BRAXTON BRAGG ON LEADERSHIP: A HISTORICAL CASE STUDY ON
LEADER-MEMBER EXCHANGE IN THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE

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ABSTRACT

This historical case study was designed to analyze and describe the quality of the relationships between one historical, military commander, GEN Braxton Bragg, commander of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, and his senior lieutenants, through the lens of a contemporary, relationship-centered model of leadership dynamics, Leader-Member Exchange (LMX). The results of this research fill a void in the examination of historical leadership in light of contemporary theoretical frameworks. In addition, this study enables organizational leaders, from a variety of contexts, to identify the various dynamics between leader-member relationships that influence perceptions of organizational justice, trust, and loyalty.

The literature review (1) discusses the legitimacy of history as a source of leadership insight, (2) details the context for the emergence of LMX as a credible relationship-based theoretical framework, (3) identifies the distinctive features of LMX, and (4) anticipates how those features were evidenced in the historical context of the tenure of Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee during the most critical days of its history, most notably the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. Through a content analysis of the historical record, including the primary source record and seminal secondary sources, the interactions between Bragg and the senior members of his command are analyzed, using the LMX-MDM scale, and synthesized into a general LMX-informed description of the command climate of the Army of Tennessee during Bragg’s tenure.
While historians have tended to classify officers within the Army of Tennessee as either pro-Bragg or anti-Bragg, the findings indicate a much more complex command climate, with several officers demonstrating indications of anti-Bragg (i.e., out-group) sentiment, several indicating pro-Bragg (i.e., in-group) sentiment, and several demonstrating features of both.

While there are myriad reasons for the emergence of out-group and in-group sentiment, it is believed that this synthesis provides contemporary leaders with a model for examining leader-follower relationships within their own organizational settings, as well as with a series of lessons that might inform leadership preparation programs and, in the interest of promoting organizational effectiveness, instruct current leaders in better management of the quality of their relationships with members of their organizations.
DEDICATION

With all my heart, I dedicate this to my matchlessly beautiful wife, Whitney, who suffered far more than she should have had to during the past few years. My devotion to this project was an extension of my love for her. I pray that our love will always be characterized by truth and endurance, and I pray that I will never again allow her to feel like a casualty of some ancient battlefield.
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I would also like to acknowledge Lee White, Chris Young, and James Ogden, III for their willingness to participate in this project as members of my expert panel. Their insights on GEN Braxton Bragg and the Army of Tennessee carry tremendous weight, and their contributions have given this study a significant amount of authority.

The seeds of this study were planted years ago in high school and college. For being the most inspirational teachers I’ve ever had, I would like to thank Terry Phelps and Dr. Steven Woodworth.
Special thanks go to Dr. Richard McMurry, who read and critiqued a very early, rough version of my dissertation proposal and pilot study, and to Dr. Earl Hess, who generously provided a number of insights and pointed me in the direction of a number of GEN Bragg’s letters that I was able to add to my data pool.

To my comrades in Cohort 6, especially Ryan Bandy, Jill Beard, Colleen Harris, Ross Ian Vance, and Sharon Ratchford, I thank you for enduring countless discussions on Bragg and for allowing me to use each of you as sounding boards.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION........................................................................................................ vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................... vii

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................... xix

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................... xx

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

   Background to the Problem ........................................................................... 1
   Statement of the Problem ............................................................................. 7
   Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................... 9
   Research Questions ...................................................................................... 10
   Rationale for the Study ............................................................................... 12
   Theoretical/Conceptual Framework ........................................................... 14
   Significance of the Study .......................................................................... 15
   Definition of Terms .................................................................................. 17
   Methodological Assumptions ................................................................... 19
   Delimitations of the Study ....................................................................... 20
   Limitations of the Study ........................................................................... 21
   Organization of the Study ......................................................................... 24

II. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................... 25

   History as a Source of Leadership Insight ............................................... 25
   The Question of Universal Leadership Principles .................................... 26
   Military Doctrine as a Source of Leadership Insight .................................. 30
   LMX and the Development of Leadership Theoretical Frameworks .......... 32
      Categories of Leadership Theories .......................................................... 33
      Trait theories .......................................................................................... 34
      Behavioral theories .............................................................................. 37
      Contingency/situational theories ............................................................ 40
   The Development of LMX ......................................................................... 43
      Stage 1 – Vertical Dyad Linkage (VDL) .................................................. 44
Stage 2 – Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) .......................................................... 45
Stage 3 – The Leadership Making Model ............................................................. 50
Stage 4 – Aggregations of dyads .................................................................... 51
Defining LMX .............................................................................................. 52
LMX Limitations ......................................................................................... 54
Summary of LMX ...................................................................................... 55
Braxton Bragg and Leadership in the Army of Tennessee .............................. 55
  The Dyadic Dimension of Military Leadership in the Civil War ................. 57
  Braxton Bragg Maligned and Reconsidered: A Dyadic Perspective ............. 59
Summary .................................................................................................. 63

III. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 64

Introduction ............................................................................................... 64
The Instructional Value of Historical Case Studies ....................................... 65
Research Questions ................................................................................... 70
Data Set ..................................................................................................... 71
Description of Population and Sample ......................................................... 73
Design Elements ...................................................................................... 75
Instrumentation and Data Collection .......................................................... 76
Data Analysis ............................................................................................ 77
Credibility, Dependability, and Confirmability .......................................... 80
Researcher Positionality .......................................................................... 83
Summary .................................................................................................. 85

IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA ........................................................................... 87

Introduction ............................................................................................... 87
Analysis of Research Subjects ................................................................... 88
  GEN Braxton Bragg ................................................................................. 89
  LTG Leonidas Polk .................................................................................. 91
  Background ............................................................................................ 91
  LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg ....................................... 92
    Affect .................................................................................................. 92
    Contribution ....................................................................................... 93
    Distributive justice ............................................................................. 94
    Loyalty ................................................................................................ 94
    Procedural justice ............................................................................. 95
    Professional respect .......................................................................... 96
  Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire ................................................. 97
  The LMX theoretical framework ............................................................ 98
  LTG William J. Hardee ........................................................................... 100
  Background ........................................................................................... 100
  LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg ....................................... 101
    Affect ................................................................................................ 101
    Contribution ....................................................................................... 102
MG Joseph Wheeler…………………………………………………………………………172
Background………………………………………………………………………………172
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg …………………………………………174
   Affect .................................................................174
   Contribution ..........................................................174
   Distributive justice ..................................................175
   Loyalty ...............................................................175
   Procedural justice ....................................................175
   Professional respect ..................................................176
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire………………………………………………176
The LMX theoretical framework ................................................................…..177
MG Jones M. Withers .......................................................................................178
Background ……………………………………………………………………………178
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg …………………………………………178
   Affect .................................................................178
   Contribution ..........................................................179
   Distributive justice ..................................................179
   Loyalty ...............................................................179
   Procedural justice ....................................................179
   Professional respect ..................................................180
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire………………………………………………180
The LMX theoretical framework ................................................................…..181
BG Patton Anderson ...........................................................................................182
Background ……………………………………………………………………………182
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg …………………………………………182
   Affect .................................................................182
   Contribution ..........................................................183
   Distributive justice ..................................................183
   Loyalty ...............................................................184
   Procedural justice ....................................................184
   Professional respect ..................................................184
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire………………………………………………185
The LMX theoretical framework ................................................................…..186
BG Frank C. Armstrong......................................................................................187
Background ……………………………………………………………………………187
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg …………………………………………187
   Affect .................................................................187
   Contribution ..........................................................187
   Distributive justice ..................................................188
   Loyalty ...............................................................188
   Procedural justice ....................................................188
   Professional respect ..................................................188
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire………………………………………………188
The LMX theoretical framework ................................................................…..189
BG William Bate.................................................................................................189
Background ……………………………………………………………………………189
LIST OF TABLES

1 List of Confederate Ranks & Unit Elements ................................................................. 2

4.1 Cumulative List of LMX-MDM Questionnaire Responses...........................................239

4.2 LMX Positionality, Rank, State, and Commission Source of Research Subjects ..........241

5.1 Perceptions of Procedural Justice in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command ..........249

5.2. Perceptions of Distributive Justice in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command..........251

5.3 Levels of Affect in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command .....................................253

5.4 Levels of Loyalty in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command .....................................255

5.5 Perceptions of Contribution in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command ....................257

5.6 Levels of Professional Respect in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command ...............259
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1 Development of LMX Theory .................................................................................. 44
2.2 An LMX Conceptual Framework ............................................................................ 53
3 Overall Study Design ................................................................................................ 81
4.1 LMX: LTG Leonidas Polk ...................................................................................... 99
4.2 LMX: LTG William J. Hardee ................................................................................ 107
4.3 LMX: LTG D.H. Hill .............................................................................................. 114
4.4 LMX: LTG James Longstreet .................................................................................. 120
4.5 LMX: MG John C. Breckinridge ........................................................................... 128
4.6 LMX: MG Simon B. Buckner ................................................................................ 133
4.7 LMX: MG Benjamin F. Cheatham .......................................................................... 140
4.8 LMX: MG Patrick Cleburne .................................................................................. 146
4.9 LMX: MG Thomas Hindman .................................................................................. 150
4.10 LMX: MG John B. Hood ...................................................................................... 154
4.11 LMX: MG Lafayette McLaws .............................................................................. 158
4.12 LMX: MG Carter Stevenson ................................................................................. 161
4.13 LMX: MG A.P. Stewart ......................................................................................... 167
4.14 LMX: MG W.H.T. Walker ................................................................................... 173
4.15 LMX: MG Joseph Wheeler ................................................................................... 177
4.16 LMX: MG Jones M. Withers ................................................................................. 181
4.17 LMX: BG Patton Anderson ................................................................................... 186
4.18 LMX: BG Frank C. Armstrong............................................................189
4.19 LMX: BG William Bate.................................................................193
4.20 LMX: BG Nathan Bedford Forrest................................................198
4.21 LMX: BG States Rights Gist .........................................................201
4.22 LMX: BG John K. Jackson............................................................205
4.23 LMX: BG Micah Jenkins.................................................................208
4.24 LMX: BG Bushrod Johnson .........................................................211
4.25 LMX: BG Joseph B. Kershaw ......................................................214
4.26 LMX: BG Evander Law.................................................................218
4.27 LMX: BG St. John R. Liddell.......................................................223
4.28 LMX: BG William T. Martin.........................................................226
4.29 LMX: BG John Pegram ...............................................................230
4.30 LMX: BG William Preston...........................................................234
4.31 LMX: BG John A. Wharton..........................................................238
5 Out-Group vs. In-Group Intensity......................................................261
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background to the Problem

During the American Civil War, the Confederate States of America fielded two major field armies, the famous and highly successful Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by GEN Robert E. Lee, and the less famous and less successful Army of Tennessee, commanded by multiple generals, though GEN Braxton Bragg was the longest-serving of them all (for a list of Confederate rank abbreviations and army units, see Table 1). While historians are in general agreement that the Army of North Virginia benefited from some of the greatest military leadership in American history, they are less enthusiastic about the nature of leadership in the Army of Tennessee (McMurry, 1989). Generally, the Army of Tennessee is considered one of the most dysfunctional military organizations in American military history, and this dysfunction is largely attributed to the leadership of Bragg, one of the most criticized and heavily maligned commanders in the American Civil War, who, unlike Lee, seemed unable to forge the kind of healthy relationships with his immediate subordinates that are prerequisite to organizational cohesion and effectiveness (Connelly, 1971). According to Wood (1997):

…the Army of Tennessee was as unlike Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia as one could imagine…Though the army [of Tennessee] had fought through its share of brutal battles, it had also suffered a series of changed commanders, lost and recovered elements, and reorganizations that had left it without the esprit de corps that it deserved. Then, after the terrible bloodletting at Murfreesboro, the Army of Tennessee was badly in need of a leader who could breathe life into it and make it the force that the Confederacy so badly needed in the west. What it got instead was Braxton Bragg…In the six months of inactivity [following Murfreesboro] the army did recover its physical well-being thanks
to Bragg’s administrative skills and rigid enforcement of discipline. At the highest command levels, however, a cancerous tumor was eating away at the base of the army’s brain. A major cause of the tumor was one of the factions…that historians have labeled the anti-Bragg bloc. This clique was composed mainly of corps and division commanders within the Army of Tennessee who shared a distrust of Bragg’s generalship and a combined fear and loathing of his tendency to blame operational failures on his subordinates…the anti-Bragg bloc was essentially a faction or clique…its informal nature in no way made it less of a powerful force, a force that came close to removing Bragg from command…The clashes between personalities became so intense and prolonged that an observer could not help but note that Bragg was waging war on two fronts – against Rosecrans as well as the Confederate generals who wanted him ousted from command. (pp. 115-116)

A cursory survey of Civil War narratives confirms a principle that most would take for granted as a matter of “common sense” – the most successful military organizations were those characterized by relationships of mutual respect, trust, and loyalty between unit commanders and their immediate lieutenants. The command partnerships, for example, between Lee and LTG Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, and GEN Ulysses S. Grant and MG William T. Sherman yielded spectacular, long-term, and routine military successes. On the other hand, command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranks*</th>
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<tr>
<td>General (GEN)</td>
<td>Army/Army Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General (LTG)</td>
<td>Wing</td>
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<td>Major General (MG)</td>
<td>Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigadier General (BG)</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (COL)</td>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)</td>
<td>Regiment and Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major (MAJ)</td>
<td>Company</td>
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<td>Captain (CPT)</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant (1LT)</td>
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<td>Second Lieutenant (2LT)</td>
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* - Ranks are listed in order of precedence, from highest ranking to lowest ranking
+ - Units are listed in order of size, from largest to smallest
partnerships characterized by distrust, resentment, and confusion – such as the relationships between Bragg and LTG Leonidas Polk, and MG John Pope and MG Fitz John Porter – resulted in monumental, often predictable military failures (Glatthaar, 1994).

When the dust settled over the bloody battlefield of Chickamauga on the evening of September 20, 1863, the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee and the Federal Army of the Cumberland had just taken part in what would prove to be the largest, bloodiest battle in the western theater of the American Civil War (i.e., the theater west of the Appalachian Mountains). After only the battle of Gettysburg, it is the bloodiest battle in the recorded history of the western hemisphere (Hughes, 2009). Though the general public had been far more preoccupied with events east of the Appalachians – understandable when one considers (1) the proximity of the eastern battlefields to the major American media outlets in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC and (2) the spectacular success of GEN Lee and Confederate military operations in the eastern theater relative to the abysmal state of Confederate operations in the west under the direction of GEN Braxton Bragg – the Confederate victory at Chickamauga was, to date, arguably the Union’s most devastating operational setback (Cozzens, 1992; Woodworth, 1998). In its immediate aftermath, Chickamauga resulted in: the removal of MG William S. Rosecrans, one of the Union’s most successful generals, as commander of the Army of the Cumberland; the encirclement and potential surrender of the Army of the Cumberland, the Union’s principal fighting force in the western theater (an event which could, theoretically, cause irreparable damage to the Union war effort); and the inability, at least in the near future, of Union forces to hasten the end of the war by capturing the strategically important regions of northern Georgia and northern Alabama, the center of the Confederacy’s military-industrial
complex (Cozzens, 1994; Ogden, 2010). Consequently, in the weeks and months following the battle, the attention of the nation would shift away from Virginia and toward Chattanooga, Tennessee, a city so strategically important that President Lincoln considered it “fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond” (McDonough, 1984, p. 42).

In many ways, the battles of the campaigns for Chattanooga are anomalous. First, as the fighting halted at Chickamauga, and as Federal troops retreated into Chattanooga, the Army of Tennessee, in spite of suffering from a near paralyzing state of upper echelon leadership dysfunction, was able to enjoy something it had never experienced – a major battlefield victory. Second, the battle of Chickamauga represented one of the few occasions in which Confederate forces enjoyed numerical superiority over their Federal counterparts. Perhaps the most important anomaly, however, was that Chickamauga, unlike most Civil War battles, was essentially a soldier’s fight. Given the confused situations of the two opposing armies and the highly unfavorable terrain (rather than across open fields, the battle was fought largely in the thick North Georgia woods and underbrush), at no point during the battle were the two principal army commanders able to exercise command and control over their respective forces. The battle would, instead, be developed by lower level commanders at the battalion, regiment, brigade, and division echelons (hence, general officers are not memorialized at Chickamauga with statues and monuments, as one would see at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Antietam, etc.). The battle of Chickamauga, as the largest battle of an overall campaign for control of the city of Chattanooga, offers a glimpse into the leadership dynamics of operational and tactical-level units in a way that no other Civil War battle does. For this reason, therefore, when Chickamauga-Chattanooga

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1 During the Vicksburg campaign, Confederate forces enjoyed a general numerical superiority in the theater of operations, but Ulysses S. Grant was able to manage the distribution of his forces in such a way that the Federals were never outnumbered on a single major battlefield (Woodworth, 2011).
National Military Park was established in 1890 as the first federally preserved battlefield, one of its stated purposes was to be a military reservation for professional military officers to engage in the formal study of tactics and leadership principles as played out during the battle (Smith, 2009).

Indeed, the events surrounding the campaigns for Chattanooga illustrate some of the most brilliant and perplexing exercises and/or malpractices of leadership in American military history:

On multiple occasions in the days leading up to the battle of Chickamauga, for instance, the leadership of the Army of Tennessee would be presented with fantastic opportunities to badly damage large, isolated elements of the Army of the Cumberland and reverse many of the Federal gains of the preceding months. These opportunities, however, were missed because of a combination of Federal alertness, Confederate hesitation, and most dramatically, in-fighting and outright insubordination among the members of the Confederate high command (Wood, 1997; Woodworth, 2010a).

During Chickamauga, at the climactic struggle for Horseshoe Ridge, Confederate forces that had just broken through the Federal line and forced the bulk of the Army of the Cumberland into a chaotic and confused retreat met stiff resistance from a hastily assembled rear guard force. Inexplicably, the Army of Tennessee was unable to coordinate an effort to dislodge the Federals and prevent a successful retreat into the relative safety of Chattanooga. In one particularly notorious episode, two regimental commanders quarreled over whom was the higher ranking officer instead of focusing on mission accomplishment (Powell, 2009).

In the days immediately preceding the battles for Chattanooga – Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge – a celebrated corps commander, LTG James Longstreet,
commanded a half-hearted attempt to close the precariously established Federal supply line into the besieged city of Chattanooga. Longstreet’s attempt resulted in a minor tactical defeat (known as the battle of Wauhatchie), but one with major strategic ramifications. With the security of the Federal supply line guaranteed, Bragg was unable to starve Federal forces into submission, and Federal forces were poised to break the siege. Some historians have attributed Longstreet’s half-heartedness, at least in part, to his profound distrust for the decision-making abilities of Bragg (Woodworth, 1998; Mendoza, 2008).

On the first day of Chickamauga, a newly promoted division commander within the Army of Tennessee, MG A.P. Stewart, was forced to act decisively, in the face of intense chaos and confusion, without clear or coherent guidance from the Army commander. The result was one of the most remarkable leadership demonstrations of the campaign. Because of a high level of cohesion among the division’s leaders, the young division commander was able to assess his circumstances, exercise command and control over his unit, effectively develop the situation, and succeed in piercing the center of the Federal line, nearly ending the battle under favorable circumstances a day before the battle would actually conclude (White, 2010).

Each of these events is illustrative of the command climate within the Army of Tennessee during the late summer and fall of 1863. At times, as in the first three examples, leadership interactions and decision-making processes manifested the significant level of dysfunction within the Army’s high command. At other times, as in the final example, leadership interactions and decision-making processes amounted to efforts at either overcoming or correcting leadership deficiencies within the Army, or remarkable leadership performances in spite of a pervasively unfavorable command climate. Though the Army of Tennessee would suffer disaster at Chattanooga in the following months, the fact that such a mismanaged organization could
manufacture the victory of Chickamauga (and could come tantalizingly close to victories at the battles of Perryville and Stones River the previous year), however pyrrhic it would prove to be, has mystified students of leadership ever since. Indeed, in the aftermath of the battle of Chickamauga, participants were so aware that something terrible, unique, and instructive had happened that field expedient markers were immediately erected to accommodate study of the battle and battle site tours, which were being given as early as October 12, 1863, only 22 days following the battle’s conclusion (Ogden, 2010).

**Statement of the Problem**

Research suggests that there is a relationship between trust and perceptions of organizational equity on the one hand and organizational success on the other. In one study, for example, organizations characterized by a high perception of distributive justice, a high perception of procedural justice, and a high degree of trust tended to experience high levels of organizational performance (Dirks, 2000). Another study suggested that relationships could be observed between confidence in an organization’s leaders, organizational morale, and organizational effectiveness (Dalessandro, 1995). The quality of leader-member relationships, in other words, has an impact on organizational effectiveness (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008b).

The major research problem addressed in this study is that, while the Army of Tennessee experienced a number of problems unique to its historical circumstances, many of them were the manifestations of a broader set of leadership dynamics that can be found in a wide range of historical and contemporary organizational settings (this argument is developed further in Chapter II). Bragg’s command suffered, in particular, from overwhelmingly dysfunctional relationships, lacking in trust, respect, and perceptions of equity. While it is not certain that
better relationships would have reversed the army’s fortunes, it is reasonable to assume that these relationships made an already difficult (perhaps impossible) situation worse.

Many seminars and analyses offer studies of leadership dynamics within historical military organizations (McWhinney, 1969; Robertson, 2004), most of them focus on a handful of isolated leadership themes (e.g., the importance of a clearly articulated vision, team-building strategies, etc.) or principles (e.g., unity of command, economy of force, etc.). Battlefield Leadership, LLC, for instance, offers seminars that aim to provide contemporary leaders, often from the civilian sector, with insights and perspectives, derived from great battles, into team building, coping with transition, and crisis management (Battlefield Leadership, LLC, 2009). The current U.S. Army field manual on leadership, moreover, articulates various principles of leadership and illustrates each principle with an historical vignette (United States, 2006). There are surprisingly few studies that examine historical military leadership in light of major contemporary theoretical leadership frameworks such as leader-member exchange (LMX), path-goal theory, or situational leadership.

This historical case study attempted to begin the process of filling that void by examining features of one theoretical framework, LMX, within the particular context of the high command of the Army of Tennessee in the late summer and fall of 1863. This time period represents not only the period of the Army of Tennessee’s greatest operational success (i.e., the battle of Chickamauga) but also its most monumental failure (i.e., the battles for Chattanooga). In the space of only two months, from late September to late November, the Army of the Tennessee went from being on the cusp of decisive victory, with the Army of the Cumberland besieged and clinging to survival inside Chattanooga, to catastrophic defeat, with the besieging Confederates routed and the strategically vital Deep South opened, once and for all, to the war-ending invasion
that would commence in the subsequent spring campaigning season. This reversal of fortunes is attributable to a variety of contributing factors, tactical, logistical, and even meteorological, but it is also attributable, at least in part, to the quality of the relationships between Bragg and his senior lieutenants that came to characterize and, ultimately, undermine his tenure as army commander (McMurry, 1989; Woodworth, 2010b).

**Purpose of the Study**

Several leadership frameworks exist which could offer valid explanatory insights into the nature of the leadership dysfunction within the Army of Tennessee (e.g., Fielder’s leader-match theory, Vroom’s contingency theory, Argyris’s Model I and Model II, four-factor theories, etc.) (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008b). The purpose of this case study, however, was to examine the quality of the relationships between Bragg and his senior lieutenants through the lens of a relationship-specific theoretical construct. Accordingly, seminal research findings were used to identify significant features of the leader-member exchange (LMX) theoretical framework and, next, to examine and describe ways in which features of this framework were manifested in Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command. This description, furthermore, yielded a number of lessons that could prove valuable in contemporary leadership preparation programs and instructive for current leaders in their own organizational settings. Because the lifespan of the Army of Tennessee extends for nearly four years, and because the Army of Tennessee was commanded by others besides Bragg, this case study focused on those officers that commanded a division or higher at some point during the most monumental, most successful, but ultimately, most ill-fated period of Bragg’s tenure, the campaigns for Chattanooga in the summer and fall of 1863 (see Appendix D – Orders of Battle). Many of the
campaigns preceding the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga – namely the 1862 Kentucky campaign and the events surrounding the battle of Stones River – largely influenced or, in some cases, determined the quality of the relationships between Bragg and his lieutenants and, therefore, could not be omitted from this study. Therefore, while the focus of the study was on those officers that constituted the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, the research was not precisely limited to the correspondence and events occurring during the 1863 campaign seasons.

**Research Questions**

At its core, LMX is a framework for understanding “the relational bases and influence tactics that leaders use and how they vary vis-à-vis followers” (Glynn & DeJordy, 2010, p. 125). Because LMX attempts to interpret the ways in which a leader’s behaviors differ from follower to follower (between, for example, members that represent the leader’s “inner circle,” members that represent the average “rank and file,” and members that represent the leader’s opposition), it is essentially a theory of organizational justice, with particular emphases on the concepts of procedural justice, distributive justice and trust (Scandura, 1999). To most clearly address the lack of research in Civil War-era military leadership through the lens of contemporary leadership theoretical frameworks, particularly the LMX framework, this case study addressed one central research question: how did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee, particularly during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, exhibit features of LMX?
In applying the LMX framework to Bragg’s relationships, this study took into account the distinctive features of LMX as described in the research of Liden and Maslyn (1998) and Scandura (1999). Therefore, the following supporting questions were answered:

1. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of procedural justice (i.e., due process)?

2. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of distributive justice (i.e., distribution of resources, promotions, and assignments)?

3. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of affect?

4. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of loyalty?

5. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of contribution?

6. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of professional respect?

The formulation of a research hypothesis is not critical to every research study, particularly those of a qualitative, historical, case study design (Trochim, 2006). Indeed, it is often the case that, unlike quantitative studies that begin with a well-crafted research hypothesis to test, the end goal of a qualitative study is to derive a hypothesis or grounded theory for future investigation (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). Accordingly, this case study did not test a hypothesis. It, rather, explored and described the quality of leader-follower relationships within an historical
military organization through the lens of a contemporary, relationship-based leadership framework in order to derive lessons that may inform current leadership settings or leadership preparation programs and establish a basis for future research.

**Rationale for the Study**

Numerous research studies have demonstrated the relationship between high levels of organizational justice (or, at least, high levels of the perception of organizational justice) and high levels of organizational effectiveness (Dirks, 2000; George 1996; Miner, 2005). These studies have been conducted in widely ranging contexts, from athletic organizations (Dirks, 2000) to industrial work teams (George, 1996). Similarly, countless studies have documented the centrality of effective command partnerships in achieving battlefield success to such an extent that, often, an effective command partnership is simply defined as a command partnership that produces battlefield successes (Dalessandro, 1995; Glatthaar, 1994; McWhiney, 1960, March; Woodworth, 2010b). However none of these studies have examined the LMX network of organizational justice, trust, and confidence perceptions (resulting in the emergence of in-groups and out-groups relative to the organization’s leader) as a component of effective command partnerships in nineteenth century military organizations.

The modern-day armed forces differ dramatically from those of the nineteenth century (Weigley, 1977). Technological innovation, monumental advances in military training and education, the evolution of the professional officer corps, and the increasing scope of the mission of America’s armed forces (due to the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole “superpower”) have presented modern military leaders with advantages and challenges that military leaders of the past could never have imagined (Bolger, 1997). Nevertheless, military
organizations, in spite of changes over the span of time, are fundamentally conservative institutions. Certain formal features of military cultures, such as the troop leading procedures (TLPs), are essentially unchanged (United States, 2006). Consequently, modern military leader preparation programs continue to be informed by the lessons, traditions, and in some cases, doctrine (e.g., Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini, etc.) of bygone eras (Skelton, 1992). “Every war is unique,” explained GEN Wesley Clark (2001), former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. “Just as in chess, where games begin similarly only to diverge in unpredictable ways, no particular military engagement is likely to be repeated exactly. Nevertheless, lessons must be drawn from past experiences” (p. 418). Accordingly, an examination of various aspects of leadership dynamics, including LMX, in a nineteenth century military context is an appropriate exercise for informing, instructing, and influencing leadership dynamics in modern contexts.

It is, furthermore, appropriate that GEN Braxton Bragg’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, particularly during the decisive summer and fall months of 1863, should serve as the central focus of a case study on the relational aspects of leadership dynamics. Bragg was, after all, a man of considerable intellectual and strategic abilities, as evidenced by his impressive academic record at West Point and a distinguished military career that included brilliant performances during the Mexican War and a string of near victories in the months leading up to Chickamauga (Wood, 1997). Nevertheless, few commanders in American military history who could claim to have been Bragg’s intellectual or strategic equals, have been more significantly characterized and, ultimately, undermined by dysfunctional relationships:

In a very real sense Braxton Bragg lost his victory [at Chickamauga] by his failure to pursue his enemy’s broken forces, but in a deeper sense he was already on his way to losing it because of the mutual distrust that existed between him and his subordinates. This distrust was compounded by his abrasive nature – he simply could not get along with anyone who failed to measure up to his rigid standards…The price that he paid was demonstrated by his disastrous defeat in the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary
Ridge, which ended the siege of Chattanooga and opened the door to the Union invasion of the heartland of the Confederacy. (Wood, 1997, p. 187)

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

Though it has undergone substantial revision and refinement, the LMX theoretical framework has been studied for over 30 years. Emerging from scholarly explorations into leadership dynamics, dyadic (i.e., relationship-based) leadership models, and organizational justice, LMX took formal shape largely through the research of Graen and Cashman (1975), Vecchio (1985), and Dienesch and Liden (1986). As a framework for exploring the “relationship-based social exchange between leaders and members,” LMX attempts to provide an account for the dyadic organizational phenomenon in which some group members achieve a trusted “in-group” status, while others are relegated to an “out-group” status (Scandura, 1999, p. 35). According to the LMX model, members of the “in-group” are more inclined to loyalty toward the organization’s leader, and are more likely to consider the procedures, compensation, dissemination of information, and job assignments within an organization to be fair and just; members of the “out-group,” however, are more likely to feel treated as mere functionaries, are less likely to be motivated by loyalty to an organization’s leaders, and are more inclined to challenge the basic justice and fairness of an organization’s procedures and policies (Dienesch & Liden, 1986). Essentially, therefore, “a basic premise of LMX theory asserts that leaders develop separate exchange relationships with each of their followers,” often on the basis of “attitudinal similarity,” and that the various exchange relationships will differ in terms of “roles, expectations, rights, and responsibilities” (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008a, p. 29).

Because leadership dynamics are at work in every organization, understanding LMX provides one theoretical lens for observing the kind of leadership dynamic at work among the
leaders of the Army of Tennessee. A review of campaign and battle narratives, the official battle reports and after action reviews (AARs), and the correspondence between officers in the Army of Tennessee suggests that, by the time of the battle of Chickamauga in September 1863, a clear distinction between “in-group” members (i.e., a pro-Bragg faction) and “out-group” members (i.e., an anti-Bragg faction) had emerged (Connely, 1971; Hallock, 1991; Wood, 1997; Woodworth, 1990). To be certain, tactical success and failures during the battle are distributed between both members of the in-group and out-group. For example, Longstreet, who aligned himself with the anti-Bragg faction, achieved the climactic breakthrough of the Federal line that ensured ultimate victory for the Army of Tennessee at Chickamauga; on the other hand, Stewart, who refused to align himself with the anti-Bragg faction, likewise achieved great success of his own on the first day of the battle (Elliot, 1999; Wert, 1993). Nevertheless, much of the leadership malpractice during the campaign was a direct extension of the abysmal command relationships that characterized the Army’s headquarters, such as Polk’s and Hill’s failures to destroy isolated Union elements at Lee & Gordon’s Mill and in McLemore’s Cove, respectively. It was expected that LMX would provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the quality of relationships between Bragg and his senior lieutenants, would provide some insight into the battlefield successes and failures of the Army of Tennessee during these critical military campaigns, and would yield a number of lessons to instruct contemporary leaders as they manage relationships with members of their own organizations.

**Significance of the Study**

Because of the tremendous amount of doctrinal and cultural continuity between nineteenth century American military organizations and those of the present day, lessons may be
derived from a study of military history and applied to modern-day contexts (Clark, 2001; Robertson, 1987; Sweeney, Matthews, & Lester, 2011; Weigley, 1977). Indeed, one of the major instructional components of formal military preparation programs (i.e., the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, etc.) is the military staff ride in which students are immersed in studies of certain military principles through “systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each” in order to apply them to current, relevant situations (Robertson, 1987, p. 5).

The military staff ride is, therefore, essentially an on-location case study. Consistent with the goal of staff rides of deriving lessons and principles from or relating them to specific historical incidences, the aim of a historical case study is to consider a specific historical situation in order to derive or apply lessons and principles (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992), not only with regard to strategic/tactical doctrine or the operational art, but also with regard to logistics, unit cohesion, and “leadership, at any level desired” (Robertson, 1987, p. 6). The last three considerations are relevant to virtually all organizations, military or corporate (Axelrod, 2001). Consequently, battlefields frequently play host to both military and corporate seminars and study groups (Battlefield Leadership, LLC, 2009).

This historical case study sought to explore, through the lens of the LMX theoretical framework, the nature and quality of Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command, particularly during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. Because of the timeless and universal nature of many principles of leadership, the insights gleaned from such an exploration not only highlight the network of factors that influence the quality of leader-follower relationships, but also inform and instruct modern leaders in the management of relationships within their own
organizational contexts (Cohen, 1998). Indeed, history is a repository of generally applicable leadership lessons because it is often an expression, at least in part, of “universal human characteristics” (Robertson, 1987, p. 3). A study of LMX, as exhibited in Bragg’s relationships with his key leaders, therefore, enhances the ability of current leaders, as well as leadership preparation programs, to identify and manage factors that influence the quality of leader-follower relationships (e.g., perceptions of organizational justice, perceptions of procedural justice, loyalty, trust, etc.) in the interest of facilitating organizational cohesion and, ultimately, organizational success (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008b). An awareness of these factors, augmented by examples of how these factors were expressed in one notoriously dysfunctional leadership setting, will enable leaders to identify them in their own settings, address and, when necessary, correct them.

**Definition of Terms**

For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined accordingly (Dirks, 2000; Liden & Maslyn, 1998; Pierce & Newstrom, 2008b; Scandura, 1999):

*Affect* refers to the “mutual affections members of the dyad have for each other based primarily on interpersonal attraction, rather than work or professional values…(i.e., friendship)” (Liden & Maslyn, 1998, p. 50).

*Contribution* refers to the “perception of the current level of work-oriented activity each member puts forth toward the mutual goals (explicit or implicit) of the dyad” (Liden & Maslyn, 1998, p. 50).
Distributive justice refers to the degree to which compensation, rewards or favorable/unfavorable tasks and assignments are disseminated fairly and equitably among members of an organization.

Lieutenant, when used in its generic sense (as opposed to the specific ranks of second lieutenant and first lieutenant), refers to any officer that is subordinate to another. Since Bragg was the commander of the Army of Tennessee, all other officers in the army, from the lieutenant generals to the second lieutenants, can be generically referred to as Bragg’s lieutenants (Freeman, 1946). In this study, however, “lieutenant” is typically used to refer to members of Bragg’s high command.

Loyalty refers to the “expression of public support for the goals and the personal character of the other member of the LMX dyad. Loyalty involves a faithfulness to the individual that is generally consistent from situation to situation” (Liden & Maslyn, 1998, p. 50).

Organizational trust refers to the degree of confidence that an organizational member has in the organization’s leaders and leadership decisions.

Procedural justice refers to the degree to which an organization’s tactics, techniques, procedures, and policies are, essentially, perceived to be fair and equitable with respect to an organization’s members, and the degree to which an organization’s leaders observe due process.

Professional respect refers to the “perception of the degree to which each member of the dyad has built a reputation, within and/or outside the organization, of excelling in his or her line of work” (Liden & Maslyn, 1998, p. 50).

In-group members refer to the members of an organization that are recipients of relatively high levels of confidence, trust, and responsibility from the leader and who, in return, accord to the leader relatively high levels of confidence, trust, and loyalty.
**Out-group members** refer to the members of organization that are recipients of relatively low levels of confidence, trust, and responsibility from the leader and who, in return, accord to the leader relatively low levels of confidence, trust, and loyalty.

**In-group/out-group mobility** refers to the transition of an organization’s members from the in-group to the out-group or vice versa (i.e., upward or downward mobility).

Throughout the study, references are often made to levels of unit organization (e.g., armies, corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, companies, etc.) and levels of rank (e.g., General, Major General, Brigadier General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, etc.). When appropriate, troop numbers were supplied in association with levels of unit organization, and ranks were associated with their respective levels of unit organization. In the absence of specifically identified troop levels or levels of command, standard nineteenth century military doctrine was assumed (United States War Department, 1863).

