During the first headscarf affair, Minister of Defense and former Minister of Education Jean-Pierre Chevenement explained that he would not object to a student “simply wearing a headscarf as one wears a small cross” but not if it intends to “remind Muslim children not to deviate from a rigorous interpretation of religion” (Le Monde, 1989c). Originally, like Chevenement, many politicians sought to distinguish acceptable from ‘ostentatious’ ones, which were worn by students with the intention of proselytizing their religious beliefs. As exemplified by Chevenement’s reference to “Muslim children,” Muslim students were perceived in French discourse to be the more likely to proselytize in the school setting.

This perceived tendency to proselytize was further conceptualized as a failure of immigrants to assimilate and accept central French values like laïcité. In the same quote, Chevenement writes that “integration will be impossible if the principle of laïcité is not respected” (Le Monde, 1989c). Minister of Heath Claude Evin echoed him when he said integration that is “respectful of cultural and religious particularities” is only possible within the “rules of our republican and secular state” (Le Monde, 1989c). Consistently in French elite
discourse, Muslim girls in headscarves represented the gulf between Muslims and true Frenchness. Moreover, though many of the girls at the heart of this controversy and some of their parents had been born in France, French politicians called them “immigrants,” thereby positioning ideologically and culturally outside France even though they lived geographically within it. As a result, Almeida (2017) calls this new laïcité a thinly veiled ethnicized debate premised on the myth of a racially, ethnically, and culturally homogeneous France (p. 28). In this mythic France, Muslims are seen as too excessive or ‘conspicuous’ in their religiosity and, irrelevant of their either their legal status or birthplace, as ‘immigrants’ to France.

Elite French discourse has also portrayed Muslim community as a *communautarisme*, a community with strict obligations that override one’s individualism and allegiance to the Republic. As aforementioned, France’s legal and historical approach to citizenship differs from that of the Anglo-American model. Whereas both the United Kingdom and United States have often proudly claimed ‘multiculturalism’ as a national value, France rejects group identifications, group recognitions, and group identities. Unlike most other countries, for example, it is illegal under French law for the government to conduct censuses on race, ethnicity, country of origin, or religion. In these debates on Muslim women’s presentation, French politicians and commentators extended this to a model of citizenship premised on the separation of “the public (secular)” and “the personal (religious)” (Scott, 2007, p. 125). Within this model, Muslim women’s headscarves, niqabs, and burkinis are seen as extraneous to the individual and as hampering one’s ability to fully participate in citizenship. When in 2010 the Constitutional Council judged that the niqab ban was constitutional, it wrote that concealing the face “misrecognizes the minimal requirements of living in society” (get citation from Bowen, p. 327). Visibility of the
body was thus determined to be a prerequisite for citizenship just as it was for republican schooling.

In addition to existing outside of citizenship, Muslim women in elite discourse are also portrayed having lost autonomy to the demands of Muslim *communautarisme*. Muslim women in headscarves and niqabs were perceived to have an “autonomy defect” as a part of their “assimilation defect” (Bowen, 2011, p. 344). As such, many construed Muslim girls’ wearing the headscarf and women wearing the niqab as an imposition by their oppressive group culture rather than an individual choice. This belief in covered women’s lack of autonomy manifested as their absence in major public debates about their public presentation. The Stasi Commission, appointed to explore the feasibility of banning religious symbols in public schools, interviewed none of the headscarf-wearing girls in their public hearings and interviewed at most a few, potentially only one, of these girls in private (Scott, 2007, p. 124). Likewise, the voices of women and girls who choose to cover themselves were notably absent from debates in 2010 and 2015. Additionally, since covered girls and women lack autonomy, elite discourse perceives them as needing the state’s protection. The report produced by the Stasi Commission explains that “the veil offers them the protection that the Republic should grant them… [from being] pointed out as ‘indecent’ or even ‘infidels’” (get citation from Billaud & Castro, p. 2013). To protect these women from repressive *communautarisme*, then, the state must intervene.

In these debates, French officials and media expressed the urgency of protecting Muslim women not only from their repressive culture but also from Muslim patriarchy and the perceptions of concentrated sexism in Muslim-majority suburbs. Indeed, French perceptions of the victimization of Muslim women reflected the intersectionality of the women’s position:
gendered female and therefore in need of protection, and specifically protection from racialized male subjects. These debates and especially the Stasi Commission hearings reinforced the long held French image of the ‘dangerous’ sexist, violent Arab man, which has its origins in French colonialism (Billaud & Castro, 2013, p. 83). The Stasi Commission argued girls wore the headscarves, because otherwise they risked “verbal, psychological and physical violence” [emphasis in original] or being “stigmatised as ‘whores’” (get Stasi citation from Billaud & Castro, 2013, p. 89). Thus, the headscarf represented a dual perversity of Muslims’ sexuality — the violent urges of men who lose control in the presence of an uncovered woman, and the sexually repressed woman. The Commission’s report went on to connect the headscarf to allegedly similar forms of oppression faced by Muslim women, including polygamy, forced marriage, and genital mutilation (Billaud & Castro, 2013). In these debates, the headscarf became a symbolic catchall for those who led these debates and gave testimony perceived to be the forms of French Muslim girls’ oppression. As aforementioned, those developing the symbolic meaning of the headscarf in these hearings were not the girls who chose to wear them, often against the wishes of their parents. The headscarf was defined for them by French politicians, schoolteachers, and commentators who decided that the headscarf signified Muslim girls’ desperate attempts to shield themselves from the misogyny of Muslim men, the imposition of sexual restraint, and a host of patriarchal practices.

