TERRORISM IDEOLOGY AND PERCEPTIONS OF HOMELAND SECURITY IN TENNESSEE LAW ENFORCEMENT

A Thesis Presented for
The Master of Science Degree
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Adam Baldwin
May 2010
To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Adam Baldwin entitled “Terrorism Ideology and Perceptions of Homeland Security in Tennessee Law Enforcement.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Criminal Justice.

Dr. Vic Bumphus

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Dr. Gale Iles

Dr. Roger Thompson

Accepted for the Council:

Stephanie Bellar

Interim Dean of the Graduate School

(Original Signatures are on file with official student records.)
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my family. To my parents Ralph and Lucinda, thank you for always supporting me and encouraging me to challenge myself. To my brother Neal, thank you for being not only a wonderful brother, but a great friend. Finally, to my fiancé Rachel, you are truly an inspiration and my best friend. You have inspired me never to settle and always strive to reach my full potential. Thank you for all your love, support, and understanding.
Acknowledgements

To the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga criminal justice faculty, thank you for providing a wonderful graduate experience. To Dr. Gale Iles and Dr. Roger Thompson, thank you for serving on my thesis committee and for all your help. A special thanks to Dr. Vic Bumphus for serving as my thesis chairperson and whose interest in law enforcement helped to inspire this research. Thank you for your guidance and support not only throughout my thesis, but throughout my graduate experience.
Abstract

Homeland security is a concept that has become firmly embedded in American society since the events of September 11, 2001. While recent research has begun to study the implications of homeland security in state and local law enforcement, few have focused on perceptions of homeland security ideology, policy, and practice. Therefore, this study focuses on the impact that homeland security ideology, policy, and practice has had on the local law enforcement community by examining the varying levels of individual understanding, agreement, and support for the concept. Moderate levels of agreement were found regarding homeland security clarity at federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement. Variables measuring perceptions of consistency and departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies, post 9/11 funding, homeland security training, and number of agency collaborations and training activities were found to be the best predictors of perceived clarity. No demographic variables had a significant impact on perceptions of homeland security clarity.
Table of Content

Chapter I  Introduction........................................................................................................ 1
Chapter II  Literature Review ............................................................................................. 4
  Evolution of Terrorism: Differing Varieties ................................................................. 6
  Pre 9/11 Terrorism in the United States: Ideology, Policy, and Practice ..................... 8
  Homeland Security in Local Law Enforcement .......................................................... 16
  Homeland Security Research ...................................................................................... 18
Chapter III  Methodology ................................................................................................. 28
  Instrumentation and Major Variables ....................................................................... 28
  Procedure................................................................................................................... 29
Chapter IV  Results and Analysis ..................................................................................... 31
  Descriptive Statistics................................................................................................... 31
  Major Variable Coding............................................................................................... 36
  Bi-Variate Relationships............................................................................................. 38
  Multivariate Analysis.................................................................................................. 43
Chapter V  Discussion ...................................................................................................... 47
List of References .............................................................................................................55
Appendix A-C................................................................................................................... 60
List of Tables

Table 1. Demographic/Organizational Statistics of Sample ............................................ 32
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey ......................................... 33
Table 2a. Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey (continued).................... 34
Table 3. Correlations of Homeland Security Practical Perceptions............................... 71
Table 3a. Bi-variate Correlations of Homeland Security Ideological Perceptions and Perceptions of Clarity ....................................................................................................... 72
Table 3b. Correlations of Agency Demographics............................................................ 73
Table 4. OLS Regression Models of Homeland Security Clarity, Practices, Ideology, and Demographic Factors ................................................................. 44
Chapter I

Introduction

Even though terrorism has existed in multiple forms throughout history (Barghothi, 2005), the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks by the international terrorist group known as Al Qaeda against the United States has greatly contributed to an increased focus on this issue in recent years. As a result, international terrorism has become one of the most widely debated and controversial concepts (Rogers, Loewenthal, Lewis, Amlot, Cinnirella, & Ansari, 2007; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).

Prior to the events of 9/11, however, most of our ideologies and policies directed toward international terrorism were severely limited, based primarily on other countries’ experiences and media reports. In addition, they were considered to be uncoordinated and lacking clear focus (Hoffman, 2001). Overall, little to no uniformity was seen across state and local law enforcement agencies concerning responses to international terrorist incidents, with existing policies placing heavy reliance on the federal government. International terrorism research in the United States was also severely lacking and mostly limited to studying domestic threats (Mullins, 1988; Rogers et al., 2007). The research that did exist focused primarily on terrorism ideologies and typologies as opposed to counterterrorism measures (Crenshaw, 2000; Gibbs, 1989; Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983).

The events of 9/11 ushered in a new wave of thinking about terrorism in the United States. Massive restructuring of the federal government took place, such as swift reform of existing agencies and the creation of multiple new agencies, in order to expand the federal mandate to more substantially address the threat of international terrorism.
(McGarrell et al., 2007). New terrorism legislation was also enacted, such as the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act that aimed at expanding police powers to investigate terrorism (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). Restructuring of government agencies not only occurred at the federal level, but also at state and local levels. Following the 9/11 attacks, homeland security policies and practices were extended to state and local law enforcement agencies in order to more effectively consolidate resources and correct major flaws in international terrorism defense. The events of 9/11 also prompted an intense examination of the level of terrorist threat and activity around the world, signaling a dramatic change in the world of terrorism research (Rogers et al., 2007). Instead of continuing to rely solely on academic inquiries, research tasks were also given to government entities in hopes of developing theories that could explain terrorist events.

Despite multiple attempts by government organizations and the academic community to expand the existing body of international terrorism research, much is still lacking. While some studies have attempted to address post 9/11 counterterrorism strategies, the development of agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and their political and policy implications throughout the state and local law enforcement community have yet to be thoroughly examined. Therefore, this study focuses on the impact that homeland security ideology, policy, and practice has had on the local law enforcement community by examining the varying levels of individual understanding, agreement, and support for homeland security practices. More specifically, it intends to extend the existing body of literature by considering the potential influence that one’s perception of homeland security and terrorism can have on
the implementation of counterterrorism policy, practice, and funding within local law
enforcement agencies.

The study then attempts to determine significant predictors of perceived clarity of
homeland security missions and goals of federal, state, and local (or departmental level)
law enforcement organizations as well as identify demographic, ideological, and practical
factors that may influence the nature of these belief systems. In sum, the inquiry
poses the following questions: (1) is there consensus concerning the perceived missions
and goals of homeland security at the various law enforcement levels?; (2) what is the
relative level of agreement in regard to homeland security policy and practical
perceptions?; and (3) what factors significantly impact overall perceived mission and
strategic clarity of homeland security as an emergent law enforcement mandate?
Chapter II

Literature Review

Terrorism is an ambiguous concept that may take many different forms and be carried out for a variety of reasons (Barghothi, 2005; Cooper, 2008; Gibbs, 1989; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Onwudiwe, 2001; Rogers et al., 2007; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). However, much of the debate surrounding terrorism comes from trying to find an all-inclusive definition of such a broad concept. Currently, there is no single definition of terrorism (Gibbs, 1989; Laqueur, 1999; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). While the many forms that terrorism can take make it difficult to establish a general definition, the difficulty in defining terrorism is further compounded by various definitions for similar types of terrorism. This is made evident when comparing government agency definitions and scholarly definitions for the same type of terrorism. However, in order to fully understand the debate surrounding this concept, some of the various definitions that have been formulated over time must be identified and considered.

The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological” (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/t/7591.html). Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), however, defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or
social objectives” (United States Department of Justice & The Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). It has also been defined by the United States Department of State as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (United States Department of State, 2003, p.1).

While these definitions do show some similarities, they differ in terms of what features they emphasize in their respective definitions. Overall, it would seem that agencies such as these define terrorism based on their own needs and scope of their legal and investigative authority. For example, in their 2003 report National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the State Department defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (p. 1). While it is not specified in their definition, the State Department elaborates in their report by extending the scope of their interests to international terrorism by only collecting data on these types of incidents (Sandler & Enders, 2007). This is also made evident by the FBI, which has separate definitions for both domestic and international terrorism (United States Department of Justice and The Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.).

Just as variations are seen among government agency definitions of terrorism, variability exists among scholarly definitions as well. For example, Li and Schaub (2004), Cooper (2008), Gibbs (1989), and Sandler and Enders (2007) have all postulated definitions of terrorism. As previously illustrated in the non-scholarly literature, there is no single definition of terrorism. Even though there are inherent differences among the
various definitions, the concept of terrorism does have basic commonalities (Mahan & Griset, 2008).

*Evolution of Terrorist Strategies: Differing Varieties*

Terrorism scholarship is typically separated into two eras: historical and modern (Barghothi 2005; Laqueur, 1999; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; Weinzierl, 2004). Historical terrorism most commonly refers to terrorist acts occurring before the 20th century (Barghothi, 2005). These early forms of terrorism were primarily religiously motivated. As a result, the goal of terrorist groups during this era was to not only influence the masses, but the Gods as well (Barghothi, 2005; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Weinzierl, 2004).

Modern terrorism, on the other hand, typically refers to terrorist activity occurring during and after the late 19th and 20th centuries (Barghothi, 2005; Laqueur, 1999; Weinzierl, 2004). While some modern terrorist groups exhibit the religious fervor that was prominent among historical terrorist groups, seldom are modern terrorists’ actions strictly religious. They also include elements of political and/or social motivation (Barghothi, 2005). Historically, nationalism is another prominent motive that is seen among modern terrorist groups, with the objective being statehood and legitimate recognition for the involved nationalities (Weinzierl, 2004). The war crimes committed by Hitler and the Nazis during World War II as well as the development of the Ku Klux Klan illustrate another prominent theme of modern terrorists, maintaining the status quo.