### Methodological Assumptions

This case study took multiple methodological assumptions for granted. First, it was assumed that, in spite of cultural developments and technological innovations, certain principles of leadership are universal and timeless, transcending cultural, technological, and geographical dissimilarities (Dickson et al., 2003, September 2; Robertson, 1987). Many of the leadership lessons derived from this examination are, therefore, applicable to other leadership settings, regardless of the temporal or cultural context (Axelrod, 2001; Dickson et al., 2003). The theme of the universal nature of leadership principles is given broader consideration in the following chapter.
Second, it was assumed that, because LMX is a theoretical framework for interpreting certain aspects of leadership dynamics, and because leadership dynamics are, in many ways, universal (Dickson et al., 2003, September 2), features of LMX will be present in any organizational context, including the high command of the Army of Tennessee in September 1863.

Next, it was assumed that, because research has suggested a relationship between LMX and organizational success (Dirks, 2000; George, 1996), the nature of LMX will be at least one of the many contributing factors to the Army of Tennessee’s degree of battlefield effectiveness. Though this case study did not attempt to establish an observable relationship between LMX and organizational achievement, it was assumed that features of LMX were one valid dimension for observing and interpreting the nature of the Army of Tennessee’s command climate and its resultant level of battlefield achievement.

Finally, it was assumed that, in the absence of the ability to interview now-deceased historical subjects, the historical record, consisting of the primary source record, in the form of written correspondences and battle reports, as well as seminal secondary sources, were an adequate repository of information for constructing reasonable analyses of the thoughts, beliefs, opinions, and expectations of the members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command (Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1989).

**Delimitations of the Study**

This study was limited to the professional and personal correspondence, as well as anecdotal narrative accounts of the interactions of a specifically defined group of officers who held division-level commanders or above in the Army of Tennessee at some point during the
1863 campaigns for Chattanooga (see Appendix D – Orders of Battle). This was a total of 32 relevant Confederate officers in the grades of Brigadier General and above, including the army commander, ten corps commanders, and 21 division commanders. The officers were, demographically, a homogenous group, being all southern, Caucasian males of similar political persuasion. The campaigns for Chattanooga, the Tullahoma-Chickamauga-Chattanooga Campaigns, include actions leading up to and including the battle of Chickamauga, from roughly June 24 (the beginning of the Federal attempt to maneuver the Army of Tennessee out of middle Tennessee) to December 2, 1863 (the day Bragg resigned his command of the army) (Powell, 2009). Because some of the events prior to the summer of 1863, particularly the 1862 Kentucky campaign and the events surrounding the battle of Stones River, were instrumental in influencing the relationships that defined the command climate of the army in the late summer and fall of 1863, correspondence during those events, when relevant, were included in this study.

Limitations of the Study

There were at least three significant limitations of this study, design, sample selection, and data availability.

Regarding the design limitation, this researcher was aware that qualitative research has often been criticized as “soft science,” given the obvious limitations resulting from subjectivity and lack of generalizability (Yin, 1994). In qualitative research, the researcher is the instrument and the interpreter, making pure objectivity impossible (Yin, 1994). In addition, the research sample is often narrow and is selected deliberately, greatly reducing or eliminating the possibility of generalizing the research findings. Other qualitative researchers, however, have demonstrated that “particularization and transferability can be as useful as generalizability,” and that “there is
merit in understanding particular phenomenon or individuals in greater depth than the impersonal representation derived from statistical manipulations” (Hancock, 2008, p. 36; Sweatt, 2002). Any shortcomings or limitations arising from the nature of the qualitative, historical case study design are, therefore, outweighed by the overall merits of the study. Echoing the stated goal of other qualitative researchers, the goal of this study was to “explore, illuminate, describe, and increase understanding” through the lens of LMX, the nature and quality of the relationships between Bragg and his senior lieutenants, primarily during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga (Hancock, 2008, p. 36). With that goal in mind, this researcher affirmed the maxim that “there are neither good or [sic] bad methods, but only methods that are more or less effective under particular circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal” (Homans, 1962, in Hancock, 2008, p. 36).

In addition to limitations resulting from the research design, there were also limitations regarding the research sample. Because the individuals being examined in this study were all deceased, they were unable to provide explanations for their behaviors, beliefs, or perceptions. The researcher, therefore, was limited to an analysis of their written correspondence to derive an interpretation of their behaviors, beliefs, and perceptions. To minimize the effects of these limitations, a member-check was incorporated into the study by which the researcher’s analysis of the historical record was informed, confirmed, or challenged in a series of interviews with a panel of subject-matter experts. The interviews consisted of semi-structured, open-ended questions that allowed members of the panel to comment and elaborate upon the researcher’s analysis and provide their own analyses. Previous research has indicated that peer examinations and expert opinion are appropriate means for verifying construct validity (Houghton & Johnson, 2009; Merriam, 1998).
Finally, related to the limitations regarding the research sample, were limitations regarding data availability. Because “interviewing” the research subjects depended upon the availability of relevant primary source material, the absence of those materials meant that, in many cases, gaps in the data appeared. For a number of officers, a perspective simply did not emerge because of the lack of personal memoirs or relevant correspondences. The more junior the officer, the less likely were the chances of obtaining relevant source materials that could support the study. Even in the case of senior officers, gaps in the data appeared. It is believed, however, that these gaps did not necessarily detract from the overall importance of the study, for a number of reasons. First, it was expected, at the outset of the study, that the themes that emerged would be of a general, less precise nature, particularly since the study involved the examination of a historical organization through a contemporary theoretical lens. At no point did the researcher expect to paint a perfect, complete picture of the command climate of the Army of Tennessee. Second, while gaps did appear in the data and, therefore, in the findings, those gaps mostly involved less senior officers. Those closest to Bragg tended to provide a more complete data pool. The researcher, then, could simply have conducted the study using the senior most officers (i.e., those occupying corps-level command positions), but the study was expanded to include division-level commanders in order to increase the robustness of the study. While gaps do appear, then, in the data pool generated by division-level commanders, this group of officers did generate a number of valuable sources that served to augment the data supplied by more senior officers. Finally, it is believed that, even with gaps in the data, the findings that did emerge from the study were adequate to derive a number of extremely profound observations with relevance to modern leadership contexts.
Organization of the Study

This chapter presented the introduction, statement of the problem, research questions, rationale for the study, significance of the study, and study delimitations and limitations. Chapter II contains a review of literature relevant to the use of history as a source of leadership lessons, the emergence of LMX as a distinctive, relationship-based leadership framework, the limitations of LMX as a theoretical framework, and the dyadic dimension of leadership in the Army of Tennessee during Bragg’s tenure as commander. Chapter III discusses the research design, participant selection, methods of data collection, and methods of data analysis. Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the relevant data collected in the primary source record and an interpretation of the research findings through the use of the LMX-MDM questionnaire and a framework for conceptualizing LMX. Chapter V summarizes the answers to the research questions, highlights a number of observations that emerged from the study, suggests a number of leadership lessons derived from the study for implementation in current leadership contexts or leadership preparation programs, and makes suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

History as a Source of Leadership Insight

Leadership studies have become a burgeoning industry, characterized by “countless centers, institutes, programs, courses, seminars, workshops, experiences, teachers, trainers, books, blogs, articles, websites, webinars, videos, conferences, consultants, and coaches, which all claim to teach people how to lead” (Kellerman, 2011, p. 25). Leadership studies range from classical biographies to intense theoretical analyses and from battlefield case studies to popular leadership/management literature. According to Kellerman (2011), however, the body of literature can be generally classified into two categories: studies about leadership (i.e., “leadership as an area of intellectual inquiry”) and studies concerning how to lead (i.e., leadership as “a skill we should aspire to acquire”)(p. 28).

Beyond this classification, however, the field of leadership studies is lacking in cogency, consistency, and consensus, as illustrated in Waddell’s (2006) humorous, but cynical, observation:

To be a leader, a manager should master Accountability Leadership, Collaborative Leadership and Contagious Leadership. He should get his or her arms around the Tao of Leadership and learn how to Lead From the Front and know Leadership That Works. There is Zen Leadership (perhaps this is the 102 version of the Tao of Leadership?), Spiritual, Ethical, Inspirational and Moral Leadership - all separate approaches. There is a 5th Wave of Leadership to master (no first through fourth, however), along with Thought Leadership, Facilitative Leadership, Systematic Leadership and, most important, I would imagine, Grown Up Leadership…In order to keep all of this straight, leadership has been organized into 4 E’s, 5 Personalities, 6
Priorities, 7 Zones, 8 Keys, 9 Lessons, 10 Common Sense Lessons (apparently the 9 Lessons defy common sense), 21 Principles, 50 Basic Laws, 124 Actions and 180 Ways - each a separate tome… For help along the way, the would-be leader should read up on Abraham Lincoln, Attila The Hun, Santa Claus and basketball coach John Wooden. Jesus, the Founding Fathers and the US Army Rangers all have leadership lessons to teach, as do Teddy and Eleanor Roosevelt (not Franklin, though), Alfred Sloan, Martin Luther King and Six University Presidents (the rest of the academic folks are not leadership examples - just 6 of them). Jack Welch, the old rebel Robert E Lee and TV characters the Sopranos are leadership paragons to study. George Patton, Ronald Reagan, Alexander The Great, the Navy Seals and arctic explorer Robert Shackleton have leadership principles, practices and secrets to adopt, as does Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi - better known as Mahatma.

**The Question of Universal Leadership Principles**

Regardless of the disarray that characterizes the field of leadership studies, the underlying assumption in all of the literature is that there are certain enduring lessons to be learned. Even in historical case studies and anecdotes, when one sifts through the contextual circumstances that make each leadership challenge unique (e.g., culture, technological developments, political circumstances, etc.), it is overwhelmingly assumed that certain fundamental insights may be gleaned to provide continued guidance to leaders in modern contexts. Woodworth (1995a), for example, in introducing a collection of essays on leadership and command in the American Civil War, makes precisely this point when he implies that, despite the seemingly endless list of considerations behind each battlefield decision in the war, a thorough consideration of each would yield “a full cargo of insights and lessons” (p. i).

To be sure, the concept of universal leadership principles is not without critics. To begin with, the idea of “universality” needs clarification. Lonner (1980) and Bass (1997), for instance, identified several distinct conceptions of “universality,” including the simple universal (i.e., a phenomenon that is universally constant) and the variform universal (i.e., a phenomenon that is, in principle, universally constant, but is applied according to cultural parameters). Dickson,
Hartog, and Mitchelson (2003), furthermore, conducted a review of the literature on leadership in cross-cultural contexts between 1995 and 2003 and found that many studies concluded that leadership principles identified as “universal” often reflected an American or western bias. Nevertheless, several leadership principles – e.g., leaders should be supportive, motivational, and dynamic; rewards should be contingent; noncooperative leadership styles should be avoided; etc. - were identified as universal in the “variform” sense. Accordingly, Dickson et al. concluded that, though one should not anticipate the emergence of specific leadership behaviors and principles that are universal in the “simple” sense, leadership principles will continue to be universally applicable but culturally moderated.

Some scholars, however, are emphatic in asserting that certain universal principles are timeless, universal, and generalizable to essentially all leadership contexts. Campbell (2006), for example, in addressing the challenges of globalization that face modern policymakers and corporate leaders, cautions them not to be overwhelmed because globalization is not a new phenomenon. It is, rather, simply more apparent, given modern technological and geo-political considerations. The leadership principles for meeting the challenges of globalization are, furthermore, transcendent, having been proven across time and cultures. Criticizing the governmental and corporate worlds for developing their own idiosyncratic lists of leadership “core competencies” and “skill sets,” Campbell explains these various lists can be synthesized and reduced to nine universal competencies:

1. Vision – establishing an organization’s tone and direction
2. Management – specific goal-setting and resource allocation
3. Empowerment – selecting and developing committed subordinates
4. Diplomacy – building coalitions with internal and external stakeholders
5. Feedback – observing and listening to stakeholders, and responding in ways that are beneficial to the organization

6. Entrepreneurialism – anticipating and finding future opportunities for organizational growth and development

7. Personal style – setting a personal example of “competence, optimism, integrity, and inspiration” (p. 155)

8. Personal energy – disciplining one’s lifestyle in order to meet the physical and psychological demands of leadership

9. Multi-cultural awareness – being aware and adaptable to other cultures

Military history has provided ample opportunity for the investigation of universal leadership principles. Bowery (2005), for example, derives a list of universal, broadly generalizable leadership principles from an examination of the Overland Campaign of 1864 during the American Civil War, explaining that “leaders, managers, and executives should not overlook the battles, campaigns, and personalities of the Civil War as a source of leadership lessons” (p. 5). Bowery’s study is particularly valuable, not only in that the lessons are specifically intended to be transferable to the corporate world, but that the lessons derived are informed by historical analysis, a broad array of theoretical leadership categories (i.e., participative leadership, transactional leadership, transformational leadership, etc.), and the U.S. Army’s structural framework for understanding the three broad categories of leadership activity (i.e., direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership). Among the universal leadership lessons highlighted by Bowery are:

• “Try to match subordinates to your intent, and understand systems that are at your disposal” (p. 81).
• “Don’t let faulty assumptions continue to dominate your thinking” (p. 107).

• “Lead by personal examples in true crisis situations” (p. 108).

• “Flexibility is a cornerstone of effective leadership” (p. 136).

• “Turn vision into action” (p. 152).

• “Leverage staffs and technology to reinforce your vision” (p. 152).

• “Don’t let optimism or a ‘can-do’ spirit blind you to second and third-order effects” (p. 171).

• “Pay constant attention to your interpersonal relationships” (p. 171).

• “Acknowledge and plan for degraded performance over time” (p. 193).

Bowery (2005) is not alone in attempting to derive leadership lessons from war. A number of organizations, such as Battlefield Leadership, LLC, offer seminars for governmental and corporate leaders on lessons, derived from great battles, into team building, coping with transition, and crisis management (Battlefield Leadership, LLC, 2009). Attempts to learn lessons from wartime leaders have become commonplace in contemporary, popular leadership/management literature. Leadership insights have been gleaned from an examination of the wartime careers of Lincoln (Phillips, 1993), Churchill (Hayward, 1998), Patton (Axelrod, 2001), Sun Tzu (Alexander, 2011; Michaelson, 2007), and others. Beyond popular literature, however, the U.S. Army uses military history to formally shape its doctrine (both theoretically, in its fundamental understanding of leadership, and operationally, in its approach to battle-focused training and troop leading procedures [TLPs]) and guide the professional development of its soldiers and officers.
Military Doctrine as a Source of Leadership Insight

As a broad generalization, military leadership is highly technical/mechanical and mission-oriented:

Leaders act. They bring together everything they are, everything they believe, and everything they know how to do to provide purpose, direction, and motivation. Army leaders work to influence people, operate to accomplish the mission, and act to improve their organization (United States, 1999, para. 2.26).

Earlier Army Leadership manuals list, among the “principles of leadership,” several guidelines that are, indeed, distinctively managerial: “be technically and tactically proficient”; “make sound and timely decisions”; “keep your followers informed”; “ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished”; and “employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities” (United States, 1990). From a doctrinal standpoint, then, the distinction between military leadership and management, if one exists, is extremely vague.

Though the U.S. Army is a traditional, insular, and mission-oriented institution, it has, nonetheless, been sensitive to outside insights into the collaborative nature of leadership. Acknowledging that leadership is not only the function of unit commanders, but that it also involves some transformative, reciprocal, change-inducing dynamic within an organization, the Army’s most recent publication on leadership, FM 6-22 (formerly FM 22-100), gives the following description of how leaders must exert influence: “The key element of extending influence and building teams is the creation of a common vision among prospective team members. At times leaders may need to interact with others as a persuasive influence but not from an obvious position and attitude of power” (United States, 2006, para. 7.11). Features of this interaction, the manual continues, include “negotiating, consensus building, and conflict resolution” (para. 7.12). This emphasis on consensus and negotiation should not, however, be mistaken as democratization within the Army, for the mission-oriented understanding of Army
leadership remains the same: “Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization” (para. 1.2).

A far more explicit influence on the U.S. Army’s understanding of leadership than contemporary, collaborative leadership frameworks has been the universal leadership lessons derived from military history, as evidenced by the heavy reliance on historical vignettes in *FM 6-2* (United States, 2006) to illustrate leadership lessons. For example, to illustrate how leaders should embody the characteristics of competence and confidence, the example of Colonel (COL) Joshua Chamberlain’s actions on Little Round Top at the battle of Gettysburg is provided. The concept of the value of shared leadership is illustrated by the example of Army and Naval joint-planning in 2002 in anticipation of a potential ground invasion of Iraq. Loyalty is illustrated by the example of General (GEN) Jonathan Wainwright’s conduct following the 1942 surrender of Luzon to the Japanese. In fact, one of the major instructional components of formal military preparation programs (i.e., the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, etc.) is the military staff ride in which students are immersed in studies of certain military principles through “systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each” in order to apply them to current, relevant situations (Robertson, 1987, p. 5).

To be sure, given the unique challenges and dangers that military leaders face, not all leadership principles derived from military history or doctrine are axiomatically applicable to non-military contexts. Military organizations have their own unique set of values, norms, and obligations, and those values, norms, and obligations may change from era to era and from war to war. Nevertheless, according to Sweeney, Matthews, and Lester (2011):
Leading in dangerous contexts [e.g., military organizations, emergency services, first responders, etc.] is fundamentally the same, yet qualitatively different, from leading in non-dangerous contexts. The common fundamentals for leading in any context involve leaders possessing key characteristics associated with competence, character, and caring; mutual influence exercised in and through leader-follower and peer-peer relationships; organizational factors, such as culture, policies, procedures, practices, and systems, that promote cooperation to achieve a common purpose; and the demands associated with the context. (pp. 4-5; emphasis added).

It is plausible, therefore, that many broad leadership insights and principles can be derived from a careful examination of multiple sources – including cross-cultural studies, corporate models, history, military doctrine – and applied to modern leadership contexts. One might even use contemporary leadership frameworks, such as Path-Goal theory or Situational Leadership theory, to retroactively analyze organizations and historical events. If, in fact, contemporary theoretical leadership frameworks have merit, and if, indeed, principles of leadership are universal, then significant amounts of clarity and insight can be gained by allowing past events and organizations to interpret leadership frameworks and by allowing leadership frameworks to interpret past events and organizations. One of the most insightful contemporary leadership frameworks, particularly given the emphasis, placed by Sweeney, Matthews, and Lester (2011) on the centrality of leader-follower and peer-peer relationships to leadership dynamics, is Leader-Member Exchange (LMX).

**LMX and the Development of Leadership Theoretical Frameworks**

Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) was first conceptualized as an extension of Vertical Dyadic Linkage (VDL) theory during the last quarter of the twentieth century, largely in reaction to approaches to leadership theory that overwhelmingly focused on leaders and neglected a consideration of followers (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Against a backdrop of traditional leadership research investigating leader traits and behaviors, other researchers began to give
considerable attention to the role of the follower in leadership dynamics and, furthermore, the role of individual leader-follower relationships (i.e., dyads). Indeed, since the 1940s, scholars have come to acknowledge that leadership is largely “a relational phenomenon” (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008b, p. 27). It is appropriate, therefore, to trace the emergence and development of relationship-based leadership frameworks, particularly LMX, within the context of other categories and domains of leadership theory.

**Categories of Leadership Theories**

Leadership is an ambiguous concept. It is one of the oldest preoccupations, but due to a lack of consensus on, among other things, its nature, functions, and effects, it is also one of the most elusive (Glynn & DeJordy, 2010; Sweatt, 2002). In their attempt to define leadership in terms of meaning-making, Podolny, Khurana, and Besharov (2010) acknowledge that the ambiguity regarding leadership has caused its study to be academically marginalized, since many perceive it as “too loosely defined” and nothing more than “an amalgamation of behaviors and attributes that can be more readily defined and linked to performance when they are analytically decoupled” (p. 65).

If anything, the development, during the twentieth century, of leadership as a researchable scientific concept has only heightened the ambiguity (Rost, 1993). Though there has been no universally received definition of leadership, there has been, at least, an overwhelming historical tendency to describe leadership in terms of the leader (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Pierce and Newstrom (2008b), accordingly, assert that “the leadership literature is largely leader centered,” beginning with ancient Hellenistic, Chinese, and Egyptian efforts to locate certain qualities within individuals that uniquely equip them to lead (p. 3). As history
progressed, conceptions of leadership were preoccupied with the lives of remarkable individuals – e.g., Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Abraham Lincoln, etc. – possessed of extraordinary capacities for leading, resulting in the widespread popularity of, for example, “great person” theories of leadership. Though multiple leadership theories emerged, most were classified according to the leader’s traits or behaviors. Indeed, historically, “leadership was learned by learning about leaders,” a practice that persisted for thousands of years (beginning with Plutarch’s *Lives*) as autobiography and biography “were used as pedagogy” (Kellerman, 2011, p. 25). Not until after World War II did a paradigm shift occur in leadership research “away from research on the traits and behaviors of leaders to an emphasis on the situation and context in which the leadership occurred” (Bass & Bass, 2008, p. 6). This paradigm shift, on the one hand, contributed to the ambiguity of leadership studies, prompting countless researchers to offer an equally countless number of competing theories which were increasingly difficult to classify (Bass & Bass, 2008). On the other hand, it invited researchers to examine domains of leadership beyond the leader that are equally critical, including the follower and the leader-follower relationship (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).

In order to place relationship-based approaches to leadership in conceptual context, a brief examination of the major categories of leadership theory leading up to the emergence of VDL theory follows.

**Trait theories**

“Trait theory of leadership was the foundation for the field of leadership studies” (Lussier & Achua, 2007, p. 30). They appear, in embryonic form, in antiquity, when leaders were perceived to be naturally elevated to their rank by some personal, inherent quality. For Plato,
individuals possessed varying degrees of intellectual ability. In his ideal society, membership in the leadership class, the class of guardians or philosopher-kings, was reserved for those with the greatest capacity for intellectual inquiry (Gutek, 2005). For Confucius, government was the highest calling, and an individual could receive no greater honor than to be recognized for one’s talent and virtue and, accordingly, elevated to positions of authority and responsibility (Wills, 1994).

By the nineteenth century, leader-centric theories took formal shape with the emergence of the “great man” theory, in which great men were supposed to have been “born, not made” (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991, p. 74). Among the advocates of this theory were Carlyle (1888), Woods (1913), and Nietzsche (1883-1885).

The “great man” hypothesis was eventually modified. According to Judge, Ilies, Bono, and Gerhardt (2002), by the first decade of the twentieth century, trait theory had emerged, sharing with the “great man” hypothesis the assumption that the course of history is dictated by extraordinary leadership, but not necessarily assuming “that leadership reside[s] solely within the grasp of a few heroic men” (p. 80). Leadership, rather, was considered to be influenced by traits. Some of these traits are genetic and inherent, but some of them are psychological and may be cultivated. Judge et al. (2002) provide a qualitative review of many notable leadership trait catalogs. Among them are Mann’s (1959), which includes adjustment, extraversion, dominance, masculinity, and conservatism among the most important leadership traits; Northouse’s (1997), which includes self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability; and Yukl’s (1998), which includes energy level, internal locus of control, socialized power motivation, and low need for affiliation. Judge et al. (2002), themselves, endorse the emerging consensus of the relevance
of the five-factor model of personality to leadership (centered on the personality dimensions of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness).

Judge et al. (2002) acknowledged, nevertheless, that trait theories have several significant limitations. First, though support for a five-factor model of personality is growing, trait theories are largely heterogeneous and inconsistent. Next, even if the five-factor model were conceded, researchers have “a relatively poor idea of not only which traits are relevant, but why” (p. 88). Finally, trait theories largely ignore the “many situational factors that may moderate the validity of personality in predicting leadership” (p. 88).

This situational dimension of leadership was anticipated in the research of Stogdill (1948), who conducted the most important review of leadership traits in the first half of the twentieth century. In his review, Stogdill, like Judge et al. (2002), noted that though the 124 leadership trait inventories he observed shared many commonalities, they lacked anything resembling universality. Traits alone, he concluded, were insufficient in any consideration of leadership. Consideration, rather, must also be given to situational and relational factors. Stogdill (1974) reasserted these insights in a later survey.

Stogdill’s research was a driving impetus behind the decline of trait theory as the dominant leadership construct. Though traits, he insisted, are relevant leadership considerations, and though trait theories persist, particularly in popular literature (Peters & Waterman, 1982; Peters & Austin, 1985; Sinek, 2011; Slater & Bennis, 1990), Stogdill irrevocably altered leadership studies. By 1975, “most empirical researchers…abandoned the search for traits and turned their attention to the situation” (Bass & Bass, 2008, p. 6). By the end of the decade, emerging leadership constructs were combining considerations of trait and situations, as well as of leaders and followers (Bass & Bass, 2008).
Behavioral theories

Stogdill’s (1948) earlier research occurred just as researchers were beginning to focus on behavior theories but before they were beginning to give significant consideration to situational factors. Though largely dependent upon leadership traits and skills, the emerging behavior theories focused on what leaders did to become effective, rather than on what leaders possessed (Miner, 2003).

A series of university-level studies were conducted focusing on the identification of various “leader behaviors and accompanying categorization schemes” (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008a, p. 165). The earliest of the studies, conducted by Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) at the University of Iowa examined the various leadership styles of managers in order to identify common trends among them. Without drawing distinctions between leadership and management, they concluded that three major leadership styles could be identified: authoritarian (directive), democratic (participative), and laissez-faire (delegative). Managers who adopted an authoritarian leadership style tended to retain all decision-making authority, take a non-participative role in work, but would commonly provide employees with praise and criticism. Managers who adopted a democratic style collaborated with employees in the decision-making process, shared in the work responsibilities, and allowed all organizational members to offer informed praise and criticism. Laissez-faire managers allowed workers to control the decision-making process, but were non-participative in work (unless asked) and rarely offered praise or criticism. Lewin et al. found that organizations with autocratic managers were highly productive, but were often characterized by hostility and aggression among members. Organizations with democratic managers were fairly productive and were characterized by high
levels of camaraderie and creativity among members. Organizations with laissez-faire managers experienced low productivity and high levels of organizational dissent.

A decade after the research of Lewin et al., two similar studies were conducted simultaneously at Ohio State University and the University of Michigan to determine which leadership styles, if any, resulted in effective leadership. At Ohio State University, Stogdill and Coons (1957) were contracted by the U.S. Department of Defense to study effective leadership in order to derive a universal leadership model. Using a self-developed instrument called the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ), Stogdill and Coons catalogued 150 distinctive leadership behaviors that they rated along continuums of two major, perceived leadership types: initiating structure and consideration. In the initiating structure leadership type, leaders organized work, scheduled activities, and defined follower roles. In the consideration leadership type, leaders collaborated with followers in work facilitation and conscientiously attempted to build trust, rapport, and respect. Leaders could be rated high or low on both continuums. Consequently, Stogdill and Coons identified four possible leadership styles: high structure/high consideration, low structure/low consideration, high structure/low consideration, and low structure/high consideration. The Ohio State University Leadership Model did not gain universal acceptance, but its influence is apparent in two respects. First, the LBDQ, though criticized for its original gender-specific orientation, has experienced numerous revisions and is still widely used (Yukl, 1998). Second, the Ohio State University Leadership Model has prompted other researchers to construct alternate four-factor leadership theories and leadership style matrixes, such as the Blake and Mouton Managerial Grid (Blake & Mouton, 1964), though most were fairly consistent with the structure of the Stogdill and Coons model (Bowers & Seashore, 1966).
At the University of Michigan, Likert’s (1961) study attempted to classify leadership behavior as either effective or ineffective on the basis of performance outcomes, and to determine why particular leadership behaviors were effective while others were not. Using a questionnaire, called the “Survey of Organizations,” as a data collection tool, Likert identified two major leadership styles, a production oriented (i.e., job-centered) leadership style and an employee oriented leadership style. Leaders with a production orientation tended to place heavy emphasis on goals and work facilitation, while leaders with an employee orientation placed heavy emphasis on employee needs and trust-building relationships. The most effective leaders, concluded Likert, were those who maintained a production orientation as well as an employee orientation by demonstrating five particular behaviors: supportive, respectful relationships with employees; collaborative supervision; high performance goals; technical proficiency; and work facilitation through effective scheduling and planning.

Nevertheless, after three decades of prominence, the leadership behavior paradigm has failed to identify leadership behaviors that could be universally linked to leadership effectiveness (Lussier & Achua, 2007). On the one hand, the questionnaire approach that became the hallmark of leadership behavior research was criticized for its gender and culture bias and ambiguity (Yukl, 1998). On the other hand, critics insisted that behavior style inventories did not adequately account for situational contexts (Fisher & Edwards, 1988). Consequently, another paradigm shift occurred in leadership studies, this time focused on the contingencies/situations “in which leader behavior was embedded” (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008a, p. 195). It was in the context of contingency/situational approaches to leadership that LMX emerged.
Contingency/situational theories

The importance of situational contexts to considerations of effective leadership was anticipated by Stogdill (1948) and, even earlier, by Murphy (1941), who suggested that certain needs, created by specific situations, dictated the kind of leadership required by individuals and organizations. Leadership, argued Murphy, was fundamentally situational:

Leadership study calls for a situational approach; this is fundamentally sociological, not psychological. Leadership does not reside in a person. It is a function of the whole situation. The situation calls for certain types of action; the leader does not inject leadership but is the instrumental factor through which the situation is brought to a solution. (1941, p. 12)

Over the next three decades, several contingency/situational models of leadership were advanced, but four in particular achieved widespread prominence: Fielder’s (1967) Contingency Theory, House’s (1971) Path-Goal Theory, Vroom and Yetton’s (1973) Decision Process Theory, and Hersey and Blanchard’s (1982) Situational Leadership Theory.

Fielder (1967) argued that leadership styles were rooted in a leader’s personality and, therefore, remained fundamentally constant. Some situations were, accordingly, more favorable to some leaders than others, depending upon the leadership style. Like Likert (1961), Fielder identified two major leadership styles, a production-orientation and a relationship-orientation. Using Fielder’s instrument, the least preferred coworker (LPC) scale, individuals could determine their leadership style. The degree to which a situation was favorable to one style or the other depended upon three factors: the nature of the leader-member relationship (i.e., the degree to which the leader-follower relationships were characterized by trust, respect, acceptance, and loyalty); the degree to which job tasks were clear and structured, or unclear and ambiguous; and the nature of the leader’s position power (i.e., the degree to which the leader could punish or reward). Leadership effectiveness ultimately depended upon achieving
congruence between the leader and the situation/environment. Though some research has supported Fielder’s model (Strube & Garcia, 1981), critics were particularly critical of the assertion that leadership styles are constant and that situations, not styles, must be changed in order to achieve leader/environment fit (Schriesheim & Kerr, 1977). Subsequent contingency theorists, therefore, advanced situational models for changing and adapting leadership styles.

House’s (1971) Path-Goal Theory, for instance, acknowledged that leaders have traits that predispose them to certain styles, but argued that leaders must, after an assessment of their situation (determined by subordinate and environmental factors), select and use a leadership style (directive, supportive, participative, or achievement-oriented) that would best enhance the performance and satisfaction of the subordinates. Ultimately, “a leader’s behavior is motivating or satisfying to the degree that the behavior increases subordinate goal attainment and clarifies the paths” (House & Mitchell, 1974). Subordinate factors that inform a leader’s style selection include authoritarianism (the degree to which a subordinate requires direction), locus of control (the degree to which a subordinate believes that they control success), and ability (a subordinate’s task proficiency). Environmental factors include task structure (degree of task variance or repetition), formal authority (the nature and extent of a leader’s positional power), and work group (the level of group cohesiveness and job satisfaction). A leader would select a more directive leadership style “when the followers want authority leadership, have external locus of control, and the follower ability is low…[and] when the environmental task is complex or ambiguous, formal authority is strong, and the work group provides job satisfaction” (Lussier & Achua, 2007, p. 173). By contrast, a participative leadership style would be adopted “when followers want to be involved, have internal locus of control, and follower ability is high; when
the environmental task is complex, [formal] authority is either strong or weak, and job satisfaction from coworkers is either high or low” (Lussier & Achua, 2007, p. 173).

Similarly, Vroom and Yetton’s (1973) Decision Process Theory attempted to establish a model for selecting a leadership style based on situations, but it was particularly oriented toward questions of when and to what degree leaders should engage in collaborative decision-making with subordinates. Vroom and Yetton’s five leadership styles, therefore, resembled a continuum ranging from the lowest level of group collaboration in the decision-making process to the highest level: decide, consult individually, consult group, facilitate, and delegate. Finally, Hersey and Blanchard’s (1982) Situational Leadership Theory suggested that leader situations were often determined by the follower’s maturity level (i.e., a follower’s self-confidence and technical proficiency). The adoption of a task-oriented style or a relationship-oriented style should depend upon the maturity level of the employee, so that the lower the maturity level of the employee, the higher should be the task-orientation of the leader.

With the exception of the Vroom and Yetton (1973) model, contingency theories have provoked substantial amounts of criticism (Pierce & Newstrom, 2008a; Sweatt, 2002). Nevertheless, they have contributed to a greater awareness of the importance of a relationship-oriented approach to leadership. It was precisely in this context that LMX emerged. Indeed, Sweatt (2002) acknowledges that, because it is premised upon the development of separate mutually agreed upon exchange relationships between leaders and followers, LMX is essentially a situational leadership model.

Before turning to a discussion of the emergence and development of LMX, it would be appropriate to acknowledge that, since the development of contingency/situational models, other categories of leadership models have emerged. These categories, including
transformational/integrative models, new leadership models, and systems models are, however, beyond the scope of this study. For a concise and informative overview of these models, see Sweatt (2002).

**The Development of LMX**

According to Schriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser (1999), leadership theories have been vulnerable to criticism partly because there has been, in general, “a lack of responsiveness to constructive criticisms provided by the field, as well as a failure to incorporate needed changes as evidence has accumulated. Neither of these criticisms can be leveled at LMX theory” (p. 99). Indeed, since the emergence of the theory in the 1970s in the research of Cashman, Graen, Dansereau, and other colleagues (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Cashman, 1975), LMX has experienced substantial amounts of revision and evolution.

Graen & Uhl-Bien (1995) explained, in retrospect, that LMX theory evolved through a series of four progressive stages (see Figure 2.1). In the first stage, research emphasized the nature of differentiated dyads within work units. In stage 2, research shifted to an investigation of LMX characteristics and organizational implications/outcomes. Stage 3 emphasized dyadic partnership building (also referred to as Leadership Making), while stage 4 research was concerned with “the aggregation of differentiated dyadic relationships to group and network levels” (p. 225). Most LMX research has emphasized the first two stages, and there remains a significant need for continued research in the latter two stages (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).
Stage 1 - Vertical Dyad Linkage (VDL)

Most leadership theories, whether behavioral or contingency/situational models, took for granted the underlying assumptions of the Ohio State and Michigan studies that effective supervision was characterized by leaders who used an average leadership style (ALS) (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Beginning in the 1970s, however, a series of research studies suggested that “many managerial processes were found to occur on a dyadic basis, with managers developing differentiated relationships” (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995, p. 226). The watershed study of Dansereau, Graen, and Haga (1975), for instance, involved longitudinal research of 60 managers constituting the administrative pyramid over a housing division within a large public university,
17 of whom were interviewed as supervisors and 43 of whom were interviewed as subordinates. After nine months of research, it was concluded that, contrary to the prevailing ALS assumptions, “a given superior can establish ‘leadership’ relationships [i.e., influence without authority] with some of his members and at the same time establish ‘supervision’ relationships [i.e., influence based solely on authority] with other of his members” (p. 76). Several contemporaneous and subsequent studies yielded similar findings across multiple occupational fields and cultural contexts, though it must be acknowledged that several of these studies involved the same researchers (Graen & Cashman, 1975; Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1976; Graen, Cashman, Ginsburgh, & Schiemann, 1977; Vecchio, 1982; Rosse & Kraut, 1983; Graen & Wakabayashi, 1994).

This new approach to leadership dynamics, initially called the Vertical Dyad Linkage model, demanded a reexamination of the traditional ALS assumptions (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975). Instead, relationships between members of an organization could be described as dyadic (i.e., individualized), and the nature of these dyadic relationships was quite heterogeneous (Lussier & Achua, 2007). Within any single organization, individuals could perceive themselves as either trusted assistants or hired hands, describing their relationship with supervisors or managers as either “high-quality exchanges”, characterized by high degrees of mutual trust, respect, and sense of obligation, or “low-quality exchanges”, characterized by low degrees of mutual trust, respect, and sense of obligation (Zalesny & Graen, 1987).

**Stage 2 - Leader-Member Exchange (LMX)**

While research in the first stage of LMX development focused on the identification of differentiated relationships, the second stage was concerned with the characteristics and
implications of these relationships. There continues to be a significant amount of preoccupation with LMX characteristics and implications. In fact, even after the first two decades of development, “much of the writing about the theory [was] still occurring on this level” (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995, p. 225).