This discourse is also premised on a binary of oppressed, covered Muslim women and liberated, exposed French women. As Tissot (2011) describes it, covered Muslim women and girl “have replaced the traditional the traditional housewife as the symbol of female subservience” (p. 41). According to this logic, it was and is the duty of France, a beacon of
gender equality and feminism, to protect and liberate Muslim women, many of whom daily wear a symbol of their oppression. Many French feminists joined together with politicians against the headscarf to demand that Muslim women be elevated to the status of French women (Scott, 2007, p. 162). During his tenure as Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy called on Frenchmen and politicians to “bring pressure to bear so that the rights of French women apply also to immigrant women” (get citation from Scott, p. 162). Feminists joined Sarkozy in this call for the liberation of the Muslim woman. Paradoxically, the same feminists who before decried the hypersexualization of women in French media attacked covering the body as evidence of inequality and misogyny. Julie Billaud and Julie Castro (2013) examine how within the rigid parameters of acceptable gender performance, both prostitutes (too exposed) and covered women (too concealed) are and have historically been excluded from the ‘imagined community’ of French nationhood and citizenship. Many feminists and French politicians thus together conceptualized strict limits on the gender presentation of women on the cultural and economic margins. Focus on the vast minority of women, Tissot (2011) argues, conveniently obscured the many ways in which French women continue to experience inequality and oppression. For example, while French discourse grew obsessed with the niqab, worn by up to 2,000 women in a country of 64 million, “the government [had] still to implement its plan against domestic violence” (Tissot, 2011, p. 43). The dichotomy of the liberated French women and Muslim women does a disservice to both. It obscures the real oppression of French women and focuses on the enforcement of standards of ‘French’ gender performance rather than the real oppression of Muslim women as they themselves conceptualize it.
This belief that the headscarf represents the sexist oppression of Muslim women is entrenched to the extent that women who wear the headscarf are perceived as oppressed even when they make explicit that they have chosen independently to wear the headscarf. In 2008, the State Council denied citizenship to a Moroccan woman named Faiza because of her *défaut d’assimilation* [assimilation defect] (Bowen, 2011, p. 332). The State Council judged her assimilation insufficient because of failure to accept and uphold the value of gender equality, and because of this defect, she was denied citizenship despite meeting all the formal, legal requirements. When Faiza married her husband, a French convert to Islam, she chose to start wearing the niqab. The State Council interpreted this as a submission to her husband and rejection of gender equality. According to Faiza, however, she had worn the headscarf before in Morocco and chose to wear the niqab after reading several books on the subject. She even said explicitly, “I don’t believe that I submit to my husband” (Bowen, 2011, p. 333). In a similar 2016 case, an Algerian woman on the cusp of citizenship was denied citizenship because of her refusal to shake hands with male officials at the naturalization ceremony (Breeden, 2018). The State Council decided in favor of the officials who denied her citizenship, writing that her refusal demonstrated a “lack of assimilation.” These interventions into the naturalization were in both cases made possible by a law that allows the government to deny a foreign spouse citizenship two years after filing for citizenship on the grounds of “lack of assimilation, other than linguistic” (as cited in Breeden, 2018). In both these cases, French politicians’ and the courts’ conception of ‘assimilation’ included the adoption of specific norms of gender performance and gender relations, the meanings of which were determined by French elites. Performance of
gender outside these norms indicated victimization by Muslim culture or more specifically Muslim patriarchy, either through direct external control or internalized belief.

In other cases, French elite discourse has treated deviation from French norms of gender performance (e.g. wearing a headscarf or niqab) as a direct threat posed to the Republic. The duality of Muslim woman as both victim to protect and threat to protect against have coexisted within the same discourse (Tissot, 2011, p. 42). During the headscarf affairs, French politicians and commentators portrayed Muslim girls’ choice to wear the headscarf as both indicative of their victimization and of a religious extremism dangerous to the Republic. The 2009-2010 debates about the niqab increasingly framed the niqab, which covers the face except for the eyes, as a threat to security and “public order.” According to Bowen (2011), “public order” is used to mean both physical security and “‘public moral order,’ with its Durkheimian sense that the law protects socially embedded moral conceptions” (p. 340). In this sense, the covered Muslim woman presents a threat to both the physical security and moral foundations of French society. They represent a “Trojan horse of extremist Islam” (Tissot, 2011, p. 43) come to infiltrate the Republic. These concerns about public safety contributed heavily to the 2010 law banning the covering of one’s face in public. The language of public order and safety reappeared in 2016 when conservative French mayors of coastal towns banned the burkini-style swimsuit from public beaches two weeks after the Nice terrorist attacks. In the weeks following the original burkini ban in the town of Cannes, a city official explained that the ban “is not about banning religious signs at the beach” but rather seeks to prohibit “conspicuous clothing that refers to an alliance with terrorist movements with which we are at war” (Le Monde, 2016). The burkini posed a problem, then, not because of its religiosity but because of its alleged connection to
terrorist movements that led to attacks in Paris and Nice. As is clear from this quote, discourse on the burkini took place within “the discursive regime of the state of emergency” (Almeida, 2017, p. 24). Within this regime, covered women become not only victims of their culture but perpetrators of terror that more and more afflicts French society.

As aforementioned, these frames were constructed with minimal input from the Muslim girls and women who these issues actually concerned. In the absence of their perspective, frames and symbolic meanings developed within a neo-republicanism largely detached from how Muslims and especially Muslim girls and women themselves understood French society, the meanings of various symbols, and the oppression of Muslim women. In addition to the political development of neo-republicanism, several domestic and international focusing events, along with the weight of France’s colonial history, affected how these issues were conceptualized and understood as public problems in elite discourse. The next chapter explores how a small selection of French-Algerian women, all but one of them practicing Muslims, conceptualize and frame this issues.

**Symbolic Meaning and French-Algerian Women’s Identity in their Own Words**

As exemplified by the Stasi Commission, the voices of Muslim girls and women are too often absent from elite discourse on policies that directly affect them. When the French government has tried to consult French Muslims, it has often done so by anointing particular Muslims as spokesmen for the entire Muslim community. For example, in 1983 the French government established le Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France (Corif) as an intermediary between the state and the Muslim community, but it lacked credibility due to its lack of support from French Muslims. In 2003, President Sarkozy worked with some Muslim university
students to create the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), which replaced Corif as the official intermediary between the French state and Muslim community. Unlike Corif, the CFCM is composed of several mosques and Muslim organizations. However, like Corif, the CFCM has drawn wide criticism, and many see it as not representing French Muslims (Manilève, 2015).

Similarly, President Sarkozy appointed Fadela Amara, a French Muslim feminist and founder of *Ni Putes Ni Soumises* (Neither Whores Nor Submissives), to Secretary of State for Urban Policies. It was especially politically instrumental for President Sarkozy that Amara had been an outspoken proponent of the 2004 law banning signs of religiosity in public schools.

Though the Muslim individuals and organizations recognized by the French state certainly represent some French Muslims, the small number of Muslim voices presented in mainstream French discourse through government recognition or media attention limits the extent to which all French Muslims feel themselves represented in major national conversations. This chapter explores perspectives less commonly expressed in French mainstream politics or media, those of individual French-Algerian women. The term French-Algerian here includes both Algerian immigrants to France and their descendants. I chose to focus on French-Algerian women, rather than French Muslim women more broadly, for a few reasons. Firstly, French-Algerians compose the largest bloc of Muslims in France (Laurence & Vaïsse, 2007). Secondly, this on French-Algerians allows for further exploration of post-colonial continuities and reflections through questions regarding personal experiences and family history. Finally, many second and third generation French citizens whose families originated in Algeria have disaffiliated themselves from Islam as a religion, and examining French-Algerians creates room
to consider the sentiments of those who grew up in Muslim households but no longer identify as religiously Muslim.