Even though social and political motivations are much more prominent among modern terrorists than their historical forerunners, they still exhibit some of the religious
overtones that were prominent among these earlier groups. What separates these modern
groups from their historical counterparts, however, is the fact that their cited religious
motivations are commonly used to shadow the political or social agendas of the group
(Mahan & Griset, 2008). The events of 9/11, for example, have been linked to Islamist
fascism, which is an extremist view of Islam, demanding complete adherence to the
sacred law of Islam (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). Even though a religious overtone
was prominent in the 9/11 attacks, other factors such as the rejection of western societal
norms and political practices were stated as motivational influences. In all, this illustrates
that attacks such as these consist of numerous motivations that are inherently different
than those which consist of strictly religious overtones that were prominent in earlier
terrorist events.

These terrorist activities can be sponsored by state actors (Mahan & Griset, 2008),
non-state actors (Barghothi, 2005), or by domestic actors as defined by the FBI as
“groups of individuals who are based and operate entirely in the United States and Puerto
Rico without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at elements of the United
States government or population” (United States Department of Justice and The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Domestic terrorist groups in the United States typically
consist of left wing idealist groups such as animal rights activists and environmentalists,
right wing extremists such as neo-Nazi groups, or special interest groups such as those
that target abortion clinics (Mahan & Griset, 2008; Mullins, 1988). Some notable
domestic terrorists are Ted Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, and Timothy
McVeigh, one of the individuals who were convicted of bombing the Alfred P. Murrah

By contrast, international terrorism, also known as transnational terrorism, refers to terrorist activity that crosses national borders. The FBI, for example, defines international terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group or individual, who has some connection to a foreign power or whose activities transcend national boundaries, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (United States Department of Justice and The Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.). Basically, a transnational terrorist incident in a country involves victims, perpetrators, targets, or institutions of another country (Li & Schaub, 2004).

Lately, international terrorism has emerged as a prime security concern that many claim requires bold new strategies because of its incalculable dangers (Daase & Kessler, 2007).

Pre 9/11 Terrorism in the United States: Ideology, Policy, and Practice

Prior to the events of 9/11, terrorism research in the United States was limited. A general interest in terrorism was not reflected in the works of American social scientists (Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983). Furthermore, theoretical formulations that did exist were for the most part preoccupied with studying terrorism definitions and typologies (Crenshaw, 2000; Gibbs, 1989; Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983). Most of our ideologies of international terrorism were based on other countries’ experiences and media reports. While some research did attempt to correct such flaws (Hamilton & Hamilton, 1983), an overall concern for terrorism was significantly lacking in academic research. The
research that did exist consisted of underdeveloped psychological approaches and theories unsupported by empirical research (Danieli, Brom, & Sills, 2005). During this era, terrorism research was geared primarily toward domestic threats (Mullins, 1988). As a result, terrorism did not seem to be a prominent threat to our society. Most of this, however, was most likely related to the classification of certain terrorist acts by government agencies. Before 9/11, the FBI, for example, did not always separate elements of a crime that might constitute terrorism from regular criminal activity. Instead, data collected on what might have been terrorist activity was sometimes categorized as regular crimes in the Uniform Crime Report (White, 2006).

The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was the largest scale terrorist incident on United States’ soil prior to 9/11 (U.S. Department of Justice, *Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons learned for the States*). However, following terrorist attacks such as the one against the U.S.S. Cole in 2001, many started to question the effectiveness of terrorism policies at that time. Polices prior to the events of 9/11 were considered to be fragmented and extremely uncoordinated and consisted of overlapping responsibilities, duplication of efforts, and lacked an overall clear focus (Hoffman, 2001). Furthermore, counterterrorism measures at the time were often geared toward recovering from attacks, and the best course of action was viewed as a direct strike against those responsible for the terrorist acts (Cordesman, Parachini, Hoffman, & Eland 2000; *9/11 Commission Report*, 2004).

Of the existing policies and procedures, most were limited to the federal government, with little to no uniformity seen among the states regarding responses to
terrorist incidents. Policies that did exist relied heavily on federal assistance and other countries’ experiences with terrorist activity. For example, the Pentagon first became concerned with terrorism as a result of hostage taking. This was due to several instances in the 1970s, including the hijacking of an Air France plane in 1976 by Palestinian terrorists and a Lufthansa plane in Mogadishu in 1977 (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). In both instances, Israeli and German Special Forces stormed the planes, killing all terrorists and rescuing all but one hostage. As a result, the United States took notice, creating the Delta Force whose mission was hostage rescue (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). International terrorism policies and procedures prior to 9/11 were considered to be reactive as well. It was not until the 1983 Hezbollah attack against Marines stationed in Beirut that customary procedures were put in place for troops to follow when deployed abroad, such as watching for strange cars and unknown aircraft overhead (9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Even though there were considerable issues concerning pre 9/11 terrorism policies and practices, the importance of extending the scope of counterterrorism responsibilities was recognized. To begin with, instead of trying to combat terrorism with immediate force or a direct strike, recommendations were made to take a more democratic approach. It was also recommended that policies and practices be extended to include more reliance on state and local law enforcement agencies (Cordesman et al., 2000). For example, in 1999, California published a terrorism response plan that outlined responsibilities for first responders, such as local and state law enforcement, until federal agencies could arrive and take over the scene (Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 1999). The
addresses were even broken down by purpose, objectives, and a hierarchical chain of command for the involved agencies.


On the morning of September 11, 2001, members of a Middle-Eastern terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda hijacked four American Airlines flights. Two of the planes were flown into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, one plane was flown into the west wall of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the fourth crashed in a field outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. In all, nearly 3,000 people were killed in the attacks, most of them civilians. The death toll on 9/11 surpassed that of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, making it the deadliest attack on American soil (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010). It has even been called “an act of war against the United States and its allies, and against the very idea of civilized society” (United States Department of State, 2003, p. 1).

The events of 9/11 resulted in a new wave of thinking about terrorism in the United States. As previously stated, prior to the events of 9/11, discourse concerning international terrorism ideology, policy, and practice were extremely limited (Rogers et al., 2007). While prior to 9/11 most states had in place some form of services to provide assistance to individuals involved in criminal activity, the magnitude of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were so great that many states were not prepared to handle the repercussions (U.S. Department of Justice, Responding to September 11 Victims: Lessons learned for the States). As a result, these attacks prompted an immediate and virtually unanimous
reaction among the public that the United States should take whatever steps necessary to strike back at the terrorists and to prevent recurrences of such events (Brady, 2004).

Massive restructuring was seen among multiple areas of the federal government, especially among federal law enforcement (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006). For example, restructuring was seen in several federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the creation of new agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation and Safety Administration (Brown, 2007; McGarrell et al., 2007; White, 2006). Dramatic change was witnessed in the legislative arena as well. Counterterrorism legislation, most notably the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, was passed at break-neck speed, granting law enforcement an increased amount of power and authority (Brown, 2007; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; White, 2006).

The events of 9/11 prompted an intense examination of the level of terrorist threat and activity around the world, signaling a dramatic change in the world of terrorism research (Rogers et al., 2007). Instead of continuing to rely solely on academic inquiries, research tasks were also given to government entities in hopes of developing theories that could explain terrorist events. Shortly following the events of 9/11 and an increased focus on international terrorism research, the term “homeland security” emerged and quickly became a symbol firmly embedded in American society (Maxwell, 2005, p. 157). Homeland security is a term used after the 9/11 attacks to describe defense within American borders (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002; White, 2006). The directives of homeland security are illustrated in its official definition, which is “a concerted
national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 2). However, just as the definition of terrorism varies, the same can be said for the concept of homeland security. For example, while most view it as representing the need to effectively provide for the safety of United States’ citizens and those within the nation’s borders, politicians may see it as a series of organizational challenges, a mandate of efficiency in a decentralized environment, and an overall requirement for improved means of communication and coordination (Maxwell, 2005). Simply put, however, the concept of homeland security means keeping the country safe (White, 2006).

As previously mentioned, the events of 9/11 ushered in massive change and restructuring of government, especially at the federal level. Due to this dramatic change, a new agency was created in 2002, known as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As made evident in the previously mentioned definitions of the concept of homeland security, three strategic objectives are identified by the DHS, including preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing damage and recovering from attacks (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002). The DHS also has five major directives which are information analysis and infrastructure protection, border and transportation security, emergency preparedness and response, science and technology, and management (Davies, Plotkin, Filler, Flynn, Foresman, Litzinger, McCarthy, & Wiseman, 2005). Multiple agencies were created or restructured to fit under the DHS vision. These agencies consisted of, but were not
limited to Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), United States Coast Guard, United States Secret Service, and the Office of the Inspector General (http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm). Overall, 22 agencies were merged into what is referred to as a “cohesive” department (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010).

The idea behind such restructuring and placement of agencies under the DHS was that it would ensure greater accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity of purpose among agencies responsible for them (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002). While a great deal of restructuring was seen at the federal level, the DHS furthered their post-9/11 counterterrorism polices by extending its mandate to include state and local law enforcement agencies. For example, joint terrorism task forces and data information collection centers were set up throughout the nation in order to aid in this extension of counterterrorism policies and practices. Furthermore, even though a large part of the DHS mandate is to improve coordination of all aspects of information gathering and sharing at federal, state, and local levels, it also identifies priorities and educates the public as to threats and appropriate precautions and responses as part of its public affairs function (Feinberg, 2002). In essence, “the DHS leverages resources within federal, state, and local governments, coordinating the transition of multiple agencies and programs into a single, integrated agency, focused on protecting the American people and their homeland” (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010, p. 27). Funding for such a massive undertaking has been exponential. For example, the United States government has
budgeted over $55 billion for the federal agencies alone under the DHS for the year 2010 (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

Following the events of 9/11, an aggressive attempt was also made by Congress to enact new pieces of legislation that effectively addressed the issue of terrorism in our society. Out of the legislation, the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act emerged as one of the most sweeping new laws (Feinberg, 2002). The name is an acronym for United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Brown, 2007; Feinberg, 2002; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; White, 2006). This statute, which came into law on October 26, 2001, was aimed at expanding police powers to investigate terrorism in the Homeland (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010).