It could be reasonably argued that, though the theory is not entirely dichotomous, the hallmark of LMX is, nevertheless, the recognition of “in-groups” and “out-groups” within organizations (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). These kinds of differentiated groups arise from the fact that, as asserted by Situational Leadership Theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982), members or organizations have different individual needs, though there are limited organizational resources available to meet those needs. Vasudevan’s (1993) research indicated that, for instance, members of organizations may possess varying levels of optimism, appreciation of team skills, internal locus of control, self-efficacy, career orientation, ability to engage in long-term planning, etc. However, because leaders or superiors have limited amounts of energy, time, and attention, these kinds of resources are distributed selectively. As a result, relationships of varying degrees of quality emerge. For example, in a study of the perceptions of the quality of relationships between organizational supervisors and subordinates in multiple business contexts, Mueller and Lee (2002) found that high levels of communication satisfaction at the interpersonal, group, and organizational level were related to perceptions of high-quality exchange relationships. “In-groups” and “out-groups” are, therefore, a product of the different qualities of relationships that emerge within organizations. Accordingly, argue Lussier & Achua (2007):

The in-group includes followers with strong social ties to their leader in a supportive relationship characterized by high mutual trust, respect, loyalty, and influence. Leaders primarily use expert, referent, and reward power to influence members of the in-group. The out-group includes followers with few or no social ties to their leader, in a strictly task-centered relationship characterized by low exchange and top-down influence. Leaders mostly use reward, as well as legitimate and coercive power, to influence out-
group members… the out-group follower receives the standard benefits for the job (such as a salary) and no more…Members of the in-group are invited to participate in important decision making, and given added responsibility, and have greater access to the leader [while] members of the out-group are managed according to the requirements of the employment contract (p. 253).

A considerable amount of research has been dedicated to investigating the various characteristics and outcomes of LMX, suggesting that differentiated LMX relationships are related to organizational variables like job climate (Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989), organizational obligation (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Fairhurst, 1993), and trust (Liden & Graen, 1980; Dirks, 2000). Truckenbrodt (2000), for instance, conducted a study involving 204 full-time employees in a highly specialized, information technology company. He found that in relationships described as “high-quality exchange” (i.e., in-group) employees had high levels of commitment (i.e., loyalty) stemming from “the employee’s combined belief that the goals, objectives, and values of the organization [were] congruent with their own” (pp. 234-235). As the quality of LMX increased, Truckenbodt concluded, the quality of commitment and citizenship behaviors would also increase, resulting ultimately in organizational growth and success.

Other studies have suggested that high-quality exchange relationships are characterized by a greater occurrence of organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) (Manogran & Conlon, 1993; Truckenbrodt, 2000). OCBs are defined as “job behaviors that are discretionary, not explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, yet, in the aggregate, contribute to organizational effectiveness,” such as volunteering for extra duty, helping absent coworkers, positively promoting the organization to the public, etc. (Erkutlu, 2011, p. 533). A meta-analysis conducted by Ilies, Nahrgang, and Morgeson (2007), in which 50 independent samples (N=9,324) were derived from a collection of 329 peer-reviewed articles on VDL and LMX, 48 independent correlations between LMX and OCBs were reported.
High-quality exchange relationships are also characterized by high perceptions of procedural and distributive justice within the organization (Piccolo, Barde, Mayer, & Judge, 2008; Johnson, Truxillo, Erdogan, Bauer, & Hammer, 2009; Bolino & Turnley, 2009). Distributive justice refers to the perception that received outcomes (e.g., promotions and favorable job assignments) are fair, while procedural justice refers to the perception that organizational procedures (e.g., due process and decision-making processes) are fair (Cropanzano & Folger, 1991). Scandura’s (1999) research suggests, not only that a relationship between LMX and perceptions of organizational justice existed, but also that concerns regarding distributive and procedural justice are instrumental in an organization member’s relegation to “in-group” or “out-group” status, or even mobility of members between “in-group” and “out-group” status. In fact, she argues, “failure to recognize the important role that organizational justice plays in LMX can help explain why some high quality LMXs disintegrate over time” (p. 40). Of all LMX characteristics, including trust, mutual respect, and commitment, issues of organizational justice must be given a central position in any further refinement of the LMX model (p. 41).

Though there are clearly multiple characteristics and outcomes of LMX relationships, there is no consensus on what essentially characterizes high-quality relationships. Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) and Dienesch and Liden (1986) concur that high LMX relationships are characterized, at least, by mutual trust, respect, and obligation. Schriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser (1999), however, conducted a comprehensive review of theory, measurement, and data-analytic practices in 82 empirical LMX studies performed during the 1990s. They concluded that, of the various characteristics, “six content subdomains appear to be predominant in a majority of the studies: mutual support, trust, liking, latitude, attention, and loyalty” (p. 77).
According to Liden & Maslyn (1998), the lack of consensus regarding LMX characteristics has, naturally, resulted in a similar lack of consensus in the construction of instruments for measuring LMX:

A wide variety of measures have been used to assess LMX over the past 20 years. The original measure, referred to as negotiating latitude (rather than LMX), consisted of 2 items and later 4 items. A fifth item was then added to the original 4 items and the new measure was renamed, leader-member exchange, or LMX. Leader-member exchange has also been assessed with 7-item, and 14-item versions of the scale…a 13-item “information exchange” measure [was developed] to assess LMX. Some researchers have employed a one-item scale assessing a low LMX/high LMX dichotomy, In some studies, the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) has been used as a surrogate for LMX…the 7-item LMX measure [referred to as LMX-7] has been the most frequently used LMX measure in the 1980s and 1990s. (p. 47)

LMX-7, designed to measure three key dimensions of strong partnerships (i.e., respect, trust, and obligation), continues to be the most common LMX measurement scale. Nevertheless, critics of LMX-7 argue that the scale is inadequate because (1) it only assesses formal proscribed work relationships between leaders and subordinates, rather than the formal and personal relationship between leaders and subordinates, and (2) the dimensions of respect, trust, and obligation, when subjected to an explanatory factor analysis, are actually revealed to be unidimensional (Liden & Maslyn, 1998).

In response to the criticisms of LMX-7, Liden and Maslyn (1998) developed a new, more deliberately multi-dimensional scale, called the LMX-MDM scale, designed to measure four separate LMX dimensions: affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). An explanatory factor analysis confirmed the multi-dimensionality of the LMX-MDM scale, and a test for reliability, using Cronbach’s α, yielded the following scores: affect = .92, loyalty = .85, contribution = .76, professional respect = .94, and total LMX = .92 (Alabi, 2012; Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Assuming, then, that affect, loyalty,
contribution, and respect are valid LMX characteristics/dimensions, the LMX-MDM scale is a reliable instrument for measuring LMX.

The clear relationship between differentiated LMX relationships and organizational variables, argued Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995), must lead one to conclude that “higher-quality LMX relationships have very positive outcomes for leaders, followers, work units, and the organization in general” (p. 299). Consequently, the next stage of development in LMX research focused on how LMX relationships could be adjusted to bring about positive organizational outcomes.

Stage 3 – The Leadership Making Model

Graen and Uhl-Bien are the architects of the next stage of LMX development, commonly referred to as the Leadership Making Model. Based on the recognition of “the utility of increasing proportions of high-quality relationships in organizations,” Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995, p. 225) proposed that research move beyond the descriptive second stage of LMX research into a more normative, prescriptive stage of providing “a more practically useful, model of leadership development” (p. 229). In other words, emphasis should not be placed on how leaders differentiate between “in-group” and “out-group” members, but on how leaders may work with organization members individually to develop mature partnerships with each (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991a; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991b; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1992; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1993a; Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1993b; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Effective leadership making, after all, would result in more mature LMX relationships, which would, in turn, result in more effective leadership outcomes and greater organizational performance (Butler & Reese, 1991; Cogliser, Schriesheim, Scandura, & Gardner, 2009).
The Leadership Making Model involves three phases (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995):

1. Stranger phase – Individuals encounter one another in the exercise of interdependent organizational roles. Exchanges are formal and purely contractual.

2. Acquaintance phase – An “offer” is made by either member of the exchange relationship “for an improved working relationship through career-oriented social exchange” (p. 231). If the “offer” is declined, either explicitly or implicitly, the exchange relationship will not likely move beyond the “stranger” phase and low-quality LMX will result. If the “offer” is accepted, increased social exchanges, some contractual and some non-contractual, will occur, resulting in a greater, but still limited, sharing of personal and professional time and resources.

3. Mature partnership phase – Relationships in the “acquaintance” phase will gradually grow until they are characterized by mutual loyalty and support. Relationships at this stage are no longer merely behavioral. They are also emotional, characterized by an increasing sense of mutual trust and obligation. At this stage, “the payoffs can be tremendous…the potential for incremental influence is nearly unlimited, due to the enormous breadth and depth of exchange of work-related social contributions that are possible” (p. 232).

Stage 4 - Aggregations of dyads

Beyond the development of the Leadership Making Model, Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995) have also continued to move the development of LMX theory forward by examining the possible implications of aggregations of dyads within organizations. Differentiated dyads, they suggest, “can be effectively assembled in larger collectivities (collectivities as aggregations of dyads)” (p.
Rather than considering dyads as independent of one another, attention should be given to how relationships naturally network due to a combination of peer influences and mutual dependencies. Few researchers, however, have followed Graen and Uhl-Bien’s lead in this direction. In fact, some earlier advocates of LMX have broken with Graen and Uhl-Bien and have taken the research on dyadic relationships in the completely different direction of Individualized Leadership (IL) theory. While a detailed examination of IL theory is beyond the scope of this study, it is relevant to note that the approach was developed by Dansereau (1995), a VDL/LMX pioneer, and his colleagues (1995) who suggested that, contrary to the assumptions of Graen and Uhl-Bien, dyads remain essentially independent of one another.

Defining LMX

It is clear from the above review of the development of LMX that the theory embodies a contingency/situational relationship-based approach to leadership. At the heart of the theory, explains Graen and Uhl-Bien, is the “centroid concept…that effective leadership processes occur when leaders and followers are able to develop mutual leadership relationships (partnerships) and thus gain access to the many benefits these relationships bring” (p. 225).

Figure 2.2 is a suggested conceptualization of the major themes of the LMX framework. According to this conceptualization, the “in-group” and the “out-group” are depicted as two concentric circles. The LMX characteristics/dimensions identified in the LMX-MDM scale—affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect (Liden & Maslyn, 1998) are depicted as continuums. Movement toward the center “in group” circle would correspond with an increase (+) in the level of affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect, while movement toward the outer “out-group” circle would correspond with a decrease (-) in the level of affect, loyalty,
Figure 2.2 An LMX Conceptual Framework

contribution, and professional respect. Additionally, in light of Scandura’s (1999) research on the centrality of perceptions of organizational justice on LMX relationships, similar continuums for perceptions of distributive justice and perceptions of procedural justice are also depicted.

While variations of LMX definitions abound, the following definition, offered by Scandura, Graen, and Novak (1986), captures the central tenants of the theory:

Leader-member exchange [LMX] is (a) a system of components and their relationships (b) involving both members of a dyad (c) involving interdependent patterns of behavior and (d) sharing mutual outcome instrumentalities and (e) producing conceptions of environment, cause maps, and value. (p. 580)
Lussier & Achua (2007) suggest that, regardless of the criticisms of the LMX theory (many of which are legitimate), “it is evident that good or effective leadership is partly due to good relationships between leaders and followers” (p. 250).

**LMX Limitations**

It must be acknowledged that the LMX framework is not without its limitations or critics. Concerns, for instance, have arisen over the theoretical adequacy of LMX, particularly given the fact that the evolution of the theory necessarily implies an evolution of the theoretical conceptualization and operational measurement of the framework. Beyond the substantial variance in the theoretical content, the dimensionality of LMX, the manner in which LMX is measured, and even the basic definition of the construct, research by Schriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser (1999) and Vecchio and Gobdel (1984) found that the lack of uniformity in measurement and data analysis resulted in mixed results in the measurement of relationships between LMX and its outcomes. In addition, LMX critics (some of whom, like Dansereau, were early LMX advocates) suggest that the development of the theory through four stages was sporadic and contrived rather than chronological and progressive, and that the framework is too dismissive of the ALS approach (Dansereau, 1995; Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999). Finally, apart from the research of Graen and Uhl-Bien, few LMX studies move beyond the descriptive stage 2 into the prescriptive and normative stages of the theory “where guidelines for managerial practice are developed” (Scandura, 1999, p. 36).

Some of the same critics, nevertheless, acknowledge that, in spite of its shortcomings, LMX has tremendous value. The framework is, at least in its early VDL stages, consistent with ASL (in that “both ASL and VDL effects may operate simultaneously”) (Dansereau, 1995, p.
Moreover, some instruments for measuring particular LMX dimensions/characteristics, particularly the LMX-MDM scale, have demonstrated high validity and reliability (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). Regardless of theoretical and analytical inconsistencies, “the majority of studies [suggest] good consensus on the nature of the phenomenon as being the quality of the exchange relationship between leader and subordinate” (Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999, p. 77).

**Summary of LMX**

LMX emerged from a theoretical context emphasizing the influence of external contingencies or situational factors on a leader’s chosen style. Situational/contingency approaches represented a departure from traditional theories – both trait and behavioral – which described leadership in terms of a leader’s personality or actions. In contrast to these leader-centric models, situational/contingency theories were increasingly environment and follower-centric. Among situational models, LMX is unique in that it challenges the conception of broadly applied leadership styles. Dyadic relationships, instead, dictate that a leader may adopt leadership styles unique to every individual dyad within an organization. LMX, therefore, is neither leader-centric, environment-centric, nor follower-centric. It is relationship-centric.

**Braxton Bragg and Leadership in the Army of Tennessee**

“To express my convictions in a few words, our chief [i.e., Bragg] has done but one thing he ought to have done since I joined his army,” wrote LTG James Longstreet to Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon on September 26, 1863, less than a week after the battle of Chickamauga. “That was to order the attack upon the 20\textsuperscript{th}. All other things that he has done, he ought not to have done. I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us
as long as we have our present commander” (*OR*, 1880-1901, vol. 30, part 4, pp. 705-706).

Longstreet was not alone in his sentiments. Three days later, he used his tremendous influence to persuade eleven other members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command, including three of the eight corps-level commanders and three division commanders, to sign a petition demanding that President Jefferson Davis remove Bragg from command of the army (Cooper, 2000).

Though the anti-Bragg faction had grown steadily in influence and strength since the retreat from Kentucky following the battle of Perryville in 1862 (McWhiney, 1960), it did not universally infect the Army of Tennessee’s leadership. BG William Bate (1863, March 24), for example, in response to a previous effort to oust the embattled commander, communicated his opinion of Bragg to Senator Landon C. Haynes:

> General Bragg exacts military duty from officers as well as men, and hence many of the former, as well as the latter, have become his critiques *par excellence*…I am for proper discipline and drill, and there is no man in our entire army who is the equal of General Bragg in organizing, disciplining, and keeping together a large command.

Indeed, several other notable officers, such as MG Benjamin F. Cheatham and MG John C. Breckinridge, refused to participate in any anti-Bragg *coup d’état*, however critical they may have personally been of their commander.

These correspondences represent two diverging opinions, within the same organization, of the organization’s leader, Braxton Bragg. Even without an awareness of the distinct features of LMX, it is readily apparent that some officers, like Longstreet, had extremely critical views of their commander, stemming from low perceptions of organizational justice, affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Others, like Bate, expressed confidence in Bragg, suggesting a high perception of organizational justice, affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Whatever motives may have generated these perceptions – some suggest, for instance, that Longstreet coveted the command of the Army of Tennessee for himself and,
therefore, had a positional “axe to grind” (Woodworth, 1998) – factions emerged in accordance with them. Longstreet, along with LTG Leonidas Polk, would become two of the most outspoken leaders of the anti-Bragg cabal, a clique that, on the surface, would appear to meet Scandura’s (1999) criteria for inclusion in the “out-group”, while Bate, on the other hand, expressed sentiments that would, on first glance, appear characteristic of “in-group” membership.

The Dyadic Dimension of Military Leadership in the Civil War

Though there have been relatively few applications of dyadic leadership frameworks, like VDL, LMX, or IL theory, to military organizations (Maksom & Winter, 2009), there is a substantial amount of literature on the nature and outcomes of command relationships in the American Civil War.

Even before the emergence of contingency/situational theories of leadership in the 1940s, historians studied the powerful, intangible positive and negative forces that can emanate from command partnerships. Freeman (1946), in his seminal *Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command*, described how an army with very few tangible advantages (relative to its opposing armies), the Army of Northern Virginia, was sustained by, among other things, remarkable command relationships stemming from the personal character of the commander:

In case after case, Lee patiently assuaged the victims of hurt pride, stimulated the discouraged, appealed to the better nature of wavering men, and by force of his own righteousness more than by the exercise of his authority, reconciled bitter differences or induced personal enemies to work together. The seeming absence from the Army of Northern Virginia of such rivalries and animosities as hampered nearly all the other large forces, Confederate and Union, was not in reality absence but control. In the hearts of Lee’s subordinates were all the explosive qualities that existed elsewhere, but the General himself possessed the combination of tact, understanding, prestige, firmness and personal character necessary to prevent the explosion (pp. xxiv-xxv)
In similar fashion, historians have argued that, among the many features of military command that contribute to success on the battlefield (e.g., industrial capability, technological superiority, strategic and tactical acumen, etc.), the well-cultivated command relationship is among the most important. Williams (1952), for instance, explains that Lincoln micromanaged the relationships with the field commanders that he trusted the least (e.g., Frémont, Banks, McClellan, etc.) because he felt compelled, by the insubordination, incompetence, of inactivity of these commanders, to be involved in the minutia of managing and directing the war. The rise of Ulysses S. Grant, however, enabled Lincoln to emerge as a great wartime president. Lincoln developed a nearly unshakeable trust-based relationship with Grant that gave Lincoln the confidence to relinquish operational control of the war to Grant, freeing him up to devote his energies to grand strategy.

Other authors have made similar assessments (Simon, 1994; Stoker, 2010). Woodworth (1995b) examines the command partnerships between the other wartime president, Jefferson Davis, and his commanders, and concludes, in similar fashion, that much of Lee’s success must be attributed to Davis’s confidence in Lee, which resulted in Lee receiving an amount of autonomy that practically no other Confederate commander would receive. Indeed, Woodworth (1990) argues elsewhere that much of the Confederate failure in the western theater, particularly during Bragg’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, can be blamed on Davis’s unwillingness to allow his western commanders to engage in the kind of team-building that would allow them to forge the favorable command relationships necessary for long-term, strategic success.
Glatthaar’s (1994) study is extremely valuable because it is one of the few to place primary emphasis on the dyadic dimension of command relationships, and its strategic, tactical, and logistical implications:

As American military history has demonstrated, an abundance of war resources does not guarantee success…Warfare had become too complicated for that. Political and military leaders had to collaborate, to establish effective partnerships that could translate strategic vision into battlefield execution. They needed to learn how to join with others to harness and employ their resources most efficiently in order to triumph in the war. (p. vii)

Of course, those relationships characterized by genuine “partnership” (i.e., Lee and Jackson, Grant and Sherman, etc.) translated into battlefield victories, whereas relationships characterized by distrust and suspicion (e.g., McClellan and Pope, Davis and Johnston, etc.) translated into organizational mismanagement and battlefield defeat. Nevertheless, while helpful, it was not necessary, Glatthaar asserts, for “partnerships” to be based on personal intimacy or compatibility. The most successful command relationships, rather, “rested in the ability of leaders to understand strengths and weaknesses. They had to know themselves, to know their own assets and liabilities as well as the qualities and characteristics of critical subordinates” (p. 236). What was required, in other words, was the kind of professionalism that engendered mutual trust, respect, sense of obligation, and singularity of purpose.

The literature review suggests that few of Bragg’s relationships had that.

**Braxton Bragg Maligned and Reconsidered: A Dyadic Perspective**

Civil War scholarship is currently experiencing a renaissance of interest in and a reappraisal of the leadership of Bragg. Though much of the failure of the Army of the Tennessee has, traditionally, been attributed to the leadership deficiencies of Bragg, recent scholarship has challenged that assessment and has suggested that a much larger set of leadership dynamics at
work in the army’s high command is to blame. Woodworth (2010a), in his essay analyzing one spectacular example of breakdown in the Confederate command architecture during the Chickamauga campaign (the actions at McLemore’s Cove in north Georgia), summarizes this point:

…perhaps the most effective and most avoidable [reason for Confederate failure at McLemore’s Cove] was the culture that prevailed among the general officers of the Army of Tennessee. Bragg’s weakness as a general was his inability to motivate and win the cooperation of difficult generals, but even Robert E. Lee wrote that he doubted he could gain the cordial cooperation of the western generals if he were transferred to that theater. The bitterness, backstabbing, cross-purposes, and mistrust among the Army of Tennessee’s generals became the greatest handicap of that long-suffering Confederate host. (p. 66)

Overshadowed by the more successful, elegant, and chivalrous Lee, Bragg has been the subject of only a handful of scholarly biographies. Countless battle narratives, campaign studies, army histories and leadership analyses, however, have painted an overwhelmingly negative picture of his leadership. Rafuse (2012), in a recent survey of the six most contemptuous officers of the American Civil War, captures this sentiment when he describes Bragg as “the architect of a remarkable record of defeat” (p. 36). Bragg is accused of being an excessive disciplinarian, an unimaginative tactician, and an inept commander whose only success was attributable, not to ability, but to “a magnificent stroke of luck” (p. 36).

Rafuse’s (2012) description of Bragg, however, is nothing more than a restatement of the conventional wisdom that, since Seitz (1924) wrote the first major biography of Bragg, has dominated Civil War literature. McWhiney’s (1969) biography, for example, replaced Seitz’s as the standard work on the life of Braxton Bragg. In it, he acknowledges and challenges the brutality with which historians, including venerated Civil War scholars like Bruce Catton, Douglas Southall Freeman, and T. Harry Williams, have treated Bragg, concluding that Bragg, indeed, possessed many useful military qualities, including courage, audacity, and ingenuity.
The consensus, however, appears to be that Bragg was unfit for command because of, among other things, his lack of charisma, his mediocre tactical ability, his inability to grow and develop as a commander (as many of his peers, in fact, did), and his severe interpersonal deficiencies (Connelly, 1971; Hess, 2012; Seitz, 1924). In one particular anecdotal insight, McMurry (1989) indicates that McWhiney, who had intended to write a second volume on Bragg’s career, abandoned the project after becoming disillusioned by Bragg’s tactlessness and irascibility.

Two historians produced major histories of the Army of Tennessee, both of which are highly critical of Bragg’s tenure as army commander. Horn (1941), while acknowledging Bragg’s sound strategic vision, launches multiple criticisms at Bragg, ranging from timidity (at Perryville) to outright stupidity (in dividing his army prior to the battles for Chattanooga by detaching Longstreet to Knoxville, TN). Connelly (1971), though much more charitable than Horn, nevertheless adds indecisiveness and pettiness to the barrage of criticisms, before concluding that Bragg’s personality was insufficient to successfully lead a field army:

> It was ironic that Bragg, who was then and later castigated by many as incompetent, had managed the army during its period of greatest success, had penetrated the enemy’s territory deeper than any other western general, and had molded an efficient army. Yet something had been missing. A rapport between Bragg and his men and officers had never existed. Bragg’s personality – quarrelsome, suspicious, quick to blame – had simply not been sufficient. (p. 278)

In the most thoroughly documented account of the battle of Chickamauga, Cozzens (1992) concludes that Confederate victory in the battle came in spite of the spectacular incompetence of Bragg. Not only did Bragg issue vague and “impossible” orders that engendered fear, created confusion, and discouraged decisive, independent action from his lieutenants, but also many of his officers’ failures, even failures of gross negligence, like Hill’s decision to go to sleep rather than to communicate important orders to Polk, according to Cozzens, were the fault of Bragg’s “infectious” apathy.
Other scholars have suggested that the failures of the Army of Tennessee were the result of a much more complex leadership dynamic. According to Woodworth (1990), Bragg certainly possessed a number of personality flaws that made his task as commander more difficult. The leadership challenges within the Army of Tennessee, however, would have been insurmountable for any commander. More directly responsible for the army’s failure was the blind loyalty of President Davis to incompetent generals like Polk, the personal ambition and near-criminal insubordination of several high ranking officers (including Polk, Hill, and Longstreet), and the sheer magnitude of the Army of Tennessee’s mission, in the face of overwhelming odds. In spite of these difficulties, Woodworth explains, Bragg proved to be the longest serving and most-successful commander in the Army of Tennessee’s history.

Elsewhere, Woodworth (2010b) analyzes the Army of Tennessee’s high command during the battle of Chickamauga and suggests that, as simple as Bragg’s tactics were, he had actually done everything necessary to ensure battlefield success (and had even succeeded, on three occasions before the battle, at catching his enemy in turning or flanking maneuvers). A sweeping, decisive victory was prevented, not by Bragg’s interpersonal weaknesses, but by the willful incompetence and malicious insubordination of Polk and Hill. “Perhaps,” Woodworth explains, “if Bragg had been among the handful of truly great commanders in the history of warfare…he might have succeeded in winning a decisive victory anyway. Yet even such an extraordinary commander might well have failed under these circumstances” (p. 131).

A number of recent historians have echoed Woodworth’s opinion that the Army of Tennessee suffered primarily from a well-entrenched, ambitious, and often incompetent high command, rather than from an unsociable commander. Robins (2006), for example, in a relatively charitable treatment of Polk, nevertheless concedes that Polk’s argumentative nature,
protectiveness of personal honor, and sensitivity to criticism contributed to a “self-serving” opposition to Bragg. Wert (1993), Mendoza (2008) and Hallock (1998), furthermore, each suggest that Longstreet’s relationship with Bragg was ill fated from the beginning because, in transferring from Lee’s prestigious Army of Northern Virginia to the less prestigious Army of Tennessee, Longstreet coveted Bragg’s position and was sorely disappointed when he was not granted authority to replace him as commander.

This most recent scholarship on leadership in the Army of Tennessee, therefore, seems to suggest that, rather than lay the blame for the army’s abysmal command climate at the feet of Braxton Bragg, the blame must be distributed. It is more appropriate, when attributing blame for the leadership dysfunction in the high command of the Army of Tennessee, to give serious consideration to the dyadic forces at work.

**Summary**

This chapter presented a review of literature relevant to the use of history as a source of leadership lessons, the emergence of LMX as a distinctive, relationship-based leadership framework, the limitations of LMX as a theoretical framework, and the dyadic dimension of leadership in the Army of Tennessee during Bragg’s tenure as commander. Chapter III discusses the methodology used in this study. This study followed a qualitative, historical case study design to examine features of a contemporary, relationship-based leadership framework, LMX, in the relationships between a historical military commander and his senior lieutenants. The chapter provides a discussion on the appropriateness of the historical case study design. It also provides a discussion on the participants, the methods of data collection, and the methods of data analysis.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This study was qualitative in nature and followed a historical case study design. It combined qualitative research and historical, primary source research. Its ultimate concern was to examine and interpret the interactions among members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga in light of one particular relationship-oriented theoretical framework, leader-member exchange (LMX). As evidenced in the prior chapter, there is a wealth of research that elaborates upon the distinctive features of LMX (Ilies, Nahrgang & Morgeson, 2007), and a methodological assumption was that, since many of the principles of leadership are universal and enduring (Dickson, Den Hartog, & Mitchelson, 2003), the Army of Tennessee, like any organization, exhibited many of these features. In using a primary source research model, the interactions of members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command, found in the primary source record (particularly battle narratives, personal memoirs, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies [OR, 1880-1901], etc.), were analyzed and synthesized, along with the insights of certain seminal secondary sources (primarily campaign studies and biographies) in order to better analyze and describe the nature of the well-documented dysfunction in this organization’s
command climate (following common convention in contemporary Civil War studies, the official records contained in The War of the Rebellion will, hereafter, be referred to simply as the OR²).

The distinctive features of LMX, outlined and described in seminal literature, served as the theoretical framework in light of which the primary source record and certain seminal secondary sources were analyzed and interpreted. To ensure the reliability of the analysis, the findings of this study were subjected to a peer examination through a series of interviews with a panel of subject-matter experts. In these interviews, members of the expert panel confirmed, corrected, or augmented the research findings with their own analyses. From these multiple analyses, an accurate LMX perspective on the command climate of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga (including the Tullahoma, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga campaigns) emerged. This perspective: provides a working model for examining and identifying features of LMX in other leadership contexts, both historical and contemporary; yields lessons which can inform and instruct current leaders and leadership preparation programs; and provides a basis for future research.

**The Instructional Value of Historical Case Studies**

This study employed an historical case study design to examine the nature and quality of Bragg’s relationships with his senior lieutenants through the lens of the LMX theoretical framework. It is generally acknowledged that Frederic Le Play, French economist and sociologist during the age of Napoleon III, is the father of case study research (Healy, 1947).

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² When references from the OR were cited in the text, the researcher modified the APA conventions in favor of conventions more typically used in Civil War historiography. Accordingly, the OR’s dates of publication were not cited in each reference, and specific page numbers were provided, even if portions of the text were not directly cited. The use of these conventions (1) made the general body of the text less confusing, cumbersome, and repetitive, and (2) made the location of the references more precise and user-friendly.
Though two centuries have elapsed since Le Play published his pioneering set of case studies on the conditions of working class families in Europe, the case study methodology has yet to gain the kind of near-universal academic credibility associated with other research strategies (e.g., experimentation, survey research, archival analysis, etc.). Nevertheless, the widespread use of the case study suggests that, in spite of the many reservations associated with it, “the method of the case study is solidly ensconced, perhaps even thriving” (Gerring, 2007, p. 3). It has been increasingly used in fields, like economics, that have been, traditionally, resistant to the method. It is commonly used in, among other fields, political science, anthropology, and education. Alongside the battle/campaign narrative and biography, the case study has even become one of the preferred research strategies for those in history-related fields (Gerring, 2007; Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Yin, 1994).

Though historians often use case study methodology, and though historiography and case study research have many similarities, the two are distinctly different research methods. While both are essentially “narrative oriented paradigms,” the two differ in terms of key focus, delivery of results, and generalizability (O’Brien, Remenyi, & Keaney, 2004, p. 141). In historiography, the emphases are on chronology and on narratives leading to hypotheses, and generalizability is typically considered irrelevant. In case study research, however, the emphases are on events, narratives, hypotheses and theoretical frameworks, and there is often a desire to generalize the research findings (or to, at least, derive certain general lessons or applications). Historiography, therefore, tends to be descriptive, and case study research, while often descriptive, can sometimes be prescriptive. At any rate, “historiographical research…resonates with the case study family of research methods…shares many of the same sources of evidence…shares the emphasis on the narrative…[and] focuses on how and why questions” (O’Brien, Remenyi, &
Keaney, 2004, p. 142). Consequently, case studies and histories often resemble one another. When they do, the product is referred to as a historical case study (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). The two methods are often complimentary.

Though case studies (historical ones included) can come in, literally, hundreds of variants, most, according to Yin (1994), fall into one of three broad categories. Like other qualitative and quantitative research strategies, case studies can be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory, and many of them overlap. Exploratory case studies are preparatory in nature, involving the initial exploration of a particular phenomenon, often as a prelude to other research; research questions and hypotheses emerge only after data have been collected and serve as the framework of the study. Descriptive case studies are interested in describing certain phenomena (which often assume a descriptive theory) against contextual backdrops. Explanatory case studies are used to do causal explorations and involve the close examination of data in order to explain certain phenomena (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1994). While the preparatory function of exploratory case studies is extremely valuable, most historical case studies are descriptive or explanatory in nature.

The body of historical case study research is too extensive to permit a comprehensive survey of the literature. Instead, selected examples will be adequate to illustrate how researchers, in the past, have used historical narratives and primary source documents to construct descriptive or explanatory historical case studies.

Researchers may use descriptive historical case studies to discuss and influence public or military policy. Burrough (2009), for instance, conducted a case study on U.S. strategic thinking toward Afghanistan from the Cold War to the present. He highlighted a series of American strategic successes and failures arising from the development of U.S. strategy alongside changes
in the global and regional context. Rather than engaging in speculation about why such successes and failures occurred, Burrough develops a set of “lessons learned from U.S. experiences in strategic engagement in Afghanistan [that] can and should be used to make adjustments to the current strategy” (p. 26).

An increasingly common form of descriptive historical case study research, particularly in popular literature, are studies that use the careers of great leaders to highlight certain leadership principles. In these studies, principles are applied to broad leadership situations and challenges. Axelrod (2001), Bowery (2005), and Phillips (1993), for instance, analyze the careers of Lincoln, Grant, and Lee in order to derive leadership lessons for corporate leaders. Alvy & Robbins (2010) take a similar approach, applying leadership lessons from Lincoln to the field of educational leadership. Alexander (2011), likewise, explains how the military insights of Sun Tzu were explicitly invoked on battlefields throughout history in order to derive certain universal leadership lessons that might be used by any military leader in any future context.

Others have engaged in descriptive historical case study research by examining historical events (rather than historical figures) in order to generate lessons. Bolger (1997), for instance, describes the experience of one military unit at the U.S. Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center. On the basis of his description, he developed a number of tactical lessons that could be applied to other contexts, military or civilian.

While many researchers seek to describe historical persons or events and draw lessons from these descriptions, others attempt to explain how or why certain events took place and draw lessons from these explanations. As in descriptive research, some of these case studies are intended to influence policy decisions. The USACSI (2008), for instance, published a case study on the July 12, 2008, battle of Wanat in which it attempted to explain the various factors that
contributed to making Wanat the bloodiest American battle since 2001. Though U.S. soldiers ultimately gained the victory, the costliness of the battle was attributed to, among other things, mistakes by junior officers, lack of terrain familiarity, and poor intelligence. The USACSI study was intended to influence the manner in which American ground troops conduct combat operations in the future. Similarly, Sundquist (2010) attempted to explain the successes of the Italian Red Brigades and the failures of the Italian government’s response in an effort to derive lessons that might inform international counterterrorism efforts.

Others researchers have conducted explanatory case studies in order to provide lessons or insights that might be applied in broader career or organizational contexts. Chabot (2008), for instance, attempted to explain the factors that contributed to resiliency within the Arellano-Felix in order to derive broad lessons on organizational resiliency. Houghton & Johnson (2009) applied the content analysis of verbatim expressions (CAVE) technique to primary source documents in order to establish a relationship between the explanatory style of several Civil War generals and their battlefield success in order “to understand and predict the actions of modern military leaders” and to enable other “leadership theorist and practitioners…to apply some of our findings to other leadership contexts” (p. 52).

Regardless of whether historical case studies are descriptive or explanatory, they have, in common, the goal of considering a specific historical situation in order to derive or apply lessons and principles (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). The extensive use of historical case studies to achieve these ends, regardless of the perception of case study research as “the weak sibling among social science methods,” indicates that many have ignored the stereotype and found, within the methodology, a valuable means for investigating, in detail, certain phenomena in particular contexts. Indeed, anthropologists, political scientists, educators, and even economists, among
others, have relied extensively on historical narratives and primary source documents to construct case studies that explore, describe, or explain certain phenomenon so that lessons may be applied or derived for present and future benefit. The present study is best characterized as a descriptive historical case study that intended to use historical leaders as well as historical events to derive generally applicable leadership lessons. Whatever shortcomings might be associated with using a historical case study methodology to examine features of LMX in Bragg’s relationship with his senior lieutenants, this researcher believes that the benefits of such a study outweigh the shortcomings.

**Research Questions**

The central methodological assumption in this study was that, in spite of its critics, LMX, as a relationship-based theoretical framework, is viable, demonstrable, and academically defensible. LMX is, in other words, taken for granted. This study, therefore, did not attempt to demonstrate, for example, the LMX assumption that a relationship exists between perceptions of organizational justice and levels of organizational success (another assumption is, in fact, that the command climate of the Army of Tennessee, expressed in perceptions of organizational justice, is one among many factors that contributed in some way to the ultimate operational failure of the Army of Tennessee) (McMurry, 1989). This case study, rather, addressed one central research question: how did Bragg’s relationships with members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee, particularly during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, exhibit features of LMX?

In applying the LMX framework to Bragg’s relationships, this study took into account the distinctive features of LMX as described in the research of Liden and Maslyn (1998) and
Therefore, the research question was answered by answering the following supporting questions:

1. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of procedural justice (i.e., due process)?

2. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of distributive justice (i.e., distribution of resources, promotions, and assignments)?

3. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of affect?

4. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristics of high/low levels of loyalty?

5. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of contribution?