In June 2018, I interviewed four French-Algerian women, and this chapter is devoted to their testimonies. The questions I asked covered a range of topics including the 2004 law, changes since the terrorist attacks and the 2016 presidential election, and the meaning of French citizenship (for a full list of questions, see Appendix A). All of these interviews were conducted over a 1 hour period in the Aix-Marseille area; I conducted two interviews in Marseille, and two in Aix-en-Provence. Soraya and Eléanor were interviewed individually. Faiza and Leila, already friends and members of the same mosque, were interviewed at together. Eléanor provided the only English-language interview. The other three were conducted in French, and all quotations here are my own translations. With such a small sample size, the goal of this chapter is not to generalize about how ‘French-Algerian women’ or ‘Muslim women’ conceptualize and experience this issues. Rather, by treating these interviews as case studies and contextualizing them within other work done on French Algerian women’s experiences, I seek to complicate the notion that French-Algerian women share particular conceptualizations of these issues.

The scope of my research is limited by its small sample size. Future research could conduct similar qualitative research on a larger scale. Though Killian (2003, 2007) provides similar but more extensive research, its findings do not reflect significant political changes in the last several

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7 Interviews conducted with the approval of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (UTC) Institutional Review Board, application 18-075. See blank copy of consent form in Appendix B. Recordings of Soraya and Eléanor will be available at the UTC Library, and the recordings of Faiza and Leila were destroyed in October 2018.

8 I would like to thank the Institut Americain Universitaire for generously allowing me to use their facilities for interviews held in Aix-en-Provence.

9 I began studying French at age 5, have lived in two French-only homestays during a semester abroad where I earned B2 level equivalent language proficiency, and have a minor in French. I am confident that I have captured the fundamental substance of these interviews, though there are of course nuances that a native speaker would have found that I have not.
years, including recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Nice. Additionally, Killian (2003) focuses on North African women who have immigrated to France, rather than looking at the identity construction of second and third generation French citizens. More extensive research would also allow for the identification of generalizable differences between generations, levels of religiosity, class, and education level.

Table 1  Overview of Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Nationality(s)</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soraya</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>French, Algerian</td>
<td>Muslim (practicing)</td>
<td>Master’s student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eléanor</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Spiritual, Agnostic</td>
<td>Bachelor’s student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faiza</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Muslim (practicing)</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leila</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>French, Algerian</td>
<td>Muslim (practicing)</td>
<td>Master’s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Findings

When asked about the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols in public schools, all four participants agreed that the law did not protect but rather violated the principle of laïcité. Soraya, Faiza, and Leila — all three of them practicing Muslims — focused on what they perceived to be the hypocrisy of prohibiting the headscarf but allowing Christian students to wear a small cross. Soraya began by describing the difference between “ostensible” and “ostentatoire,” a subtle but key difference in the 2004. She said that one of university professors describe the difference as:

‘‘Ostensible,’ is what is seen; for example, a small Christian cross, one can see it. A sign that is ‘ostentatoire’ is one that wants to be seen.’ But it’s subtle — how can one judge if someone wants to show the sign or if it is simply visible?

As described in the last chapter, elite discourse often portrayed the headscarf as inherently proselytizing and thus ‘ostentatoire.’ Because intent became too difficult to prove, the final law bans all ‘ostensible’ [conspicuous] signs, and the continued allowance of a small cross demonstrates the extent to which the headscarf is seen as inherently more visible. Soraya, who does not wear the headscarf herself, considers this distinction arbitrary. In their joint interview, Leila said and Faiza verbally agreed that the law exists to “legalize their discrimination.” Leila continued, focusing on the injustice of unequal application of laïcité-based restrictions, “Veiled women are excluded from school, but women with a small cross are not excluded.” All four agreed that, though the law attempts to appear neutral, its implementation discriminated unfairly
against Muslim girls and women. Eléanor, who neither practices Islam nor wears the headscarf, added that the law “is not neutral because it’s still a culture not to wear religious symbols.” To Eléanor, forced secularism is not neutrality but rather the imposition of a cultural particularism.

The interviewees also considered state actions like the 2004 law a violation of individual liberties, and their responses demonstrated the intersectionality of their position as Muslim (for the three who are), French-Algerian, and women. Soraya focused at first on the 2004 law primarily as a violation of religious liberties. She argued that those in favor of the law misunderstood a fundamental tenet of laïcité, free exercise of religion and freedom of conscience. The 2004 law, she concluded, “robs [Muslims of] their freedom of religion [liberté du culte].” In response to the argument that the government restricted religious liberty to further women’s liberation, she responded:

It’s a liberty. I do not understand why one is opposed to the liberty of women — here, the liberation of women, it’s how you dress. Upon consideration, it’s very Franco-French, eh, to think that to uncover oneself is the emancipation of women… notably after the 1968 sexual revolution… Rather, it’s against the liberation of women, in my opinion. When a women who goes to university, who has a diploma, who has skills, who is financially independent — because that’s the real liberation of women.

Soraya’s answer sheds light on the fact that, while the 2004 law only legally restricts wearing the headscarf in public schools, it has also impacted the freedom of adult women to wear a headscarf in the workplace, especially those who work in the public sector and interact with clients/customers on a regular basis. Just after this quotation, she tells the story of a Muslim
professor she had who wore the headscarf who, after receiving her PhD, had trouble finding work, due in part to Islamophobic discrimination. Similarly, Soraya knew a woman at the bank where she worked who each day had to remove her headscarf upon arrival to work and replace it at the end of the day when she left. In each of these cases, she argued, women who were fully financially and socially independent were restricted because their free exercise of religion was deemed by outside institutions to be a form of oppression. Leila and Faiza echoed these sentiments. In reference to arguments in favor of the 2004 law, Leila said:

Yes, liberation, liberation. Liberation from what? I am free to say no, I am free to wear my headscarf [foulard]. I am free… — Liberation from what? Each person has their own liberty to decide their meaning of that word. I am free to practice my Muslim religion, whereas another person sees it as a form of oppression.

She further calls arguments that the 2004 law protects women “the veneer of liberation, the veneer of saving.” In both arguments, the ‘veneer’ of liberating women conceals the restriction of these women’s right to exercise religion. Similarly, both Faiza and Leila considered the French state’s 2016 decision to deny citizenship to an Algerian woman because she refused to shake the hand of male immigration officers a violation of the woman’s rights as a woman and Muslim. Faiza said, “It’s liberty, it’s her choice. If she doesn’t want to shake his hand, she doesn’t.” Leila added, “It is truly a form of violence, a symbolic violence.” By forcing Muslim women to perform gender and gender relations in a specific way, they argue, the French government does not liberate them but rather contributes to their oppression.
The other interviewees focus more on the hypocrisy of France attempting to ‘liberate’ French women even as they fail to address other forms of gender-based oppression. When asked about whether the 2004 law was an effort to liberate women, Faiza responded bluntly, “That makes me laugh, because the liberation of women does not exist in France.” Likewise, Eléanor describes the law not so much as a restriction of women, but rather as a misdirection of feminism. “If they want to liberate women,” she explained, “they could do a lot more. Stop the advertisements with naked women. They could do a lot more.” This resonates both with Soraya’s comment about uncovering as the French woman’s emancipation and with Eléanor’s own experiences as a French-Algerian woman. Eléanor explained that white French people do not attribute to her the stereotypes they typically apply to Maghrebin or Muslim women, which she attributes to her not wearing the veil. Instead, she said, “They say you have all these facial features and this ‘air,’ commenting on my femininity or my beauty or something that is precious.” She interpreted these comments as based on an exoticization and eroticization of her as a French-Algerian. In the same time that the French government has mandated the uncovering of Muslim women as a part of their liberation, it has also failed to address what Eléanor considers the hypersexualization of women in mainstream media, which is reflected in her own personal interactions.