The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act is broken down into ten titles, or sections, outlining these new powers. The first nine titles encompass an array of new mandates and procedures ranging from enhancing domestic security, surveillance procedures for law enforcement, border security, intelligence and information gathering, international money laundering, providing for the families and victims of 9/11, strengthening of criminal laws against terrorism, and a vast range of other counterterrorism and homeland security related issues (Brown, 2007; Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010; White, 2006). While the aforementioned nine titles specifically outline their aims and objectives, the last section is entitled Miscellaneous. Even though it is considered crucial to the PATRIOT Act, it includes information from an array of areas including a “review of the Department of Justice, grant programs for state and local preparedness support, and critical
infrastructure protection” (Spindlove & Simonsen, 2010, p. 26). In sum, the law gives officials greater authority to track and intercept communications for law enforcement and intelligence gathering purposes, as well as enhanced surveillance procedures in an attempt to combat terrorism.

While supporters of the law believe that it provides a critical law enforcement tool for combating terrorism, others feel that it infringes on civil liberties. For example, some of the most hotly debated practices of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act are found in Title II, Enhanced Surveillance Procedures (Brown, 2007). This section of the PATRIOT ACT deals with the sharing of criminal intelligence and the authority of law enforcement agencies to conduct wiretapping and electronic surveillance being expanded. Proponents argue that this title allows for law enforcement and government officials to better combat instances of terrorism and protect our country. However, those opposed to the law argue that the expanded police powers go too far and infringe on civil liberties outlined in the Constitution (White, 2006). The debate surrounding the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act is not limited to the expanded law enforcement powers outlined in Title II. Concerns have been addressed by civil libertarians, racial/ethnic minorities, and immigrants also concerned with multiple areas of the law, including wiretapping of telephones, monitoring internet activity, the surveillance of religious gatherings, extensive searches of homes, and detaining people for extended periods of time without filing charges or granting them access to legal counsel (Brown, 2007).

*Homeland Security in Local Law Enforcement*
Just like federal agencies, local law enforcement agencies play a crucial role in the homeland security mission. However, there is typically not much uniformity among police departments. This is evident when looking at how homeland security funding and grants are awarded to local agencies. For example, in order to gain accessibility to DHS funding and assistance, local police departments must go through their state homeland security authority. However, the decision on how to allocate the police agency’s resources and set priorities for terrorism prevention and preparedness fall to local law enforcement. This is also influenced by the officer in charge of allocating the funding. Depending on their perceptions of threat, terrorism ideology, or needs of the agency, funding may be allocated accordingly (Davies et al., 2005).

Even though variability is often seen among the homeland security programs and practices implemented at the local level, most local law enforcement roles in homeland security include several specific criteria. First, the role of local law enforcement in homeland security is achieved primarily through typical crime control duties of local police officers (Oliver, 2006). This may include the enforcement of criminal law, traffic law, or through extra or preventative patrols. Second, tactics and technology are crucial to the role of local law enforcement in combating terrorism. Typically, this takes the form of intelligence gathering and surveillance of potential terrorist threats. However, this can also be extended to data collection and analysis of other law enforcement activities. For example, calls for service, offense reports, arrests, field interview information, citations, accidents, traffic stops, domestic violence, hate crimes, confidential informant information, and citizen tips can all be analyzed in order look for patterns of increased
criminal activity pertaining to potential threats of terrorism (Chapman, Baker, Bezdikian, Cammarata, Cohen, Leach, Schapiro, Scheider, & Varano, 2002).

Some agencies, however, have taken this one step further by extending the scope of their efforts to include crime mapping. For example, project CLEAR in Chicago uses such technology to identify critical facilities in the wake of terrorist attacks (Chapman et al., 2002). This program, which collects and analyzes data on targets such as buildings, bridges, and water treatment facilities, has the ability to immediately map what are considered to be critical locations. Officers are then dispersed accordingly to the select targets and deploy target hardening techniques, such as extra patrols and security (Chapman et al., 2002). The creation of partnerships among law enforcement agencies falls under this category as well. As previously stated, homeland security calls for uniformity among agencies concerning the threat of terrorism (The Office of Homeland Security, 2002). In order to achieve this goal, law enforcement collaborations such as joint terrorism task forces, drug task forces, and fugitive task forces have been established that include local, state, and federal law enforcement (Davies et al., 2005).

Furthermore, local law enforcement agencies must have some type of emergency management plan in place in order to properly handle large-scale crises (Oliver, 2006). Finally, training is crucial for law enforcement under homeland security. Many have recognized the need for increased law enforcement training in the areas of the handling of biological or chemical weapons, technology, and information and intelligence gathering and sharing techniques (Chapman et al., 2002; Davies et al., 2005; Oliver, 2006).

_Homeland Security Research_
Even though there are obvious advantages to extending the role of terrorism prevention to local law enforcement agencies, there are some repercussions. A study conducted by Thatcher (2002) outlines some of these challenges. As previously stated, many critics of post 9/11 terrorism policies and practices, such as the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, believe that expanded law enforcement powers and investigative authority infringe on individual civil liberties and disproportionately target certain groups (Brown, 2007; White, 2006). Thatcher (2002), however, argues that this is due to the “fragmented and decentralized nature of the American government’s role in homeland security” (p. 636). In order to test the belief that homeland security policies and practices disproportionately target certain racial/ethnic groups, he conducted a study of the Dearborn, Michigan Police Department and their proactive approach to combating terrorism. Dearborn was chosen for the study because it has one of the nation’s largest concentrations of Arab Americans, and as a result has received a great deal of attention since the events of 9/11 (Thatcher, 2002). For example, of the 98,000 residents, over 29,000 claimed to be Arabic on the last census.

As the role of local law enforcement agencies suggests, they are responsible for the safety and security of particular territories. As a result, this can take the form of conflict between their homeland security responsibilities and the safety of the community. Thatcher (2002) identifies this as conflict among the distinction of community protection and offender search. Community protection refers to practices such as target hardening or extra patrols in order to prevent terrorist activity, while offender search refers to the investigation of certain people in order to take a proactive
approach to preventing an attack. Basically, the line between the two may become blurred when dealing with communities that have somewhat larger than normal concentrations of certain racial/ethnic groups, such as in Dearborn, Michigan (Thatcher, 2002). In order to investigate what shapes the city’s interests in the local role of homeland security, Thatcher gathered information through interviews, observations, and documented reviews. Four major areas were focused on during the study. These areas consisted of the city’s response to the threat of hate crimes after 9/11, its response to media attention after the attacks, its decision about the role it would play in federal interviews with recent immigrants about terrorism, and its creation of a local homeland security office (Thatcher, 2002).

Results of the study concluded that local politics influenced many of the city government’s perceptions, which inadvertently filtered down into law enforcement practices. Thatcher (2002) stated that throughout the study, city officials and citizens alike expressed more concern about their honor and how their community would be viewed. An increase in concern for police legitimacy was also seen due to the increased investigations and surveillance efforts by local law enforcement. This sentiment also filtered into perceptions of the media as well, due to the homeland security practices and the high volume of Arab Americans in the community. Overall, “the Dearborn case contributes to the implications that local law enforcement roles in homeland security can have by illustrating how surveillance and information-gathering can have chilling effects on a city’s social life that may undermine trust and cooperation with police” (Thatcher, 2002, p. 644).
Studies such as Thatcher’s (2002) point out potential flaws concerning homeland security policies and practices. Other studies, however, are concerned with the effect that homeland security may have on changing the overall face of local law enforcement. One of the most critical questions that scholars and law enforcement practitioners have attempted to address is whether homeland security could be achieved through traditional community policing practices, or if policing for homeland security is inherently different (Oliver, 2009). For example, Oliver (2006) and Brown (2007) state that homeland security policies and strategies are so inherently different from anything that the law enforcement community has experienced before that it has ushered in a new era of policing.

In modern society, American policing has gone through three different eras. These eras are political, reform, and community policing. Furthermore, these eras are also said to consist of one of four different models of policing, which are typically identified as traditional, community policing, problem-oriented, and zero-tolerance (Oliver, 2006). However, due to the implementation of homeland security policies and practices, local law enforcement agencies are using aggressive and invasive tactics that are not inherent to any these eras of policing (Brown, 2007). As a result, Oliver (2006) states that we have entered a new era of policing, known as “homeland security.” To support this claim, the argument is made that this new shift in policing is due largely to national and international threats of terrorism, sparked by the events of 9/11. In turn, this has sparked citizen interest in the topic, and as a result the public has lent more support to combating terrorism. This has also caused a change in traditional policing policy and practice in
order to meet such demands. For example, the community policing era was marked by police involvement in the community, strong relationships between police and citizens, and focus on traditional, as well as quality of life criminal offenses. However, under the homeland security directive, police agencies are much more professional. While relationships are remote like the ones reflective of the reform policing era, the professional relationship of police with the community are geared strictly toward information gathering and are intelligence driven (Oliver, 2006).