6. How did GEN Braxton Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of professional respect?

**Data Set**

In attempting to construct an LMX perspective on the leadership climate within the high command of the Army of Tennessee, data were collected from a number of primary and seminal secondary sources. Because the Civil War is one of the best documented and most exhaustively interpreted pre-20th century wars, the primary and secondary sources used in this study were restricted to the *OR*, selected private collections, and battle narratives or biographies specifically
relevant to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga and those officers included in the research sample. Since even that restricted amount of literature is substantial, analyses were restricted to those portions of the historical record relevant to the features of LMX delineated in the research questions. A peer examination consisting of a battery of open-ended interviews conducted with selected content-area experts confirmed, corrected, and augmented the LMX perspective that emerged from the study.

There were, to be sure, certain limitations that arose from attempting to generate an analysis of a contemporary theoretical framework using historical sources. Because “interviewing” the research subjects depended upon the availability of relevant primary source material, the absence of those materials meant that, in may cases, gaps in the data appeared. For a number of officers, a perspective simply did not emerge because of the lack of personal memoirs or relevant correspondences. The more junior the officer, the less likely were the chances of obtaining relevant source materials that could support the study. Even in the case of senior officers, gaps in the data appeared. It is believed, however, that these gaps did not necessarily detract from the overall importance of the study, for a number of reasons. First, it was expected, at the outset of the study, that the themes that emerged would be of a general, less precise nature, particularly since the study involved the examination of a historical organization through a contemporary theoretical lens. At no point did the researcher expect to paint a perfect, complete picture of the command climate of the Army of Tennessee. Second, while gaps did appear in the data (and, therefore, in the findings), those gaps most involved less junior officers. Those closest to Bragg tended to provide a more complete data pool. The researcher, then, could simply have conducted the study using the senior most officers (i.e., those occupying corps-level command positions), but the study was expanded to include division-level commanders in order
to increase the robustness of the study. While gaps do appear in the data pool generated by division-level commanders, this group of officers generated a number of valuable sources that served to augment the data supplied by more senior officers. Finally, it is believed that, even with gaps in the data, the findings that did emerge from the study were adequate to derive a number of extremely profound observations with relevance to modern leadership contexts.

**Description of the Population and Sample**

Because this study is a historical case study, the population and sample was strictly defined. The study explores features of LMX among the members of the high command of one particular Confederate Army, the Army of Tennessee, primarily during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga (including the Tullahoma, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga campaigns). The population, therefore, was the entire Officer Corps in the Army of Tennessee, though it is believed that the lessons gleaned from the case study are applicable to all members of the United States and Confederate States Officer Corps during the American Civil War, as well as to leader-member relationships in other historical or contemporary contexts. The sample was those officers, at the division level or above, who constituted the high command of the Army of Tennessee (see Appendix D – Orders of Battle). Normally, the term “high command” designates those officers commanding corps or higher (Brown, 2005). In order to broaden the scope of the study, the term “high command” was operationalized to include division commanders as well. While including division commanders significantly increased the occurrence of data gaps, it also increased the likelihood of building a more comprehensive analysis of the command climate at the highest levels of the Army of Tennessee.
According to American military doctrine (at present and during the Civil War), Army echelons are divided according to their tactical, operational, and strategic significance (United States, 2001). Tactical units include platoons, companies, battalions, legions, regiments, and in some situations, brigades and divisions. Operational units include divisions and corps. Strategic units include armies or army groups. For the purposes of this study, the high command of the Army of Tennessee included the army commander, corps commanders, and division commanders. The total number of officers that met the sample criteria vary according to a number of circumstances: department transfer, attrition (normally due to battlefield casualties), or promotion/demotion. To place the officer corps in numerical perspective, there were, following the battle of Chickamauga (representing, roughly, the central point of the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga), 26 officers (out of an officer corps of slightly less than 8000 men and an army of about 40,000 men) that met the operational criteria for inclusion in this study: the army commander, eight corps-level officers, 15 division commanders, and two brigade commanders who were promoted as a result of battlefield attrition (Martin, 2011, p. 334; OR, 1880-1901). Ultimately, because of department transfers, promotions, and demotions that occurred between the battle of Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863) and the battles for Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863), 32 officers were included in the sample, including one General (GEN), four Lieutenant Generals (LTG), 12 Major Generals (MG), and 15 Brigadier Generals (BG) (see Appendix D – Orders of Battle).

Included in the study were:

1. The Army of Tennessee commander: GEN Braxton Bragg

2. Corps/Wing Commanders: LTG Leonidas Polk (removed after Chickamauga), LTG D.H. Hill (transferred after Chickamauga), LTG James Longstreet (transferred, with
his command, after Chickamauga), LTG William J. Hardee (in another department
during Chickamauga, but present during the Tullahoma campaign and the battles for
Chattanooga), MG Simon B. Buckner (demoted to division command after
Chickamauga), MG John B. Hood (transferred, with Longstreet, following
Chickamauga), MG William H.T. Walker (demoted to division command following
Chickamauga), MG Joseph Wheeler, MG John C. Breckinridge (promoted to Corps
command following Chickamauga) and BG Nathan B. Forrest (transferred after
Chickamauga).

3. Division Commanders: MG Benjamin F. Cheatham, MG Patrick Cleburne, MG
Thomas Hindman, MG Alexander P. Stewart, MG LaFayette McLaws (transferred,
with Longstreet, after Chickamauga), MG Carter L. Stevenson (promoted after
Chickamauga), MG Jones M. Withers (promoted after Chickamauga), BG Evander
Law, BG Joseph B. Kershaw, BG William Preston, BG Bushrod Johnson, BG Patton
Anderson, BG States Rights Gist, BG St. John R. Liddell, BG John A. Wharton, BG
William T. Martin, BG Frank C. Armstrong, BG John Pegram, BG William B. Bate
(promoted after Chickamauga), BG John K. Jackson (promoted after Chickamauga),
and BG Micah Jenkins (promoted after Chickamauga).

**Design Elements**

The formulation of a research hypothesis is not critical to every research study,
particularly those of a qualitative, historical, case study design (Trochim, 2008). Though
quantitative studies are expected to begin with a well-crafted research hypothesis to test, an
acceptable approach of a qualitative study is to explore a particular situation for the purpose of
deriving a hypothesis or grounded theory for future investigation (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992). Quantitative studies, therefore, establish hypotheses from the outset, whereas qualitative studies often arrive at hypotheses in a study’s conclusion. This historical case study, therefore, did not identify dependent, independent, or classification variables en route to testing a hypothesis. It, instead, explored the features of a particular relationship-based leadership framework, LMX, within an historical military organization in order to examine and describe the nature and quality of one historical leader’s relationships with his senior subordinates, derive lessons which might inform and instruct current leaders and leadership preparation programs, and establish a basis for future research.

Instrumentation and Data Collection

Ideally, in examining an organization’s leadership climate through a particular theoretical framework, members of the organization would be interviewed, surveyed, or observed (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). Because all of the members of the organization examined in this study were long deceased, those methods of data gathering were impossible. Instead, this researcher attempted to, in effect, “interview” the members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command in absentia.

In order to accomplish this, the LMX framework, along the lines of the LMX-MDM scale (Liden & Maslyn, 1998) and the organizational justice research of Scandura (1999), served as the lens through which the primary source record and seminal secondary sources were interpreted. The primary source record represented the most central, authoritative source of data. Where the primary sources were incomplete or unavailable, seminal secondary sources (primarily battle narratives or biographies) were included to assist in providing contextual background. In every
instance, however, secondary sources were only used to assist in the interpretation of primary sources. Once relevant data were gathered, the LMX framework was used to determine how a subject’s comments or actions reflected the distinctive features of LMX: high/low perceptions of procedural justice, high/low perceptions of distributive justice, high/low levels of affect, etc.

This study involved historical research, including an examination of the primary source record, focusing mostly upon the personal correspondences and official battle reports of the members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, found in the OR, soldier memoirs, and historical collections such as the Braxton Bragg papers (Bragg, 1833-1879) housed in the Western Reserve Historical Society of Cleveland, OH. In addition, in order to augment the primary source record and provide necessary contextual information, the historical research included an examination of a number of seminal secondary sources, including campaign studies and biographies. The instrument, then, was the researcher.

An obvious disadvantage in using this method of data gathering is that the researcher might have misinterpreted the data or been influenced by bias. This threat, however, was overcome by a peer examination consisting of a battery of open-ended interviews with an expert panel to confirm, correct, or augment the researcher’s analysis.

**Data Analysis**

Qualitative data in general and case study data in particular are difficult to analyze for a number of reasons. First, unlike quantitative research, in which data collection and analysis occurs somewhat sequentially, case study data analysis begins immediately during the data collection process as notes are taken and interpreted and as hypotheses, where relevant, are
tested. Next, case studies lend themselves to data overload, the acquisition of too excessive an amount of information to analyze. Additionally, in case study research, there are “inevitably more variables than cases, or data points, so traditional statistical analyses cannot be applied” (Kohn, 1997, p. 5). Finally, “analyzing case study evidence is especially difficult because the strategies and techniques have not been well defined in the past” (Yin, 1994, p. 102). There are, nevertheless, a number of methods by which data may be collected, presented, and analyzed fairly. Yin (1994), while acknowledging that there are many ways to analyze case study research, nevertheless offers two broad analytic strategies and four specific analytic techniques. A discussion of each of these strategies and techniques are beyond the scope of this study. It is appropriate, however, to describe the broad analytic strategy and the specific analytic technique that guided this study.

Strategically, this researcher assumed certain theoretical propositions when examining case study data. Since case studies are often intended to explore certain phenomena within various contexts, the objectives of the case study (and the resultant research questions, literature reviews, etc.) presume certain propositions. In the case of this study, the LMX theoretical framework performed an orienting and guiding function, allowing the researcher to focus on details and events pertinent to the study while ignoring others that were not (Yin, 1994).

Any of the specific analytic techniques described by Yin (1994) – pattern matching, explanation-building, time-series analysis, or analytic induction – would be appropriate in case study research. The technique most appropriate to this historical case study, however, was some form of content analysis, particularly given this study’s dependence upon primary source documentation. In content analysis, documents, texts, speeches, etc., are examined for certain themes, patterns, evidences, or elements (Weber, 1990). Under some circumstances, these
patterns, elements, and themes may be coded and quantified. In addition, while it is possible for theoretical propositions to emerge from a study using content analysis, this particular model is typically theory-driven. The underlying theoretical framework is typically not questioned; it is, rather, assumed, and the case study data are analyzed in light of it. The content analysis of verbatim explanations (CAVE) technique, one particular variant of content analysis, for example, analyzes primary source records of verbal statements, speeches, or correspondences in light of explanatory style theory (Houghton & Johnson, 2009). In content analysis, therefore, theory guides the case study, and the primary source documentation illustrates the theory. Like other forms of case study analysis, the purpose of content analysis is not to definitively conclude a study, but to explore certain phenomena, that are taken for granted, and to develop ideas for further research (Weber, 1990). In the present study, research was guided by the LMX framework, and the documents, texts, speeches, and correspondences gathered from the primary source record were analyzed in light of the LMX framework.

A number of researchers have explained that, in qualitative research, it is imperative that, in making sense out of the data that has been gathered, the researcher must be aware of the recurring themes that emerge (Merriam, 1998). By using LMX as an interpretive framework, these themes were essentially predetermined. The data gathered from the primary source record were, therefore, sorted, coded, and organized according to the particular feature(s) of LMX, as identified by Liden and Maslyn (1998) and Scandura (1999) that they most reflected: perceptions of procedural justice, perceptions of distributive justice, level of affect, level of loyalty, perception of contribution, and level of professional respect. Once the data were classified according to these LMX themes/features, each member of the research sample was analyzed using a modified version of the LMX-MDM scale questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-
MDM Scale Questionnaire, a multi-dimensional scale possessing high reliability (α = .92) and shown, on a four-factor explanatory factors evaluation, to be a valid instrument (Liden & Maslyn, 1998). The LMX-MDM questionnaire contains 12 questions grouped according to four factors: affect, loyalty, contribution, and professional respect. Normally, individuals answer each question on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (indicating strong disagreement) to 7 (indicating strong agreement). For the purposes of this study, the researcher did not attempt to be precise in rating an officer’s answers along a 7-point continuum. Instead, a simple 3-point continuum was adopted, with “-1” indicating general disagreement, “0” indicating that there was not enough conclusive data to answer the question, and “+1” indicating general agreement.

Following the completion of the LMX-MDM questionnaires, an individual LMX profile was created for each member of the Army of Tennessee’s high command, using the conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 2.1, to determine if or to what degree each officer would be classified as an in-group or an out-group member. This analysis (1) illustrated, in particular detail, how members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee exhibited the features of LMX and (2) provided a template for examining the features of LMX in other historical or contemporary organizational contexts.

The overall study design is illustrated in Figure 3.

**Credibility, Dependability, and Confirmability**

One of the paramount concerns of this study is trustworthiness. It was important that the study accurately identified features of LMX within the Army of Tennessee’s high command (credibility), that others, particularly subject-matter experts, would identify those same features
According to Merriam (1998), there are a number of strategies for guarding against threats to trustworthiness, including triangulation, member-checks, and peer examination. Because this study does not involve living participants, traditional member-checks were not possible. The principle of triangulation, however, was observed in the sense that, though primary source documentation constituted that major source of data, there were, nevertheless, multiple depositories of these documents. In addition, when the primary sources were
incomplete, unclear, or contradictory, secondary sources were used in order to provide necessary contextual information or clarification. Finally, peer examinations, in the form of open-ended interviews with a panel of content-area experts, confirmed, corrected, and augmented the research findings.

Interviews were conducted on February 4, 2013 with Lee White and Chris Young, and an interview was conducted on February 7, 2013 with James Ogden, III. White is a Park Ranger and historical interpreter at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park. He is a published historian with widely recognized expertise on Bragg, Cleburne, Stewart, and the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. Young has been a Park Ranger in the Interpretation and Resource Education Division at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park for the past five years. He earned his Education Specialist degree from Jacksonville State University. His formal training in history and leadership uniquely qualified him to participate in this study as a member of the expert review panel. Ogden is the staff historian at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park and has been recognized, for nearly twenty-five years, as one of the nation’s leading authorities on Bragg and western theater Civil War studies.

In each interview, the members of the expert panel were provided with a brief summary of leader-member exchange, and overview of the purpose of the study and its research questions, and a description of the methodology used in the study. The researcher’s data analysis was discussed in detail. Relevant primary source and second sources were discussed, the suggested answers to each subject’s LMX-MDM questionnaire were explained, each subject’s LMX profile was described, and the members of the expert panel were invited to confirm, correct, or provide further insight that might add to the robustness of the analysis.
It is believed that the use of data triangulation and peer examination overcame any major threats to credibility, dependability, or confirmability.

**Researcher Positionality**

Since, in this study, the researcher is the instrument, personal bias has certainly influenced both the research findings and the lessons that emerge from them. I am currently a public school administrator, but I have nearly ten years of experience in the classroom as a history teacher (mostly in the field of Georgia history, but also in American history and civics). Prior to my career as an educator, I served in the United States Army as an infantry officer in the 10th Mountain Division, and participated in multiple global deployments.

A native of Dalton, GA, approximately 20 miles from Chickamauga battlefield, I grew up with an interest in the Civil War. That interest intensified during my undergraduate studies at Toccoa Falls College, where I majored in Secondary Education: History. My faculty advisor and favorite professor was Dr. Steven E. Woodworth, a noted historian of the Civil War’s Western Theater, and one of the nation’s foremost experts on Braxton Bragg. Woodworth is part of a newer generation of Civil War scholars who are characterized by a renewed interest in the Civil War west of the Appalachians and by a willingness to reexamine traditional assessments of important leaders like Bragg, LTG James Longstreet, and BG Nathan Bedford Forrest. Woodworth made an indelible impression on me and ignited, within me, a lifelong interest in Bragg and the Civil War in the West.

Woodworth is considered a Bragg apologist, and though I have tried to be objective in my consideration of Bragg over the years, I cannot deny that, because of Woodworth’s influence, I have an inclination to view Bragg in a more favorable light than most of my contemporaries. I
do not deny, however, that he had tremendous character defects that badly handicapped his capacity for high-level organizational leadership.

Since returning to Georgia, after nearly eight years in military service, my expertise in the Civil War’s Western Theater increased greatly, partially because of my role as a classroom teacher, but largely because I was fortunate to take a seasonal position with the National Park Service as the Teacher-Ranger-Teacher (TRT) for Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park (NMP). In this role, I was responsible for providing historical interpretation and battlefield tours for park visitors. I was also responsible for aligning the park’s curriculum with Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee public school performance standards.

During my time as the TRT, I conducted over 50 tours of Chickamauga-Chattanooga NMP, including Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, the Craven’s House, Moccasin Bend, and Wauhatchie. I also authored the park’s Junior Ranger adventure book, and directed a summer day camp for elementary and middle school students for two consecutive years (I have participated in the day camp program for three years, but my role in last year’s and this year’s program has been more advisory than directorial). I have also conducted over a dozen personal tours of Chickamauga battlefield in my capacity as a lay historian and Chickamaugan enthusiast. In 2012, I was involved in the preparation of a middle school curriculum entitled A Nation Divided (McGuire, 2012), focusing on the Civil War in Chattanooga.

My experiences as an infantry officer, a public school teacher, a public school administrator, and a historical interpreter have influenced me in a number of ways, some of which are undoubtedly reflected in this study. First, as an infantry officer, I have been personally acquainted with the stresses of military life, some emerging from missions, and some emerging from personalities. I have a certain conception of the etiquette and protocol that
governs the relationships between officers and their superiors and subordinates, and though some of the formal features of military etiquette have changed (e.g., the adoption of a formal promotion and counseling system), much of the substance has remained the same (e.g., customs, courtesies, and expectations regarding fraternization) (Skelton, 1992). As a public school teacher and administrator, I have become acquainted with cliques and factionalism within organizations, and I have been exposed to effective and ineffective strategies for dealing with these various subgroups. Finally, as a historical interpreter, I’ve become more intimately acquainted with Bragg and his strengths and deficiencies as an organizational leader, and I have developed an interpretation of Bragg that, to a large degree, is informed by my own experiences as an infantry officer.

While I have attempted to be as objective as possible in conducting this study, I must acknowledge that pure objectivity is impossible. This does not, of course, mean that the presence of bias necessarily undermines the value or trustworthiness of the study. The research methodology, I expect, largely prevents that. It does mean however, that in practicing scholarship, I do have my own values, my own contextual presuppositions, my own favorites and, perhaps, even my own “axe to grind.”

**Summary**

This chapter described the methodology used in the study. Primary source data and seminal secondary source data were collected and analyzed through the lens of LMX. Once the data were collected, they were classified according to the essential LMX features – levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and perceptions of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice – an individual analysis was conducted for each member of the research
sample to determine whether they exhibited in-group or out-group characteristics. Next, the LMX analyses were used to determine, where possible, the subjects’ likely responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (using a modified scoring system). In order to verify the trustworthiness of the findings, a series of open-ended interviews were conducted with subject matter experts. Finally, a number of leadership lessons were derived from the study for the benefit of contemporary leadership preparation programs or persons currently serving in leadership capacities. Chapter IV presents a detailed analysis of the data, in which each individual member of the research sample is discussed separately through the prism of the distinctive features of LMX and their positionality with respect to Bragg. Finally, Chapter V provides summary responses to each of the research questions, broad observations that emerged from the findings, a number of leadership lessons that were derived from the study, and recommendations for further study.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

This historical case study was designed to examine the quality of the relationships between GEN Braxton Bragg and the members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga through the lens of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX), a relationship-oriented leadership framework. In addition, an attempt was made to derive a number of lessons from the study that might prove valuable in contemporary leadership preparation programs and instructive for current leaders in their own organizational settings. These lessons will be discussed in Chapter V.

The research subjects were limited to the members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. For the purposes of this study, the high command includes the 32 officers who permanently or temporarily commanded a division or higher in the Army of Tennessee at some point between July and December 1863. The orders of battle included at the beginning of this study (pp. xi-xiii) present the members of the high command, both the echelons they commanded and their positions on the chain of command relative to Bragg, during each of the three major phases of the overall campaigns for Chattanooga: the Tullahoma Campaign, the Battle of Chickamauga, and the Battles for Chattanooga.
Each individual member of the high command was analyzed separately. Relevant statements from their battle reports and personal correspondences were organized according to the particular features of LMX they most reflected: perceptions of procedural justice, perceptions of distributive justice, level of affect, level of loyalty, perception of contribution, and level of professional respect. In the absence of relevant primary source data, seminal secondary sources were consulted to assist in providing insight on the positionality of the research subjects with respect to the various LMX themes. Once the data were classified according to each LMX theme, each member was analyzed using a modified version of the LMX-MDM scale questionnaire. The hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM scale questionnaire resulted in individual LMX profiles for each research subject, as well as an organizational LMX profile for the high command of the Army of Tennessee. Once the data analysis was completed, the findings were subjected to a peer examination, in the form of a series of open-ended interviews with a panel of three content-area experts, in order to confirm, correct, or augment the findings.

**Analysis of Research Subjects**

In the following section, a brief biographical sketch of Bragg is provided, followed by individual discussions of each research subject. In order to establish the dyadic context for each individual, a brief discussion of each subject’s background prior to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga is provided, followed by a discussion of their positions on each LMX theme with respect to Bragg, based on the primary source record and, when necessary, seminal secondary sources. Next, the hypothesized answers to the LMX-MDM scale questionnaire are discussed. Finally, on the basis of the primary source data and the hypothesized LMX-MDM questionnaire responses, an individual LMX profile for each subject is suggested using the LMX conceptual
framework presented in Chapter II (see Figure 2.2). In the following analyses, reference is often made to key events in the Army of Tennessee relevant to the case study. In order to familiarize the reader with these events, a timeline of critical events is included in this study (see Appendix C – Timeline of Critical Events) for the reader’s reference. The most comprehensive discussions of these events are contained in studies by Connelly (1971) and Woodworth (1990).

GEN Braxton Bragg

Born in Warrenton, NC in 1817, Bragg had a moderately wealthy upbringing. Though never accepted as a member of the social elite (due partly to rumors that his mother had murdered an African-American freedman), Bragg’s father owned 20 slaves and was wealthy and influential enough to send Bragg to military school and to secure an appointment for him to the United States Military Academy at West Point. Bragg had an impressive West Point career, graduated with the class of 1837, 5th out of 50 cadets, and received a commission as a second lieutenant in the 3rd U.S. Artillery (McWhiney, 1969).

Bragg served in various posts in Florida, South Carolina, and along the frontier before the Mexican War. During the war, Bragg earned a reputation as an excellent disciplinarian and tactician, and he earned brevet promotions for gallantry at the battles of Fort Brown and Monterrey. At the battle of Buena Vista, however, Bragg’s conduct made him a national figure and a war hero. When the war ended, Bragg was one of the most highly respected officers in the army (McWhiney, 1969).

Bragg continued to serve in the U.S. Army for several years after the war, but he resigned in 1856 and purchased a sugar plantation in Louisiana, becoming a successful planter and major slaveholder. When the secession crisis came, Bragg was serving in the Louisiana
militia, but he soon accepted a Confederate commission as a brigadier general and command of the Confederate Department of West Florida, headquartered at Pensacola. By September, he was promoted to major general and was reputed to command one of the most disciplined departments in the entire Confederacy (McWhiney, 1969).

In early 1862, Bragg convinced President Davis that troops stationed along the Confederate coast, particularly in west Florida and Alabama, could be better used elsewhere, and he supervised the transfer of approximately 10,000 troops to Corinth, Mississippi, where he assumed command of a corps in GEN Albert Sydney Johnston’s Army of Mississippi (the precursor to the Army of Tennessee). As a corps commander, Bragg fought tenaciously at the battle of Shiloh and, upon the death of Johnston, was named second-in-command to the army’s new commander, GEN P.G.T. Beauregard. In recognition of his gallantry, Bragg was promoted, on April 12, 1862, to full general (one of only seven Confederate officers to attain that rank). Beauregard’s tenure as army commander was short-lived. After taking an unapproved leave of absence, Beauregard was relieved as army commander and, on June 17, 1862, was replaced with Bragg (McWhiney, 1969).

Due largely to Bragg’s pre-war reputation, his assumption of command was welcomed with great optimism and fanfare. He immediately set himself to the task of bringing drill and discipline to the army, and within a matter of weeks, Bragg was preparing to transfer his army to Chattanooga and launch his first major campaign, the 1862 Kentucky Campaign, which culminated at the battle of Perryville (McWhiney, 1969).

Despite the early public confidence in his leadership, Bragg had a reputation for contentiousness. Prior to the Mexican War, Bragg was known to quarrel with many of his fellow officers and, on occasion, to even write criticisms of his colleagues and superiors for publication
in newspapers. He was later court-martialed and convicted for disrespect and insubordination to his commander, GEN Winfield Scott. By the time of the Mexican War, a story was already circulating among Bragg’s peers illustrating his contentious character:

While serving in the dual role of company commander and post quartermaster at a small fort, Bragg, in his capacity as commander, had made a requisition for supplies, which, in his capacity as quartermaster, he had refused. He then carried on an exchange of nasty letters with himself and finally, unable to resolve the dispute, referred the whole matter to the post commander, who is supposed to have exclaimed, “You have quarreled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarreling with yourself.” (Woodworth, 1990, p. 92).

The story, though probably apocryphal, nevertheless illustrated a flaw in Bragg’s character. Bragg’s contentiousness would soon bear itself out in his army and would come to largely define his relationships with his subordinates.

**LTG Leonidas Polk**

**Background**

LTG Leonidas Polk attended the United States Military Academy at West Point and graduated in 1827, 8th out of 38 cadets, and received an appointment as a brevet second lieutenant in the artillery (Parks, 1962; Robins, 2006). While at West Point, he established a personal friendship with Jefferson Davis, a cadet from Mississippi who was two years younger and one year behind him in his studies. In addition, Polk acquired an interest in moral philosophy and theology and, not long after his graduation, resigned his commission and began a career as an Episcopalian minister, rising to the ecclesiastical rank of Bishop of Louisiana (Parks, 1962; Robins, 2006).

When the Civil War erupted, Polk felt duty-bound to enter the military service on behalf of the south. He appealed to his old friend and West Point classmate Jefferson Davis, now
President of the Confederacy, for an officer’s commission, and President Davis appointed Polk a major general in the Confederate army (Park, 1962; Robins, 2006). By the time that Bragg rose to army command, Polk was Bragg’s senior-most lieutenant, despite having virtually no military experience prior to the Civil War.

By the summer of 1863, a great deal of personal and professional animosity had already developed between Polk and Bragg. Following the 1862 retreat from Kentucky, Polk became recognized as a leader of “the western concentration bloc,” an informal clique of officers who, united by friendship or familial and political ties, advocated relentlessly for Bragg’s removal from command (Connelly & Jones, 1973, p. 52).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

The interaction between Polk and Bragg during the summer and fall of 1863 suggests an intensification of the personal animosity between the two. Despite the fact that Bragg, in early summer 1863, converted to Episcopalianism and was warmly congratulated and encouraged by Polk, the formal ecclesiastical connection between the two does not seem to have been adequate to overcome the personal contempt that the two mutually shared for one another (Elliot, 2003).

While most of Polk’s criticisms toward Bragg were of a professional nature, he did, on a number of occasions, express significant personal contempt for him. Following Bragg’s Special Order # 249, for example, by which Polk was arrested and removed from command as a consequence of his dereliction on the morning of September 20, Polk wrote a scathing criticism of Bragg to President Davis: “General Bragg…allowed the whole of the fruits of this great victory [i.e., Chickamauga] to pass from him by the most criminal negligence, or, rather,
incapacity, for there are positions in which weakness is wickedness” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 68).

Ultimately, President Davis refused to court-martial Polk and assigned him to a new command (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 70). Following his arrival at his new assignment in Mississippi, Polk, in a personal letter to his daughter, explained that Bragg was “a poor, feeble minded, irresolute, man of violent passions” and that “I had a contempt for his military capacity and his personal character” (Parks, 1962, p. 353).

Contribution

Prior to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, Bragg formally commended Polk on multiple occasions for his actions on the battlefield. Following Perryville, Bragg remarked, regarding Polk’s Corps, that “nobler troops were never more gallantly led” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1088). Similarly, after Stones River, Bragg wrote that Polk was “specially commended to the Government for the valor, skill, and ability displayed…throughout the engagement” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670). In later reports written after Stones River, however, Bragg revised his praise for Polk and circulated a letter to various members of the high command, inquiring about their involvement in Polk’s clandestine meeting near Frankfort, KY during the Perryville campaign. In the letter, he accused Polk of insubordination and of providing misleading and damaging information (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, pp. 1091-1097). Some historians have argued that Bragg revised his appraisal of Polk’s contributions at Perryville due to Polk’s increasing association with the anti-Bragg clique within the Army (Parks, 1962; Robins, 2006). Nevertheless, prior to the summer and fall campaigns, Bragg had given reassurance, through his formal (and public) battle reports, that he valued Polk’s contributions to the war effort.
The following campaigns, however, particularly the Chickamauga campaign, were a different matter. Bragg criticized Polk’s failure to attack isolated Federal units near Lee & Gordon’s Mill on September 13 (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 33). After the failure of Polk’s Corps to initiate the attack, as ordered, at daylight on September 20, Bragg reported that Polk’s conduct “was not satisfactorily explained” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 24). In his formal report of the battle of Chickamauga, Bragg accused Polk of dereliction and claimed that, when Polk should have been preparing his troops at the line of battle, Polk was found, instead, nearly two miles away from his troops, reading a newspaper and waiting for breakfast (Hill, 1884, p. 653). As a result of Polk’s conduct, Bragg issued Special Order # 249, removing Polk from command and placing him under arrest (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 55-56). Polk, of course, protested Bragg’s order and issued a formal protest to Secretary of War James Seddon, arguing that the order was both arbitrary and unlawful (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 69).

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Polk’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

Following Perryville and Stones River, Bragg seems to have maintained significant reservations regarding Polk’s loyalty. Bragg had become aware of Polk’s clandestine meeting prior to Perryville in which Polk, and a number of Polk’s lieutenants, agreed to disobey Bragg’s explicit orders and pursue a different course of action. Bragg sent inquiries about this meeting to those involved, including Polk, apparently with the intention of preparing formal charges against
those involved, but the matter was never pursued to its conclusion (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1097). After Stones River, Polk wrote to President Davis and urged that Bragg be removed from command and replaced with GEN Joseph E. Johnston (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, pp. 729-730).

From Polk’s perspective, the most significant indication of his perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him during the summer and fall campaigns is found in his formal complaints concerning Special Order # 249. Polk, in his protests, argued that his removal was arbitrary, unlawful, and personally motivated (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 69). In order to substantiate his claims, Polk appealed to a number of his fellow officers, including LTG D.H. Hill, MG W.H.T. Walker, and MG Benjamin Cheatham, to write letters of defense explaining that the delayed attack of September 20 was not a result of dereliction on Polk’s part (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 56-57).

**Procedural justice**

Even as Polk was emerging as a leader of the anti-Bragg “western concentration bloc,” he, nevertheless, seems to have regarded Bragg as an intensely equitable person, however unqualified for field command he might have been. In his letter to President Davis urging Bragg’s replacement with GEN Johnston, Polk suggested that Bragg be assigned to a position in which his particular talents and benefits would benefit the entire Confederacy:

My idea is – my conviction rather – that if the presence and offices of General B. were entirely acceptable to this army, the highest interests – military interests – of the Confederacy would be consulted by transferring him to another field, where his peculiar talent – that of organization and discipline – could find a more ample scope. For that kind of service he has, undoubtedly, peculiar talent…My opinion is that the general could be of service to all the armies of the Confederacy, if placed in the proper position. Such a position would be that of a place in the Adjutant and Inspector General’s Department at Richmond. Assign him the duties of Inspector-General…The whole family of idlers, drones, and shirks, of high and low degree, far and near, would feel his searching hand,
and be made to take their proper places and do their duty. (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, pp. 729-730).

Polk’s opinion of Bragg’s equitability was substantially different following Special Order # 249. Aside from complaining of the order’s unlawfulness and arbitrariness, Polk demanded that a court of inquiry be established expeditiously so that he could, not only vindicate himself, but establish “the truth and justice of what I have written of [Bragg’s] lack of capacity as a commanding general” (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 68).

*Professional respect*

From the Kentucky campaign in October 1862 to Polk’s removal from command in October 1863, Polk consistently expressed a lack of confidence in Bragg’s ability to effectively command the army. His clandestine meeting in Kentucky, for instance, was called to discuss alternatives to Bragg’s orders to attack the Federal forces that were advancing toward Frankfort (Parks, 1962, p. 264). In June, Polk objected to Bragg’s orders for his corps to march on Stones River (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, p 618). Again, at the end of June, Polk objected to Bragg’s plan to bring the Federals to battle at Tullahoma (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, pp. 621-622).

On multiple occasions, Polk wrote to Confederate civil leaders, including President Davis and Secretary of War Seddon, complaining of Bragg’s “incapacity” for command (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, pp. 729-730; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 67-69). On one of these correspondences with President Davis, Polk argued that Bragg’s incompetence was not a merely professional shortcoming, but a “criminal” one (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 68).
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Polk’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and Polk would likely disagree with each of these questions. Polk’s official or personal correspondence and actions, with the exception of his actions following Bragg’s conversion to Episcopalianism, suggests a high level of contempt and personal dislike and distrust. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Polk would likely disagree with each of these questions. Polk’s public declarations of “no confidence” in Bragg’s leadership, his repeated defiance of Bragg’s directions, and his ultimate arrest and removal by Bragg indicate an extremely low level of mutual loyalty and commitment. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while it appears likely that Polk would answer questions #8-9 in the negative (Polk may have, indeed, argued that he was willing to work his hardest, the questions are framed to measure willingness to work hard for a particular person, and Polk’s repeated efforts to have Bragg removed suggests an unwillingness to work hard for Bragg), it is plausible that Polk would answer question #7 positively. Regardless of his personal or professional feelings toward Bragg, Polk clearly held his own abilities and contributions in high regard, and he felt that his actions at Lee & Gordon’s Mill and on the morning of September 20 were either militarily or circumstantially justifiable. Polk, therefore, likely considered his arrest and removal to be an indication of Bragg’s procedural inequity, rather than a consequence of his own dereliction. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Polk would likely disagree with each of these questions. Polk’s official and personal correspondence and actions, and Polk’s interactions with Bragg, suggest a mutually consistent low level of professional respect between
the two. For the purposes of this study, answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire were not scored on the normal 7-point continuum (with “1” representing strong disagreement and “7” representing strong agreement) because the design and nature of the study did not permit such precision. Instead, questions were rated on a more general 3-point continuum (with “-1” indicating likely disagreement, “0” indicating that not enough evidence existed to generate an answer, and “1” indicating likely agreement). Polk’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -10.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Polk’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.1). Despite his position as Bragg’s senior corps commander, Polk likely considered himself to be a member of the out-group, characterized by low levels of contribution, affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and a low perception of procedural justice. The primary source record did not provide adequate enough evidence to analyze Polk’s perception of distributive justice.

Figure 4.1 provides an example of how LMX between Bragg and Polk (and, in subsequent figures, the other members of the high command) is illustrated in this study. The organization – the Army of Tennessee’s high command – is illustrated as two concentric circles, with the inner circle representing actions that are characteristic of in-group behaviors and the outer circle representing actions that are characteristic of out-group behaviors. Since, for example, Polk’s levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and his perceptions of procedural justice and contribution were indicative of out-group behaviors, an “X” was placed on
each respective black arrow within the outer circle. If Polk’s level of affect had been more characteristic of in-group behaviors, the X would have been placed on the affect arrow, but within the inner circle. If Polk’s behaviors were indicative of both in-group and out-group behavior, the X would have straddled the inner circle and the out circle. If, as with the case of Polk’s perception of distributive justice, there was not adequate evidence to make a reasonable analysis, no X is placed on the arrow.

Figure 4.1 LMX: LTG Leonidas Polk
LTG William J. Hardee

Background

A West Pointer who graduated 26th out of 45 cadets in his 1838 class, LTG William Joseph Hardee was a career officer with combat experience in the Mexican War. Not only did he venture to France, where he studied tactics at the Royal Cavalry School, and serve as West Point Commandant, but he published, in 1855, a tactics manual that would serve, in the early years of the Civil War, as official light infantry doctrine for both Federal and Confederate forces (Hughes, 1965).

Following Georgia’s secession in January 1861, Hardee resigned his commission in the U.S. Army and offered his services to the Confederacy. Though some historians argue that Hardee’s military accomplishments had been, up to that point, highly exaggerated, Hardee was, nevertheless, one of the most respected officers to declare his sympathies for the secessionist movement (Hughes, 1965; Woodworth, 1990). Accordingly, Hardee entered Confederate service with a colonel’s commission, but by October 1861, had risen to the rank of major general. In a year’s time, he would command a corps at the battle of Shiloh and receive a promotion to the rank of lieutenant general (Hughes, 1965). By the time that Bragg ascended to army command, Hardee was, after Polk, Bragg’s senior-most lieutenant.