Faiza and Leila connect the notion of liberating Muslim women to the mainstream French image of the covered Muslim woman as submissive, devalued, and isolated. Leila describes this image, explaining that, “For them, a veiled woman is a submissive woman, who has no role apart from hiding herself away and accepting all that is imposed upon her.” The headscarf thus signifies the Muslim woman’s inferiority and submission to Muslim patriarchy and culture. Both
women perceive this stereotype as impacting the daily interactions that they have with white French people. They describe the daily patronization they experience at work, in banks, at stores, and in passing. Rather than explicit comments or altercations, racism and Islamophobia are typically transmitted through implicit behaviors and microaggressions. Leila recalls that her interactions changed when she began wearing the headscarf after the birth of her first child. At the bank, for example, they began to ask more frequently and insistently, “Did you understand, ma’am? Did you understand?” Other times, people doubt their intellectual capacities because, as Faiza describes it, the covered woman is perceived as “ignorant.” For example, they have been asked if they know how to read, and both receive surprised reactions — “Really? You studied?” when people find out that they have advanced graduate degrees. As Leila explained, “Your economic, cultural, educational, and social levels have no value anywhere [when wearing the headscarf].” At different points, both Faiza and Leila describe the need to everyday “deconstruct” this image of the Muslim woman by proving their independence, citizenship, intellect, and education.

This stereotype of the covered Muslim woman is grounded in what both women refer to as the essentialization of Muslim culture. According to Leila and Faiza, the French fear of communautarisme, or communalism, that has formed the basis of much elite discourse around Muslim practices and the place of Islam in society stems primarily from the French inability to recognize diversity between French Muslims. Faiza points out that, for example, mainstream French media and politicians refer constantly to the “Muslim community” but hardly ever to a “Jewish community” and never a “Christian community.” Leila agrees and adds that this Muslim community is perceived as “one single Muslim, terrorist, submissive bloc.” French Muslims are
consistently essentialized. Within this conception of the French Muslim community, Muslim women are seen as submissive conduits of Muslim patriarchy and culture. Soraya, for example, recounted a story wherein a white French person assumed that her sister was being oppressed by Muslim men and subject to child marriage, a long-held French stereotype of Muslims. She was 14 and told an adult at school that she was going to her sister’s wedding. The adult assumed that she and her sister were the same age and asked, aghast, if her sister was being married off as a child. Though not indicative of a trend in its own right, this anecdote represents a personal example of a theme that has been pervasive in elite discourse about the condition of French Muslim girls.

In stark contrast to this stereotype of the submissive covered woman, each of these interviews demonstrates that the decision to wear or not to wear a headscarf or other religious symbol is often personal, deliberate, and motivated by an array of different factors. Soraya, for example, practices Islam but does not wear a headscarf. When I asked if she did not due to social pressure from French society, she said that this was a part of it but that primarily, she said, “It’s not a level of faith I have yet attained, I think. I don’t yet feel the need...but I would like to one day.” Her mother, age 53, began wearing the headscarf only three to four years earlier. Soraya explained that her mother began wearing it in part because she retired, making it easier for her to do so without social constraints, but that she also felt inspired to do so after her pilgrimage to Mecca. Soraya also describes two different women — one her professor, another her acquaintance — who wear the headscarf even though their husbands are neutral or even opposed to it. Likewise, Leila began wearing the headscarf of her own volition, at first after high school and then permanently after the birth of her first child. Both Leila and Faiza’s mothers stopped
wearing a headscarf upon their immigration to France as an effort to integrate. Leila recalled that her mother’s father had not wanted her mother to wear the headscarf because he wanted her to integrate. Leila believes that her mother re-discovered Islam and began wearing the headscarf because of the development of prayer and mosque spaces that gave her an Islamic education later in life. For Faiza’s mother, she found religion and became more devout [pratiquant] after having children.

Whereas Leila’s mother was pressured by her family to remove her headscarf to integrate, Eléanor’s mother felt family pressure to remain a devout Muslim after her immigration to France. Her mother grew up in the Berber-populated area of Kabylie and moved to France in her adolescence. Her parents refused to meet Eléanor’s father, a white French Catholic born in Algeria (pieds-noirs), because he was non-Muslim. In the last two years of her life before her premature death in her early forties, Eléanor’s mother converted to Catholicism but never told her family and was buried in a Muslim cemetery. These stories reveal a wide range of family pressures, personal relationships to religion, adaptations to immigration, and identity constructions.

Interviewees differed even more widely in their descriptions of French citizenship, integration, and their relationship to Frenchness. All four interviews agreed that the basis of French citizenship is “rights and obligations” [les droits et devoirs]. Eléanor described the least ambivalent, least strained relationship to Frenchness. As the daughter of a white French and Berber Algerian Muslim mother, she was raised with both white and non-white family members,

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10 Native, non-Arab ethnic group within Algerian. Her mother is from Kabylie, a mountainous region in Algeria famous for being a hotbed of anti-French resistance during the Algerian War (1954-62).

11 Pieds-noirs is a term often used to refer to French and other European naturalized descendants born in Algeria.
and in both Muslim and Catholic traditions. She also explains that, because of her father’s high salary and her having grown up in a wealthy suburb, her class status changes the way in which she interacts with whiteness. “When an Arab is rich,” she explained, “he’s not really Arab anymore.” With asked to describe French citizenship and national identity, she responded, “I never really thought about it because I don’t have to think about it. Because I feel integrated.” For her, whatever she is constitutes what is it to be French; it is not something apart from her to which she has an external relation. Additionally, because she does not wear symbols of religiosity and does not practice Islam, she often passes as non-Maghrebin. She also describes French citizenship as advantageous, remarking that it has allowed her to travel. Her definition of ‘integration’ is general — she defines it as linguistic proficiency, mobility, and access to education.