In conclusion, Oliver (2006) lists five criteria that the homeland security era of policing must meet. The first is that the role of homeland security policing in terms of prevention will be intelligence driven. Second, the power of police under homeland security may pose a risk to civil liberties. For example, Oliver (2006) states that a fine line exists between targeting terrorists for criminal violations versus blanketing neighborhoods in search for specific suspects in large populations (p. 60). This is further reiterated by the Thatcher (2002) study in Dearborn, Michigan. Third, homeland security policing necessitates that the bar for training and hiring police officers be raised. More specifically, officers will need to become familiar in areas such as intelligence gathering, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and how to properly respond to mass casualty events (Oliver, 2006). Finally, communication between police management and line officers, as well as lateral and vertical communication among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies will be crucial to the success of homeland security policing.

While Oliver (2006) focuses on a potential shift in the eras of policing due to homeland security policies and practices, Brown (2007) focuses on what is referred to as
community-oriented terrorism. In his study, Brown (2007) notes that the extended law enforcement powers under the homeland security directive, such as wiretapping, monitoring internet activity, the surveillance of religious gatherings, and detaining individuals for long periods of time “do generate concern among civil libertarians and racial/ethnic minorities, as well as violate the basic principles of community policing” (p. 240). Even though it is noted that there is an ideological change among law enforcement, evidence is provided that this might not necessarily usher in a new era of policing, but reiterate the importance of the role of the community in combating criminal activity, more specifically terrorism. For example, Brown (2007) states that aggressive and invasive tactics have proven to be ineffective in combating traditional criminal activity. While such tactics may be inherent to the nature of homeland security policies, they have the ability to alienate the public, causing distrust and sentiment toward law enforcement (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Thatcher, 2002). As a result, policies and practices such as these that cause a divide between law enforcement and the public will ultimately fail. In order to fix this problem, Brown (2007) suggests that “technologically advanced investigative and intelligence gathering techniques are no substitute for a cooperative public.” (p. 246). Therefore, “including the public in combating terrorism and using the community-oriented policing methods to gather intelligence would not only yield quality intelligence, but also reduce the abuse of government power” (Brown, 2007, p. 247), which are currently two major critiques of homeland security and the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act.
Just as there is disagreement in regard to how homeland security ideology and policies have affected local law enforcement’s relationship with the public, there has also been debate concerning the exact role that local law enforcement will play in a post 9/11 environment. As the aforementioned literature suggests, there have been dramatic changes, especially in local law enforcement since the events of 9/11 (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Thatcher, 2002). These are most exemplified in the DHS’ *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Office of Homeland Security, 2002). This document outlines potential roles that local law enforcement may play in regard to terrorist threats, such as intelligence gathering, domestic counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, emergency preparedness and response, and information sharing (Office of Homeland Security, 2002; Oliver, 2009). Even though reports such as this have emphasized a strong role for local law enforcement, specifically how this level of law enforcement would change has not been very clear (Oliver, 2009). For example, while the events of 9/11 showed that police will play an active role as first responders in the event of a terrorist attack, since 9/11 some agencies have become primarily focused on other activities such as intelligence gathering and similar policing tactics (Oliver, 2009). More specifically, larger policing strategies have been outlined, but not the exact actions that police need to take. While local agencies have been given significant responsibility in responding to terrorist attacks, little direction has been given on how to achieve such a task (Pelfrey, 2009).

As previously stated, research on homeland security ideologies, policies, and practices in local law enforcement is still limited at best (Oliver, 2009; Schafer, Burruss,
Even though existing research has outlined practices in which local agencies have become involved, very few scholarly studies have attempted to determine what affects the implementation of such policies and practices (Oliver, 2009; Pelfrey, 2009; Schafer et al., 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009). Schafer, Burruss, and Giblin (2009) attempted to determine what affects the implementation of homeland security policies and practices by surveying municipal departments in the state of Illinois. Since the events of 9/11, urban departments have been the main focus of studies concerned with homeland security in these local agencies, with little or no attention given to small departments (Schafer et al., 2009). In order to address this issue, Schafer, Burruss and Giblin (2009) surveyed small departments, defined as those employing nine or fewer full time sworn officers (Schafer et al., 2009). More specifically, the study attempted to identify shifts in operations and perception of preparedness to critical incidents in their jurisdiction post 9/11.

In order to evaluate perception of risk of being targeted for a terrorist attack, respondents were asked to rate their perception on a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely) (Schafer et al., 2009). Findings from the study indicated the average perceived risk of being the target of a terrorist attack to be relatively low, with most variation in small rural departments as opposed to small metropolitan agencies. Concerning measures to enhance homeland security preparation and responsiveness, programs such as task forces and the creation of special units that required extensive devotion proved to be uncommon, with training being the most common step taken across the surveyed departments (Schafer et al, 2009). Furthermore, training, grant
funding, and equipment acquisition were found to be common concerns mentioned by respondents. Overall, agencies in the study reported modest perceptions concerning their preparedness to respond to a critical incident, with modest policy changes being implemented since 9/11 (Shafer et al., 2009). While the author speculates that this may be related to low perception of risk of being targeted, it is noted that more research is needed in the field.

A similar study conducted by Stewart and Morris (2009) surveyed a sample of 208 police chiefs in the state of Texas concerning perceptions of homeland security in local law enforcement and factors influencing those perceptions. Respondents were asked a series of questions regarding perceptions of homeland security as the dominant strategy in their department, homeland security as the dominant practice in the police institution, demographic variables on the chiefs’ respective departments, the extent of homeland security-related initiatives in their departments, perceptions concerning the level of collaboration between their organization and federal agencies, homeland security preparedness within their agency, and their perceived likelihood of terrorist incidents within their jurisdiction (Stewart & Morris, 2009).

Results from the study indicated that there is a higher level of agreement among chiefs that homeland security is the dominant policing strategy in the police institution as opposed to the overriding strategy in their department (Stewart & Morris, 2009). One’s opinion of whether or not homeland security was dominant in the police institution was also found to be a significant predictor of the perception of dominance of homeland security in their respective departments and vice versa. Other factors such as federal
collaboration, preparedness, and perceptions of risk were also found to have significant positive effects regarding the level of agreement that homeland security is the dominant policing strategy in their department (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Agency size was the only structural variable to have a significant effect on perceptions of homeland security being the dominant departmental strategy, with chiefs of smaller departments in more agreement than their counterparts in larger departments. Overall, the less prepared a chief believed their own department to be in terms of homeland security, the more likely they were to believe that the overriding strategy in the police institution was homeland security (Stewart & Morris, 2009). Furthermore, the belief of what other agencies were doing in terms of homeland security affected how chiefs viewed homeland security in their own agencies.

Ambiguity still exists with both the concept of terrorism (in its various forms) and homeland security. This confusion is only heightened by the perceived role that local governments play as opposed to the federal government. The recent supposition suggesting that the “homeland security” era may comprise the fourth era of policing potentially modifies the Kelling and Moore typology of first the political era, the reform era, and the community-oriented era (Oliver, 2006; Stewart & Morris, 2009). Noting that substantial disagreement still exists among the proper role and benefits of community-oriented policing, it is no surprise that similar differences in the discourse concerning homeland security exist. Therefore, this research extends this debate by examining the level of consensus concerning homeland security ideology, policy, and practice and attempts to isolate the most salient predictors which indicate support for the concept.
Chapter III
Methodology

Data for this study comes from a quantitative, electronic survey of individuals listed as members of the Tennessee Chiefs’ of Police Association (TCPA). As such, the initial sampling frame contained 2,457 email addresses of individuals with various levels of police involvement. The survey instrument itself captured their respective roles as law enforcement supporters or professionals. Utilizing the Speed-Survey software and website, a list-serve was created and the entire sampling frame was entered. The purpose of this research was to determine if a general consensus existed among local law enforcement agencies regarding homeland security objectives and strategies. Furthermore, the research attempted to establish if a relative level of agreement exists in regard to homeland security policy and practical perceptions, as well as identify factors that significantly impact overall perceived mission and strategic clarity of homeland security as an emergent law enforcement mandate. The research approach considered individual perceptions across a broad cross-section of law enforcement participants throughout the entire State, ensuring some amount of regional diversity. Furthermore, the sampling frame was deemed relevant to the descriptive and exploratory research purpose by sampling individuals associated with the largest, professional association for law enforcement in Tennessee – TCPA.

Instrumentation and Major Variables

In order to produce relevant findings, the survey was constructed after reviewing past research and instrumentation used in other similar studies (Western Carolina
University, 2006; International City/County Management Association, 2005; The Council of State Governments & Eastern Kentucky University, 2006). Most of the scholarly research in the area of homeland security perceptions and practices has been conducted on a national level; therefore, the content of national instruments was modified by using smaller scale state surveys and questions deemed relevant to the overall purpose of the present inquiry. The survey looked for general disagreement among respondents as the ideology, rationale, and practice of homeland security at the local level. It also asked respondents to report on both formal and informal departmental policies on homeland security. Further survey items addressed homeland security activities, training, and expenditures, and general demographic information on officers, agencies, and the communities policed. A copy of the survey instruments can be found in Appendix A.