October 1862 marked the beginning of the deterioration of his relationship with Bragg. Following Bragg’s retreat from Kentucky after the battle of Perryville, Hardee appeared to be swayed by many of his fellow officers who had grown disenchanted with Bragg’s leadership. Due to his pre-war reputation, he soon became one of the most influential members of the anti-Bragg clique (Connelly & Jones, 1973).
Following the Tullahoma Campaign, Hardee received orders to join Johnston in Mississippi. Though Hardee’s transfer caused him to miss the battle of Chickamauga, his time away from Bragg was short-lived. By mid-October 1863, Hardee was transferred back to Tennessee to replace Polk, whom Bragg had removed from command for insubordination (Hughes, 1965).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Hardee was restrained in his correspondence when making comments of a personal nature regarding Bragg. Despite being identified as a leader of the anti-Bragg bloc, his verbal and written criticisms (though not always his actions) of Bragg were largely professional in nature. Indeed, following Polk’s removal after Chickamauga, Bragg appealed to President Davis to transfer Hardee back to the army (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, p. 534). Davis complied, explaining to Hardee that “there is a want there of that harmony among the highest officers which is essential to success” and that his return would facilitate “the restoration of a proper feeling” (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 3, p 609).

Hardee did make two explicit declarations of his high personal regard for Bragg. In response to Bragg’s inquiry, in January 1863, into his lieutenants’ confidence in his leadership, Hardee stated that his professional opinion was distinct from the “highest respect” he felt for “the purity of [his] motives, [his] energy, and [his] personal character” (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 683). Upon his assumption of temporary army command, after Bragg’s resignation in November, Hardee stated, “The steady purpose, the unflinching courage, and the unsullied patriotism of the distinguished leader who has shared your fortunes for more than a year, will be
long remembered by this army and by the country he has served so well” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 3, p. 776).

It is unlikely, however, that these declarations are indicative of personal friendship between Bragg and Hardee. On one hand, though Bragg often commended Hardee for his battlefield actions, he also issued stinging criticisms, even calling Hardee “a good drill-master, but no more…” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, p. 407). On the other hand, Hardee often acted in ways toward Bragg that could reasonably be perceived as subversive, even going so far during the Tullahoma campaign as to suggest mutiny (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, pp. 623-624).

**Contribution**

Of all of Bragg’s senior lieutenants, Hardee was the one who was, most often, the recipient of Bragg’s commendation. From the outset of Bragg’s tenure as army commander, Bragg asserted that “of all the major generals, indeed, in this army…but one [i.e., Hardee] can now be regarded as a suitable commander of that grade” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 17, part 2, p. 628). In spite of Hardee’s association with the anti-Bragg bloc within the army, Bragg seems to have been consistent in his official (and public) praise of Hardee’s contributions in battle, awarding Hardee with official commendations following Perryville, Stones River, and Chattanooga (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1088; OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666).

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record provides little evidence regarding Hardee’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. On one occasion, however, Hardee did
express frustration with Bragg for sending some of Hardee’s troops on a special assignment with BG St. John R. Liddell without including Hardee in the planning and preparation: “whenever you order troops on special service it is proper to state the amount of rations to be taken…I am not presumed to know what orders have been given by the commanding general to General Liddell…” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 3, p. 702). Since distributive justice refers to, among other things, the fair and equitable dissemination of assignments, it is reasonable to assume that, from a distributive justice perspective, Hardee felt that it was inequitable to be excluded from plans involving soldiers under his command.

*Loyalty*

There is little indication in the primary source record that Hardee questioned Bragg’s loyalty, either to him or to the cause. In fact, Hardee openly acknowledged Bragg to be a man of high personal character and unquestioned patriotism. Hardee did, however, act in ways that suggest a lack of loyalty toward Bragg. A few months prior to the Tullahoma campaign, Hardee, for instance, suggested that Polk challenge Bragg’s report of the battle of Perryville in such a way as to “rip up the Kentucky campaign [and] tear Bragg to tatters” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1098). Prior to the start of the Tullahoma campaign, Hardee wrote to Polk of Bragg’s “enfeebled” state and seemed to suggest that they lead a mutiny against Bragg’s leadership:

If we have a fight, [Bragg] is evidently unable either to examine and determine his line of battle or to take command on the field. What shall we do? What is best to be done to save this army and its honor? I think we ought to counsel together…When can we meet? (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, p. 623; Woodworth, 1998).
Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hardee’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

Though Hardee openly acknowledged Bragg to be a person of high moral character, he, nevertheless, also consistently argued that Bragg lacked the ability to be an effective army commander. In response to Bragg’s January 1863 inquiry about the state of his lieutenants’ confidence, Hardee stated: “I feel that frankness compels me to say that the general officers, whose judgment you have invoked, are unanimous in the opinion that a change in the command of this army is necessary. In this opinion I concur” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 683). On November 19, 1863, prior to the battles for Chattanooga, Hardee again offered an appraisal of Bragg’s leadership, stating, in a letter to COL William B. Johnston, that Bragg had failed as commander and had committed “unpardonable errors” in the exercise of his office (Hughes, 1965, pp. 134-135).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Hardee’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. The primary source record did not provide adequate enough evidence to analyze the level of personal affect between Hardee and Bragg. Though historians associate Hardee with the anti-Bragg faction, Hardee was either professional enough or politically savvy enough to
avoid personal criticism or affection in his official or personal correspondence and actions. While Hardee’s professional criticisms of Bragg, particularly in response to Bragg’s circular after Stones River, were qualified with statements of personal admiration for Bragg’s courage and patriotism, there’s little evidence of either personal friendship or animosity between the two. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and though the primary source record does provide adequate evidence to answer questions #5-6, Hardee would likely agree with question #4. Bragg was clearly disposed to value Hardee’s war-fighting abilities and actions, he clearly respected him above any of his other corps commanders, and he consistently lauded Hardee’s battle contributions in his formal (and public) battle reports. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while it appears likely that Hardee would answer questions #8-9 in the negative (Hardee may have, indeed, argued that he was willing to work his hardest, the questions are framed to measure willingness to work hard for a particular person, and Hardee’s recommendation that Bragg resign after Stones River, and his apparent suggestion for mutiny during the Tullahoma Campaign, suggests an unwillingness to work hard for Bragg). It is likely, however, that Hardee considered his own actions to be patriotic, professional, and competent, and he would likely agree with question #7. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and though Bragg clearly held Hardee in high professional esteem, Hardee would likely disagree with each of these questions. His official and personal correspondence and actions clearly suggest a low level of respect for Bragg’s actions or abilities as an army commander. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Hardee’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -3.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Hardee’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.2). Despite his position as one of Bragg’s senior corps commanders, Hardee’s relationship with Bragg was characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect (by Hardee toward Bragg), and a low perception of distributive justice. While the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hardee’s perception of procedural justice, it is reasonable to assume that Hardee, despite his low level of professional respect for Bragg, felt highly respected and valued by Bragg. Consequently, Hardee’s relationship with Bragg was characterized by a high perception of contribution. Given Bragg’s respect for Hardee and appreciation for his contributions, it cannot be argued, with certainty, that Hardee considered himself to be in the out-group. It is possible, instead, that Hardee considered himself a professional who was “above” army politics. He was, however, closely aligned and identified with the leading members of the anti-Bragg out-group.

LTG D.H Hill

Background

LTG Daniel Harvey Hill, a native of South Carolina, graduated 28th out of the 56 cadets in the West Point class of 1842. After distinguished service in the Mexican War, Hill resigned his commission to pursue a career as an educator, eventually becoming superintendent of the North Carolina Military Institute. When the Civil War began, Hill returned to the military in the
service of his adopted state, North Carolina, and accepted a commission as a colonel in the 1st North Carolina Infantry Regiment (Bridges, 1961; Warner, 1959).

Hill spent most of his service in GEN Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, participating in the Peninsular Campaign, the Seven Days battles, Second Bull Run, and Antietam. He earned a reputation as a fierce fighter and he rapidly rose to the rank of major general, but his relationship with Lee became strained and disputatious. When the opportunity came, Hill was recommended for promotion to lieutenant general and, in mid-July 1863, transferred to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee (Bridges, 1961; Warner, 1959).
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

When Hill joined Bragg’s army, he did so with a tremendous amount of optimism. Upon his arrival in July 1863, Hill and Bragg embraced one another as fellow North Carolinians, and Bragg warmly welcomed Hill, encouraging him to offer advice and suggestions that might improve the army’s circumstances. The opportunity for Hill to make suggestions came in early September in McLemore’s Cove. Learning that a Federal division was isolated in the cove, Bragg leapt at the opportunity to strike and begin the process of destroying Rosecrans’ army piece by piece. He ordered Hill and MG Thomas Hindman to cooperate in an attack to destroy the lone Federal division. Neither Hill nor Hindman were up to the task. For various reasons – logistics, manpower, weather, etc. – Hill advised Bragg that the attack was impractical. Soon, the Federal division grew wary of its vulnerable position and withdrew. An opportunity that many historians consider golden had slipped from Bragg’s grasp, and he never appeared to forgive Hill for it (Bridges, 1961; Cozzens, 1992; Powell, 2010; Woodworth, 1998).

A few weeks later, on the first night of the battle of Chickamauga, Bragg reorganized the command structure in order to accommodate LTG James Longstreet who had just arrived from Lee’s army in Virginia to reinforce Bragg. Bragg now had on over-abundance of lieutenant generals. He reorganized the army into two wings, one commanded by Longstreet and the other commanded by Polk, his senior-most lieutenant. Hill was left without an independent command and was placed under Polk’s supervision, a move that amounted to an informal but functional demotion. For right or wrong, Hill’s colleagues considered the reorganization to be a “needless affront” to Hill resulting from Hill’s failure to attack in McLemore’s Cove and his “querulous and insubordinate spirit in general” (Polk, 1893, p. 245).
The personal affinity between the two was never repaired. Hill eventually became identified as a member of the anti-Bragg bloc and, on October 4, signed the anti-Bragg petition. Though most historians attribute the authorship to MG Simon B. Buckner, some have ascribed it to Hill. Longstreet, in fact, claimed that Hill confided to him that he was, indeed, the author (Longstreet, 1896).

Regardless of the authorship, Bragg clearly viewed Hill as a personal enemy within the army. Following President Davis’ conference with the high command in October, Bragg was left in command and essentially given authority to remove those officers whom he perceived to be liabilities. On October 11, Bragg petitioned Davis for Hill’s removal, claiming that Hill “weakens the morale and military tone of his command” (OR, ser. 1., vol. 30, part 2, p. 148). Davis complied. Hill was removed from command and never again held a major command for the duration of the war. In the following months, Hill requested a written explanation for his removal. Concerned that his reputation might suffer because the public would view his removal to be the result of dereliction, Hill wanted it known that is removal was a result of personal, rather than professional factors. Bragg acquiesced to Hill’s request and provided correspondence indicating that Hill was removed because of his personal incompatibility with Hill and because of Hill’s participation in the anti-Bragg petition (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 148-153; OR, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, pp. 677-678).

Contribution

Hill had little reason to believe that Bragg valued his contributions to the army’s efforts. Hill was formally censured by Bragg for his failure at McLemore’s Cove (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 27-30). Hill’s assignment to a subordinate role, under the supervision of Polk, was
regarded as a retaliatory affront (Polk, 1893). Polk would, himself, later be arrested and removed from command for his failure to carry out the dawn attack on September 20, but it was Hill, acting as one of Polk’s lieutenants, who was to initiate the attack. Ultimately, Bragg, who described Hill as an “inefficient commander,” sought and attained Hill’s removal from command (Bridges, 1961, pp. 227-228).

*Distributive justice*

Distributive justice refers to, among other things, equitable duty assignments, compensation, and promotion. When Hill replaced Hardee, he was one of Bragg’s two senior-most commanders. For whatever reason, Bragg chose to functionally demote Hill on September 19, placing him under the command of another officer of equivalent rank, and giving command of that army’s other wing to an officer who had only recently arrived from another theater. It is reasonable to assume that Hill perceived the demotion to be an “affront,” and he expressed his shock and unpleasant surprise at that decision (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 64).

*Loyalty*

Having been formally censured by Bragg for the actions at McLemore’s Cove and ultimately removed from command for personal reasons, Hill most certainly doubted Bragg’s loyalty toward him. Hill, however, demonstrated little personal loyalty to Bragg either, as evidenced in his support of the anti-Bragg petition. So close was his involvement to the petition, that Hill is considered one of its two most likely authors (Bridges, 1961; Longstreet, 1896).
**Procedural justice**

Hill’s removal from command by Bragg in October 1863 set off a significant exchange of correspondence between Hill, Bragg, and the Confederate War Department. Hill clearly viewed his removal as unjust and was adamant that Bragg publicly account for Hill’s removal in order to acknowledge that it was not a result of dereliction. Bragg, in fact, agreed that Hill was not derelict, but he insisted that Hill’s personal temperament made inadequate commander and incompatible with Bragg’s vision for the army (Bridges, 1961, pp. 227-228; OR, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, pp. 677-678).

**Professional respect**

Following his initial optimistic meeting with Bragg, Hill’s professional respect for his commander deteriorated drastically. Though Bragg welcomed Hill’s suggestions and insights, when Hill actually offered insights, such as in McLemore’s Cove, Bragg roundly rejected them (and even considered them insubordinate). Following the Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Hill claims to have been one of the officers who counseled Bragg to pursue the Federals. According to Hill, Bragg’s failure to do so was “the great blunder” of the war (Hill, 1884, p. 662). Hill, in agreement with Polk, discussed Bragg’s “incapacity” for command (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 67). Finally, Hill signed the anti-Bragg petition, requesting President Davis to replace Bragg with a more competent commander (Bridges, 1961; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66).
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Hill’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and Hill would likely disagree with each of these questions. Hill’s official or personal correspondence and actions, with the exception of his opening exchange with Bragg when he arrived to the army in July 1863, suggests a rapidly deteriorating personal relationship between the two that, by its conclusion in October 1863, was clearly characterized by a high level of mutual contempt and personal dislike and distrust. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty and Hill would likely disagree with each of these questions. Hill’s participation in the production (and possible authorship) of the anti-Bragg petition and his ultimate removal by Bragg indicates an extremely low level of mutual loyalty and commitment. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while the evidence was not adequate to suggest a response to question #7 (since Hill was not arrested or court-martialed, he did not personally generate the kind of defenses for his actions in McLemore’s Cove or on September 21 that Polk was compelled to generate), it appears likely that Hill would disagree with questions #8-9. Hill may have, indeed, believed himself to be hardworking and competent, the questions are framed to measure willingness to work hard for a particular person, and Hill’s role in the anti-Bragg petition suggests an unwillingness to work hard for Bragg. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Hill would likely disagree with each of these questions. By the time Hill was removed from command, his official and personal correspondence, actions, and interactions with Bragg, suggest a mutually low level of professional respect between the two. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Hill’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a
score of -11, the lowest score measured in this study. It is interesting to note that this score was shared by only one other officer in the army’s high command, MG Benjamin F. Cheatham (see pp. 137-143).

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Hill’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.3). Despite his position as one of Bragg’s corps commanders, Hill’s relationship with Bragg was characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, professional respect, and low perceptions of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice. Of all the officers included in the research sample, Hill was one of the most distinctively out-group officers of all.

LTG James Longstreet

Background

LTG James Longstreet achieved a nearly unparalleled celebrity status for a corps commander as one of Lee’s senior lieutenants in the Army of Northern Virginia. Historians have, nevertheless, viewed Longstreet’s Civil War career as a mixed bag (Mendoza, 2008; Wert, 1993). Even as his celebrity and influence in the Virginia theater increased, Longstreet demonstrated a tendency to attribute his shortcomings in battle either to his subordinates (at Seven Pines) or his commander (at Gettysburg) (Longstreet, 1896). Several historians have noted, moreover, that Longstreet tended to halfheartedly execute orders with which he disagreed (Freeman, 1946; Hallock, 1998; Woodworth, 1998). In addition, he did not disguise his own
ambitions for independent command. On multiple occasions during 1863, Longstreet requested transfers that would remove him from Lee’s command and give him an independent command, preferably in place of LTG John C. Pemberton in Vicksburg, MS or Bragg in middle Tennessee (Mendoza, 2008; Woodworth, 1998). Longstreet was, indeed, critical of the ability of either Pemberton or Bragg to bring about Confederate victories in their departments, even arguing that Bragg “was not likely to do a great deal for us” (OR, 1880-1901, ser. 1, vol. 29, part 2, p. 699).

Finally, in September 1863, the Confederate government approved Longstreet’s transfer to the western theater, along with the First Corps, in order to reinforce Bragg’s army, which was then in the midst of the operations leading up to the battle of Chickamauga. Longstreet’s troop
movements began on September 9, and the initial elements arrived at Ringgold station, in north Georgia, on September 19, during the first day of action at Chickamauga (Mendoza, 2008).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

The primary source record indicates that, almost from the moment he arrived in theater, Longstreet had a strained personal relationship with Bragg. Upon his arrival on the night of September 19, Longstreet was disappointed to find that Bragg had not sent representatives to greet him on his arrival. Personally offended, Longstreet found his way to Bragg’s headquarters, arriving near midnight. Bragg, who had fallen asleep, woke to describe the day’s events to Longstreet and to explain Longstreet’s role as a wing commander in the next day’s planned actions (Sorrel, 1905).

On September 20, Longstreet’s wing achieved the decisive breakthrough of the Federal line resulting in the Confederate victory at Chickamauga. As the remaining Federal forces retreated to Chattanooga, a number of Bragg’s lieutenants, including Longstreet, advised Bragg to pursue the Federals. Bragg’s refusal to acquiesce to Longstreet’s suggestions led Longstreet, within days of the victory, to harshly denounce Bragg in a letter to Confederate Secretary of War Seddon (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 4, pp. 705-706). By early October, only two weeks after his arrival, he was considered, due to his celebrity-status, one of the most influential member’s of the anti-Bragg faction of officers with the army. Bragg’s chief of staff, in fact, remarked that Longstreet had done particular damage to the army because of the manner in which he used his influence to prejudice many officers against Bragg (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 4, p. 742). On October 4, he colluded with several other members of the high command in producing the
petition for Bragg’s removal, and in President Davis’s mid-October visit to the army, he did not hesitate to voice his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 65-66; Mendoza, 2008; Wert, 1993).

President Davis’s affirmation of his confidence in Bragg did nothing to improve Bragg’s relationship with Longstreet. Bragg held Longstreet partially responsible for the establishment of the Federal “cracker line,” and, ultimately, chose to detach Longstreet’s corps to conduct actions against the Federal Army of the Ohio in east Tennessee, partially as a means to rid himself of Longstreet’s presence (Liddell, 1997; Mendoza, 2008). Longstreet’s detachment ended Bragg’s direct control over Longstreet and his forces, but it did not end the personal conflict between the two. Their correspondence with one another in the following weeks reflected the continued strained relationship between the two as each bickered over logistical matters. On one occasion, Bragg insulted Longstreet by calling him overrated (Liddell, 1997). Longstreet protested the “objectionable tone” in Bragg’s correspondence, and rejected Bragg’s insinuations that Longstreet had been neglectful in the execution of his duties (OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 1, p. 456). The direct correspondence between the two ended in November 1863, however, as Bragg was being forced from the high ground around Chattanooga and as Longstreet became more embroiled in his own, ultimately unsuccessful, operation against Federal forces in Knoxville, TN.

Contribution

Following the victory at Chickamauga, Bragg graciously acknowledged Longstreet’s leadership as prompt, vigorous, and satisfactory (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 24). After Longstreet’s denunciation of Bragg’s failure to pursue the Federals on September 21, however,
Bragg would never again give Longstreet a formal commendation. On the contrary, Bragg held Longstreet personally responsible, through his inactivity and half-heartedness, for the establishment of the Federal “cracker line,” whereas Longstreet blamed Bragg for failing to promptly approve a battle plan which would have prevented the Federals from establishing the “cracker line” (Liddell, 1997; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 1, p. 218). Following Longstreet’s detachment to East Tennessee, the strained correspondence between Bragg and Longstreet suggests that Bragg viewed Longstreet as slovenly, derelict, and neglectful of his logistical duties as a commander (OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 3, pp. 686-687).

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Longstreet’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

*Loyalty*

Longstreet came to the Army of Tennessee with the hope that he might displace Bragg as commander (Mendoza, 2008; OR, ser. 1, vol. 29, part 2, p. 699; Woodworth, 1998). He, in fact, never viewed his corps as an integral part of Bragg’s army (merely a temporary detachment), and, therefore, never regarded himself or his soldiers as subordinate to Bragg’s authority. Longstreet, in other words, never seemed to believe that he was obliged to be loyal to Bragg as his commander.

Though Longstreet received Bragg’s commendation after Chickamauga, he was never recorded to have encouraged Bragg and he, on multiple occasions, suggested that Bragg discarded his advice with little, if any, consideration (Longstreet, 1896, pp. 462-463; OR, ser. 1,
vol. 31, part 1, p. 318). Given his initial lack of any sense of attachment to Bragg or the Army of Tennessee, and given Longstreet’s assumptions that Bragg did not give proper consideration to the suggestion of his lieutenants, Longstreet, without hesitation, denounced Bragg’s leadership to Confederate Secretary of War Seddon and signed the anti-Bragg petition (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 4, pp. 705-706; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66).

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Longstreet’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

Even before his arrival in theater, Longstreet doubted Bragg’s competence as a commander (OR, ser. 1, vol. 29, part 2, p. 699). Within days of his attachment to Bragg’s army, Longstreet denounced Bragg as incompetent in a letter to the Confederate Secretary of War (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 4, pp. 705-706). On October 4, Longstreet signed the anti-Bragg petition, requesting President Davis to replace Bragg with a more suitable commander (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66). At no point, before, during, or after his service with Bragg did Longstreet give any indication of professional respect for his commander.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Longstreet’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3

118
measure affect, and Longstreet would likely disagree with each of these questions. Following Bragg’s refusal to pursue the Federals on September 21, the relationship between Longstreet and Bragg became overwhelmingly negative and characterized by a high level of mutual contempt and personal dislike and distrust. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Longstreet would likely disagree with each of these questions. Longstreet’s participation in the production of the anti-Bragg petition, and Bragg’s detachment of Longstreet to East Tennessee and post-1863 intervention, on behalf of MG McLaws and BG Law, against Longstreet’s threat of court-martials suggests a low level of mutual loyalty and commitment. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while Longstreet clearly esteemed his own contributions and competence (indicating that he would agree with question #7), it appears likely that he would disagree with questions #8-9. Longstreet believed himself to be hardworking, competent, and more qualified to command an army than Bragg (and, perhaps, Lee), but questions #8-9 are framed to measure willingness to work hard for a particular person. Longstreet’s less than enthusiastic role at Wauhatchie and his participation in the anti-Bragg petition indicate an unwillingness to work hard for Bragg. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Longstreet would likely disagree with each of these questions. Even before his arrival to the Army of Tennessee, Longstreet’s official and personal correspondence suggested a low level of professional respect for Bragg. This opinion was consistently expressed throughout Longstreet’s entire tenure with the army. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Longstreet’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -10.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Longstreet’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.4). Longstreet’s relationship with Bragg was clearly characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, professional respect, and low perceptions of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice, and given his celebrity status as Lee’s “war horse,” he quickly emerged as a leader of the anti-Bragg out-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: LTG James Longstreet](image-url)

Figure 4.4 LMX: LTG James Longstreet
MG John C. Breckinridge

Background

MG John Cabell Breckinridge, a native of Kentucky, was a political general. A lawyer, Breckinridge entered Kentucky politics in 1849 and enjoyed a rapid rise to national prominence, culminating in his election, in 1856, to the office of Vice President of the United States in the administration of President James Buchanan (Davis, 1974; Warner, 1959).

When it became apparent that Kentucky would not secede from the Union and join the Confederate States of America, Breckinridge accepted a Confederate commission as a brigadier general. By mid-April 1862, he was promoted to major general. After seeing action in 1862 at Shiloh and in Mississippi, Breckinridge was summoned to Bragg’s army to participate in the 1862 Kentucky campaign. Even prior to his arrival, Breckinridge proved a disappointment to Bragg, who held Breckinridge partially responsible for the failure of Kentuckians to rally to the army. The relationship between Bragg and Breckinridge never improved. Indeed, Breckinridge soon became an extremely influential force within the Kentucky wing of the army’s anti-Bragg faction (Davis, 1974; Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Much like Hill’s relationship with Bragg, Breckinridge’s relationship with Bragg began with great optimism. In the year prior to the 1863 campaigns, Bragg personally endorsed Breckinridge’s promotion to major general. In anticipation of the Kentucky campaign, by which Bragg hoped to liberate a sympathetic population from Federal occupiers and, in the process, rally thousands of potential Kentucky soldiers to the Confederate cause, Bragg regarded
Breckinridge’s assignment to the army as indispensable (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 2, p. 995). When the Kentucky campaign fell short of Bragg’s expectations, however, Bragg held Breckinridge partially responsible. In Bragg’s estimation, Breckinridge had not displayed an adequate amount of energy in reporting to the army and had not displayed an adequate amount of energy, as a favorite son of Kentucky, in promoting the campaign to the state’s population (*Davis*, 1974, pp. 327-328; *OR*, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 2, pp. 815, 891-892). Like Hill’s failure at McLemore’s Cove, Breckinridge’s failure in Kentucky was unforgivable and the personal relationship between the two was soon to be characterized by hostility.

Aside from Breckinridge’s supposed dereliction, Bragg attributed the failure of Kentuckians to rally to his army as in indication of a flaw inherent in the character of Kentuckians, including Breckinridge (and other Kentucky officers, like MG Simon Buckner and BG William Preston) (*Davis*, 1974, p. 328).

Breckinridge’s conduct at Stones River was criticized by Bragg, and Bragg made the point to validate his criticism of Breckinridge by attaching, to his official report, the official report of a junior officer, CPT Felix Robertson, which was also critical of Breckinridge’s conduct (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 666, 668, 759-761). In response, Breckinridge complained to Richmond that Bragg’s report was personally motivated and was deliberately disparaging and deceitful (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 790-791). Soon thereafter, Breckinridge was transferred to Mississippi.

Breckinridge’s hiatus from Bragg was short-lived. Following Hill’s arrival to the Army of Tennessee in July 1863, Breckinridge was reassigned to the army and given a division command in Hill’s corps (as a testament to his friendship with Hill, and his solidarity with him in his opposition to Bragg, Breckinridge wrote a heartfelt tribute to Hill following his removal;
Throughout the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns, Bragg and Breckinridge seem to have largely refrained from making personal statements, critical or otherwise, about one another. Indeed, on the second day of Chickamauga, though Breckinridge’s division was late in attacking (due to the mishaps of Polk and Hill), it was nevertheless involved in a bloody assault against the Federal left flank which, according to Bragg, was “led with the greatest gallantry…coolness, bravery, and heroic devotion” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 33).

When Hill was removed from command in October 1863, Breckinridge was functionally promoted to command Hill’s corps. The corps, however, was drastically reorganized by Bragg to dilute the anti-Bragg opposition that had flourished under Hardee’s and Hill’s leadership. Many of the most anti-Bragg divisions and brigades, mostly from Tennessee and Kentucky, were assigned to other corps and replaced with more decidedly pro-Bragg units. Bragg, therefore, took preventative steps to ensure that Breckinridge would not be able to build an anti-Bragg dyadic coalition within his organization (Connelly, 1971).

Finally, following the battle of Missionary Ridge, Bragg launched one final personal attack against Breckinridge, accusing Breckinridge of being intoxicated during battle (Bragg, 1817-1876, Bragg to J. Davis, December 1, 1863; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666).

Contribution

Bragg’s formal (and public) reports of the Kentucky campaign, the Stones River campaign, and the battles for Chattanooga gave Breckinridge little doubt as to the value that Bragg placed on his contributions. Though Bragg, without mentioning Breckinridge by name, seemed to praise Breckinridge for his efforts at Chickamauga on September 20, Bragg,
nevertheless, viewed Breckinridge’s contributions as a member of the Army of Tennessee’s high command to be overwhelming deficient (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 33). Bragg held Breckinridge responsible for the failure of the Kentucky campaign, particularly for the failure of Kentuckians to rally to the Confederate army (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 2, pp. 815, 891-892). Bragg criticized Breckinridge’s conduct at Stones River (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 666, 668). Finally, Bragg accused Breckinridge of being intoxicated at Missionary Ridge (Bragg, 1817-1876, Bragg to J. Davis, December 1, 1863).

Distributive justice

Though Breckinridge might have viewed Bragg’s battlefield criticisms of him as inequitable (i.e., Breckinridge did not receive the commendations that he felt his efforts merited), the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Breckinridge’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

Given the nature of the personal hostility between Bragg and Breckinridge, as well as the lack of value that Bragg placed on Breckinridge’s contributions to the army, it is not surprising that the two felt very little loyalty toward one another. For his part, Bragg was willing to publicly blame Breckinridge for military failures and to make accusations, to the highest levels of the Confederate government, of Breckinridge’s criminal negligence. Breckinridge, naturally, defended himself from such criticisms and accusations, citing Bragg’s personal motives and poor military decision-making (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 781-791). Following the retreat from
Stones River, Breckinridge was among the officers who voiced a lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 682).

Interestingly, at the October 4 meeting that produced the anti-Bragg petition, Breckinridge refused to add his signature. He was certainly present at the meeting, and he certainly expressed his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership. Nevertheless, Breckinridge refrained from signing, perhaps, according to his biographer, because he felt that signing the petition would be politically damaging and might undermine his efforts to have a court of inquiry investigate Bragg’s criticisms of Breckinridge from prior campaigns (Davis, 1974).

Procedural justice

Breckinridge’s perceptions of procedural justice in the Army of Tennessee can be best gauged by his responses to two events. First, many historians have viewed the court-martial and execution of Asa Lewis as a decisive event in the Bragg-Breckinridge dyad. Lewis, a soldier in the 6th Kentucky Regiment, was arrested and found guilty of desertion. Breckinridge felt that certain mitigating circumstances were not taken into account, and he pleaded with Bragg to commute the death sentence. Bragg refused to relent, and Lewis was executed, by firing squad, on December 26, 1862, just days before the battle of Stones River. According to those present, Breckinridge actually fainted after the execution was carried out (Daniel, 2012; Davis, 1974).

Next, Breckinridge lamented Hill’s removal from command in October 1863, and even wrote a tribute to him (Bridges, 1961).

Breckinridge’s responses to each of these events suggest a low perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

Following his initial appeal to have Breckinridge attached to the Army of Tennessee, Bragg was clear and consistent in his low professional estimation of Breckinridge. At Perryville, Stones River, and Missionary Ridge, Bragg, in his formal reports, declared Breckinridge to be inept or criminally negligent (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 2, pp. 815, 891-892; OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 788-792; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666). Breckinridge, on the other hand, viewed Bragg’s criticisms as unprofessional and personally motivated (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 790-791). He openly declared his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership following the retreat from Stones River (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 682), and though he refused to sign the anti-Bragg petition, he was, nevertheless, present at the October 4 meeting and certainly voiced his opposition to Bragg, regardless of his reluctance to sign (Davis, 1974).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Breckinridge’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and Breckinridge would likely disagree with each of these questions. Bragg held Breckinridge personally responsible for the failure of Kentuckians to rally to the Confederate army in 1862, and the relationship between the two never softened. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Breckinridge would likely disagree with each of these questions. Bragg was uniformly critical of Breckinridge in his formal battle reports, even accusing Breckinridge of drunkenness during the battle of Missionary Ridge. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while it is conceivable that Breckinridge viewed his own contributions to the army as competent,
the primary source record does not provide adequate enough evidence to generate likely responses to these questions. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Breckinridge would likely disagree with each of these questions. Breckinridge expressed his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership following Stones River, and though he did not sign the anti-Bragg petition, he was present at the October 4 meeting to verbally declare his lack of confidence. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Breckinridge’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -9.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Breckinridge’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.5). Breckinridge’s relationship with Bragg was clearly characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, professional respect, and low perceptions of contribution and procedural justice (though not enough evidence was found to analyze the perception of distributive justice). Breckinridge was one of the most influential Kentucky politicians and military figures, and his influence carried great weight among members of the Kentucky wing of the army’s anti-Bragg out-group.

**MG Simon B. Buckner**

**Background**

A native Kentuckian, West Point graduate of the class of 1844, and distinguished Mexican War veteran, MG Simon Bolivar Buckner accepted a Confederate brigadier general appointment after declining an offer for a similar appointment in the Union army.
surrendering Fort Donelson to Union forces in February 1862, Buckner was taken prisoner but later exchanged in time to command a division in Bragg’s 1862 Kentucky campaign (Warner, 1959).

Like many of his fellow Kentuckians, Buckner seemed to have been alienated by Bragg’s denunciation of the failure of Kentuckians to rally to the army. From October 1862 onward, Buckner seemed to align with members of the Kentucky wing of the army’s anti-Bragg faction (Davis, 1974).

Following the retreat from Kentucky, Buckner was assigned, for an extended period of time, to duty on the Alabama coast, and prior to the Tullahoma Campaign, he was given command of an independent department in East Tennessee, joining Bragg again in time to
command a corps at Chickamauga. Following the battle of Chickamauga, Buckner spent most of the remainder of the war in assignments in the Trans-Mississippi Theater of the war (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*affect*

Buckner was among the most judicious members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command in terms of avoiding the appearance of personal animosity toward Bragg. As one of the senior-most Kentuckians in the high command, he naturally emerged as one of the leaders of the anti-Bragg bloc within the army. Bragg’s condemnation of Kentuckians to rally to the army during the Kentucky campaign, and his refusal to commute the death-sentence of Asa Lewis deeply alienated Buckner and his fellow Kentuckians (Davis, 1974; Robins, 2006). Nevertheless, Buckner avoided, at least in writing, the kind of personal denunciations of Bragg that characterized the correspondence of Hill, Longstreet, and Polk.

Indicators of low affect between the two, however, are present. MG Lafayette McLaws, for example, claims that Bragg, in a personal reflection written after his resignation from command of the army, described Buckner as “a most perfect Jesuit and totally unreliable” (Oeffinger, 2002, p. 220). A few months prior to the Tullahoma Campaign, Buckner declined to answer Bragg’s circular implicating he, and his fellow officers, in Polk’s clandestine meeting prior to Perryville. He, nevertheless, acknowledged the bad feelings that characterized Bragg’s relationship with his senior lieutenants (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, pp. 1105-1107). Finally, Buckner participated in the October 4 meeting that produced the anti-Bragg petition, and most
historians, and a number of contemporaries, claim that Buckner was, himself, the author of the petition (Bridges, 1961; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66; Woodworth, 1990).

_Contribution_

Though Buckner was formally commended by Bragg for his “noble” and “gallant” efforts at Perryville, the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Buckner’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

_Distributive justice_

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Buckner’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. When Buckner’s department was absorbed by Bragg’s, Buckner and Bragg engaged in several exchanges, many of them heated, with one another and with authorities in Richmond, over delegation of responsibilities. However much the absorption may have strained the relationship with Bragg and Buckner, the decision to combine the two departments and the complications that emerged from the combination, however, were attributable to authorities in Richmond and not personally to Bragg (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 924).

_Loyalty_

Though Buckner emerged as a leader with the Kentucky wing of the anti-Bragg bloc, Buckner largely avoided the appearance of disloyalty to Bragg, due partially to the fact that Buckner enjoyed protracted periods of time outside of Bragg’s direct supervision. Following Perryville, he spent an extended period of time in Mobile. In the months prior to Chickamauga,
he commanded an independent department in East Tennessee. Following Chickamauga, he took
an extended leave from the Army of Tennessee and never returned (Hughes, 1965; Warner,
1959). Prior to his final departure, however, he participated in, and probably authored, the anti-
Bragg petition, suggesting a low level of loyalty toward Bragg (Bridges, 1961; OR, ser. 1, vol.
30, part 2, pp. 65-66).

Procedural justice

Though Buckner was among the Kentucky officers that were alienated by Bragg’s refusal
to commute the death sentence of Asa Lewis, the primary source record did not provide adequate
enough evidence to analyze Buckner’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of
Tennessee (Davis, 1974; Robins, 2006).

