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## Cryptographic accumulators

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# Cryptographic Accumulators

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# Outline

- ▶ Motivation & Problem Statement
- ▶ Cryptographic Accumulator Definition and Classification
- ▶ Cryptographic Accumulator Architectures
- ▶ Cryptographic Accumulator Properties - Security
- ▶ Cryptographic Accumulator Properties – Optional Features
- ▶ Current and Potential Applications
- ▶ Q&A

# Motivation & Problem Statement

- ▶ A cryptographic accumulator is a **space and time efficient** data structure that is used for **set membership tests**
- ▶ It is possible to phrase any *computational problem where the answer is yes or no as set membership problem.*
- ▶ Common Example: Access Control List in User Account Management
  - ▶ **Approach 1:** compare each credential and look for a match
    - ▶ Lookup - linear ( $O(n)$ ) with the size ( $n$ ) of the list
  - ▶ **Approach 2:** compare each credential in the ordered list
    - ▶ Lookup - sublinear ( $O(\log n)$ )
    - ▶ Sort - could be anywhere between  $O(n \log n)$  to  $O(n^2)$
    - ▶ Memory - ( $O(n)$ )
  - ▶ **Approach 3** - constructing auxiliary data structures like hashmaps.
    - ▶ Lookup- Constant
    - ▶ Memory - ( $O(n)$ )
  - ▶ **Approach 4 - Cryptographic Accumulators**
    - ▶ Lookup – constant
    - ▶ Memory – constant\*

# Cryptographic Accumulator Classification

- ▶ Asymmetric Cryptographic Accumulator
  - ▶ **Requires a witness** creation and update for dynamic verification of set membership
  - ▶ Built on asymmetric cryptographic primitives
  - ▶ Require the underlying hash algorithm to exhibit the quasi-commutative property
    - ▶ Generalization of the commutative property
    - ▶  $h(h(x,y1),y2) = h(h(x,y2),y1)$
- ▶ Symmetric Cryptographic Accumulator
  - ▶ **Does not require a witness** for verification
  - ▶ Built on symmetric cryptographic primitives
  - ▶ Underlying hash algorithm does not exhibit the quasi-commutative property
  - ▶ Provides a limited representation of set-membership with a **false positive rate**

# Cryptographic Accumulator Architectures


- ▶ One-way Accumulators (Benaloh and de Mare)
  - ▶ A family of one-way hash functions with the additional quasi-commutative property
  - ▶ One-way hash function (H)
    - ▶ accept an arbitrarily large message (M)
    - ▶ returns a constant size output called a message digest (MD)
- Collision-Free Accumulators (Barić and Pfitzmann)
  - ▶ More general constructs that are defined as a 4-tuple of polynomial time algorithms
    - ▶ Generate
    - ▶ Evaluation
    - ▶ Witness Extraction
    - ▶ Verification
- ▶ One-way Accumulators (**Implemented**) / Collision-Free Accumulators (**Theoretical**)

# Cryptographic Accumulator Properties (Security)

- ▶ Soundness (Collision-Freenes)
  - ▶ **Cannot generate** membership/non-membership witnesses for non-set members/set members
- ▶ Completeness
  - ▶ **Should be able to prove membership** by using accumulator and witness value
- ▶ Undeniability
  - ▶ **Cannot generate** membership and non-membership witness for the same element **at the same time**
- ▶ Indistinguishability
  - ▶ Privacy related property
  - ▶ Neither the accumulator nor the witness **leak information** about the accumulated set

# Cryptographic Accumulator Properties (Optional Features)

- ▶ Input Set Size Change
- ▶ Membership Proof
- ▶ Accumulator Manager Trust
- ▶ Accumulator / Witness Update





# Current and Potential Applications

- ▶ Known & Potential Areas
  - ▶ Time Stamping and Membership testing.
  - ▶ Privacy and anonymity-conscious applications/data sharing
  - ▶ Authentication systems
  - ▶ Revocation Lists
- ▶ Applications
  - ▶ In Cryptocurrency
    - ▶ Bitcoin – Bloom Filter for set membership testing of transactions
    - ▶ Bitcoin – Merkle Block to confirm validity of transactions
    - ▶ Zerocoin – CL-RSA-B based accumulator for privacy preserving cryptocurrency operations
  - ▶ In Industry (Potential)
    - ▶ Any access-controlled systems
    - ▶ Finance
    - ▶ Smart and autonomous systems



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