Procedure

During the second week of February 2010, the survey was forwarded to individuals on the TCPA member list. A message was included in the email that contained information regarding survey sponsorship, objectives, and purposes. Potential recipients were also assured concerning issues of anonymity and confidentiality as well as information regarding researcher adherence to required processes regarding involvement of human subjects in social research. In an effort to increase the response rate, the initial email mentioned two important organizations as co-sponsors – the Law Enforcement Innovation Center (LEIC) and the Southeastern Command and Leadership Academy (SECLA). Both entities are well recognized and respected across the State as important professional associations for law enforcement. After one week, approximately
120 individuals had responded to the survey. Furthermore, the useable sampling frame was reduced to 1,938 due to invalid or unreachable email addresses. It is expected that many of the survey announcements were received as “spam mail”, one of the major drawbacks to electronic survey delivery. Therefore, considering the valid sample frame, the first wave response rate was 6.2%. Two subsequent waves of the survey were delivered during the third and fourth weeks of February. The administration of wave two included the addition of TCPA as one of the sponsoring agencies, after they had provided their consent to be listed. This was done in an effort to increase the number of useable surveys. At the end of wave two 205 surveys had been completed, which increased the overall response rate to 10.6%.

A final administration of the survey was conducted in the last week of February. The email announcement was appropriately amended and indicated to non-respondents that this was the last email that they would receive. The third wave produced 93 additional responses (a total of 294 respondents) which increased the final response rate to 15.2%. This final response rate reflects a percentage related to the population of TCPA members and appropriately represents a percentage of a population. Therefore, generalizations can certainly be made to TCPA member perceptions, and to a more limited degree, to officers across the State. Finally, since the Speed-Survey apparatus does not allow for the same email address to complete the survey in subsequent deliveries, the researchers remained reasonably assured that there were no duplicate surveys contained in the data.
Chapter IV
Results and Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

Frequency distributions were run on all demographic variables in the study, which can be found in Table 1. Results indicated that a majority of respondents worked for a municipal law enforcement agency (53%), within an urban jurisdiction (51%), and were from an agency that employed 100+ full-time, sworn staff (50%). Concerning officer’s role within the agency, numbers were dispersed relatively evenly across all categories, with about 28% in a field or part field/part administrative position and 27% in a strictly administrative role, potentially allowing for a high level of generalizability of the survey throughout multiple levels of local law enforcement. Results also indicated that most respondents were experienced law enforcement professionals, with 44% and 53% reporting that they have worked for their respective agency and in their current profession for 16+ years. Most respondents also reported to be between the ages of 41-50 (40%). Furthermore, 85% were white, and 81% were male, with just under 50% having a college degree.

Descriptive statistics were performed on continuous and discrete variables in the study, which can be found in Tables 2 and 2A. First, descriptive statistics were conducted on all homeland security ideological variables. On a scale from 1-3 (with 1 representing the least amount of importance and 3 representing the most amount of importance), respondents were asked to state their perception of the importance of prevention, protection, and preparation at both federal and local levels. Results indicated an average
Table 1: Demographic/ Organizational Characteristics of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% (Valid)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency/medical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire/Safety</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approximately Number of Staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-30</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-99</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100+</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Jurisdiction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role in Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field position</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part field/Part Administration</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Position</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years Working in Agency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in Current Profession</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51+</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS/GED</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
response of about “2” across all categories, reflecting a modest level of agreement concerning importance of all variables. Respondents were also asked to report the level of emphasis placed on homeland security in their department on a scale of 1-4 (1

Table 2:
Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey (n=294)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Prevention at Federal Level</td>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.638</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Protection at Federal Level</td>
<td>(most)</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Preparation at Federal Level</td>
<td>- least)</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>.799</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Prevention at Department Level</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Protection at Department Level</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>.714</td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of Preparation at Departmental Level</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.796</td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on HS at Departmental Level</td>
<td>4-1 (high - No)</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that DHS mission is clear</td>
<td>5-1 (strongest - least agreement)</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that HS state/local mission is clear</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that HS department mission is clear</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that local HS mandate should be same as DHS</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that local HS training is as important as DHS</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement that local threat info is an important as DHS</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>.878</td>
<td>293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of HS practices throughout the state</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of HS practices and overall state mission</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>.957</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency of HS activities and mission in department</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of emergency preparedness at local level</td>
<td>5-1 (highest - lowest)</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of terrorism prevention at local level</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of border patrol at local level</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import of disaster relief at local level</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatest potential threat to federal government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to critical infrastructure</td>
<td>146(50%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to public health</td>
<td>104(35%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to buildings/installations</td>
<td>38(13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5(2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatest potential threat to local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to critical infrastructure</td>
<td>107(36%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to public health</td>
<td>122(42%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to buildings/installations</td>
<td>56(19%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>8(3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All percentages represent valid ones, and descriptive statistics have been rounded to nearest whole number.

representing low emphasis and 4 representing high emphasis). An average of 2.8, suggesting a slightly higher than moderate emphasis on homeland security at the departmental level, was indicated.
Next, respondents were asked a series of questions regarding their agreement with certain statements concerning the clarity, consistency, and importance of certain aspects of homeland security at the local, state, and federal level. Responses were measured on a scale of 1-5 (1 representing the least agreement and 5 representing the strongest agreement). Responses indicated the strongest agreement with the statements that:

**Table 2A:**
Descriptive Statistics of Homeland Security Survey (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HS Practice and Preparedness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of threat management/ assessment program</td>
<td>68(23%)</td>
<td>13(46%)</td>
<td>90(31%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 HS/emergency management plan</td>
<td>39(13%)</td>
<td>186(64%)</td>
<td>67(23%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of recognized HS priority activities</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of HS agency collaborations</td>
<td>1-7</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of HS training</td>
<td>1-8</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 enhanced investigation responsibilities</td>
<td>4-1 (strongly)</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS directives are being effectively implemented</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>.979</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department has good amount of HS training</td>
<td>agree - strongly</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>.803</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in implementing counterterrorism strategies</td>
<td>4-1 (strongly)</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.894</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of HS local training</td>
<td>agree- strongly disagree</td>
<td>23(8%)</td>
<td>39(13%)</td>
<td>149(52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-annually</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually (or less)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HS Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 funding allocations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>38(13%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>153(53%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>97(34%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 requests for HS funding in agency have increased</td>
<td>4-1 (strongly)</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>.961</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 resources have better prepared agency</td>
<td>agree – strongly</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 9/11 resources should target non-rural areas</td>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.933</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: All percentages represent valid ones, and descriptive statistics have been rounded to nearest whole number.*

Homeland security training at the local level is as important as the national level, and having valid information on terrorism/threat assessment is as important at the local level.
as the national level. Furthermore, the concept of emergency preparedness at the local level was viewed as most important among respondents, $\bar{x} = 4.3$. Respondents were also asked to select what they viewed as the greatest threats to the federal and local government. Threat to critical infrastructure proved to be most prominent among the federal government, while threat to public health was viewed as the greatest potential threat to local government.

In order to measure the amount of homeland security practices within agencies, respondents were asked questions regarding the number of homeland security activities and the frequency of training within their respective agencies. First, respondents were asked to select what aspects of homeland security they saw as a top priority in their departments. These ranged from training, planning, communication and information sharing, to investigative and prosecutorial activities. Results indicated an average of 3.2 top priorities in their departments. Next, respondents were asked which agencies they collaborated with on homeland security-related issues, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and Federal Emergency Management Administration. Results indicated that agencies collaborated with a $\bar{x}$ of 3.6 agencies in relation to homeland security-related issues. Respondents were also asked to report the number of areas they had homeland security training, such as emergency planning, biohazard awareness, cyber security, and media communications. Respondents reported a $\bar{x}$ of 3.8 training areas.

Respondents were also asked their level of agreement (1 representing strongest disagreement and 4 representing strongest agreement) with statements concerning the
effectiveness and implementation of DHS directives in their agencies and how involved their department is in implementing homeland security strategies. Overall, results indicated slight disagreement to somewhat moderate agreement regarding post 9/11 enhanced investigation responsibilities, effective DHS directive implementation, whether or not they felt their agency had a good amount of homeland security training, and involvement in implementing homeland security related strategies. Finally, 52% reported that their agency had homeland security related training annually (or less).

Concerning homeland security funding, 53% said that they had received some amount of homeland security funding since 9/11. Perceptions of homeland security funding increases were measured on a scale of 1-4 (1 representing strongly disagree and 4 representing strongly agree). When asked if requests for funding had increased in their agency since 9/11, results produced a $\bar{x}$ of 2.8, indicating a slight level of disagreement in regards to funding request increases. Respondents were also asked if they felt that post 9/11 resources have better prepared their agency. The $\bar{x}$ response was 2.7, once again indicating no clear level of agreement. Finally, when asked if homeland security funding should continue to be distributed primarily to non-rural agency, again results indicated some level of disagreement ($\bar{x} = 2.7$).

Major Variable Coding

Certain variables were recoded into dichotomous, dummy-coded categories in order to conduct bi-variate and multivariate analysis. Questions measuring respondents’ level of agreement with certain ideological and practical related statements that had specified values for each category were recoded as 0 = disagree and 1 = agree. These
questions consisted of agreement with current allocation of homeland security funding based on jurisdiction (UALLOCATE), effect of funds’ allocation on homeland security preparedness in one’s department (ALLOCATE), increases in requests for homeland security funding in one’s department post 9/11 (REQUESTS), and increases in departmental investigative responsibilities post 9/11 (RESPONSE). The question “how involved is your department in implementing counterterrorism and homeland security strategies?” (STRAT) was recoded to 0 = not involved at all and 1 = involved. Certain demographic variables were also recoded. Race (RACE) was recoded to 0 = minority and 1 = White, Age (AGE) as 0 = 21-40 and 1 = 41 or older, Gender (GENDER) as 0 = Female and 1 = Male, and the type of jurisdiction that one’s agency serves (URBAN) as 0 = other and 1 = urban. Respondent’s role within their agency was recoded into two separate dichotomous variables: field position (FIELD) as 0 = other and 1 = field and administrative positions (ADMIN) as 0 = other and 1 = administrative.