Professional respect

Given the limited amount of time that Buckner served directly under Bragg’s supervision,
very little evidence exists in the primary source record regarding Buckner’s level of professional
respect toward Bragg and vice versa. Bragg did commend Buckner following Perryville, but he
later, according to MG McLaws, criticized Buckner as “unreliable” (Oeffinger, 2002, p. 220;
OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1088). Buckner, on the other hand, did sign the anti-Bragg petition
and is widely considered to be the petition’s author, suggesting a low level of professional
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Buckner’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and Buckner would likely disagree with each of these questions. Though extremely reserved in his personal criticisms of Bragg, it is clear, based on his role in the production (and likely authorship) of the anti-Bragg petition, that Buckner was deeply contemptuous of Bragg. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty. Because Buckner spent extended periods of time outside of Bragg’s direct supervision, not enough evidence was found to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate a likely response to question #7, it is likely, based on Buckner’s involvement in the anti-Bragg petition, that he would likely disagree with questions #8-9. Finally, questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Buckner would likely disagree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Buckner’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -8.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Buckner’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.6). Though it was not possible to analyze Buckner’s perceptions of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice, it is clear that his relationship with Bragg was characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and
professional respect, and it is reasonable to associate Buckner with the army’s anti-Bragg out-group.

Figure 4.6 LMX: MG Simon Buckner

MG Benjamin F. Cheatham

Background

MG Benjamin Franklin Cheatham was a native of Tennessee, and though he was not a West Point graduate, he did have extensive service in his state’s militia, participating in the Mexican War and rising to the rank of major general. Prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, he was a failed gold speculator, a planter and, it appears, a racetrack manager (Liddell, 1997; Losson, 1989; Warner, 1959). Because of the association of racetracks with alcohol
consumption, Cheatham had already established (perhaps justifiably), before the war, a reputation for drunkenness.

Cheatham spent nearly his entire Civil War experience, from Shiloh to Franklin, in the Army of Tennessee. Either because of Cheatham’s reputation as a hard drinker, Bragg’s reputed natural distrust of Tennesseans, or Bragg’s apparent disposition against non-West Point officers, the relationship between Bragg and Cheatham was strained from beginning to end (Losson, 1989). Only months after taking command following Shiloh, Bragg lamented the lack of any suitable officers in the army (including Cheatham) and appealed directly to the Confederate War Department to have Cheatham removed from command (Losson, 1989; McWhiney, 1969).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Among the Tennessee officers in the high command, Cheatham was likely one of the most ardent among the anti-Bragg bloc, though establishing Cheatham’s positionality on the various LMX features requires a large amount of inference. Cheatham did not produce a substantial body of papers from which scholars are able to draw explicit statements, probably because most of Tennessee’s prominent political or military figures, including Governor Isham Harris, were co-located with the army, making correspondence between Cheatham and his Tennessee allies unnecessary (Losson, 1989). Nevertheless, Cheatham’s LMX positionality may be established, through inference, with a reasonable amount of confidence.

Cheatham and Bragg, for instance, clearly had a low level of personal affect for one another. In late 1862, Bragg requested that Confederate Secretary of War Randolph remove Cheatham from command. Following Stones River, Bragg, in his official report, attributed MG
Cleburne’s high casualty rate to a delay by Cheatham, and Cheatham’s name was omitted from the official list of officers commended for their actions in battle (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 664). Later, Bragg accused Cheatham of being drunk during battle, an accusation that Cheatham apparently never disputed (Bragg, 1833-1879, Bragg to S. Cooper, April 9, 1863). In a private conversation, Cheatham pledged, to Governor Harris, that he would never again go into battle with Bragg (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 624).

By the beginning of the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, Cheatham had developed a strong alliance with Polk and, following Polk’s arrest and removal from command, Cheatham contradicted Bragg’s claim that Polk was absent from his place of duty on the morning of September 20. In fact, argued Cheatham, Polk was at his place of duty at sunrise (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 63). With Polk gone, Cheatham soon requested, unsuccessfully, to be relieved of duty and permitted to report to the War Department in Richmond (Cheatham, 1834-1893, Cheatham to G. Brent, October 31, 1863). Bragg, of course, would likely have encouraged Cheatham’s transfer. He had already requested his removal, and in a letter to President Davis, argued that Cheatham was as “equally dangerous” as Breckinridge (Bragg, 1817-1876, Bragg to J. Davis, December 1, 1863).

Interestingly, Cheatham refused to join his fellow officers in expressing a lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership following Stones River and his name is conspicuously absent from the anti-Bragg petition of October 4. Some suggest that Cheatham refrained from making public anti-Bragg declarations out of a sense of self-preservation, perhaps because he feared Bragg would pursue formal sanctions against him for his drunkenness in battle. Nevertheless, Cheatham was present at the mid-October conference with Davis, Bragg, and the other members of the high command, and Cheatham did, in this context, express his lack of confidence.
Regardless of his general unwillingness to criticize Bragg in writing, Cheatham had clearly developed a reputation for speaking critically of Bragg, though some officers in the army felt that Cheatham was only willing to be critical of Bragg behind his back (Avery, 1893).

**Contribution**

Cheatham had every reason to believe that Bragg placed little value on his contributions to the army. Though Bragg did say of Cheatham’s troops, following Perryville, that “nobler troops were never more gallantly led,” Bragg never again offered words of commendation for Cheatham (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1088). Bragg, in fact, accused Cheatham of drunkenness at Stones River and, accordingly, refused to commend Cheatham for his participation in that battle (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 664). Little was said between the two officers, or by each officer regarding one another, until near the end of Bragg’s tenure in the army. As he was preparing to hand command of the army to Hardee, Bragg, in discussions with BG Liddell and President Davis, explicitly denounced Cheatham as a liability to the army (Bragg, 1817-1876, Bragg to J. Davis, December 1, 1863; Liddell, 1997).

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Cheatham’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

Given Bragg’s accusations of Cheatham’s impropriety in battle and his refusal to commend him, either at Stones River, Tullahoma, Chickamauga, or Missionary Ridge, and given
Cheatham’s participation in the October 9 conference with President Davis and the members of the Army’s high command, it is reasonable to assume that a low level of loyalty existed between the two.

*Procedural justice*

Cheatham likely did not appreciate Bragg’s accusations of drunkenness, but there is little likelihood that he could have denied the accusations. Cheatham was, in fact, probably drunk at Stones River, and it appears that he never disputed the accusation (Bragg, 1833-1879, Bragg to S. Cooper, April 9, 1863; Losson, 1989; Woodworth, 1990). Aside from personal discomfort and embarrassment, then, the Stones River controversy can not be cited as a legitimate example of Bragg’s inequitable approach to procedural justice.

Cheatham, nevertheless, likely had a low perception of procedural justice within the army, as evidenced by his claim in defense of Polk. Contrary to Bragg’s suggestion that Polk was absent from his place of duty on the morning of September 20, Cheatham argued that Polk was, indeed, at an appropriate place in the appropriate timeframe – near Turner’s battery at sunrise (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 63).

*Professional respect*

It is beyond doubt that Bragg and Cheatham had little professional respect for one another. From the beginning of Bragg’s tenure as army commander to the very end, Bragg viewed Cheatham as an incompetent drunkard. Upon assuming command of the army, Bragg complained, to the War Department, of an absence of any qualified commanders within his army, with the exception of Hardee, and he soon requested that six officers, including Cheatham
be removed (OR, ser. 1, vol. 17, part 2, pp. 628, 673). On multiple occasions toward the end of his tenure, Bragg reiterated his view that Cheatham was a drunkard whose presence in the army was “dangerous” (Bragg, 1817-1876, Bragg to J. Davis, December 1, 1863; Liddell, 1997).

Cheatham, on the other hand, clearly spoke of his lack of professional respect for Bragg, even if he refused to put his opinions in writing (Avery, 1893; OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 624). When he met with President Davis and his fellow commanders in Chattanooga on October 9, he joined his colleagues in expressing his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership and, following the removal of his ally, Polk, from command, he requested to be transferred away from Bragg (Cheatham, 1834-1893, Cheatham to G. Brent, October 31, 1863; Losson, 1989).

**Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire**

Based upon Cheatham’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and Cheatham would likely disagree with each of these questions. Bragg and Cheatham, on multiple occasions throughout their tenure together, expressed personal contempt for one another. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty. Because of Bragg’s repeated (and, possibly, justifiable) accusations of Cheatham’s drunkenness, and because of Bragg’s consistent criticisms of Cheatham in his formal battle reports, it is certain that Cheatham would disagree with each of the questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. The primary source evidence did not provide enough evidence to generate a response to question #7, but because of Cheatham’s request for a transfer away from Bragg in late October 1863, it is reasonable to suggest that Cheatham would disagree with questions #8-9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect,
and though the primary source record provided scant evidence, it is plausible to infer, from his reputation as a “behind the back” critic of Bragg and from his denunciation of Bragg in his meeting with President Davis on October 9, that Cheatham would disagree with each of these questions. Cheatham did not produce a substantial body of papers, and because most of the Tennesseans who carried significant military and political influence were personally located with the army, it was not necessary for Cheatham to engage in lengthy correspondences with his allies on the topic of his relationship with Bragg. Cheatham, moreover, was reluctant to engage in open, public criticism of Bragg, perhaps because he feared that such public criticisms would prompt Bragg to take formal action against him because of his alleged drunkenness during battle (L. White, personal communication, February 4, 2013). Nevertheless, on the modified scoring scale used for this study, Cheatham’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -11, matching Hill for the lowest score among the members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Cheatham’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.7). Though it was not possible to analyze Cheatham’s perceptions of distributive justice, it is clear that his relationship with Bragg was characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and low perceptions of contribution and procedural justice. It is reasonable to associate Cheatham with the army’s anti-Bragg out-group.
MG Patrick Cleburne

Background

MG Patrick Ronayne Cleburne was one of the most universally celebrated division commanders, on either side, during the Civil War, even earning the nickname “Stonewall of the West.” In an age of extreme prejudice against foreigners, particularly Irishmen, Cleburne was the only foreign-born officer, Federal or Confederate, to reach the rank of major general during the war (Symonds, 1997).

A native of Ireland, Cleburne served a three-year enlistment in the British army before immigrating to the United States in 1849. In the years preceding the war, Cleburne settled in Arkansas, received training as a pharmacist and a lawyer, and established a successful law practice. When Arkansas seceded from the Union, he immediately entered the military in the
service of his state and was elected colonel of an Arkansas regiment. By the spring of 1862, he was appointed a brigadier general, but he demonstrated such effectiveness in battle that, following the retreat from Kentucky in 1862, he received a promotion to major general (Symonds, 1997; Warner, 1959).

Though Cleburne developed strong associations with anti-Bragg officers like Hardee, and without hesitation, offered professional criticisms of Bragg, he appears to have avoided personal criticisms. Along with Hardee, Cleburne is one of the few Bragg critics whose criticisms did not seem to earn Bragg’s personal or professional contempt. He was the only signer of the anti-Bragg petition to escape the purge of the anti-Bragg officers in October 1863 (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013; Symonds, 1997; Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

There are few, if any, indications of any personal animosity between Bragg and Cleburne. Indeed, Cleburne seems to have deliberately avoided politics within the army, even if he held professional reservations about Bragg’s leadership (Symonds, 1997). When Cleburne responded to Bragg’s inquiry of January 1863 regarding the confidence level in Bragg’s leadership, Cleburne qualified his remarks by explaining that he had the highest regard for Bragg’s character, bravery, and patriotism (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 684). Though Cleburne signed the anti-Bragg petition of October 4, Bragg never seemed to have developed a personal dislike for Cleburne and, according to some sources, when Bragg resigned as army command, he gave his personal horse saddle to Cleburne as a token of his respect and appreciation (White, 2010, February 6).
Months after his departure, Bragg did express contempt for Cleburne’s proposal to emancipate and arm slaves as a military necessity, and he seemed to have viewed this as an opportunity to defeat many of his old enemies in the army (including Cleburne) (Symonds, 1997). During their time together, however, the professional opinions of Bragg and Cleburne had minimal influence on the level of affect between the two.

**Contribution**

Cleburne could have had little doubt about the high level of value that Bragg placed on Cleburne’s leadership. Following the Kentucky campaign, Bragg strongly endorsed Cleburne’s promotion to major general, despite the fact that Cleburne was Irish and was not a graduate of West Point (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 2, pp. 508-509). Bragg, furthermore, formally commended Cleburne following each of the major phases of the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, even crediting Cleburne with saving the Army of Tennessee following the army’s retreat from Chattanooga in November (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 30-31; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666).

**Distributive justice**

When Buckner departed for East Tennessee, he endorsed Cleburne for promotion to major general, despite the fact that two officers within Buckner’s division, BG Sterling Price and BG Bushrod Johnson, outranked Cleburne. Bragg, however, enthusiastically endorsed Cleburne’s promotion, and President Davis conceded. Cleburne would certainly have regarded this promotion, over two higher-ranking officers, as an equitable recognition of his past efforts and his potential (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 2, pp. 508-509; Symonds, 1997).

142
**Loyalty**

The manner with which Bragg expressed his appreciation for Cleburne’s contributions – in one commendation, Bragg even described Cleburne as a “gallant chief” – would have left Cleburne with little doubt regarding Bragg’s high level of commitment and loyalty to him (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 30-31).

**Procedural justice**

As Bragg’s popularity in the army declined, Cleburne became increasingly identified as an ally of Bragg enemies, particularly Hardee and Hill (Symonds, 1997). Cleburne viewed Bragg’s criticism of Hill at McLemore’s Cove as unjust, and upon Hill’s removal from command, Cleburne wrote a tribute, extolling Hill’s leadership and achievements during his brief tenure with the Army of Tennessee (Bridges, 1961; Symonds, 1997). From Cleburne’s perspective, Hill’s public censure and eventual removal by Bragg was indicative of an inequitable level of procedural justice within the army.

**Professional respect**

Regardless of Bragg’s high personal regard for and loyalty toward Cleburne, Cleburne was consistent in expressing his low regard for Bragg’s professional competence as an army commander. In response to Bragg’s inquiry of January 1863, Cleburne freely admitted that he and his division commanders, BG Liddell and BG Johnson, were unanimous in their lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 2, p. 684). Ten months later, Cleburne was present at the October 4 meeting that produced the anti-Bragg petition, and though he did
not speak at the meeting, he did sign the petition (Liddell, 1997). Immediately upon Bragg’s departure, Cleburne was noticeably happier, thankful that his friend, LTG Hardee, had assumed command of the army, and relieved to be rid of Bragg’s “military mismanagement” (Symonds, 1997, p. 182).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Cleburne’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and because Cleburne deliberately avoided personal criticisms of Bragg, it was not possible to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty. Because Bragg consistently lauded Cleburne’s achievements in his formal battle reports, it is likely that Cleburne would agree with question #4. The primary source record, however, did not provide adequate evidence to generate likely responses to questions #5-6. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. Cleburne was a conscientiously professional officer who consistently performed at the highest levels in battle (ultimately even giving his life). While his statements of “no confidence” in Bragg and his support for the anti-Bragg petition indicate that he would disagree with question #9, it is likely that, in spite of his professional criticisms of Bragg, Cleburne would agree with questions #7-8. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect. Cleburne was consistently and unreservedly critical of Bragg’s professional competence, and would likely have disagreed with these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Cleburne’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -1.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Cleburne’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mixed leader-member exchange relationship (see Figure 4.8). Though Cleburne signed the anti-Bragg petition, and though historians are inclined to include Cleburne among the faction of anti-Bragg officers within the army, it is clear that the relationship between the two had both positive and negative features. Cleburne, on the one hand, likely considered Bragg to be loyal to him, likely appreciated Bragg’s endorsement for his promotion, and was certainly aware of the high value that Bragg placed on his contributions. Cleburne, on the other hand, likely questioned procedural equity within the army and, though Bragg clearly esteemed Cleburne’s professional abilities, Cleburne did not reciprocate the professional respect. Cleburne’s LMX-MDM score of -1 is not adequate enough to place Cleburne firmly within the out-group, but Cleburne’s lack of professional respect for Bragg indicate that he was certainly not part of the in-group.

MG Thomas Hindman

Background

Born in Tennessee, MG Thomas Carmichael Hindman served with distinction in the Mexican War before dabbling in politics in Mississippi and Arkansas. He played a significant role in bringing about Arkansas’ secession from the Union, and when the Civil War broke out, he entered military service as a colonel in an Arkansas regiment (Warner, 1959). By the spring of 1862, Hindman had risen to the rank of major general. He subsequently exercised an independent command in the Department of the Trans-Mississippi and he demonstrated competence as a battlefield commander when he fought Federal forces to a
When he joined the Army of Tennessee in the weeks preceding the battle of Chickamauga, Bragg had high expectations. The failure to bring decisive action against isolated Federal forces in McLemore’s Cove, however, permanently prejudiced Bragg against Hindman. Though Hindman was distinguished for gallantry for his efforts during the battle of Chickamauga (where he was seriously wounded), Bragg had him removed from command following the battle for his failure in McLemore’s Cove. Hindman was restored to command in time to participate in the battles for Chattanooga, but there is no indication that the relationship between Hindman and Bragg ever softened (Warner, 1959; Woodworth, 1998).
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Hindman left little correspondence shedding insight on the level of affect between he and Bragg. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Hindman’s arrest, by Bragg, for his supposed dereliction in McLemore’s Cove engendered a significant amount of personal animosity toward Bragg (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 55).

Contribution

Similarly, though Hindman made few written statements regarding the perception of contribution, and though Bragg commended Hindman for “gallantry and good conduct” at Chickamauga, Hindman’s arrest, by Bragg, was certainly regarded as an indication of the low level of value that Bragg placed on Hindman’s contribution (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 27-30, 35, 55).

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hindman’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

Given this study’s operational definition (see p. 18), it is reasonable to assume that Hindman regarded his arrest as an indication of Bragg’s lack of loyalty toward him.
Procedural justice

Given this study’s operational definition (see p. 19), it is reasonable to assume that Hindman regarded his arrest as an inequitable violation of procedural justice.

Professional respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hindman’s level of professional respect for Bragg. It is reasonable to assume, however, that Hindman’s arrest engendered a low level of professional respect for Bragg.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Hindman’s limited correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and because of the events surrounding Hindman’s removal from command for dereliction, it is reasonable to assume that Hindman would disagree with each of these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Hindman’s arrest and removal was a strong indication of Bragg’s lack of loyalty toward Hindman. Hindman would have disagreed with each of these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. The primary source record did not provide adequate enough evidence to generate likely answers to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and it is likely that Hindman’s arrest and removal would have undermined any professional respect he might have had for Bragg. Hindman would likely have disagreed with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Hindman’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -9. It must
be recognized, however, that Hindman’s score is largely the result of inferences drawn from documented events, not necessarily from the primary source record. Particular attention was drawn to this (and officers whose scores were similarly derived inferentially) during the interview with the panel of subject-matter experts in order to confirm or correct the trustworthiness of the analysis.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Hindman’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.9). Though it was not possible to analyze Hindman’s perceptions of distributive justice, it is clear that his relationship with Bragg was characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and low perceptions of contribution and procedural justice. It is reasonable, therefore, to associate Hindman with the army’s anti-Bragg out-group.

**MG John B. Hood**

**Background**

A native of Kentucky and an 1853 graduate of West Point, 44th in a class of 52 cadets, MG John Bell Hood was a professional soldier who spent virtually all of his pre-war years in uniform. When the Civil War began, Hood resigned his U.S. Army commission and volunteered his services to Texas, his adopted state. As a Confederate officer, he experienced “by all odds the most spectacular advance in rank of any officer in Confederate service,” ultimately rising to the rank of full general and commander of the Army of Tennessee in the final months of the war.
In the Army of Northern Virginia, Hood participated, with few exceptions, in every major battle from the Peninsular Campaign to Gettysburg, rising to the rank of major general and developing a reputation as an aggressive (perhaps overly aggressive) commander, as evidenced by the near-mortally wounding at Gettysburg that foreshadowed an equally serious wounding at Chickamauga (McMurry, 1982; Warner, 1959).

Hood commanded a corps in Longstreet’s First Corps when that unit was temporarily attached to Bragg’s army from September-October 1863. Because of his injury at Chickamauga (which removed him from participation in the battles for Chattanooga), Hood experienced an
extremely limited amount of time under Bragg’s direct supervision (McMurry, 1982; Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Though some historians claim that Hood favored Bragg after Chickamauga, there is little primary source evidence to support any assumption regarding the level of affect between the two (Hughes, 1965; McMurray, 1982). Nearly all of the communication suggests a high-level of affect between the two takes place following Bragg’s departure from the Army of Tennessee.

*Contribution*

Hood could have had little doubt regarding the high level of value that Bragg placed on his contributions at Chickamauga, where he was seriously wounded. Bragg commended Hood for gallantry, publicly expressed his thankfulness that Hood’s life was spared, and provided his officers with periodic updates on Hood’s recovery (*OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 22, 24, 35*).

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hood’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

*Loyalty*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hood’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.
*Procedural justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hood’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

*Professional respect*

Though Hood certainly appreciated the commendations showered upon him by Bragg, and though these commendations undoubtedly suggest Bragg’s high level of professional respect for Hood, the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Hood’s level of professional respect for Bragg.

*Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire*

Based upon Hood’s limited correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. Because of his limited time under Bragg’s command, it was not possible to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while Bragg’s praise of Hood’s conduct at Chickamauga indicates that Hood would likely agree with question #4, it was not possible to generate likely responses to questions #5-6. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. Though primary sources relevant to these questions are limited and a likely answer to question #9 could not be generated, Hood’s tenacity and fierceness in battle, even at his own peril, suggests that he would likely agree with questions #7-8. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, but because of the lack of primary sources relevant to these questions, it
was not possible to generate likely responses. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Hood’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 3.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Hood’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had neither a particularly high-quality nor low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.10). Of all LMX dimensions, it appears that it can only be stated with reasonable certainty that a high perception of contribution existed between the two. While it is reasonable to assume that Hood was not part of the anti-Bragg out-group, Hood’s LMX-MDM score of 3 is not substantial enough to place him firmly within the in-group.

**MG Lafayette McLaws**

**Background**

MG Lafayette McLaws was a career officer. A native of Georgia, McLaws graduated in the West Point class of 1842 (along with his friend and future corps commander, Longstreet), 48th out of 52 cadets. He served in the Mexican War, but his service was not distinguished enough to earn brevet promotions. He remained in the army, however, until the secession crisis, when he resigned his commission and entered Confederate service as the colonel of a Georgia regiment (Warner, 1959).

McLaws spent the first years of the war in the Army of Northern Virginia, where he rose to the rank of major general and proved to be a competent division commander in Longstreet’s First Corps. McLaws came to serve under Bragg when the First Corps was sent to
reinforce the Army of Tennessee in September 1863 (Warner, 1959).

McLaws’ tenure with the Army of Tennessee was brief. Prior to the battles for Chattanooga, the First Corps was sent on an assignment in East Tennessee and it never returned. During the East Tennessee campaign, McLaws had a falling out with Longstreet over allegations that McLaws was derelict during the attack on Fort Sanders. Though McLaws was later cleared of these allegations, his friendship with Longstreet was permanently damaged and a new friendship with Bragg, who had agreed to assist McLaws in fighting Longstreet’s allegations, was solidified (Oeffinger, 2002; Warner, 1959).
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

In the latter stages of the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, and in the months immediately following the campaigns, McLaws emerged as one of only a few officers (including MG W.H.T. Walker, BG Patton Anderson and, arguably, MG A.P. Stewart) to express personal warmth and friendship toward Bragg. As McLaws’ relationship with Longstreet deteriorated into animosity, his relationship with Bragg grew into an apparently genuine friendship. Indeed, McLaws claimed that, when Longstreet attempted to court-martial McLaws (and BG Evander Law) following the East Tennessee campaign, the real cause of the court-martial was his friendship with Bragg rather than any professional defect (Oeffinger, 2002).

Contribution

On multiple occasions, Bragg defended McLaws’ contributions during his tenure with the Army of Tennessee. Following Chickamauga, Bragg referred to the “distinguished” service of McLaws’ brigades (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 26). A few months following Bragg’s departure from the army, Bragg explained to McLaws that adequate evidence existed to demonstrate that Longstreet, not McLaws, was entirely to blame for “all the disasters after Chickamauga” (Oeffinger, 2002).

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze McLaws’ perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Loyalty

As Longstreet prepared the courts-martial against McLaws and Law, McLaws had enough confidence in Bragg’s loyalty toward him to appeal to Bragg for assistance. Bragg’s willingness to provide assistance justified McLaws’ confidence (Oeffinger, 2002).

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze McLaws’ perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee. McLaws’ appeal for Bragg to intervene in the court-martial against him, however, could reasonably suggest that McLaws viewed Bragg as procedurally equitable.

Professional respect

McLaws made few statements regarding his professional respect for Bragg, but he did attribute many of the failures, particularly the establishment of the Federal “cracker line,” to the mismanagement of Longstreet, not Bragg. When Longstreet was detached from the Army of Tennessee and sent to East Tennessee, therefore, Bragg, according to McLaws, “had reason to be disgusted with [Longstreet]” (McLaws, 1821-1897, folder #16).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon McLaws’ correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. Given McLaws declarations of warmth and friendship for Bragg, it is reasonable
to suggest that he would agree with questions #1-2, though the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate a response to question #3. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while it was not possible to generate a likely answer to questions #4 and #6, it is likely, based on Bragg’s willingness to assist him in defeating Longstreet’s allegations against him, that McLaws would agree with question #5. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect. Though it is possible that McLaws was motivated by personal enmity toward Longstreet, he did, nevertheless, express professional respect for Bragg, even suggesting that the failure at Wauhatchie was attributable to Longstreet rather than Bragg. It is likely, therefore, that McLaws would agree with questions #10-12. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, McLaws’ suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 6.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and McLaws’ LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by high levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and high perceptions of contribution and procedural justice (see Figure 4.11). While it is possible to argue that McLaws’ was more anti-Longstreet than he was pro-Bragg, the primary source record, taken at face value, and McLaws’ LMX-MDM score of 6 is adequate enough to place him within the pro-Bragg in-group.
MG Carter Stevenson

Background

A native of Virginia and graduate of the West Point class of 1838, MG Carter Littlepage Stevenson spent all of his pre-war years in the army, serving in constabulary assignments on the frontier and participating in the Mexican War. Though he resigned his commission following Virginia’s secession from the Union, the War Department never received his resignation. He was, instead, dismissed from the army for treason (Warner, 1959).

Entering Confederate service as a colonel in a Virginia regiment, he was promoted to brigadier general by February of the next year. Following the 1862 Kentucky campaign, where he served competently under MG Edmund Kirby Smith, Stevenson received a promotion to major general and was transferred to Vicksburg (Warner, 1959). As a result of the fall of
Vicksburg, Stevenson was taken prisoner, but was exchanged in time to join the Army of Tennessee for the battles for Chattanooga, where he would command a division in Hardee’s corps. Stevenson’s tenure under Bragg’s supervision, therefore, lasted little over a month (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

**Affect**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Stevenson and Bragg.

**Contribution**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stevenson’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stevenson’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stevenson’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.
Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stevenson’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stevenson’s level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based on Stevenson’s limited time under Bragg’s supervision and the lack of primary source evidence relevant to his relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.

The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Stevenson’s LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.12). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Stevenson was in the in-group or the out-group.
MG A.P. Stewart

Background

A native of Tennessee, MG Alexander Peter Stewart was a graduate of the West Point class of 1842, though he resigned his commission three years later to pursue a career as an educator. Though a Whig with strong anti-secessionist views, Stewart nevertheless remained loyal to Tennessee when his state seceded from the Union, offered his services to the Confederacy, and received a appointment as brigadier general before the end of 1861 (Warner, 1959).
Stewart served in the Army of Tennessee through practically all of the army’s history and he ultimately developed a reputation as, alongside Cleburne, one of the ablest division commanders in the entire army (Woodworth, 1990).

Scrupulously religious and professional, Stewart kept himself out of army politics and managed to remain within the good graces of both Bragg and Bragg’s enemies in the army. Though he was capable of criticizing Bragg’s professional decisions from time to time, he avoided all personal attacks and any appearance of disloyalty to his commander (Elliott, 1999; Woodworth, 1990).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

A few months following Bragg’s departure from the army, Stewart wrote to Bragg and expressed his “respect and kindness” toward him (Bragg, 1833-1879, Stewart to B. Bragg, March 19, 1864). It is one of only a few examples of personal warmth expressed toward Bragg by one of the members of the high command. The letter, however, does not necessarily imply that the two were affectionate toward one another during their time together in the army. On the contrary, Stewart seems to have valued professionalism, and while he was willing to make criticisms of a professional nature (toward Bragg and his fellow officers), he avoided army politics and did not express personal like or dislike for his colleagues. Despite being a Tennessean, he does not appear to have been drawn into the clique of mostly Tennessean and Kentuckian anti-Bragg officers (Elliott, 1999).
Contribution

Aside from any formal commendations that Bragg might have awarded him during the 1863 campaigns, the after-action reports of Stewart’s colleagues, submitted to Bragg, acknowledged Stewart’s contributions and accomplishments, especially after Chickamauga (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 359, 365, 387, 403). According to Stewart’s biographer, “there can be no question that the men of [Stewart’s] division were…due the appreciation of [Bragg]” (Elliott, 1999, p. 135).

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stewart’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. Following Stones River, Stewart received a promotion to major general and to command of a division, ahead of the senior brigadier general in the division (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 654). Though Bragg does not appear to have endorsed the promotion, he did facilitate (and, therefore, passively endorse) the promotion by forwarding, to Richmond, the recommendations written by Stewart’s immediate superiors.

Loyalty

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stewart’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him. In Stewart’s case, however, the silence of the primary source record might be telling. Stewart, after all, was a Tennessean. Given Bragg’s general distrust of Tennesseans, and given the fact that Tennesseans and Kentuckians, both soldiers and politicians inside and outside the army, represented a substantial portion of the anti-Bragg bloc, it
is worth noting that Bragg never personally or professionally criticized Stewart (Elliott, 1999; Hughes, 1965; J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013). Stewart, furthermore, refused to sign the anti-Bragg petition of October 4, though a copy of the petition was found in his personal papers, indicating that Stewart had the opportunity to sign it but refused to do so (Elliott, 1999; J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013).

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Stewart’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

Of all the members of the Army of Tennessee’s high command, Stewart seems to have been among the most deliberately objective regarding Bragg’s professional competence. Like many of his colleagues, Stewart (1886) did not refrain from making professional criticisms of Bragg’s leadership when he felt such criticism was warranted. He, nevertheless, acknowledged Bragg’s ability. According to Stewart (1886), Bragg was an “able” officer whose chief (and ultimately decisive) flaw was his interpersonal incompetence (p. 85). Stewart, for example, argued the Bragg accomplished all that he could possibly have accomplished during the 1862 Kentucky campaign. While Bragg ought to have fought the decisive battle against the Federals in Middle Tennessee, Stewart acknowledged that the ultimate failure of the Tullahoma Campaign was due, not to Bragg’s professional incompetence, but to the Army’s lack of manpower (Bragg, 1833-1879, Stewart to B. Bragg, March 19, 1864). The failure to strike a decisive blow against isolated Federals in McLemore’s Cove was, according to Stewart (1886), a
result of Hindman’s malpractice, but Bragg’s personality was the “real cause” because he drove Hindman to the belief that his orders were not worth obeying (pp. 81, 85, 118). While Bragg’s plan to defeat the widely dispersed Federal corps in the days preceding Chickamauga was sound, Bragg’s failure to do so was due to a “lack of confidence of subordinates in Bragg” (Stewart, 1886, p. 81). It appears, then, that Stewart was able to recognize Bragg’s ability while also acknowledging his interpersonal limitations.

**Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire**

Based upon Stewart’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. Given Stewart’s deliberate attempt to remain professional and above army politics, it was not possible to generate likely suggestions to these questions, nor is it likely that he agreed to supply answers to these questions if asked. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while it was not possible to generate a likely answer to questions #5-6, it is likely, based on Bragg’s praise for Stewart’s contributions in his formal battle reports, that Stewart would agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and it is reasonable that, whatever personal feelings Stewart might have had for Bragg, he was determined not to allow them to adversely influence the exercise of his professional duties. It is likely, therefore, that Stewart would agree with these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect. Though it is clear that Stewart acknowledged Bragg’s professional abilities, indicating likely agreement with questions #10 and #12, it is also clear that Stewart criticized Bragg’s practical application of his abilities, indicating likely disagreement with question #11. On the modified scoring scale used
for this study, Stewart’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 5.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Stewart’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had neither a particularly high-quality nor low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.13). Of all LMX dimensions, it appears that it can only be stated with reasonable certainty that a high level of loyalty and a high perception of contribution existed between the two. Stewart, furthermore, respected Bragg’s professional ability, but criticizes his professional decisions and actions (note that, in Figure 5.13, Stewart is illustrated as being between the in-group and the out-group with respect to his level of professional respect for Bragg). While it is reasonable to assume that Stewart was not part of the anti-Bragg out-group, Stewart’s LMX-MDM score of 5 is substantial enough to make only a moderate case for his inclusion in the army’s pro-Bragg in-group.

**MG W.H.T. Walker**

**Background**

MG William Henry Talbot Walker was a Georgia native, a graduate of the West Point class of 1837 (along with his future commander, GEN Bragg), and a distinguished veteran in the wars against the Seminoles and Mexico. In both conflicts, he was severely wounded and nearly killed. When he resigned his commission following Georgia’s secession from the Union, “Walker was one of the most experienced officers in the army” (Warner, 1959, p. 323).

Walker conducted himself as a Confederate officer with a fanaticism that matched his
devotion to the cause of an independent Confederate nation (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013). He was loyal, first and foremost, to the Confederacy, and he honored those whom he viewed to be an asset to the cause (by contrast, he held complete contempt for those he viewed as liabilities). Due to his history with Bragg at West Point, and his service alongside him in Pensacola during the early days of the war, Walker seems to have held a generally favorable impression of Bragg’s ability to forward the Confederate cause (Brown, 2005).

Walker resigned his commission in October 1861 for health reasons, but returned to Confederate service in early 1863 and was soon promoted to major general. Following his participation in the Vicksburg campaign, Walker transferred to the Army of Tennessee in time to
command the Bragg’s reserve corps at Chickamauga. Though his elevation to corps command was a temporary, functional promotion, he continued to fight gallantly with the Army of Tennessee until he was killed in Atlanta in 1864 (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Historians generally acknowledge that Walker was a pro-Bragg officer, particularly after Chickamauga (Hughes, 1965). It is more likely, however, that Walker was among the most fanatically devoted officers to the cause of an independent Confederacy (compared, for instance, to Hardee who spent the winter months prior to the 1864 campaign for Atlanta preparing copyright infringement lawsuits against some of his fellow countrymen) (Brown, 2005). Walker’s supposed appreciation for Bragg might have stemmed from being Bragg’s West Point classmate or from the time the two served together in Pensacola in the early days of the Civil War. It is more likely, however, that if Walker was indeed a Bragg supporter, his support was an extension of his patriotism rather than personal friendship, for Walker avoided army politics, considering them a distraction from the cause of southern independence (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013). The historical record, nevertheless, did suggest that a generally high level of affect existed between the two. Walker, in writing to his wife after joining the army prior to Chickamauga, explained: “Genl. Bragg’s health is quite delicate but he is improving. He has responsibilities and cares enough to break down a hearty man. He has been very kind and friendly to me” (Walker, 1816-1864, Walker to M. Walker, September 15, 1863). Furthermore, when Bragg was assailed by his critics following Chickamauga, Walker explicitly declared his friendship to Bragg (Walker, 1816-1864, Walker to M. Walker, October 1,
1863). When Bragg resigned his command of the army following the disaster at Chattanooga, Walker wrote: “It was sad for me to part with Bragg. He has worked hard for two years. His enemies did their work. I hope they are satisfied” (quoted in Brown, 2005, p. 191).

Contribution

Walker certainly knew that Bragg appreciated his contributions to the army. In preparation for the battle of Chickamauga, Bragg temporarily elevated Walker to corps command, entrusting him with the command of the Army of Tennessee’s reserve corps. Though the promotion was functional and temporary, Bragg, in the aftermath of Chickamauga, gratefully and publicly commended Walker for being “gallant…in his usual style” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 32).