Like Eléanor, Soraya does not wear visible signs of religiosity and is often misidentified as Portuguese, Italian, or Spanish. Unlike Eléanor, however, Soraya identifies “first as an Algerian.” She adds, “My French identity, it’s [just] on paper.” Though legally French and Algerian, she describes having true national feeling only for Algeria, while her French nationality is more an administrative status. She describes three primary reasons why she lacks the same national feeling for France. Firstly, France’s treatment of citizens of Maghrebin origin makes her feel unwelcome and not a part of France. She describes her family’s experience of oppression at the hands of the French government after the war: “My father, he experienced the bidonvilles,12 and my grandparents were treated like animals.” Secondly, French discourse has always relied on a French/Muslim binary that forces individuals to choose between their

12 Post-war North-African populated shantytowns in the outskirts of major French cities that typically lacked plumbing and electricity.
identities. This dichotomy, which has its roots in the colonial period, has been on full display in recent national debates on the headscarf, niqab, and the place of Islam in France. In an environment resistant to the complexity of her identity, she has chosen to identify primarily as Algerian. Finally, she identifies primarily out of respect for her grandparents and the other “people who fell for Algerian independence.” She feels she cannot forget that they made sacrifices to free Algeria from France, and that forgoing her Algerian identity would do just that.

When asked to define and describe ‘integration,’ Soraya responds that it is a “politics of exclusion,” a “fiasco,” and “an absolute hypocrisy.” “You can work here, be born here, have parents born here — it’s still a culture of exclusion,” she explains. True integration, she claims, does not really exist because the politics of France are designed to exclude.

Though both Leila and Faiza describe a similar pressure to choose an identity, they do not prioritize one of their identities in the way that Soraya does. When asked about their French identity, they responded:

**Faiza:** Me, I am French. Even though parents are, from the point of view of French law the immigrants, myself I feel French. I have always lived in a Franco-Algerian society.

**Me:** When you lived in Algeria, did you feel French?

**Faiza:** No, more like Franco-Algerian. I can’t dissociate. I am both at the same time.

**Leila:** I am made up of many dimensions. I am Muslim, I am of the French nationality, and I am of Algerian origin. I am all of it — at the same time. It’s a plurality of identity.
In response, I asked how they respond to the pressure from French society that one must choose French identity over and even instead of other identities. In response, Faiza said, “It’s absurd, it’s absurd, it’s completely absurd.” Whereas that same pressure had led Soraya to emphasize her Algerian identity, neither Faiza nor Leila felt capable of choosing an identity and claimed full French national feeling. Interestingly, though Leila has double citizenship, she specified that she identifies as of French nationality and Algerian origins, indicating that her Algerian identity is more linked to a sense of personal and familial history.

In their definitions of French citizenship, both Faiza and Leila focused on a sense of community. After “rights and obligations” [les droits et les devoirs], Faiza describes that, for her, “[Citizenship] starts at myself and creates circles that enlarge and enlarge and enlarge to include all the society.” Citizenship thus entails a sense of connection and mutual obligation to neighbors, local community, regional, and national communities. Leila echoes the idea of citizenship as mutual obligation, explaining that “I see [citizenship] as have factors that are legal, rights-based, obligation based — being French, one is responsible for other French citizens, for my community, for my country.” She also emphasizes that she sees the obligations of French citizenship as fully in line with the obligation she feels to others as a Muslim, and that both her Frenchness and her religion make her feel more responsible to her country everyday. In response to questions about the meaning of integration, both Faiza and Leila express resentment that French Muslims are so often told by mainstream media and politicians that they need to integrate. Faiza said, “I don’t need to become integrated.” Leila elaborated:
Today, the generation that we are, we refuse the term ‘integration’ as an obsolete term…

There is not a dichotomy of French and Muslim — we are one French community with different spiritualities.

Leila then says, and Faiza agrees, that the notion that French Muslims still need to ‘integrate’ into French society stems from the essentialization of Muslims in media and in political discourse.

This essentialization is, both women argue, politically instrumental for the politicians who emphasize Muslim and ‘immigrant’ difference, even as they refer to second and third generation French citizens educated in French schools. Soraya and Eléanor, too, describe the ways in which politicians construct an image of Muslims and Islam for political gain. Eléanor explains that French politicians need a “scapegoat,” which has in recent decades been Muslims and Maghrebin-French citizens. She adds:

When my mother grew up in France, those questions weren’t pointed the same way. It wasn’t as big as it is now. There were still all these banlieues¹³ problems, but it wasn’t like ‘Muslims.’ It was also because they were workers, they were welcome.

In her comment, Eléanor indicates that reduced reliance on Maghrebin labor has impacted the political construction of Muslims and Islam in France. Eléanor further rejects the premise of the ‘Muslim question,’ arguing that:

¹³ Banlieue is a French term for suburbs of major cities, which since the 1960s have largely been populated by Maghrebin Muslims. Areas of concentrated poverty, these banlieues are often cites of social and political unrest (e.g. 1983 protests, 2005 riots).
You can hear it in the media, saying that if they don’t like France they should go back to their country… But it’s their country. They’re French, their citizenship is questioned. But even to question in the media ‘Is Islam compatible with the French Republic?’ and stuff it’s shouldn’t even be questioned, because they are French and they are Muslim. It’s like questioning that is not questionable. It’s not something that is coming to us [in the future] that we need to decide about.

She echoes Leila and Faiza’s comments about the inseparability of their Muslim and French identities. In both cases, interviewees argue that Islam is already a French religion and that Muslims in France already French.

All four interviewees also perceive that this political instrumentalization of ‘the Muslim question’ has been ongoing in French politics for decades but that it has worsened since the terrorist attacks and the electoral gains made by the far-right party le Front National in the 2016 election have made this instrumentalization and essentialization worse. The question of ‘Islam in France’ has become such that Eléanor says, “Like in the presidential campaign, now everyone has something to say about this, about Islam. It’s now like you have ecology \[environmental issues\], the economics, and the Islam.” Discourses on ‘Islam in France’ are generally premised on Islamophobia and racism. Since the attacks in 2015-16 and the 2016 election, interviewees describe, more French people use racist and Islamophobic language with impunity. Eléanor says that she has not experienced this increased racism or Islamophobic directly because she does not wear visible signs of Muslim religiosity and because her status economically and as a mixed individual protect her from that discrimination. Though Soraya also chooses not to wear visible

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14 This interview was conducted in English, and the interviewee used the direct translation of ‘l’écologie,” which translates in English to questions about the environment and climate change.
signs of religiosity, she describes an increased sense of self-awareness of her body and behaviors due to her fear of racism and Islamophobia. In herself and her community, she feels an amplification of a fear that was already there. Faiza and Leila, too, describe an increased self-awareness, as well as an increased in perceived hostility from white French people. Faiza expresses feeling a greater sense of animosity from others when she walks in public and goes to stores. For Leila, her children’s school is a primary site where she feels this anti-Muslim animosity, from the teachers and other parents. Thus, though all four interviewees perceive an increase in the political instrumentalization of ‘the Muslim question,’ each perceives and experiences the daily manifestations of that discourse differently.