While other variables, such as those measuring perceptions regarding the clarity of DHS directives and mission statements at the federal (DHSF), state (DHSS), and local (or departmental) (DHSD) levels, the importance of homeland security training at the federal versus the local level (TRAINING), the consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices (CONSISTENCY), the important of a threat assessment at the federal versus local level (THREAT), and whether the homeland security mandate should be the same at the federal as the local level (MANDATE) were used in the bi-variate and multivariate analysis, these variables were not recoded. This was due to the lack of specified values for each category. While respondent’s level of agreement with
the statements were measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 representing the strongest agreement and 1 representing the strongest disagreement), except for strongest agreement and strongest disagreement, no specific level of agreement was implied for the other categories. Therefore, dichotomizing these variables one would have to assume an equal understanding of the level of agreement in each category among all respondents.

**Bi-variate Relationships**

A bi-variate analysis was conducted on a variety of variables related to homeland security practical perceptions, ideology, and agency demographics. Three dependent variables were used for the correlations (see Tables 3, 3A, and 3B in Appendix B). The designated dependent variables asked respondents to state their level of agreement on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 representing the strongest agreement and 1 representing the strongest disagreement) with statements regarding the clarity of the mission, responsibilities, goals and strategies of homeland security at the federal (DHSF), state (DHSS), and local (or departmental) levels (DHSD). The selected variables were used due to their overall concern with homeland security practical perceptions and ideology across multiple levels.

Correlations were first conducted on variables related to homeland security practical perceptions (see Table 3). The first variable measured was respondent’s agreement regarding the continuation of allocating homeland security funds primarily to non-rural agencies (UALLOCATE). A significant relationship was found only in regard to the clarity of homeland security at the local level (DHSD) \( r = -.192** \), indicating a weak inverse relationship. This indicated that if respondents agreed that funding should primarily be allocated to non-rural areas, the less likely they felt that there was clarity
among homeland security at the local level. Regarding the effects homeland security funding on agency preparedness (ALLOCATE), a moderate inverse relationship was found across all dependent variables (DHSF: $r = -.324**$; DHSS: $r = -.342**$; DHSD: $r = -.443**$) indicating that the more likely one felt that post 9/11 homeland security funding had better prepared their agency, the less likely they were to feel there was clarity among homeland security at all levels. Significant relationships were also found between all dependent variables and increases in funding requests post 9/11. All relationships were inverse and weak to moderate in strength (DHSF: $r = -.165**$; DHSS: $r = -.260**$; DHSD: $r = -.358**$). Results indicated that the more likely one feels that funding requests within their agency had increased since 9/11, the less likely they were to agree that there is clarity regarding homeland security at any level. Concerning the relationship between increases in departmental investigative responsibilities and the clarity of homeland security at the federal level, there was a weak inverse relationship ($r = - .197**$). A weak inverse relationship was also found among state clarity of homeland security ($r = -.237**$) and a moderate inverse relationship in regard to clarity of homeland security at the local level ($r = -.437**$). In other words, if the respondents agreed that investigative responsibilities within their department had increased since 9/11, there was less agreement that there was clarity of homeland security at all levels.

While most variables measured agreement with certain statements regarding homeland security practices, other variables were selected to measure specific departmental involvement in homeland security related practices. The correlation between departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies
(STRAT) and clarity of homeland security at the federal level produced a weak positive relationship \( (r = .196**) \), and a weak to moderate positive relationship was found in relation to clarity of homeland security at the state level (DHSS) \( (r = .292**) \). A positive relationship was also found between departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies and clarity of homeland security at the local level \( (r = .492**) \). The variable measuring the total number of areas that agencies had homeland security training (TRAIN #), number of agencies collaborated with on homeland security related issues (COLLAB #), and number of homeland security priorities within respondent’s agency (PRIORITIES #) was also measured in relation to the aforementioned dependent variables. The correlation between federal homeland security clarity (DHSF) and homeland security training activities produced a weak, positive relationship \( (r = .200**) \). Similar relationships were found between COLLAB# \( (r = .130*) \) and PRIORITIES \( (r = .131*) \) as related to DHSF. Regarding the correlation between homeland security clarity at the state level (DHSS) and homeland security training activities, collaborations, and priorities, analysis produced weak positive relationships. Bi-variate analysis between homeland security clarity at the departmental level (DHSD) and agency homeland security training activities, collaborations, and priorities produced stronger [positive] correlations of \( .455**, .459**, \) and \( .332** \), respectively. Overall results indicated that the more involved one perceives their agency to be in homeland security related practices, the more they were likely to have stronger levels of agreement concerning the clarity of homeland security at all levels.
Next, bi-variate analysis was conducted on variables relating to homeland security ideology (see Table 3A). Along with the dependent variables (DHSF, DHSS, and DHSD), four independent variables were selected which covered ideological perceptions of homeland security at the federal, state, and local levels. These consisted of the perception of the importance of homeland security training at the federal and local level (TRAINING), consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices (CONSISTENCY), whether the homeland security mandate should be the same at the local level as the national level (MANDATE), and a threat assessment/management plan is as important at the local level as the national level (THREAT). The correlation between federal homeland security clarity and homeland security training produced a weak positive relationship ($r = .154^{**}$). The same weak positive relationship was found between state homeland security clarity and homeland security training ($r = .123^*$). These results indicate that the stronger level of agreement one has that homeland security training should be the same at the local as the national level, the more likely one is to have a stronger level of agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the federal and state levels. Regarding consistency of homeland security practices within the State, a moderate positive relationship was found in relation to homeland security clarity at the federal level ($r = .495^{**}$). However, a stronger positive relationship was found with regard to homeland security clarity at the state level and CONSISTENCY ($r = .630^{**}$), with a moderate positive relationship exhibited at the departmental level ($r = .552^{**}$). In other words, the more likely one was to agree that there is consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices, the more likely one was to agree that there is
clarity among homeland security at all levels. The relationship between whether the homeland security mandate should be the same at the local as the national level and federal, state, and local homeland security clarity produced weak positive relationships (DHSF: $r = .249^{**}$; DHSS: $r = .220^{**}$; DHSD: $r = .174^{**}$). The same can be said for the importance of a threat assessment/management plan at the local versus the federal level, which produced weak positive relationships in regard to federal, state, and local homeland security clarity (DHSF $r = .189^{**}$, DHSS $r = .147^*$, DHSD $r = .128^*$). Overall, results indicated that the stronger the level of agreement one has that the homeland security mandate should be the same at the local as the national level and that the existence of a threat assessment/management plan is as important at the local as national level, the stronger the level of agreement one had that there is clarity among homeland security at all levels.

Finally, bi-variate analysis was conducted on the relationship between agency demographic variables and the dependent variables. Regarding the dependent variable of federal homeland security clarity (DHSF), significance was only found in relation to gender ($r = .143^*$). This weak positive relationship indicated that if a respondent was male, the more likely they were to have a higher level of agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the federal level. A weak positive relationship was also found between whether one has an administrative role within their agency (ADMIN) and clarity of homeland security in one’s department ($r = .120^*$), indicating that administrators were more likely to agree that there was clarity among homeland security objectives at the local level.
**Multivariate Analysis**

Following the bi-variate analysis, linear regression was used to further test the relationship between the dependent variables of DHSF, DHSS, and DHSD and the predictor variables in the study (See Table 4). Conceptualization of the three models was derived from bi-variate analysis. Practice, perception, ideological, and organizational demographic variables which exhibited significant correlations to one of the dependent criterion variables (DHSF, DHSS, or DHSD) were placed in each of the three linear regression models. Because of the extremely high correlations between DHSF and DHSS, only one of these variables was used in model 3 (DHSD) to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. Of the demographic variables, RACE, AGE, and GENDER, only gender was bi-variately related to one of the criterion variables, but due to the fact that these variables often exhibit interactive effects, all three were included in each model. In model 1, the dependent variable of DHSF was used. This model was significant and produced an $r^2$ of .611, explaining about 60% of the variance. The variables of whether homeland security funding had better prepared respondent’s agency (ALLOCATE), whether post 9/11 responsibilities have increased (RESPONSE), cumulative number of departmental collaborations (COLLAB #), and clarity of homeland security at the state and departmental level (DHSS) proved to be significant predictor variables in relation to federal homeland security clarity (DHSF). These results indicated that as agreement that there was clarity among homeland security at the federal level increased, agreement that post 9/11 officer/investigative responsibilities had increased, homeland security funding had better prepared one’s agency, and the number of
Table 4:
OLS Regression Models of Homeland Security Clarity, Practices, Ideology, and Demographic Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>DHSF</th>
<th>DHSS</th>
<th>DHSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UALLOCATE</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLOCATE</td>
<td>-.141*</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>-.116*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REQUESTS</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSE</td>
<td>-.106*</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.124*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRAT</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.143*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING #</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.152**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLAB #</td>
<td>-.126*</td>
<td>.097*</td>
<td>.101*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIORITIES #</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.307**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANDATE</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREAT</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>-.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMIN</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>-.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBAN</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHSF</td>
<td>.519**</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.175**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHSS</td>
<td>.762***</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHSD</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>.313**</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F Ratio 19.571** 34.565** 17.665**
R² .611 .735 .572

Departmental collaborations on homeland security issues decreased. However, as agreement as agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the federal level increased, as did agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the state level.

Next, the dependent variable of DHSS was used. This model proved to be significant as well and produced an r squared of .735, explaining about 74% of the
variance. In this model, the variables of whether post 9/11 investigative responsibilities increased (RESPONSE), cumulative number of agency collaborations (COLLAB #), state consistency regarding homeland security practices (CONSISTENCY), clarity of homeland security at the federal level (DHSF) and clarity of homeland security at the departmental level (DHSD) proved to be significant predictor variables. Results indicated that as agreement with the aforementioned variables and number agency collaborations increased, so did agreement that there is clarity concerning homeland security at the state level.