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Walker’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. Though Walker would certainly have appreciated his temporary elevation to corps command as an equitable recognition of his patriotism and ability, certain questions surrounded Bragg’s decision to dissolve Walker’s reserve corps. According to Liddell (1997), “Walker had annoyed [Bragg] so much, that [Bragg] had no other course to pursue” (p. 149). Walker, however, does not seem to have taken the functional demotion personally: “We have had considerable shuffling of the cards here. It is said, in commotions the scum rises to the surface, so as I have not risen to the surface, I take it for granted that I am made of some weightier matter” (Walker, 1816-1864, Walker to M. Walker, November 9, 1863).
Though the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Walker’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him, it is clear, based on Walker’s declaration of friendship toward Bragg “in his troubles,” and his denunciations of Bragg’s enemies, whom he blamed for driving Bragg from his command, that Walker felt a high degree of loyalty toward Bragg (Brown, 2005; Walker, 1816-1864, Walker to M. Walker, October 1, 1863). As Walker’s biographer explained:

Despite Bragg’s shortcomings, Walker had shown him support as much by omission as by commission. His name had not appeared among those asking for Bragg’s removal. In none of his extant correspondence did Walker ever hint that he was party to the conspiracy against Bragg. True, he wrote several times of his concern over the failure to follow up on the victory at Chickamauga, but this was an observation of military fact, not a personal attack on his commander. By the fall of 1863, however, Bragg’s bumbling leadership, his inability to admit mistakes, and his near complete mental breakdown had finished him as a field commander. Nonetheless, Walker subscribed to Bragg’s own thesis that he owed his failure to his detractors…” (Brown, 2005, p. 191).

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Walker’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee. It is interesting to note, however, especially given Walker’s history with Bragg and loose association with the pro-Bragg camp, that Polk appealed to Walker for help in vindicating himself against Bragg’s charges following his arrest and removal from command (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 57). True to Walker’s reputation for avoiding army politics, however, it does not appear that Walker contributed to Polk’s defense.
Professional respect

There are few statements in Walker’s correspondence suggesting that Walker esteemed Bragg’s professional ability. There are, however, instances in which Walker criticized Bragg’s military decision-making. Walker, for instance, considered the Confederate pursuit of Rosecrans, following the early September evacuation of Chattanooga, to be premature (Liddell, 1997). Walker, furthermore, fiercely denounced Bragg’s failure to pursue the retreating Federals on September 21 (Walker, 1816-1864, Walker to M. Walker, September 30, 1863). Though he did lament Bragg’s departure from the army, acknowledging Bragg’s hard work, it is not certain whether Walker’s feelings were a reflection of friendship or of professional respect (Brown, 2005).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Walker’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. Walker was devoted, above all else, to the Confederate cause, but he did make a few statements of high personal affect toward Bragg. While it was not possible to generate a likely response to question #3, it is likely that Walker would agree with questions #1&2. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while it was not possible to generate a likely answer to questions #5-6, it is likely, based on Bragg’s praise for Walker’s contributions in his formal battle reports, that Walker would agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and though there is little primary source evidence to support likely answers to these questions, it may be concluded, from Walker’s fanaticism for the Confederate cause, that he would agree with
these questions, regardless of whatever personal feelings he might have felt toward Bragg. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect. While the primary source evidence to not support likely answers to questions #10 and #12, Walker was clearly critical of Bragg’s decision-making, particularly for his refusal to pursue the Federals on September 21, indicating likely disagreement with question #11. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Walker’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 5.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Walker’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had neither a particularly high-quality nor low-quality leader-member exchange (see Figure 4.14). Of all LMX dimensions, it appears that it can only be stated with reasonable certainty that Walker had a high perception of the value that Bragg placed on his contributions to the army. Walker, furthermore, did not clearly articulate his opinion of Bragg’s professional ability, but he criticized his professional decisions and actions (note that, in Figure 4.14, Walker is illustrated as being between the in-group and the out-group with respect to his level of professional respect for Bragg). His LMX-MDM score of 5, and the quality of his personal correspondence, is substantial enough to place him moderately within the army’s pro-Bragg in-group.

**MG Joseph Wheeler**

**Background**

MG Joseph Wheeler, a native of Georgia and graduate of the West Point class of 1859, 19th out of 22 cadets, experienced a nearly unparalleled meteoric rise to high command. Only
four years after his graduation, he had attained the rank of major general and, at the age of twenty-six, was in command of all cavalry forces in Bragg’s department (Longacre, 2007; Warner, 1959). When he resigned his U.S. Army commission, Wheeler accepted a Confederate commission as 1st lieutenant of artillery, was assigned to duties in Pensacola (under the command of Bragg, his future mentor), and competently commanded an infantry regiment at Shiloh (Longacre, 2007; Warner, 1959).

Wheeler became a cavalry officer soon after Shiloh and, for the next three years, was one of the most prolific cavalry commanders in the west, participating in every major campaign.
of the Army of Tennessee, suffering multiple battle wounds, and earning the unqualified trust of Bragg (Longacre, 2007; Powell, 2010; Warner, 1959). Though later criticized for failures in the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga and for allowing the discipline in the cavalry to deteriorate under his watch, Wheeler’s “exploits were second only to those of [Nathan] Bedford Forrest” (Powell, 2010; Warner, 1959, p. 333).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

While there are few primary source statements of personal affect between Bragg and Wheeler, it is universally acknowledged that Wheeler was among the most devoted of all pro-Bragg officers, and the relationship between Bragg and Wheeler is often described as a paternal relationship (Longacre, 2007; Powell, 2010; L. White, personal communication, February 4, 2013). Wheeler, after all, is one of the few officers that Bragg seems to have attempted to personally develop and, though Wheeler was an extraordinarily young general officer (he was promoted to brigadier general at the age of 25, only three years after his graduation from West Point), Bragg elevated Wheeler to command of all cavalry forces in Bragg’s department (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 614).

*Contribution*

While Bragg did, at times, seem to be frustrated with Wheeler, and though Bragg’s occasional micro-management of Wheeler suggests exacerbation and, perhaps, shaken trust, Bragg consistently praised Wheeler for his contributions in Kentucky, at Stones River, and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga (*OR*, ser., 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1094; *OR*, ser.1, vol.
Wheeler, therefore, was likely convinced of Bragg’s appreciation for his service.

Distributive justice

Wheeler’s rapid rise to command of all cavalry forces in Bragg’s department, the second largest department in the Confederacy, was largely the result of Bragg’s maneuverings (Longacre, 2007; Powell, 2010). It is certain, therefore, that Wheeler considered Bragg to be distributively equitable.

Loyalty

Despite the high professional regard held by historians for Confederate cavalry in general, the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga represented a period of significant underperformance for this branch of the army (Powell, 2010). Even given the many Confederate cavalry failures and missteps during this period, and in spite of Bragg’s growing frustration with Wheeler, Bragg never waivered in his public displays of loyalty toward Wheeler (Longacre, 2007; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 34; Powell, 2010). Wheeler reciprocated the loyalty, even declaring his unwavering support for Bragg after Bragg’s departure from the army (Bragg, 1833-1879, Wheeler to B. Bragg, July 1864).

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Wheeler’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

Though Bragg grew increasingly frustrated with Wheeler as the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga developed, Bragg’s formal reports are virtually uniform in their declarations of Wheeler’s valuable and “important” service (OR, ser., 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1094; OR, ser.1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670; OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 2, p. 684, OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 34; Powell, 2010). Wheeler, likewise, explicitly expressed his appreciation for Bragg’s service and accomplishments (Bragg, 1833-1879, Wheeler to B. Bragg, July 1864).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Wheeler’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. While a paternal relationship existed between Bragg and Wheeler, the primary source record was not adequate to generate responses to question #1-3 (paternal relationships, after all, don’t always equate to friendship). Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Bragg and Wheeler were unwavering in their support for one another. Wheeler, therefore, would agree with each of these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate a likely response to question #7, Wheeler’s words and actions indicate a commitment to diligent service for Bragg. It is likely that Wheeler would agree with questions #8-9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Bragg and Wheeler where consistent in their declarations of professional respect for one another. Wheeler, therefore, would likely agree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used
for this study, Wheeler’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 8.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Wheeler’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by high levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and high perceptions of contribution and distributive justice (see Figure 4.15). Wheeler’s LMX-MDM score of 8 is adequate enough to place him firmly within the pro-Bragg in-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: MG Joseph Wheeler](image)

Figure 4.15 LMX: MG Joseph Wheeler
MG Jones M. Withers

Background

A native of Alabama, MG Jones Mitchell Withers graduated from West Point in 1835, 44th out of 56 cadets. Though he immediately resigned his commission to pursue a law career, he returned to military service during the Creek uprising of 1836 and the Mexican War. Following the Mexican War, he returned to civilian life where he dabbled in trade and politics (Warner, 1959).

When Alabama seceded from the Union, Withers offered his services to the Confederacy and was commissioned a colonel in an Alabama regiment. By the spring of 1862, he had risen to the rank of major general. He spent the early days of the war performing coastal duties in Mobile and Pensacola, where he developed a friendship with Bragg (L. White, personal communication, February, 4, 2013; Warner, 1959).

At Shiloh, Withers competently commanded two brigades, temporarily commanded Bragg’s reserve corps, and fought with the Army of Tennessee during the 1862 invasion of Kentucky and at Stones River. At the beginning of the Tullahoma Campaign, Withers was transferred to command all reserve forces in Alabama, where he remained until the end of the Civil War (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Like Walker, Withers is generally considered, by historians, to have been a Bragg ally, partially because of a friendship developed with Bragg in Pensacola during the early days of the
Civil War (Daniels, 2012, p. 17). Withers, however, left few statements of personal affect regarding Bragg, so the level of affect between the two cannot be adequately analyzed.

**Contribution**

Withers departed the Army of Tennessee for Alabama during the initial stages of the Tullahoma Campaign, so he was not present to make contributions to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. Nevertheless, Bragg clearly valued Withers’ contributions during Stones River (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670).

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Withers’ perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Withers’ perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him or vice versa.

**Procedural justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Withers’ perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

Given Withers’ relatively early departure from the army at the initiation of the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, it is difficult to analyze Withers’ professional respect for Bragg and vice versa. Bragg, however, did formally commend Withers for his contributions at Stones River (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 670). Following the battle, Withers joined his fellow officers in advising the retreat from Murfreesboro, but in response to the criticism of Bragg in the press and among his fellow officers, Withers wrote a strong defense of Bragg’s management of the battle and the subsequent retreat in the January 18, 1863 issue of the pro-Bragg Mobile Advertiser & Register (Daniels, 2012; Young, 2008).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Withers’ correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. While historians consider Withers to be an ally of Bragg, largely because of a friendship developed at Pensacola, there was not enough primary source evidence to generate likely answers to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate answers to questions #5&6, it is likely, based on Bragg’s praise of Withers in his Stones River battle report, that Withers would agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, but the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Bragg and Withers were consistent in their declarations of professional respect for one another. Withers, therefore, would likely agree with each of these
questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Wither’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 4.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Wither’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a generally high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a high level of professional respect and a high perception of contribution (see Figure 4.16). Wither’s LMX-MDM score of 4 is adequate enough to place him within the pro-Bragg in-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: MG Jones Withers](image)

Figure 4.16 LMX: MG Jones Withers
BG Patton Anderson

Background

Born in Tennessee, BG James Patton Anderson’s “antebellum career was one of varied pursuits,” ranging from medicine, to military service in the Mexican War, to a Presidential appointment as U.S. marshal for the Washington Territory (Warner, 1959, p. 7). During the secession crisis, Anderson was a member of the convention that maneuvered Florida out of the Union (Warner, 1959).

After accepting a commission as a colonel in a Florida regiment, Anderson spent the early days of the Civil War in Pensacola, where he developed a long-lasting friendship with Bragg. Prior to the battle of Shiloh, Anderson received a promotion to brigadier general, and distinguished himself in nearly each of the Army of Tennessee’s major battles and campaigns, from Shiloh to Chattanooga (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Anderson seems to have been one of only a few men to develop a genuine personal friendship with Bragg, and the friendship appears to have extended from their service together in Pensacola in the early days of the Civil War until Anderson’s death in 1872 (Raab, 2004). Though there are few statements of personal affect from either officer prior to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, there are a number of indications and post-1863 evidences of a strong personal friendship between the two. Anderson, for instance, though he acknowledged Bragg’s unpopularity in the army, steadfastly refused to be involved in any anti-Bragg discussions with his fellow officers (Anderson, 1850-1919, Anderson to E. Anderson, January 8,
1862; Rayburn, 1982). In the aftermath of Chickamauga, in order to deflect some of the criticisms directed toward Bragg, Anderson wrote stinging criticisms of his own regarding Hindman, Hill, and Polk, some of Bragg’s most ardent and outspoken enemies (Anderson, 1850-1919, Anderson to E. Anderson, October 5, 1863; Anderson, 1896). Almost immediately upon his departure from the army, Bragg lobbied and secured a promotion for Anderson “for reasons both personal and official” (Anderson, 1850-1919, Bragg to P. Anderson, February 28, 1864; Anderson, 1850-1919, A. Ellarwell to P. Anderson, January 31, 1864). Finally, Bragg maintained a post-war correspondence with Anderson and his wife, and he referred to Anderson as his “best friend” (Anderson, 1850-1919, Bragg to E. Anderson, April 3, 1876; Anderson, 1850-1919, Bragg to P. Anderson, April 10, 1867).

**Contribution**

Bragg clearly valued Anderson’s contributions to the army, and he consistently praised his generalship throughout their entire service together (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 1, p. 1088; OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 668-670; Anderson, 1850-1919, Bragg to P. Anderson, February 28, 1864).

**Distributive justice**

Following Stones River, Anderson was elevated to division command, and though he claims that he neither desired nor expected the promotion, preferring “the Brigade of Mississippians” to his new division, he certainly appreciated the confidence placed in him by Bragg (Anderson, 1850-1919, Anderson to E. Anderson, January 11, 1863). Bragg, shortly after
leaving the army, secured another promotion for Anderson. Anderson, therefore, likely had a high perception of distributive justice within the army.

*Loyalty*


*Procedural justice*

There are few statements in Anderson’s correspondence regarding his perceptions of procedural justice within the army, but given his criticisms of Hindman, Hill, and Polk, it is reasonable to assume that he felt Bragg was equitable in removing each of them from command (Anderson, 1850-1919, Anderson to E. Anderson, January 11, 1863; Anderson, 1896).

*Professional respect*

Throughout all of his correspondence, Anderson uniformly attributed the failures and missteps during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga to officers other than Bragg. Indeed, he explicitly argued that Bragg’s plans up to and during Chickamauga were militarily sound (Anderson, 1896). Bragg, on the other hand, consistently expressed his respect and appreciation

**Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire**

Based upon Anderson’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. Given Anderson’s declarations of warmth and friendship for Bragg, it is reasonable to suggest that he would agree with questions #1-2, though the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate a response to question #3. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and Bragg and Anderson were unwavering in their support for one another. Anderson, therefore, would agree with each of these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate a likely response to question #7, Anderson’s correspondence and actions indicate a commitment to diligently serve Bragg. It is likely that Anderson would agree with questions #8-9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect and Bragg and Anderson where consistent in their declarations of professional respect for one another. Anderson, therefore, would likely agree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Anderson’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 10, the highest positive score of any member of the Army of Tennessee’s high command.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Anderson’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by high levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and high perceptions of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice (see Figure 4.17). Anderson’s LMX-MDM score of 10 is the highest of any member of the high command analyzed in this study, and it is adequate enough to place him firmly within the pro-Bragg in-group.

Figure 4.17 LMX: BG Patton Anderson
BG Frank C. Armstrong

Background

BG Frank C. Armstrong was born in the Indian Territory to a U.S. Army officer stationed at Choctaw Agency. When his father died, his mother married a distinguished Mexican War veteran. Following in the footsteps of his father and stepfather, Armstrong received a U.S. Army officer’s commission after his graduation from Holy Cross Academy in Massachusetts (Warner, 1959).

Armstrong holds the unusual distinction of having commanded soldiers in battle as a Union and a Confederate officer. After commanding a company of Union cavalry at the battle of First Bull Run, he resigned his commission and offered his services to the Confederacy. As a Confederate officer, he spent the early months of the war serving as a staff officer in Arkansas. In 1863, he accepted command of the cavalry forces under MG Sterling Price, was promoted to brigadier general, and was soon assigned to command a division under BG Nathan Bedford Forrest, in time to participate in the battle of Chickamauga (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Armstrong and Bragg.

Contribution

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Armstrong’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.
Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Armstrong’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Armstrong’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Armstrong’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Armstrong’s level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based on the lack of primary source evidence relevant to Armstrong’s relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.
The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Armstrong’s LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.18). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Armstrong was in the in-group or the out-group.

Leader-Member Exchange: BG Frank Armstrong

Figure 4.18 LMX: BG Frank Armstrong

BG William Bate

Background

BG William Brimage Bate was born in Tennessee, and though he had little formal education, he acquired a highly versatile practical education through his various antebellum
career pursuits, including journalism, legal studies, military service in the Mexican War, and Tennessee state politics. During the election of 1860, Bate was an elector for Southern Democratic presidential candidate and future Confederate major general John C. Breckinridge (Warner, 1959).

When Tennessee seceded from the Union, Bate enlisted as a private in the Confederate army, but was soon elected colonel of a Tennessee regiment. Following his distinguished participation in the battle of Shiloh, where he suffered a near-fatal injury, Bate was appointed a brigadier general. When he recovered and returned to active duty, he participated, with distinction, in each of the Army of Tennessee’s major campaigns and battles of 1863 (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

**Affect**

Bate is generally considered, by historians, to be a Bragg ally, but this assumption stems largely from a letter, by Bates, to a Confederate Senator from Tennessee (the Tennessee delegation to the Confederate Congress was overwhelmingly anti-Bragg), defending Bragg as a disciplinarian and arguing that army discipline would suffer if Bragg were removed from command (OR, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, pp. 442-443; White, 2008). There are, however, no statements of personal affect between Bragg and Bate in the primary source record.
**Contribution**

Bate was one of only a few officers to receive Bragg’s formal commendation following the disaster at Chattanooga (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666). It is likely, therefore, that Bate felt valued by Bragg.

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Bate’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

Bate’s letter to Senator Haynes and his distance from any association with the anti-Bragg bloc reasonably suggests that Bate was loyal to Bragg. Similarly, though few explicit declarations of loyalty exist in Bragg’s or Bate’s correspondence, Bate would have had no reason to question Bragg’s loyalty toward him, and that assumption would have been justified by Bragg’s commendation of Bate following Chattanooga (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666).

**Procedural justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Bate’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Professional respect**

Prior to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, Bate attributed much of the growing anti-Bragg criticism to “captious…officers who are ambitious [and] should not be yielded to merely
for their gratification” (OR, ser. 1, vol. 52, part 2, pp. 442). His letter to Senator Haynes is the most explicit, unqualified declaration of confidence in Bragg’s leadership in all of the primary source record, and though the letter was written prior to the 1863 campaigns, there is no indication that Bate changed his opinion. Indeed, given Bate’s status as a high-ranking Tennessee officer who refrained from consorting with the anti-Bragg clique (and who did not sign the anti-Bragg petition), it is reasonable to assume that Bate’s professional respect for Bragg remained unchanged.

**Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire**

Based upon Bate’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, but the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate answers to questions #5&6, it is likely, based on Bragg’s praise of Bate in his Chattanooga battle report, that Bate would agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, but the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect. Given Bragg’s recognition of Bate as one of the few commendable officers at Chattanooga and Bate’s acknowledgement of Bragg’s ability as an army disciplinarian, it is likely that Bate would agree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Bate’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 4.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Bate’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a moderately high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by high levels of loyalty and professional respect, and a high perception of contribution (see Figure 4.19). Bate’s LMX-MDM score of 4, and the quality of his relevant correspondence, is adequate enough to place him moderately within the pro-Bragg in-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: BG William Bate](image)

Figure 4.19 LMX: BG William Bate
BG Nathan Bedford Forrest

Background

A native of Tennessee with little formal education, BG Nathan Bedford Forrest became one of the most celebrated cavalry commanders, Union or Confederate, of the Civil War. Acquiring substantial wealth before the war as a planter and slave trader, Forrest enlisted as a private in the Confederate army but soon became the commander of a cavalry battalion that he raised at his own expense (Warner, 1959; Wyeth, 1959).

After participating in the defense of Fort Donelson – escaping with his battalion prior to the fort’s surrender – Forrest spent much of the rest of the war raiding and harassing invading Federal forces. As his reputation for ferocity increased, Forrest received a promotion to brigadier general and, in the weeks preceding the battle of Chickamauga, was assigned to Bragg’s command. His tenure with the army was, however, short-lived. After a falling out with Bragg, stemming from a dispute over Bragg’s refusal to pursue the Federals who were retreating to Chattanooga on September 21, Forrest left the Army of Tennessee and accepted an independent command in Mississippi and western Tennessee (Warner, 1959; Wyeth, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Like Walker, Forrest is one of a handful of officers whose commitment to the cause of an independent Confederacy bordered on the fanatical (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2007). Forrest, therefore, tended to avoid army politics and left few indications of personal affect for anyone. Historians, however, generally consider Forrest to be a Bragg enemy (Connelly, 1971; Horn, 1941; Woodworth, 1998; Woodworth, 2010; Wyeth, 1959). This
assumption stems largely from a controversial post-war account of a nearly violent altercation between Bragg and Forrest following Bragg’s failure to pursue the Federals on September 21 (Powell, 2010). According to Forrest’s chief surgeon, Forrest encountered Bragg and, in the context of an angry rant, called Bragg cowardly and contemptible, and even threatened Bragg’s life (Powell, 2010; Wyeth, 1959). In a recent study, the authenticity of the encounter was challenged on the grounds that Forrest’s surgeon was one of Forrest’s blood relatives and an intense pro-Forrest partisan (Powell, 2010). Regardless of the authenticity of the story, such an encounter is consistent with Forrest’s fiery temperament and with earlier, similar encounters with other officers, including Wheeler (Longacre, 2007). Wheeler dismissed his own encounter with Forrest as evidence of little more than Forrest’s bad temper. If such an encounter did take place between Bragg and Forrest, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Bragg did not view the insult seriously, particularly since Bragg never censured Forrest for the outburst.

Nevertheless, it does appear evident that Forrest’s relationship with Bragg became increasingly strained, perhaps hostile, as the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga developed. Forrest, for example, dictated an angry letter to MAJ Charles Anderson regarding Bragg’s failure to pursue the Federals (Wyeth, 1959). In addition, Forrest communicated, to COL R.B. Kyle, his unwillingness to ever again serve under Bragg in battle (Wyeth, 1959). Bragg, on the other hand, though he initially praised Forrest, later came to view Forrest as “ignorant,” unable to cooperate, and “nothing more that a good raider” (Liddell, 1997, p. 150).

Contribution

In the initial stages of the Forrest-Bragg relationship, Bragg liberally commended Forrest for his gallantry and brilliance (OR, ser. 1, vol. 17, part 1, p. 592; OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, p. 195).
Bragg considered Forrest indispensable and adamantly refused to grant Forrest’s request for a transfer to another department \( (OR, \text{ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 34}) \). Ultimately, however, Bragg’s frustrations with Forrest proved overwhelming and Bragg came to view Forrest with contempt, reassess Forrest’s ability as a commander, and finally agree to Forrest’s transfer \( (Liddell, 1997; OR, \text{ser. 1, vol. 31, part 3, p. 604}) \).

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Forrest’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

*Loyalty*

Forrest was loyal, above all, to the cause of Confederate independence \( (J. Ogden, \text{personal communication, February 7, 2013}) \). He gave no indication of personal loyalty toward Bragg and, in fact, demonstrated, through his anecdotal angry encounter with Bragg and his refusal to serve under Bragg again, his contempt for someone he believed was impeding the chances of Confederate success \( (Wyeth, 1959) \). Bragg, likewise, came to revise his earlier acclamations of Forrest and, ultimately, rid himself of Forrest by having him transferred \( (OR, \text{ser. 1, vol. 31, part 3, p. 604}) \).

*Procedural justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Forrest’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

For Forrest, Bragg’s refusal to pursue the Federals on September 21 was unforgiveable. That singular incident shattered whatever professional respect Forrest may have had for Bragg (Hill, 1884; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 4, p. 681). Bragg, on the other hand, highly esteemed Forrest’s professional abilities, but he eventually came to view him as “ignorant” and overrated (Liddell, 1997).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Forrest’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. The primary source record suggests that, by the end of his tenure with the Army of Tennessee, Forrest had come to hold Bragg in a great deal of contempt. Forrest, therefore, would likely disagree with each of these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, but the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. Given Forrest’s fanatical devotion to the Confederate cause and his record of diligent and selfless service, it is likely that Forrest would agree with question #7. His request for a transfer from the Army of Tennessee after his falling out with Bragg, however, suggests that he would disagree with question #9. The primary source record was not adequate to generate a likely response to question #8. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and it is certain that, after September 21, Forrest had little professional respect for Bragg. He would, therefore, likely disagree with each of these questions. On the
modified scoring scale used for this study, Forrest’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -6.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Forrest’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a low-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and a low perception of contribution (see Figure 4.20). Forrest’s LMX-MDM score of -6 is adequate enough to place him within the anti-Bragg out-group.

Figure 4.20 LMX: BG Nathan B. Forrest
BG States Rights Gist

Background

A native of South Carolina, BG States Rights Gist received a classical education before graduating from South Carolina College and attending Harvard University. He returned to South Carolina in 1854 to practice law. Though he had no formal military training before the Civil War, he did serve in the state militia and rose to the position of adjutant and inspector general of the state following South Carolina’s secession from the Union (Warner, 1959).

After participating in the battle of First Bull Run as a staff officer, he was appointed a brigadier general and was assigned to the defenses of the South Carolina coast and, later, Vicksburg, Mississippi. After the fall of Vicksburg, Gist, serving as a brigade commander in Walker’s division, was transferred to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee and distinguished himself at Chickamauga and Chattanooga (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Gist, like Stewart and Walker, deliberately avoided army politics. The primary source record, therefore, did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Gist and Bragg.

Contribution

Following the disaster at Chattanooga, Gist was one of only a few officers to receive a formal commendation from Bragg (OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666). Gist, therefore, likely felt that Bragg valued his contributions.
Distributive Justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Gist’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Gist’s loyalty toward Bragg and vice versa.

Procedural Justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Gist’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional Respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Gist’s level of professional respect for Bragg. Bragg, however, did communicate his professional respect for Gist on multiple occasions. Gist was, for instance, formally commended following Chattanooga, and during the battle of Missionary Ridge, Bragg gave Gist the unusual order to remain with Breckinridge, a corps commander, and “under no circumstances…allow him to give an order” (Davis, 1974, p. 399; OR, ser. 1, vol. 31, part 2, p. 666). Bragg’s professional respect for Gist exceeded, at least, his professional respect for Breckinridge, one of Gist’s superiors.
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Gist’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and though the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to questions #5&6, Bragg’s commendation of Gist following Chattanooga indicates that Gist would likely agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution. Given Gist’s extraordinary service at Chattanooga, it is likely that he would agree with question #7, but there was not adequate evidence to generate likely answers to questions #8&9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and while it appears that Bragg esteemed Gist’s professional abilities, there was not evidence to generate Gist’s likely responses to these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Gist’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 2.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Gist’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mild high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a high level of professional respect and a high perception of contribution (see Figure 4.21). Gist’s LMX-MDM score of 2 suggests a mild, but non-conclusive, identification with the pro-Bragg in-group.
**BG John K. Jackson**

**Background**

A native of Georgia, BG John King Jackson graduated with honors from the University of South Carolina in 1846, studied law for two years thereafter, and returned to Georgia to practice law until the outbreak of the Civil War. Following Georgia’s secession from the Union, Jackson was appointed a colonel of a Georgia regiment and assigned to coastal duties in Pensacola, alongside his future commander, Bragg (Warner, 1959).

In early 1862, Jackson received a promotion to brigadier general and was placed in charge of training the soldiers that would participate in the battle of Shiloh. Jackson participated
in each of the Army of Tennessee’s major campaigns and battles, from Shiloh to the battles for Atlanta (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Jackson and Bragg.

*Contribution*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jackson’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jackson’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

*Loyalty*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jackson’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

*Procedural justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jackson’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional Respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jackson’s level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based on the lack of primary source evidence relevant to Jackson’s relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.

The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Jackson’s LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.22). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Jackson was in the in-group or the out-group.

BG Micah Jenkins

Background

Born in South Carolina to wealthy planters, BG Micah Jenkins graduated in 1854, first in his class at the South Carolina Military Academy. He subsequently helped organize King’s Mountain Military School and, after South Carolina’s secession from the Union, was elected colonel of a South Carolina regiment (Swisher, 1996; Warner, 1959).
Jenkins spent the early years of the war in the eastern theater, participating in the battles of First Bull Run, the Seven Days, and Second Bull Run (where he was severely wounded). As a brigade commander in Longstreet’s First Corps, Jenkins was transferred, with the corps, to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in September 1863 (Swisher, 1996; Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Jenkins’ was a close ally of Longstreet and, given Longstreet’s animosity toward Bragg, one might be inclined to assume that Jenkins shared Longstreet’s feelings (Swisher, 1996). The
primary source record, however, did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Jenkins and Bragg.

**Contribution**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jenkins’ perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jenkins’ perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jenkins’ perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

**Procedural justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jenkins’ perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Professional respect**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Jenkins’ level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based on the lack of primary source evidence relevant to Jenkins’ relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.

The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Jenkins’ LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.23). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Jenkins was in the in-group or the out-group.

BG Bushrod Johnson

Background

Born in Ohio, BG Bushrod Johnson was the only native northerner to rise to the level of high command in Bragg’s Army of Tennessee. A graduate of the West Point class of 1840 and veteran of the Mexican War, Johnson spent the years preceding the outbreak of the Civil War as a teacher at the Western Military Institute in Kentucky and the Military College of the University of Nashville (Warner, 1959).

Following the secession crisis, Johnson offered his services to the Confederacy as an engineer officer, but by January 1862, had risen to the rank of brigadier general. He evaded capture at Fort Donelson, was seriously wounded at Shiloh, and participated in the 1862 invasion of Kentucky and the battles of Stones River and Chickamauga (Warner, 1959). While not
heavily involved in politics within the Army of Tennessee, Johnson grew to distrust Bragg’s abilities as a commander and signed the anti-Bragg petition (Bridges, 1961). As part of Bragg’s purge of the signers of the anti-Bragg petition, Johnson was attached to Longstreet’s corps during the East Tennessee campaign, and was subsequently transferred to the eastern theater of the war where he remained until the war’s end (Warner, 1959).
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Johnson and Bragg.

Contribution

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Johnson’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

Distributive justice

While Johnson made no explicit statement regarding his perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee, it is reasonable to assume that Cleburne’s promotion to division command, enthusiastically endorsed by Bragg, would have been perceived by Johnson as a professional slight. Johnson, after all, outranked Cleburne and would have expected to be elevated to division command when Buckner departed for East Tennessee (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 2, pp. 508-509; Symonds, 1997).

Loyalty

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Johnson’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him. Johnson, however, clearly felt little loyalty toward Bragg and agreed to sign the anti-Bragg petition of October 4 (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66).
Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Johnson’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

The primary source record provided only a limited amount of evidence of Johnson’s level of professional respect for Bragg. Following Stones River, Cleburne, in expressing his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership, claimed to represent Johnson’s viewpoint (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 684). Johnson, furthermore, was skeptical enough of Bragg’s competence that he signed his name to the anti-Bragg petition (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66).

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Johnson’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Johnson, on multiple occasions, expressed a lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership. It is likely, therefore, that he would disagree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Johnson’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -3.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Johnson’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mild low-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a low level of professional respect and a low perception of distributive justice (see Figure 4.24). Gist’s LMX-MDM score of -3 suggests a mild identification with the anti-Bragg out-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: BG Bushrod Johnson](image)

Figure 4.24 LMX: BG Bushrod Johnson
BG Joseph B. Kershaw

Background

A native of South Carolina, BG Joseph Brevard Kershaw spent most of his antebellum years, with the exception of one year of service in the Mexican War, in law and politics. He participated as a delegate in South Carolina’s secession convention, became a colonel of a South Carolina regiment, and was present at the bombardment of Fort Sumter. In early 1862, he was promoted to brigadier general (Warner, 1959).

Kershaw “played a gallant and distinguished part in all the operations of [Longstreet’s] First Corps – almost literally from [First Bull Run] to Appomattox” (Warner, 1959, p. 171). As a brigade commander in the First Corps, Kershaw was attached to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in September 1863.

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Kershaw and Bragg.

Contribution

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Kershaw’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.
Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Kershaw’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Kershaw’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Kershaw’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Professional respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Kershaw’s level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based on the lack of primary source evidence relevant to Kershaw’s relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.
The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Kershaw’s LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.25). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Kershaw was in the in-group or the out-group.

Figure 4.25 LMX: BG Joseph B. Kershaw
BG Evander Law

Background

A native of South Carolina, BG Evander McIvor Law graduated from the South Carolina Military Academy in 1856 before founding and teaching at the Military High School at Tuskegee, Alabama. Following the secession crisis, Law offered his services to Alabama and was elected lieutenant colonel of an Alabama regiment (Warner, 1959).

Law was severely wounded at First Bull Run. After his recovery, he commanded a regiment at the battles of Seven Pines, the Seven Days, Second Bull Run, and Antietam, and he ultimately rose to the rank of brigadier general. As a brigade commander in Longstreet’s First Corps, Law was attached to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in September 1863. When MG Hood, Law’s division commander, was wounded at Chickamauga, Law was the presumptive favorite to assume command of the division. The command, however, was given to Jenkins, a favorite of Longstreet, and the promotion of Jenkins initiated a significant quarrel between Law, Jenkins, and Longstreet (Warner, 1959).

Following the failure of Longstreet’s East Tennessee campaign, Longstreet charged Law with dereliction and ordered him arrested and court-martialed. In anticipation of the court-martial, Bragg wrote to Law to pledge his help in disproving Longstreet’s charges. Law was eventually exonerated, but the personal breach between Law and Longstreet became permanent and a friendship between Bragg and Law was formed (Warner, 1959).
LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Law and Bragg.

Contribution

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Law’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

Distributive justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Law’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

Loyalty

As Longstreet prepared the courts-martial against McLaws and Law, Law had enough confidence in Bragg’s loyalty toward him to appeal to Bragg for assistance. Bragg’s willingness to provide assistance justified Law’s confidence (Oeffinger, 2002).

Procedural justice

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Law’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee. Law’s appeal for Bragg to intervene in the court-martial against him, however, could reasonably suggest that Law viewed Bragg as procedurally equitable.
Professional Respect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Law’s level of professional respect for Bragg and vice versa.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Law’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to questions #4&6, Bragg’s intervention on behalf of Law against the charges of Longstreet suggests that Law would likely agree with question #5. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Law’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 1.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Law’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mild high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a high level of loyalty and a high perception of
procedural justice (see Figure 4.26). Law’s LMX-MDM score of 1 suggests a mild, but non-conclusive identification with the pro-Bragg in-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: BG Evander Law](image)

Figure 4.26 LMX: BG Evander Law

**BG St. John R. Liddell**

**Background**

Born to wealthy planters in Mississippi, BG St. John Richardson Liddell received a West Point appointment, but resigned after his first year, “presumably…because of his relatively low class standing” (Warner, 1959, p. 187). He spent the remainder of his antebellum years on a plantation in Louisiana, purchased for him by his father. When Louisiana seceded from the
Union, Liddell offered his services to the Confederacy, and he spent the early months of the war serving in various staff capacities.

After commanding troops in battle at Corinth, Liddell received a promotion to brigadier general. He subsequently commanded brigades at Perryville, Stones River, and Chickamauga (Warner, 1959). By his own account, his relationship with Bragg was strained, and he repeatedly asked Bragg for a transfer to another department (Liddell, 1997). The transfer finally came after Chattanooga.

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

Liddell (1997) produced one of the most descriptive first-hand accounts of the interworkings of the high command of the Army of Tennessee, and his *Record* leaves little doubt about the nature of his personal relationship with Bragg. With few reservations, Liddell (1997) described his own personal falling out with Bragg following Perryville, his reconciliation with Bragg prior to the Tullahoma Campaign, and Bragg’s persistent personality defects that easily alienated others. “Bragg’s manner,” explained Liddell (1997), “made him malignant enemies and indifferent, callous friends” (p. 117). While he acknowledged that the officers of the high command should have more generously esteemed and encouraged Bragg, he also asserted that Bragg was so “wrapped up in his own self-opinion” that he was inapproachable, making any rapprochement between he and his lieutenants virtually impossible (Liddell, 1997, p. 148). Though Liddell (1997) considered himself one of Bragg’s “indifferent, callous friends,” he, nevertheless, repeatedly sought to be transferred away from Bragg and even claimed that he
would have rejected an assignment as Bragg’s chief of staff because the two would not have been able to get along (pp. 117, 149-150, 155, 160).

Contribution

Liddell was outspoken in his criticism of Bragg’s decision to retreat following Perryville, and he claimed that Bragg never forgave him for the criticism. Liddell, however, acknowledged that the two ultimately reconciled, and Bragg praised Liddell in his formal report on Chickamauga (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 34-35). When BG Mackall resigned as Bragg’s chief of staff, Liddell’s name emerged as one of Bragg’s choices for replacement (Liddell, 1997). Liddell, therefore, could reasonably assume that Bragg valued his contributions to the army.