Interviewees also differed in their opinions about the implications of colonial history for modern France and how they think that France should move forward in the context of that history. At no point in Eléanor’s responses about the 2004 law or le Front National did she frame these issues as a modern iteration of a colonial past. She did reference the racism of modern France and the fact of her mother’s Algerian origins, but she did not interpret modern discourses as grounded in colonialism. Rather, she perceives that many politicians and commentators abuse colonial history to reinforce racism and to argue that those with North African origins should “go back to where you’re coming from.” Moreover, she says that continuing to discuss colonial history often serves “more to divide” France than to actually foster positive change because it often turns into nativist politics. Unlike Eléanor, the other three interviews describe modern debates about where and whether Muslim girls and women can wear the hijab, niqab, burkini, etc. as having colonial undertones and constituting an extension of that ‘spirit of imperialism.’ Leila also criticizes the Franco-centric narrative of history taught in her children’s school, calling
it “an epistemological violence.” In response, she tries to create an alternative narrative [contre-discours] of history and Muslims in France for her children. “We teach liberty, equality, and fraternity\textsuperscript{15} in the house because at the school it doesn’t exist,” explains Leila. Both women agree that schools should teach a more multi-dimensional version of colonial history that better incorporates the perspectives of those who were colonized, as well as the voices of contemporary French Muslims. Leila adds later that, “Colonization is over but it lives on in our politics.” As with the curriculum, modern political discourse must incorporate French Muslims. Still, both Faiza and Leila express optimism that the colonial history will not be as much of a burden to the next generation. Both women hope that the next generation will make progress towards addressing discrimination and the legacies of colonialism. Like Faiza and Leila, Soraya perceives modern discourse about Muslim women as a manifestation of colonial legacies. However, she is far less optimistic about the possibility of progress, especially since the last election and terrorist attacks have led to an increase in open hostility towards Muslim and Maghrebin individuals. The consciousness of colonizer and colonized remains, she says, and, “Occidental culture is not ready to accept immigrants.” She anticipates that the culture of exclusion will likely continue. In the midst of that history and exclusion, she has found an identity for herself by claiming her Algerianness and Muslimness as her primary identities.

\textbf{Discussion}

These interviews with only four women show a diversity of thought with regard to the meaning of French citizenship, the role of colonial legacies, and race and class in France, among other issues. Similar but more extensive research by Caitlin Killian (2003) shows that, had I

\textsuperscript{15} Liberty, equality, and fraternity [liberté, égalité, fraternité] has been France’s national motto since the Third Republic (1870-1940).
interviewed women from more diverse economic and educational backgrounds, I would likely have found an even greater range of opinions. Killian (2003) shows that, in interviews of 45 North African women immigrants to France, the most educated and youngest were the most likely to use the terms of French republicanism (e.g. laïcité, equality, individual liberties, etc.). Consistent with these findings, all four of the participants, who have at least some higher education and are second or third generation French citizens, relied on French republican values as the basis of their opinions (see Table 1 for demographic information). While two of the four participants are around or above forty, it is potentially still significant that they were in school throughout the headscarf affairs. Additionally, the interviews here are consistent with Killian (2003)'s finding showing that younger and more educated participants were more likely to view the headscarf affair as racist and exclusionary. In addition to operating within the frames of French republicanism, these four women also framed these issues in terms of racist and Islamophobic exclusion.

All four interviewees support the right of Muslim girls and women to wear the headscarf in public schools, workplaces, and other public spaces. Recent polls show that approximately 65% of French Muslims agree with the interviewees that Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the headscarf in public schools (El Karoui, 2016). Nevertheless, their views are by no means representative of all French-Algerian or French Muslim women, particularly given that roughly one-third of French Muslims agree or feel neutral towards the law. Of the 45 North African women interviewed in Killian (2003), one-third of respondents agreed with the 2004 law for an array of reasons. Some women felt that the school is a place of ‘integration,’ while others went farther and argued that women should “adapt or go home” (p. 581). Even between the four
interviewees in this chapter, reasons for opposing the ban differed. The three Muslim
interviewees focus on the hypocrisy of the state allowing Christian students to wear a ‘small
cross’ while sending home Muslim girls who wear the headscarf, which they interpret as clear
evidence that the 2004 law was designed to target Muslims. In contrast, Eléanor said of the law,
“I don’t give a s*** what people are doing as long as they don’t interfere with the way that I am
living.” While some interviewees emphasized the importance of fairness, another focused on a
more secular notion of individual liberty.

In their opposition to the 2004 law, interviewees advocate a negative secularism, which
allows for unrestricted religious expression, rather than a positive secularism, which enforces
secular unbelief (Zimmerman, 2015, p. 52). Rather than impose non-religion, they argue, the
state should protect Muslim girls’ and women’s right to free exercise of religion. By arguing that
the 2004 law violate laïcité, interviewees adopt laïcité as a discursive frame but disagree with
how it is understood in elite discourse. Unlike elite discourse, codified as law, interviewees
conceptualize wearing the headscarf an exercise of laïcité rather than a violate of it, because
laïcité encompasses free exercise of religion. The 2004 law, rather than the headscarf, constitutes
the real violation of laïcité as it impedes this free exercise.

Interviewees also rejected the notion that Muslims and Islam more broadly need to
integrate into French society. By arguing that Islam is already a French religion and that Muslims
are already integrated into French culture, interviewees refuted the notion within elite French
discourse that Muslim culture is communitarian and therefore separate from French national
culture. Faiza and Leila perceive this perception of Islam as stemming from the essentialization
of Muslim culture by French discourse. As discussed in the first section, this essentialization and
view of Muslim culture as so communitarian so as to impede citizenship has roots in the colonial period. On a related note, interviewees had different reactions to and definitions of the word ‘integration.’ Soraya had a virulent negative reaction, calling ‘integration’ a “fiasco” and a part of a “politics of exclusion.” Similarly, Faiza and Leila called the idea of ‘integration’ “obsolete” for their generation, who have already integrated, though Faiza recognized that some cultural integration may be necessary for recent immigrants. All three (Soraya, Faiza, and Leila) connected the idea of ‘integration’ to earlier language during the colonial period emphasizing the importance of assimilating or integrating Muslims before they could achieve citizenship. Eléanor provided a more detached, neutral definition of integration, calling it a matter of linguistic proficiency and social mobility. All interviewees agreed, however, that many of the French Muslims that elite discourse claim need to be ‘integrated’ are already fully integrated as French citizens.