Finally, the dependent variable of agreement that there was clarity regarding the homeland security mission at the departmental level (DHSD) was used. This model was also significant and produced an $r^2$ of .572, explaining about 57% of the variance. Even though this model explained the least amount of the variance, it had the most predictor variables that were significant. These consisted of whether homeland security funding had better prepared one’s agency to handle threat (ALLOCATE), whether post 9/11 investigative responsibilities had increased (RESPONSE), departmental involvement in implementing homeland security strategies (STRAT), number of homeland security related training activities (TRAINING), number of agency collaborations on homeland security related issues (COLLAB #), consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices, and homeland security clarity at the federal level. Similar to its relationship with DHSF, the variable of whether post 9/11 funding had better prepared one’s agency produced an inverse relationship with the dependent variable of DHSD. However, all other significant predictor variables in this model
produced positive relationships. Even though a high number of variables proved to be significant, this may be due to other interdepartmental influences that, due to research design, cannot be accounted for in this analysis.
Chapter V
Discussion

As previously stated, this study attempted to determine significant predictors regarding perceived clarity of homeland security missions and goals of federal, state, and local (or departmental level) law enforcement objectives, as well as identify demographic, ideological, and practical factors that may influence the nature of these belief systems. More specifically, it attempted to determine if a consensus exists concerning the perceived missions and goals of homeland security at the various law enforcement levels and if there is a relative level of agreement for homeland security policy and practical perceptions. The factors significantly impacting overall perceived mission and strategic clarity of homeland security as an emergent law enforcement mandate were also examined. To begin with, consistency was found among most ideological variables. This is evident with variables measuring clarity of homeland security at the multiple levels of law enforcement, the importance of prevention, protection, and preparation at varying levels, and those regarding the homeland security mandate, training, and local threat information. Moderate to strong levels of agreement were found across all variables, with the exception of whether homeland security related training and having valid threat assessment/management information was as important at the local as the federal level, with stronger levels of agreement found among these variables. In summation, findings from the study indicate consistent moderate to strong levels of agreement across all levels of law enforcement in relation to most homeland security ideological perceptions.
Just as consistency was found among variables regarding the perceived mission and goals of homeland security, consistency was found among variables measuring policy and practical perception of homeland security. Respondents indicated an average of about three to four homeland security priority activities within their agencies, collaborations on homeland security issues, and homeland security related training activities. Furthermore, respondents indicated moderate levels of agreement with variables measuring post 9/11 enhanced investigative responsibilities, the effective implementation of homeland security directives within their agency, involvement in implementing post 9/11 counterterrorism strategies, and whether their department has a good amount of homeland security related training. Moderate levels of agreement were also found among variables related to homeland security funding, such agency post 9/11 funding request increases, whether post 9/11 resources have better prepared one’s agency, and whether post 9/11 resources should continue to target non-rural areas.

Several variables were found to significantly impact one’s perception regarding clarity of homeland security as well. Regarding the clarity of homeland security at the federal level, results indicated that there as agreement that there is clarity increased, there was less belief that funding had better prepared one’s agency, belief that officer/investigator responsibilities had not increased, a lower number of collaborations on homeland security related issues, and higher levels of agreement that there is homeland security clarity at the state level. As clarity of homeland security at the state level increased, there were perceived new officer/investigator responsibilities, a higher number of agency collaborations, perceived consistency of homeland security practices
within the state, and that there was clarity of homeland security at the federal level. Finally, as agreement that there is clarity among homeland security at the departmental level increased, as did agreement that officers/investigators have significantly new responsibilities, that there is consistency within the state regarding homeland security practices, clarity among homeland security at the federal level, and number of agency collaborations and training activities. However, there was less belief that funding had better prepared one’s agency and less perceived involvement of homeland security in one’s department. Most notably, the dependent variable of respondent’s perception of departmental homeland security clarity, followed closely by state homeland security clarity, had the highest number of variables that predicted homeland security clarity.

Other aspects of the research produced interesting results as well. First, it is important to note that results only indicated moderate levels of agreement at best regarding perceptions of homeland security ideology, policy, and practice, with the exception of whether homeland security related training and having valid threat assessment/management information was as important at the local as the federal level, with relatively strong levels of agreement found among these variables. While this could indicate somewhat of a concern for threat among respondents and a modest level of interest or concern for homeland security as a whole, this study did not measure perceptions of threat among respondents; therefore, one can only speculate as to such concerns.

Next, even though relative levels of agreement were expressed across most variables, some variation was seen among variables measuring practical perceptions. For
example, when asked if post 9/11 resources had better prepared one’s agency to handle threats, results indicated an inverse relationship with homeland security clarity. This is interesting due to the positive relationship that other similar variables concerned with ideological and practical perceptions had with perceptions of clarity in general, such as number of homeland security training activities, agency collaborations at the state and local level, and perceptions of increases in officer/investigator responsibilities at the state and local level.

Furthermore, in the multivariate analysis, a significantly higher number of variables proved to be predictors of departmental homeland security clarity as opposed to homeland security clarity at the federal level. Results also indicated that consistency of the federal homeland security mission is not predicated by higher local involvement, while the State model indicated that consistency of homeland security practices within the state and belief about new roles and collaborations are the best predictors. The Departmental model also observed tangibles such as training, responsibilities, collaborations, and consistency of state practices, but also indicated that less funding and less overall involvement defined departmental homeland security clarity. This may be due to other interdepartmental influences that, due to research design, cannot be accounted for in this analysis, such as lack of exposure to or understanding of the specifics of the broader concept of the federal homeland security mandate. However, this also lends credibility to the assumption that respondents inferred Federal clarity as a general concept, while State and Departmental clarity were inferred as more contextual or specific in relation to the major variables. Finally, agency size was found not to be a
significant predictor of perceptions of homeland security clarity. Due to the prominence of homeland security funding and practices in urban compared to rural areas, one might assume that this would have significantly impacted perceptions regarding the clarity of homeland security.

Due to the nature of this study as exploratory research and the lack of empirical analysis concerning ideological, political, and practical perceptions of homeland security, findings are not comparable to most of extant research. Currently, most studies concerning homeland security at the local/departmental level have either focused on the concept of homeland security and its overall effect on the policing institution, or been limited to examining its relationship to perceptions of threat, certain departmental activities, or specific demographic criteria (Brown, 2007; Oliver, 2006; Oliver, 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009; Schaefer et al., 2009). This study, however, not only attempted to identify demographic, ideological, and practical factors that may influence homeland security perceptions at the departmental level, but their relation to perceptions regarding the clarity of homeland security across multiple levels of law enforcement as well.

Even though the nature of this research differs considerably in comparison to other studies of homeland security issues, similar demographic variables were used in this analysis due to their significant relationship with variables regarding homeland security perceptions in other studies (Schaefer et al., 2009; Stewart & Morris, 2009). One of these variables was type of jurisdiction. While it proved to be a significant predictor in the previous literature, it did not prove to be significant in this analysis. Furthermore, while type of agency also proved to be significant in previous studies, it was not chosen
for the bi-variate or multivariate analysis in this research. This was due to its similarity in findings with type of jurisdiction in the descriptive analysis. Type of jurisdiction can also be generalized to agency type, with municipal departments policing urban areas and sheriff’s departments typically policing more rural communities; therefore, another variable concerning type of community policed was not deemed necessary.

Furthermore, even though this study is inherently different than the research conducted by Brown (2007) and Oliver (2006) on the effects of homeland security policies and practices on the policing institution, it reiterates the importance of the question posed by their research: have homeland security policing practices ushered in a new era of policing?. For example, the high number of variables found to predict clarity of homeland security at the departmental versus the federal level in this analysis may indicate that more specific, contextual variables influence perceptions of homeland security throughout local law enforcement. While the arguments by Brown (2007) and Oliver (2006) stated that homeland security policing practices have either reinforced the community policing era or ushered in a new era all together, results from this study extend that argument by also identifying a need for better understanding of perceptions of homeland security policies and practices and their potential implications throughout the local law enforcement environment.

As previously stated, there are some limitations to this study, most notably its distribution via email. The sampling frame was affected by a number of the surveys being viewed as “spam mail”, either by the recipient’s email server or the recipients themselves, which is one of the major drawbacks to electronic survey delivery.
Furthermore, this study asked questions related to funding allocation and perceptions of departmental policies and practices. Even though confidentiality and anonymity were assured to all respondents, the response rate could have potentially been limited due to respondent’s concern with providing information on what may have been viewed as “sensitive”, private, or even too political by some.

In conclusion, this study attempted to determine significant predictors of perceived clarity of homeland security of federal, state, and local law enforcement objectives as well as identify demographic, ideological, and practical factors that potentially influence such perceptions. Currently, homeland security research in local law enforcement is limited at best. However, studies such as this that seek to identify multiple influences on homeland security perceptions, policies, and practical implementation can have a dramatic effect on homeland security in local law enforcement. They can provide valuable insight as to what influences the perceived effectiveness of program implementation, allow for better allocation of funds, and lead to the development of programs that better fit the needs of individual communities while staying consistent with federal, state, and local homeland security mandates.

As the threat of terrorism throughout the world continues to evolve, so must the concept of homeland security, and research such as this will allow for better overall understanding and preparation to meet the challenges of this evolving mandate. Whereas the extant research has considered the relevance of homeland security as a dominant police strategy, the present study has focused on perceived clarity related to the
concept. It would appear logical that the answer to the latter question intuitively impacts the answer to the former.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (1999, March). *California terrorism response plan: An annex to the state emergency plan.*


United States Department of Justice & The Federal Bureau of Investigation (n.d.)
Terrorism: 2002-2005


U.S. Department of Justice (n.d.) Responding to September 11 victims: Lessons learned from the States (NCJ 208799).


APPENDIX A
Homeland Security Survey
Dear Police Professional:

Attached to this email is a web link containing a survey on homeland security concepts, policies, and practices. The research is being conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. The research is also supported by the Tennessee Association of Chiefs of Police (TACP), the Southeastern Command and Leadership Academy (SECLA), as well as the Law Enforcement Innovation Center (LEIC) in Knoxville. This research is an attempt to describe homeland security issues in local law enforcement from the perspective of individual officers. Your experience as a law enforcement practitioner/supporter makes your opinion quite valuable. If possible, we would like to include you in our study.

Although we have asked for certain demographic and organizational information, please be assured that this information will be handled in an anonymous and confidential manner. Likewise, we will not identify any agency in any printed materials. Our immediate goal is to produce research findings that will be of value both academically and practically.

We have followed the process required by our institution (The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga) for conducting this type of research project and institutional approval is on file with the Chair of the Institutional Review Board, Dr. M. D. Roblyer, who can be contacted at (423) 425-5567.

Respectfully yours,

Vic W. Bumphus, Ph.D
Associate Professor
&
Adam Baldwin
Graduate Research Assistant

Please indicate your willingness to complete the survey by accessing the following web link at: http://dhs.speedsurvey.com
Thanks! For your time and Consideration.

*The Institutional Review Board at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (FWA00004149) has approved this research project # 10-009*
Please help us serve you better by taking a few moments to fill out this survey form. The results will be returned to us automatically via the web.

The tasks of counterterrorism and homeland security are typically grouped into what are known as the 3 P's: prevention (preventing terrorist attacks), protection (protecting targets of potential attacks), and preparation (preparing for quick response and recovery after a potential attack). How would you rate the order of importance among the federal government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Least important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How would you rank the importance of prevention, protection, and preparation in your department?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Least important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In your opinion, what level of emphasis does your department place on homeland security concepts and strategies?

- [ ] No emphasis
- [ ] Low-level emphasis
- [ ] Moderate emphasis
- [ ] High-level emphasis

Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements, with 5 representing the strongest agreement and 1 representing the strongest disagreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The mission, responsibilities, strategies, and/or goals of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are clearly understood or defined.</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The mission and responsibilities of state and local homeland security strategies and/or goals are clearly defined or understood.

The mission, responsibilities, strategies, and/or goals of your department's homeland security vision is clearly understood or defined.

The homeland security mandate should be the same at the local level as on the national level.

Homeland security training is as important at local level as on the national level.

Having valid information on terrorism/threat assessment is as important at the local level as on the national level.

There is a good amount of consistency within the State regarding homeland security practices.

The homeland security activities in my State are consistent with the State mission statement.

The homeland security activities in my department are consistent with the department's mission statement or policy objectives.

Please indicate the importance of the following concepts related to homeland security at the local level, 5 (highest) and 1 (lowest).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism prevention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster relief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What do you consider to be the greatest potential threat to the national government?

- Terrorist threat to government buildings or installations
- Terrorist threat to critical infrastructure
What do you consider to be the greatest potential threat to your local government?

- Terrorist threat to government buildings or installations
- Terrorist threat to critical infrastructure
- Terrorist threat to public health
- None

Since 9/11, has your department developed a comprehensive homeland security related plan or amended your existing emergency management plan?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

How involved is your department in implementing counterterrorism and homeland security strategies?

- Very involved
- Somewhat involved
- Hardly involved
- Not involved

Which of the following aspects of homeland security would you consider to be a top priority in your department? (Check all that apply)

- Planning
- Training
- Equipment (HAZMAT, decontamination, etc.)
- Communication (interoperability, data, community mobilization, etc.)
- Intelligence/information (intelligence gathering and analysis, sensor monitoring, etc.)
- Response/recovery (primary and secondary response to incidents and disasters)
- Investigation/prosecution (proactive and reactive investigation of incidents and crimes)
Does your department currently have a threat management/assessment program?
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don't know

Since 9/11, officers/investigations in your agency have significantly new responsibilities in responding to terrorist events.
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Somewhat agree
☐ Somewhat disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

Please check the following agencies/organizations that your local government collaborates with on homeland security issues. (Check all that apply)
☐ Other local governments
☐ Local military installations
☐ State government agencies
☐ FBI/DOJ
☐ DHS/FEMA
☐ DOD
☐ Non governmental agencies

You are confident that the DHS directives are being effectively implemented and adequately supported within your department.
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Somewhat agree
☐ Somewhat disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

In which of the following areas does your local government have training? (Check all that apply)
☐ Emergency planning, preparedness, response
☐ Biohazard awareness/identification
☐ Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosives attacks/responses
☐ Critical infrastructure response
☐ Grant development and writing
☐ Cyber security
☐ Media communications
☐ Coordination of volunteer efforts/donations

Your department has a great deal of mandatory homeland security and counterterrorism training.
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Somewhat agree
☐ Somewhat disagree
☐ Strongly disagree

How often does your department have homeland security or counterterrorism training?
☐ Quarterly
☐ Bi-annually
☐ Annually (or less frequent)
☐ Not at all

Since 9/11, your department has received homeland security funding.
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Don't know

Requests for homeland security in your agency has increased compared to funding prior to 9/11.
☐ Strongly agree
☐ Somewhat agree
☐ Somewhat disagree
☐ Strongly disagree
The resources that have been allocated to your department have prepared your agency to better handle possible terrorist attacks.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

The overwhelming majority of homeland security resources have been allocated towards non-rural areas. Do you think resources should continue to be distributed in this manner?

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Type of Agency

- Municipal
- County
- Consolidated
- Emergency/medical
- Fire/safety
- Other

Approximately, how many sworn staff does your department employ?

- 0-30
- 31-99
- 100 +

How would you characterize the jurisdiction your department serves?

- Urban
- Rural
- Suburban
Role within your agency.
- Field position
- Part field/part administrative position
- Administrative position
- Other

How long have you been working with your agency?
- 1-5 years
- 6-10 years
- 11-15 years
- 16 + years

How long have you worked in your current profession?
- 1-5 years
- 5-10 years
- 11-15 years
- 16 + years

Age
- 21-30
- 31-40
- 41-50
- 50 or older

Highest level of education achieved.
- High School/GED
- Some college
- Bachelor's degree

Race
- Black
- White
□ Hispanic
□ Other

*Gender*
□ Male
□ Female

*Thank you for taking the time to fill out this survey.*
APPENDIX B:
Supplemental Tables
Table 3: Bi-variate Correlations of Homeland Security Practice Perceptions and Clarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>X1</th>
<th>X2</th>
<th>X3</th>
<th>X4</th>
<th>X5</th>
<th>X6</th>
<th>X7</th>
<th>X8</th>
<th>X9</th>
<th>X10</th>
<th>X11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x1 DHSF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x2 DHSS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.742*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x3 DHSD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.438**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x4 UALLOCATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.646**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x5 ALLOCATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x6 REQUESTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x7 RESPONSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x8 STRAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x9 TRAIN #</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x10 COLLAB #</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x11 PRIORITIES #</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.324**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p< .05; **p< .01 (2-tailed)
Table 3A:
Bi-variate Correlations of Homeland Security Ideological Perceptions and Perceptions of Clarity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>X 1</th>
<th>X 2</th>
<th>X 3</th>
<th>X 12</th>
<th>X 13</th>
<th>X 14</th>
<th>X 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x 1 DHSF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 2 DHSS</td>
<td>.742**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 3 DHSD</td>
<td>.438**</td>
<td>.646**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 12 TRAINING</td>
<td>.154**</td>
<td>.123*</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 13 CONSISTENCY</td>
<td>.495**</td>
<td>.630**</td>
<td>.552**</td>
<td>.158**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 14 MANDATE</td>
<td>.249**</td>
<td>.220**</td>
<td>.174**</td>
<td>.416**</td>
<td>.225**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x 15 THREAT</td>
<td>.189**</td>
<td>.147*</td>
<td>.128*</td>
<td>.630**</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.431**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01 (2-tailed)
**Table 3B**  
Correlations of Agency Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>X1</th>
<th>X2</th>
<th>X3</th>
<th>X15</th>
<th>X16</th>
<th>X17</th>
<th>X18</th>
<th>X19</th>
<th>X20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X1 DHSF</td>
<td>.742**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X2 DHSS</td>
<td>.438**</td>
<td>.646**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X3 DHSD</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X15 RACE</td>
<td>-.100</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X16 AGE</td>
<td>.143*</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.209**</td>
<td>-.061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X17 GENDER</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.120*</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.209**</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X18 ADMIN</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.202**</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>-.386**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X19 FIELD</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.152**</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01 (2-tailed)
APPENDIX C
Department of Homeland Security
Organizational Chart
Figure 1: Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart

DHS
Secretary

- U.S. Secret Service
- Transportation Security Administration
- U.S. Customs and Border Control
- Multiple other directorates reporting to DHS Secretary

National Cybersecurity Center

- National Protection and Programs
- Intelligence and Analysis
- U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement

US-VISIT

Office of Risk Management and Analysis
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Office of Cyber Security and Communications
Office of Intergovernmental Programs

National Cyber Security Division

- Office of Emergency Communications
- Strategic Initiatives
- National Communications System
- Outreach and Awareness

- US-CERT

Source: GAO based on DHS data.