In addition to rejecting the notion within elite discourse that French Muslims need to ‘integrate’ into French society, interviewees also refuted the argument that laws and rulings like the 2004 law liberate women or improve gender equality. Like the language of ‘integration,’ the premise of ‘liberating women’ has roots in justifications of French colonization. This was especially evident during the Algerian War, when Muslim women were prompted by the French Army to remove their headscarves at large public unveiling ceremonies as a demonstration of their Frenchness and loyalty to France. Faiza and Leila in particular argue that current policies, like colonial policy, has little to do with the liberation of women. Leila puts it bluntly when she asks, “Liberation from what?” She continues that she is already free to choose whether to wear the headscarf and how to practice her religion, and that she is already an engaged citizen in her
community with an advanced degree. Similarly, Soraya references several of her friends who wear the headscarf and also have financial independence and advanced degrees; they are not, she argues, oppressed by their wearing the headscarf but rather by the discrimination they face as a result. Soraya criticizes the specific kind of ‘liberation’ to which French elite actors refer, explaining that it is very French “to think that to uncover oneself is the emancipation of women.” Whereas to limit the gaze is to be limited and oppressed, an exposed body is more free. This resonates with the theoretical work done by Al-Saji (2010) on how limitations to the French gaze are naturalized as limitations of the Muslim woman. Likewise, Eléanor adds that it is hypocritical of the French state to focus on uncovering women even as they fail to address the ways in which French women are oppressed by the hypersexualization of their bodies in media.

Though all interviewees identify as French citizens, they have very different conceptualizations of and relationships to French identity. For Eléanor, whose Frenchness feels intrinsic to her, she views whatever she is as what it is to be French. Potentially due to their Muslim faith, the other three interviewees have more complex relationships to Frenchness. These three interviewees have had different reactions to pressure from French society to choose between their identities. Soraya chooses to emphasize her Algerian nationality as her true national identity. This reaction to anti-Islam French hostility is in line with research done by Zimmerman (2015), which shows that young Arab Muslims in France often emphasize their Muslim or non-Western identity in response to animosity from mainstream society. Faiza and Leila, on the other hand, refuse to prioritize an identity, thereby rejecting the French/Muslim binary altogether. Both claim Frenchness, Algerianness, and Muslimness as equally integral to their identity.
Class, generation, family background, and religiosity stood out as factors contributing to differences in how interviewees conceptualized citizenship, their identity, and values like laïcité. Eléanor, for example, highlighted the extent to which her elevated class status allows her to feel more fully French and often prevents other from doubting her Frenchness in the way that they might otherwise. She adds that she has other friends of Algerian origin and a higher class status who describe not facing the same discrimination that they would without that status. Eléanor also argues that her mixed racial background as the daughter of a white French man and Algerian woman help her to pass as white French in some settings, thereby protecting her from the level of discrimination and microaggressions faced by other interviewees. Further, Soraya explains that, because she does not wear visible signs of religiosity, others sometimes confuse her for a person of Spanish or Italian origin and subsequently do not apply the stereotypes of Muslim womanhood to her. Even so, she describes the Muslim identity as racialized, even though Muslim women face more severe repression when wearing visible signs of religiosity. Finally, some generational differences were clear between interviewees, though a larger sample size would be necessary to make broader claims about generation differences between French Algerian women. For example, Faiza, Leila, and Eléanor, all second generation, describe the pressures their mothers faced to integrate upon arrival to France. Themselves born and raised in France, Faiza and Leila feel less of a pressure to integrate, taking their Frenchness for granted as a part of themselves even as they choose to wear the headscarf. Soraya, a third generation French citizen, feels the limitations of French citizenship as a means to protect her and others from discrimination and identifies more strongly with Algerianness. This may also be related to her having Algerian citizenship.
Interviewees’ personal experiences and stories about others in their lives demonstrate that French-Algerian women and Muslim women have complex, individual reasons for the ways in which they choose to perform gender, engage civically, and identify themselves. The deliberation with which these individuals have chosen to present and identify themselves refutes the mainstream French image of Muslim women as mere agents of Muslim culture and/or patriarchy. Other secondary sources provide further evidence of the independence of and diversity between French Muslim and French-Algerian women. Almeida (2017), for example, explores Maghrebin Muslim women’s feelings towards the burkini by researching web forums on websites frequented by French Muslims with Maghrebin origins. Opinions of women on these forums range from support for the burkini as a way of including Muslim women in public beaches and pools, to opposition to the burkini because Muslim women should not frequent public beaches at all, to opposition to the burkini because the notion of covering is archaic and patriarchal. Even between just four women, there was sufficient diversity of ideas and conceptualizations to demonstrate that French Algerian and French Muslim women are not a monolith but rather individuals making deliberate decisions for themselves informed by a variety of factors.

Conclusion

This research set out to understand how French Muslim women’s gender performance became the subject of virulent national debates about French citizenship and nationhood, and further to explore how French Algerian women constructed these issues and identities for themselves. Throughout these debates, French Muslim women’s decisions to cover themselves or to limit cross-gender physical interaction have been constructed in elite discourse as threats to
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French laïcité, national solidarity, liberties, and public order. To understand the development of this discourse, I first explored the construction of these symbols within the French colonial period, because the weight of France’s colonial experiences have created a modern discourse that echoes with the rhetoric and images of that period. This examination of colonial discourses showed that the headscarf has long been a proxy in French culture for the traditionalism, sexism, and archaism of Muslim culture. It also showed that, after the rise of Algerian nationalism, these symbols were increasingly interpreted as threats to French power. Secondly, I examined how elite French actors and institutions have constructed these debates and the symbolic meaning of French Muslim women’s clothing and behavior. Though the terms that French commentators used to frame debates about Muslim women’s dress or behavior have roots in late early 20th century French republicanism, their meaning in these debates was shaped by both political trends in French society and focusing events that drew French public attention to the rise of Islamist fundamentalism.

This research then explored how four French-Algerian women constructed meaning, interpreted laws and events, and created an identity for themselves even as they are daily subject to binaries forged in the colonial period and refined constantly in modern French discourse. These four women do not speak for all French-Algerian women, and my research does not attempt broad generalizations about their beliefs or identities. The interviews did, however, demonstrate the extent to which these individuals interpret events, their experiences, and their identities distinctly from one another. Their decisions about how to identify and present themselves were deliberate and motivated by a variety of factors. In short, these interviews revealed a complexity and diversity not often attributed to French-Algerian or French Muslim
women in elite French discourse. Far from controlled by their religion or Muslim patriarchy, these women are French citizens with rights to individual liberties making personal decisions about their bodies and identities. French elite discourse may do well to challenge obsolete binaries and pay attention to how the women they seek to ‘liberate’ conceptualize their own liberty.

Further research on contemporary French Muslim women, especially those of Maghrebin origins, will help to ensure that their voices form an integral part of debates on policies that directly impact them. As exemplified by the Stasi Commission, the voices of French Muslim and French Algerian women themselves are often silenced or omitted from high-level discourse on issues that directly impact them. Prime Ministers Manuel Valls’ reaction to a 2016 article in the New York Times is a prime example of the silencing. The New York Times released a series of European Muslim women’s testimonies on living in Europe in 2016, just one month after the first burkini ban in Cannes (Dremeaux, 2016). In response, PM Valls criticized the New York Times for painting an “unacceptable image of France because it is false” (Rubin, 2016). The bans, PM Valls argued, were passed in full support of Muslim women’s freedom. Given that the Times simply posted the testimony of various European Muslim women, PM Valls’ rejection of the article constitutes yet another silencing of Muslim women.

Between the headscarf affairs and the newest instances of contesting Muslim women’s French citizenship, little progress has been made to incorporate the diverse voices of French-Muslim and French-Algerian women’s voices in French elite discourse. Until French Muslim women have a voice in the policies directly impacting them — many of them passed in the name of their liberation — it will be difficult to argue that French Muslim women really do
enjoy the full rights of their French citizenship. I hope that this thesis contributes to the amplification of French Algerian and French Muslim women’s voices, and makes clear the diversity and individuality of French Muslim and Algerian women. The experiences and perspectives of the individuals within this group have important implications for debates on the future of French national identity in an era of ongoing immigration, terrorism, and the rise of the far-right.

Similarly, the New York Times released a series of European Muslim women’s testimonies on living in Europe in 2016, just one month after the first burkini ban in Cannes (Dremeaux, 2016). In response, Prime Minister Manuel Valls criticized the New York Times for painting an “unacceptable image of France because it is false” (Rubin, 2016). The bans, PM Valls argued, were passed in full support of Muslim women’s freedom. Given that the Times simply posted the testimony of various European Muslim women, PM Valls’ rejection of the article constitutes yet another silencing of Muslim women. Between the headscarf affairs and the newest instances of contesting Muslim women’s French citizenship, little progress has been made to incorporate the diverse voices of French-Muslim and French-Algerian women’s voices in French elite discourse. Until French Muslim women have a voice in the policies directly impacting them — many of them passed in the name of their liberation — it will be difficult to argue that French Muslim women really do enjoy the full rights of their French citizenship.
References


APPENDIX A

Questions asked during June 2018 interviews

1. Where and in what year were you born?
   a. [If not born in France]: In what year and at what age did you immigrate to France?

2. Where were your parents born? And your grandparents?
   a. [If not born in France]: In what year did your family immigrate?

3. What citizenship(s) do you hold?

4. What is the highest level of education you have received?

5. In what country were you educated?

6. How would you describe your relative level of access to educational and economic opportunity?

7. Are you religious? If so, with which religion do you identify?
   a. [If Muslim]: Do you wear any visible religious symbols or dress?
      i. [If yes]: Do you believe that it impacts how you are treated and/or perceived by français de souche? Have you had experiences of discrimination related to your wearing this religious symbol or dress?
      ii. [If no]: Why do you choose not to — is it due more to internal (e.g. disagree or simply choose not to wear visible signs) or external factors (e.g. fear of discrimination)?
   b. [If not Muslim]: Because of your Maghrebi origins, do you feel that people expect you to be Muslim or interact with you as though you are?

8. Is your mother and are your grandmothers religious? If so, with what religion do they identify?
   a. [If Muslim]: Do/did they wear any visible religious symbols or dress?
      i. [If yes]: To your knowledge, did they experience any discrimination related to their wearing religious symbols/dress? Especially in public settings, how do you think that their wearing religious symbols impacted how they were perceived by français de souche?
      ii. [If no]: Do you know why they chose not to?
   b. [If not Muslim]: Because of their Maghrebi origins, do you feel that people expect them to be Muslim or interact with them as though they are?

9. When French officials and media discuss ‘Muslim integration,’ do you feel that they are referring to all Muslims or specifically ethnically Arab Muslims?

10. When French officials talk about ‘Muslims,’ do you feel that that applies to you?

11. Do you feel that français de souche, and especially French officials, see you as an immigrant or as a full French citizen?

12. Do you feel yourself to be an immigrant or a full French citizen?
13. If any, what stereotypes do you feel that français de souche apply to you in your daily interactions?
14. What do you think about the idea that Muslims, and especially Muslims of Maghrebi origin, have a status as ‘permanent foreigners’ in France? If you agree, what enforces that status?
15. What does French citizenship entail? Is it simply a legal status or does it signify something broader, and if so, what?
16. Do you interpret the 2004 law banning conspicuous religious symbols in certain public spaces as an appropriate extension of laïcité and/or of the ‘liberation of women’?
17. How do you define integration, and do you see it as desirable? Is it the same as assimilation?
18. Have you experienced any change in how français de souche have treated you in the aftermath of the several domestic terrorist attacks in the last three years?
19. Do you feel that emergency measures taken in the aftermath of the attacks were just and necessary, problematic but helpful, or outright discriminatory and/or useless? How would you characterize them?
20. Have you experienced any change in how français de souche have treated you since the rise of Marine Le Pen and the Front National, especially since the last presidential election?
   a. [If yes]: How has that change manifested? What specific experiences indicate to you that you are being treated different post-Le Pen?
21. Do you think that the histories of French colonization in Algeria and decolonization remain relevant today? If so, in what ways are those histories still relevant?
APPENDIX B

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TO: Mae Stuart
   Dr. Susan Eckelmann-Berghel; Dr. Jessica Auchter
   Dr. Michelle Deardorff

FROM: Lindsay Pardue, Director of Research Integrity
   Dr. Amy Doolittle, IRB Committee Chair

DATE: June 8, 2018

SUBJECT: IRB #18-075: Muslim Women’s Bodies as a Site of Negotiation of French Citizenship and National Belonging

The IRB Committee Chair has reviewed and approved your application and assigned you the IRB number listed above. You must include the following approval statement on research materials seen by participants and used in research reports:

The Institutional Review Board of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (FWA00004149) has approved this research project # 18-075.

Annual Renewal. All approved research is subject to UTC IRB review, at least once a year. Please visit our website (http://www.utc.edu/research-integrity/institutional-review-board/forms.php) for the Form B (continuation / change / completion form) that you will need to complete and submit if your project remains active and UTC IRB approval needs to be renewed for another year. Unless your research moves in a new direction or participants have experienced adverse reactions, then renewal is not a major hurdle. You as Principal Investigator are responsible for turning in the Form B on time (2 weeks before one year from now), and for determining whether any changes will affect the current status of the project. When you complete your research, the same change/completion form should be completed indicating project termination. This will allow UTC’s Office of Research Integrity to close your project file.

Please remember to contact the IRB immediately and submit a new project proposal for review if significant changes occur in your research design or in any instruments used in conducting the study. You should also contact the IRB immediately if you encounter any adverse effects during your project that pose a risk to your subjects.

For any additional information, please consult our web page http://www.utc.edu/irb or email instrb@utc.edu.

Best wishes for a successful research project.

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