Distributive justice

Despite being discussed as Bragg’s potential choice for chief of staff, Liddell seems to have had a low view of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. Following Tullahoma, for instance, Liddell was placed under the command of Walker in the reserve corps, an assignment that Liddell perceived to be retaliatory (Liddell had, prior to the assignment, criticized Bragg for being easily maneuvered out of Middle Tennessee). Liddell (1997), furthermore, repeatedly requested transfers to other departments and viewed Bragg’s refusals to grant the transfers as little more than broken promises: “my faith in Bragg’s word and promises was now badly shaken” (p. 150).
Loyalty

Liddell does not appear to have felt particularly loyal to Bragg. He viewed Bragg as self-confident and vindictive, as evidenced in his assignment to Walker’s reserve corps. He openly expressed his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership on multiple occasions, declared his preference for Johnston to take command of the Army of Tennessee and for Bragg to be transferred to Mississippi and, when it became evident that Bragg would be retained in command, sought separation from Bragg by acquiring a transfer for himself (Liddell, 1997). According to Liddell (1997), he refused to sign the anti-Bragg petition of October 4, not because of his confidence in and loyalty to Bragg, but because “indifferent as Bragg was, I did not know of any better general to take his place” (p. 151).

Procedural justice

Liddell made few statements regarding his perception of procedural justice in the army. He did, however, view the orders to attack in McLemore’s Cove to be “impatient” (Liddell, 1997, p. 139). It is likely, therefore, that Liddell viewed Hindman’s arrest for the failures in McLemore’s Cove to be inequitable.

Professional respect

Though Bragg commended Liddell for his contributions at Chickamauga, and though he likely considered Liddell a suitable candidate for the office of chief of staff, Liddell clearly did not reciprocate the professional respect. He openly criticized Bragg’s decision to retreat from Kentucky, to retreat from middle Tennessee, and to pursue the Federals in McLemore’s Cove and at Lee & Gordon’s Mill, and he denounced the failure to pursue the Federals on September
21 as “unpardonable” (Liddell, 1997, p. 147). In summarizing his assessment of Bragg’s ability as a commander, Liddell (1997) declared that Bragg was unable “to execute his own strategic combinations” (p. 98).

**Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire**

Based upon Liddell’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. The primary source record suggests a highly strained and often contentious relationship between Liddell and Bragg, so Liddell would likely disagree with each of these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate enough to generate likely responses to questions #5&6, Liddell’s record of diligence indicates that he would likely agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while there was not adequate evidence to generate likely answers to question #7, Liddell’s refusal to serve as Bragg’s chief of staff and his repeated requests for a transfer indicate that he would likely disagree with questions #8&9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Liddell’s consistent and repeated criticisms of Bragg indicate that he would likely disagree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Liddell’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -7.

**The LMX theoretical framework**

The primary source record and Liddell’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a low-
quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a high perception of contribution but low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and low perceptions of distributive and procedural justice (see Figure 4.27). Liddell’s LMX-MDM score of -7 is adequate to place him within the anti-Bragg out-group.

![Leader-Member Exchange: BG St. John R. Liddell](image)

Figure 4.27 LMX: BG St. John R. Liddell

**BG William T. Martin**

**Background**

A native of Kentucky, BG William Thompson Martin graduated from Centre College in 1840 and moved to Mississippi where he spent all of his antebellum years in the practice of law.
Despite being a strong Unionist, Martin felt compelled to follow his adopted state when Mississippi seceded from the Union (Warner, 1959).

Martin personally recruited a company of cavalry and spent the early years of the war in the eastern theater. He served under the celebrated cavalry commander BG J.E.B. Stuart during the Peninsular Campaign and participated in the Seven Days and Antietam. By the end of 1862, he had risen to the rank of brigadier general. The following year he was transferred to the western theater and he arrived to Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in time to participate in the Tullahoma Campaign and the battle of Chickamauga (Warner, 1959).

**LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg**

*Affect*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Martin and Bragg. It is worth noting, however, that Martin was one of the few Kentuckians who did not join his fellow Kentuckians in the anti-Bragg bloc.

*Contribution*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Martin’s perception of contribution relative to Bragg and vice versa.

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Martin’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.
*Loyalty*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Martin’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

*Procedural justice*

Because Martin held Hindman responsible for the failure in McLemore’s Cove, it is likely that he viewed Hindman’s arrest and removal from command as equitable (Martin, 1883). The primary source record, however, did not provide adequate evidence to analyze his perception of procedural justice.

*Professional respect*

The primary source record provides little evidence of the level of professional respect that Martin held for Bragg. It is clear, however, that Martin attributed the failure in McLemore’s Cove to Hindman and not to Bragg (Martin, 1883).

*Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire*

Based on the lack of primary source evidence relevant to Martin’s relationship with Bragg, it was not possible to generate responses to any of the questions on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, the inability to generate responses to the LMX-MDM resulted in a score of 0.
The LMX theoretical framework

Given the lack of relevant primary source data and Martin’s LMX-MDM score of 0, it was not possible to determine the quality of leader-member exchange in his relationship with Bragg (see Figure 4.28). It cannot be determined, therefore, if Martin was in the in-group or the out-group.

Figure 4.28 LMX: BG William T. Martin
BG John Pegram

Background

A native of Virginia, BG John Pegram was a graduate of the West Point class of 1854. He spent the next few years on the frontier and in Europe (on a two-year leave of absence), before resigning his commission when Virginia seceded from the Union (Warner, 1959).

Pegram was captured and released during the Rich Mountain campaign, and he subsequently served in various staff capacities, including an assignment as Bragg’s chief engineer. Following the 1862 Kentucky campaign, he received a promotion to brigadier general and command of a cavalry brigade. He fought at Stones River and commanded a division at Chickamauga, but his performance as a cavalry commander was lackluster. He was, on multiple occasions, criticized in Bragg’s formal battle reports and, after Chickamauga, was transferred to an infantry command in the Army of Northern Virginia (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Pegram and Bragg.

Contribution

There is little evidence of Pegram’s perception of the amount of value that Bragg placed on his contributions to the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. Pegram, however, would certainly have felt rebuked by Bragg’s criticism of his actions at Stones River and his omission from the
list of officers commended for their contributions at Stones River (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, pp. 666, 671).

**Distributive justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Pegram’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Loyalty**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Pegram’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

**Procedural justice**

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Pegram’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.

**Professional respect**

Bragg’s respect for Pegram was certainly damaged by Pegram’s underperformance at Stones River, and the performance of Confederate cavalry during the 1863 campaigns was so abysmal that Bragg’s respect for Pegram was not likely restored (Powell, 2010; OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 666, 671). The primary source record, however, does not provide adequate evidence to analyze Pegram’s level of professional respect for Bragg.
Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Pegram’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to questions #5&6, Bragg’s criticisms of Pegram suggest that Pegram would likely disagree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Pegram’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -1.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Law’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mild low-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a low perception of contribution (see Figure 4.29). Pegram’s LMX-MDM score of -1 suggests a mild, but non-conclusive identification with the anti-Bragg out-group.
BG William Preston

Background

A native of Kentucky, BG William Preston graduated from Harvard University in 1838 with a degree in law. He returned to his native Kentucky to practice law, and after service in the Mexican War, rose to prominence in state and national politics. After serving in the state legislature and the United States House of Representatives, he was appointed U.S. Minister to Spain by President James Buchanan (Sehlinger, 2004; Warner, 1959).

During the secession crisis, Preston worked diligently, though unsuccessfully, for Kentucky’s secession. At the outbreak of the war, he served on the staff of his brother-in-law, GEN Albert Sydney Johnston. Following Shiloh, he received a promotion to brigadier general,
and commanded brigades at Stones River and Chickamauga (Sehlinger, 2004; Warner, 1959). He aligned himself with the members of the Kentucky wing of the army’s anti-Bragg faction and signed the anti-Bragg petition, though he seems to have never personally attracted the ire and contempt of Bragg. After Chickamauga, he permanently left the Army of Tennessee, accepted an appointment as Confederate Minister to Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, and spent the final months of the war in the Trans-Mississippi Department (Sehlinger, 2004; Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

Like most of his fellow Kentuckians, Preston was associated with the anti-Bragg faction within the army. Like Breckinridge and Buckner, Preston was alienated by Bragg’s denunciation of the failure of Kentuckians to rally to the army in 1862, and remained a personal and professional critic of Bragg until Bragg’s departure from the army in 1863. He developed close friendships with anti-Bragg officers Buckner and Longstreet, and he openly expressed professional and personal contempt for Bragg (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, p. 289; Sehlinger, 2004). On October 4, Preston joined a dozen of his fellow officers in signing the anti-Bragg petition (OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66).

Contribution

Bragg initially welcomed Preston into the Army of Tennessee with high expectations, viewing Preston as indispensable to his plans to rally Kentuckians to the army in 1862 (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part 2, p. 995). When Breckinridge failed to rally the Kentuckians, Bragg expressed confidence in Preston’s ability to succeed where Breckinridge had failed (OR, ser. 1, vol. 16, part
The success never materialized. Following Stones River, Preston was transferred, but he returned to the army in time to participate in the battle of Chickamauga. By most accounts, Preston performed respectably and Bragg never formally criticized Preston, but because of his outspoken anti-Bragg opinions, Preston was removed from division command during the purge of the anti-Bragg officers in October 1863 (Sehlinger, 2004).

Distributive justice

Preston expressed his belief that Bragg was tyrannical and close-minded (Sehlinger, 2004). His removal from division command in October 1863 would certainly have reinforced that belief.

Loyalty

Whenever he had the opportunity to do so, Preston declared his lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership, ultimately signing the petition to have Bragg removed (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 682; OR, ser. 1, vol. 30, part 2, pp. 65-66). When Davis retained Bragg as army commander, equipped with the power to remove the malcontents within the high command, only Cleburne survived the purge.

Procedural justice

Though Preston was among the Kentucky officers that were alienated by Bragg’s refusal to commute the death sentence of Asa Lewis, the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Preston’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

Aside from his multiple declarations of no confidence in Bragg’s leadership, Preston denounced the “manifest hopelessness” of Bragg’s orders during Stones River (OR, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 813). While there is not enough primary source evidence to assess Bragg’s professional respect for Preston, it is certain that Preston had little, if any, professional respect for Bragg.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Preston’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect. The primary source record suggests that Preston was personally contemptuous of Bragg, indicating that he would likely disagree with each of these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and while there was not adequate evidence to generate likely answers to question #7, Preston’s role in the anti-Bragg petition indicates that he would likely disagree with questions #8&9. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and Preston’s repeated criticisms of Bragg indicate that he would likely disagree with each of these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Preston’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of -8.
The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Preston’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a low-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by low levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and a low perceptions of distributive justice (see Figure 4.30). Preston’s LMX-MDM score of -8 is adequate enough to place him solidly within the anti-Bragg out-group.

Figure 4.30 LMX: BG William Preston
BG John A. Wharton

Background

A native of Tennessee, BG John Austin Wharton attended South Carolina College and practiced law in his adopted state, Texas, until the outbreak of the Civil War. He participated in Texas’ secession as a member of the state’s secession convention and joined the 8th Texas Cavalry – Terry’s Texas Rangers – eventually rising to command the unit at the battle of Shiloh (Warner, 1959).

After recovering from serious wounds sustained at Shiloh, Wharton returned to command troops in the 1862 Kentucky campaign. He received a promotion to brigadier general in November 1862 and was again wounded at Stones River. Wharton recovered and returned once more in time to participate in the battle of Chickamauga (Warner, 1959).

LMX positionality with respect to GEN Bragg

Affect

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze the level of affect between Wharton and Bragg.

Contribution

Wharton could have had little doubt of the high value that Bragg placed on his contributions to the army, particularly during the Kentucky campaign and at Stones River. In the days preceding Stones River, Bragg recommended Wharton for assignment to regular command of a cavalry brigade, explaining that Wharton had “won his spurs” in Kentucky and should be “among the first to receive the recognition due to military merit and moral worth” (OR, ser. 1,
vol. 20, part 2, p. 418). Again, Bragg praised Wharton following Stones River (*OR*, ser. 1, vol. 20, part 1, p. 665, 670). Cavalry service kept Wharton away from the army for large portions of the 1863 campaign season, and Bragg makes little mention of Wharton’s contributions until after Chickamauga. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that Wharton was aware of the appreciation that Bragg held for him.

*Distributive justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Wharton’s perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee. It has been suggested that Wharton coveted Wheeler’s promotion to command of all cavalry forces in Bragg’s department, but Wharton made no explicit statement to that effect (Powell, 2010).

*Loyalty*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Wharton’s perception of Bragg’s loyalty toward him.

*Procedural justice*

The primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Wharton’s perception of procedural justice within the Army of Tennessee.
Professional respect

Though Bragg highly regarded Wharton’s professional abilities, the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to analyze Wharton’s level of professional respect for Bragg.

Responses to LMX-MDM questionnaire

Based upon Wharton’s correspondence up to and during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, this researcher suggests that he would supply the following answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire (see Appendix B – The LMX-MDM Scale Questionnaire). Questions #1-3 measure affect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #4-6 measure loyalty, and while the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to questions #5&6, Bragg’s praise of Wharton suggests that Wharton would likely agree with question #4. Questions #7-9 measure contribution, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. Questions #10-12 measure professional respect, and the primary source record was not adequate to generate likely responses to these questions. On the modified scoring scale used for this study, Wharton’s suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire yielded a score of 1.

The LMX theoretical framework

The primary source record and Wharton’s LMX-MDM score, generated by the hypothesized responses to the LMX-MDM Questionnaire, suggest that he and Bragg had a mild high-quality leader-member exchange, characterized by a high perception of contribution (see
Figure 4.31). Wharton’s LMX-MDM score of 1 suggests a mild, but non-conclusive identification with the pro-Bragg in-group.
Table 4.1 Cumulative List of LMX-MDM Questionnaire Responses from Research Subjects

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**Expert Analysis**

In order to confirm, correct, and augment the researcher’s analysis, a series of interviews, consisting of open-ended questions, was conducted with a panel of three content-area experts. Interviews were conducted on February 4, 2013 with Lee White and Chris Young, and an interview was conducted on February 7, 2013 with James Ogden, III. White is a Park Ranger and historical interpreter at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park. He is a published historian with widely recognized expertise on Bragg, Cleburne, Stewart, and the 1863 campaigns.
Young has been a Park Ranger in the Interpretation and Resource Education Division at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park for the past five years. He earned his Education Specialist degree from Jacksonville State University. His formal training in history and leadership uniquely qualified him to participate in this study as a member of the expert review panel. Ogden is the staff historian at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park and has been recognized for nearly twenty-five years, as one of the nation’s leading authorities on Bragg and western theater Civil War studies.

In each interview, the members of the expert panel were provided with a brief summary of leader-member exchange, and overview of the purpose of the study and its research questions, and a description of the methodology used in the study. The researcher’s data analysis was discussed in detail. Relevant primary source and second sources were discussed, the suggested answers to each subject’s LMX-MDM questionnaire were explained, each subject’s LMX profile was described, and the members of the expert panel were invited to confirm, correct, or provide further insight that might add to the robustness of the analysis.

With few exceptions, White and Young confirmed the trustworthiness of the data analysis. White argued that, though the primary source record did not provide specific evidence, it was likely that Hardee would have disagreed with questions #1-3. When Bragg left the army in December 1863 and accepted the role as military advisor to President Davis, it became apparent to Bragg that Hardee had, unbeknownst to him, been quite contemptuous of him in his interactions with other members of the high command and has played a much more pivotal role in undermining his leadership than he had realized (L. White, personal communication, February 4, 2013). Young argued that, consistent with stage 4 LMX research (see Figure 2.1), friendships were good circumstantial indicators of an officer’s positionality with respect to Bragg. The
“Pensacola bloc” of officers, including Anderson, Jackson, Walker, and Withers, Young argued, were almost certainly Bragg allies, and though the primary source record did not provide adequate evidence to substantiate this alliance, each of these officers would likely have agreed with questions #1-2, 7, and 10-12 (C. Young, personal communication, February 4, 2013).

Ogden also confirmed the trustworthiness of the study and, based on the broad modified scoring scale used in the study (the -1 to 1 continuum, rather than the 1-7 continuum), argued that each of the suggested answers to the LMX-MDM questionnaire were reasonable and safe. He suggested that it was possible that each of the members of the Tennessee faction of the anti-Bragg bloc, including Cheatham, Forrest, and Johnson, could have scored an -11 on the LMX-MDM questionnaire. The primary source record did not support these scores, he explained, because correspondence between Tennessee officers was limited, since most Tennesseans with significant military and political influence were personally present with the army. A similar argument could be made of the anti-Bragg Kentucky officers because most of Kentucky’s influential military figures were located with the army (political figures, though present, were not as critical, given Kentucky’s status as a non-seceding border state). It is possible, then, that Breckinridge, Buckner, and Preston could have each scored a -11 on the LMX-MDM questionnaire (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013).

The expert panel, therefore, confirmed the general trustworthiness of the data analysis. Ogden, furthermore, acknowledged that this study was, to his knowledge, the first distinctively leadership-oriented study of a major Civil War organization to ever be undertaken. Though Connelly’s (1971) study of the Army of Tennessee was intended to be a leadership study, he explained, neither it nor any other study has examined a Civil War organization from the perspective of a specific leadership theoretical framework. Part of the value of this study,
furthermore, was that it will enable historians to examine relationships between Bragg and his lieutenants on multiple dimensions, rather than simply classifying officers as, without qualification, either anti-Bragg or pro-Bragg (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013).

**Summary**

In this chapter, each member of the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga was analyzed through the lens of leader-member exchange, a relationship-based leadership framework. The primary source record and seminal secondary sources were used to determine each research subject’s perspective on the various dimensions of leader-member exchange relative to Bragg (i.e., level of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and perception of contribution, distributive justice, and procedural justice). Using the historical data, each research subject was hypothetically interviewed using the LMX-MDM scale questionnaire. Based upon the historical record and the suggested responses to the LMX-MDM questionnaire, individual LMX profiles were created for each research subject and, when possible, a determination was made regarding each subject’s status as a member of Bragg’s in-group or out-group.

In Chapter V, certain observations are made regarding the data analysis, answers to research questions are discussed, leadership lessons and implications are derived, and recommendations for future study are made.
CHAPTER V

OBSERVATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

The purpose of this historical case study was to examine the quality of the relationships between GEN Braxton Bragg and his senior lieutenants through the lens of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX), a relationship-specific theoretical leadership construct. Seminal research findings were used to identify significant features of the LMX theoretical framework and the primary resource record and seminal secondary sources were examined in order to describe how these features – levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, and perceptions of contributive, distributive justice, and procedural justice – were manifested in Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command. The description yielded a number of lessons that could prove valuable to contemporary leadership preparation programs and instructive for current leaders in their own organizational settings.

This case study addressed one central research question: how did Bragg’s relationships with members of the high command of the Army of Tennessee, particularly during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, exhibit features of LMX?

In applying the LMX framework to Bragg’s relationships, this study took into account the distinctive features of LMX as described in the research of Liden and Maslyn (1998) and Scandura (1999). Therefore, the research question was answered by answering six supporting questions.
The answers to the supporting questions were analyzed, in detail, and interpreted in the previous chapter. This chapter will summarize the findings for each supporting question, discuss some broad observations relative to the questions, discuss the implications and leadership lessons that emerged from the study, and make recommendations for further study.

Research Questions

Supporting question #1

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of procedural justice (i.e., due process)? For most of the members of the high command, perceptions of procedural justice within the army could not be conclusively determined (see Table 5.1). Twenty-one of Bragg’s lieutenants, roughly 68% of the high command, gave no indication in their correspondence or provided no suggestion in their actions regarding procedural justice. While it is certain that many of those who gave no conclusive evidence did, in fact, have formed perceptions (many of those with low perceptions of procedural justice had close friends and powerful allies in the high command who likely shared their views), the primary source record was not adequate to draw reasonable conclusions regarding those perceptions.

Far more important than what cannot be determined, however, is what can be reasonably determined. Only three of Bragg’s lieutenants, roughly 10% of the high command, indicated a high perception of procedural justice within the army. Two of the three – McLaws and Law – appeared to have a high perception of procedural justice, but only because they appealed to Bragg for assistance, in their own courts-martial, in helping to refute the charges of Longstreet, an outspoken and influential Bragg enemy. It may be, then, that McLaws and Law
didn’t view Bragg as particularly equitable, but viewed him as a convenient ally against a common foe. Of Bragg’s lieutenants, then, only one – 3% of the high command – objectively affirmed Bragg’s procedural equity.

By contrast, seven of Bragg’s lieutenants, roughly 23% of the high command, indicated, with reasonable certainty, a low perception of procedural justice within the army. Like McLaws and Law, some of this low perception is attributable to personal interests. Breckinridge and Cheatham, for example, were both accused of drunkenness on duty. Hindman and Polk were both arrested and removed from command for dereliction of duty. Hill was not arrested, but was criticized for his dereliction in McLemore’s Cove and was, ultimately, stripped of his command because of his strained relationship with Bragg. Only two officers, roughly 6% of the high command, appeared to be objective in their low estimation of Bragg’s procedural equity. Nevertheless, nearly a quarter of the army’s high command, including half of the army’s lieutenant generals, believed Bragg was procedurally inequitable.

In describing why certain officers held certain perceptions, it must be remembered that an officer’s objectivity (if possible) in forming their perceptions is ultimately irrelevant. LMX is, after all, a relationship-based leadership framework, and it assumes that perceptions are not necessarily formed objectively, but on the basis of personal interactions (Cogliser, Schriesheim, Scandura, & Gardner, 2009).

**Supporting question #2**

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of distributive justice (i.e., distribution of resources, promotions, and assignments)? For most of the members of the high command, perceptions of
Table 5.1 Perceptions of Procedural Justice in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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Distributive justice within the army could not be conclusively determined (see Table 5.2). In fact, of all the distinctive features of LMX, perceptions of distributive justice proved to be the most difficult to determine. Part of this difficulty stems from the nature of promotions and duty assignments in nineteenth century American armies. Bragg, ultimately, was not the final approval authority for promotions. That prerogative belonged to President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Senate. Though Bragg could endorse recommendations for promotion and suggest that officers be removed, he did not have the ability to act on his own authority. Indeed, on multiple occasions, Bragg recommended that officers be removed (e.g., Cheatham) or even attempted to remove officers on his own authority (e.g., Polk and Hindman), only to have his recommendations denied or his actions reversed by higher authorities. Following the October 1863 conference with President Davis in Chattanooga, Bragg was given some latitude to reorganize units within the Army and to remove and reassign some officers (e.g., Hill, Longstreet, Forrest), that latitude came too late in Bragg’s tenure as Army commander to have a decisive impact on the quality of relationships with his lieutenants. By that point, too many
members of the high command had become irreversibly disposed against Bragg. At any rate, Bragg could not, as a general rule, be held personally or independently accountable for rank promotions.

Bragg did have some ability to reward commanders with favorable job assignments (e.g., Wheeler’s assignment to command the Army of Tennessee’s cavalry) or to punish commanders with unfavorable ones (e.g., Hill’s functional demotion on September 20), but he does not appear to have typically conducted himself with such blatant favoritism or vindictiveness.

Twenty-three of Bragg’s lieutenants, roughly 74% of the high command, gave no indication in their correspondence or provided no suggestion in their actions regarding distributive justice. While it is certain that many of those who gave no conclusive evidence did, in fact, have formed perceptions (many of those with low perceptions of distributive justice, for instance, had close friends and powerful allies in the high command who likely shared their views), the primary source record was not adequate to draw reasonable conclusions regarding those perceptions.

Three officers, roughly 10% of the army’s high command, had high perceptions of distributive justice. Each of these officers had received Bragg’s endorsement for formal or functional promotions, so each of them had perceptions that were largely formed on the basis of promotions or assignments from which they had personally benefitted. By contrast, five officers, roughly 16% of the army’s high command, had low perceptions of distributive justice. Each of these officers, likewise, had adverse perceptions that were formed by being the personal recipients of functional demotions (e.g., Hill and Preston), unfavorable or punitive assignments
(e.g., Liddell), or leadership decisions that were perceived as professional slights (e.g., Hardee and Johnson).

Table 5.2 Perceptions of Distributive Justice in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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**Supporting question #3**

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of affect? For most of the members of the high command, levels of affect within the army could not be conclusively determined (see Table 5.3). Eighteen of Bragg’s lieutenants, roughly 53% of the high command, gave no indication in their correspondence of their perceptions of procedural justice. As with the other features of LMX, it is likely that many of those officers who gave no conclusive evidence did, in fact, have formed affect levels. Many of those with high/low levels of affect had close friends and powerful allies in the high command who likely shared their views. It is entirely possible, for example, that Pensacola veterans Wheeler and Anderson either shared similar affect levels toward Bragg or influenced, through their friendship and common history, one another’s affect level toward
Bragg. Nevertheless, the primary source record was not adequate enough to draw reasonable conclusions regarding those affect levels.

As with the perceptions of procedural justice, what *can* be reasonably determined is far more significant that what cannot be determined. Out of the 31 officers who constituted Bragg’s high command, only four – roughly 13% - gave reasonable indications of high levels of affect toward Bragg. By contrast, ten officers, roughly 32% of the high command, gave reasonable indications of low levels of affect toward Bragg. In other words, for whatever reason, nearly 1/3 of all of the high command gave strong indications of personal dislike for their commander.

Reasons for personal dislike toward Bragg are varied. Some officers seem to develop a dislike for Bragg because of Bragg’s criticisms of their professional conduct (e.g., Hill, Breckinridge, Cheatham, Hindman). Others seemed to be motivated by personal advancement (e.g., Longstreet, Polk, Buckner). Others disliked Bragg because they, being devoted to the cause of an independent Confederate nation, came to believe that Bragg’s leadership was a liability, rather than an asset, to the war effort (e.g., Forrest). Some seemed to align against Bragg because their allies had done so (e.g., Preston). Others, however, seemed to have had no other personal objection to Bragg’s character, other than that they viewed his personality to be difficult and incompatible with their own (e.g., Liddell).

Of those officers who seemed to have had a high level of personal affect for Bragg, McLaws seemed to have developed a friendship with Bragg because of their mutual animosity toward Longstreet, similar to members of the Kentucky bloc of anti-Bragg officers who, in aligning with one another, necessarily aligned against Bragg. Wheeler, though clearly loyal to and affectionate toward Bragg in a paternal sense, never expressed, at least in his correspondence, friendship toward Bragg. Anderson and Walker, of all the members of the high
command, seem to be the only officers who developed genuine, personal friendships with Bragg. It should be noted that Stewart, though he largely kept himself out of army politics, expressed kindness and warmth toward Bragg in a letter written after Bragg’s resignation from army command, but it does not appear that anything resembling a friendship existed between the two during their tenure together in the Army of Tennessee.

Table 5.3 Levels of Affect in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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Supporting question #4

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of loyalty? For 12 of Bragg’s lieutenants – roughly 39% of the high command – levels of loyalty could not be conclusively determined from the primary source record (see Table 5.4). Nevertheless, while only about 10% of officers expressed personal affection for Bragg, approximately 23% - seven officers – expressed or demonstrated personal loyalty to Bragg. Three of these officers (Cleburne, Stewart, and Bate) were generally disinterested in army politics and seemed committed to professionalism, regardless of their personal feelings toward Bragg. They did not seem personally attracted to him, and were even
capable of professional criticism of Bragg, but did not allow personal or professional feelings to influence their perceived duty to remain loyal. In the case of Stewart, though he was professionally critical of Bragg, and though he had an opportunity to sign the anti-Bragg petition (as evidenced by the copy of the petition found among his personal papers), he chose to avoid all appearances of disloyalty and refused to sign the petition. In the case of Cleburne, though he was consistently critical of Bragg’s professional competence and did choose to sign the anti-Bragg petition, he nevertheless continued to follow Bragg’s orders with an extremely high degree of professionalism and ability. His professional criticism of Bragg did not translate into dereliction or unenthusiastic execution of orders (as was arguably the case with Longstreet). Cleburne’s loyalty, then, was a kind of professional, practical, duty-oriented loyalty, demonstrated through an unquestioning and efficient obedience to orders, even though the professional competence of the commander was, in his mind, questionable.

By contrast, 11 officers – roughly 35% of the high command – demonstrated, by word or deed, a lack of loyalty in their commander. Four of these officers (Hill, Longstreet, Buckner, and Preston) signed the anti-Bragg petition and seemed to attempt to actively undermine Bragg’s ability to effectively command the army. Two other officers (Breckinridge and Cheatham) sought Bragg’s removal “behind his back” but, for political reasons, refused to sign the petition. At least four officers (Longstreet, Polk, Hill and Hindman) demonstrated a tendency to allow personal and professional feelings toward Bragg to translate into half-hearted battlefield efforts or, in some cases, outright refusal to obey orders. One officer (Forrest) came to view Bragg’s leadership as detrimental to the Confederate cause, refused to serve under Bragg again, and possibly issued a challenge to Bragg to engage in a physical altercation (either a fight or a duel). Another officer (Hardee) even seemed to suggest mutiny against Bragg during the Tullahoma
Campaign, and he appeared to be anticipating collaboration/conspiracy with two other officers in the high command (Polk and Buckner). For whatever reason, as with the levels of affect, the command climate of the Army of Tennessee’s high command was so dysfunctional that approximately 1/3 of the members openly expressed or demonstrated a lack of loyalty to their commander.

Table 5.4 Levels of Loyalty in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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**Supporting question #5**

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his high command exhibit the characteristic of high/low perception of contribution? For ten of Bragg’s lieutenants – roughly 32% of the high command – perceptions of contribution could not be conclusively determined from the primary source record (see Table 5.5). Nevertheless, the historical record suggests that 13 officers – roughly 42% of the high command – had high perceptions of contribution in the army, making perception of contribution the most manifestly positive LMX dimension within the Army of Tennessee’s command structure. Regardless of feelings of personal affect, loyalty, or
respect, each of these officers received formal and public praise from Bragg for their battlefield contributions. Battlefield commendations are one of the most powerful indications of Bragg’s professional objectivity toward his lieutenants, as even some of the most outspoken critics of Bragg’s leadership – e.g., Hardee and Liddell – received praise when their achievements on the battlefield warranted it. Even Hindman, who likely came to have a low perception of contribution, was cited for gallantry at Chickamauga when he was wounded in battle, even though Bragg simultaneously censured him for dereliction in McLemore’s Cove. Bragg apparently saw no contradiction in praising an officer for positive contributions while, simultaneously, censuring him for misconduct.

Roughly 26% of the high command – eight officers – likely held low perceptions of contribution. In all but one case, Bragg had formally criticized these officers for missteps on the battlefield, for dereliction, or for criminal negligence. In two of these cases (Polk and Hindman), officers were arrested and removed from their commands for charges of outright disobedience to orders. One officer (Forrest) was praised by Bragg in his official battle reports but was openly criticized for being overrated and unprofessional, and was ordered to turn his command over to another officer.

Supporting question #6

How did GEN Bragg’s relationships with members of his command exhibit the characteristic of high/low levels of professional respect? For ten of Bragg’s lieutenants – roughly 32% of the high command – levels of respect could not be conclusively determined from the primary source record (see Table 5.6). Nevertheless, the historical record suggests that 13 officers – roughly 42% of the high command – had low levels of professional respect for Bragg,
Table 5.5 Perceptions of Contribution in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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making level of professional respect the most manifestly negative LMX dimension within the
Army of Tennessee’s command structure. Following Stones River, nine of these officers made
statements of “no confidence” in Bragg’s leadership, urged Bragg to resign, and in some cases,
appealed to President Davis to replace Bragg with another commander. Six of the nine later
signed the anti-Bragg petition (two others would have signed, but refrained for political reasons),
indicating that their level of professional respect remained unchanged between January and
October 1863. Three others would likely have signed the petition, but were not present with the
army to do so when the petition was drafted.

In addition to the 13 officers who indicated low levels of respect for Bragg, two others –
roughly 6% of the high command – demonstrated, at alternate points, both low and high levels of
professional respect for Bragg. Walker seems to have generally respected Bragg until the
decision was made, on September 21, not to pursue the Federals who were retreating in
Chattanooga. Stewart expressed respect for Bragg’s intellectual abilities, but he had little confidence in Bragg’s practical abilities – for Stewart, Bragg was more suited to develop, rather than implement, operational plans.

Altogether, at certain points during Bragg’s tenure as army commander, 15 of his lieutenants – roughly half (48%) – expressed, in word or deed, a lack of professional respect for the commander.

By contrast, only six officers – roughly 19% of the high command – expressed unqualified professional respect for Bragg. Three of the six (Anderson, Wheeler, and Withers) had served with Bragg in Pensacola, and the favorable impressions of him that were developed then seemed to have never changed. In Wheeler’s case, professional respect for Bragg was possibly an extension of the paternal reverence that he had for him. Three officers (Anderson, McLaws, and Withers) viewed Bragg as an operationally competent officer who had been undermined by the maneuverings, dereliction, and incompetence of his subordinates. The most extraordinary endorsement of Bragg’s professional competence came from Bate who considered Bragg to be indispensable to the good order and discipline of the army. At best, however, even when Stewart and Walker are taken into consideration, only eight officers – roughly 1/4 (28%) of the high command – expressed professional respect for Bragg.

Observations

The LMX analyses of the members of Bragg’s high command yielded several observations worth noting.
Pro-Bragg vs. anti-Bragg intensity

According to Liddell (1997), “Bragg’s manner made him malignant enemies and indifferent, callous friends” (p. 116). In remarking on Bragg’s interpersonal character, Hess (2012), along similar lines, observed:

There was something bizarre in [Bragg’s] character…he seemed to have had a need to draw a line in the sand in personal relationships and couldn’t stand to not know whether someone was on his side or against him…He made very bad decisions about how to deal with errant subordinates…He was too ready to define enemies, and many said that the friends he did have tended to be sycophants who ingratiated themselves with him for reasons of their own… [he] was not above turning on people who were kind to him.

Table 5.6 Levels of Professional Respect in the Army of Tennessee’s High Command

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* - Demonstrated high & low levels of respect
Likewise, Ogden (personal communication, February 7, 2013) explained: “there were not very many people on the face of the earth capable of enduring the caustic Bragg personality enough to have actually developed what could be called a true friendship.”

Beyond the interpersonal limitations stemming from his personality, Bragg, it must be remembered, was the army commander. Prior to the war, he had become a successful planter. In both civilian and military life, therefore, he lived and moved in the upper echelons of society, heavily limiting the pool of prospective friends and opening himself to being approached and used by self-seekers. From a military standpoint, while camaraderie between commanders and subordinates is encouraged and expected, informal fraternization was just as strongly discouraged in the nineteenth century as it is today (Longacre, 2007; Skelton, 1992). Bragg, therefore, was limited by his position as army commander to develop, simultaneously, close personal friendships and effective professional partnerships.

One of the most striking observations that can be drawn from an LMX analysis of Bragg’s high command is that, as Liddell (1997) explained, the anti-Bragg sentiment among the members of Bragg’s out-group was far more intense than the pro-Bragg sentiment among the members of Bragg’s in-group (see Figure 5). Among the 14 officers – roughly 45% of the high command – with negative modified scores on the LMX-MDM questionnaire, ten of them – roughly 32% of the high command – had scores of -6 or less. By contrast, of the 11 officers – roughly 34% of the high command – with positive modified scores on the LMX-MDM questionnaire, only three – roughly 10% of the high command – had scores of 6 or more.
Figure 5 Out-Group vs. In-Group Intensity
Classification by commissioning source

Historians have often argued that Bragg had a tendency to show favoritism, and that his preference was often for officers who had earned their commissions through the United States Military Academy at West Point (Liddell, 1997; McWhiney, 1969). Ogden (personal communication, February 7, 2013), for instance, described the Army of Tennessee as a “West Point benevolent society” in which West Pointers were destined for advancement and preference, while non-West Pointers were relegated to a kind of second-class status.

Interestingly, however, the LMX analysis of the high command did not support this argument. Upon taking command, Bragg did, indeed, express confidence in West Point graduate Hardee, but in doing so, he complained of general lack of confidence in any of his officers, regardless of their commissioning source (OR, ser. 1, vol. 17, part 2, p. 628). Of the 31 members of his high command, 15 – roughly 48% - were West Point alumni (if Liddell, who did not graduate, is included). Sixteen – roughly 52% - obtained their commissions from other sources (e.g., battlefield commissions, unit elections, or state military institutes). While West Point alumni constituted the most senior members of the high command – all four lieutenant generals and eight of the 12 major generals – those ranks could not be attributed to Bragg’s preference. President Davis and the Confederate Senate, after all, appointed and confirmed all general officers. While Bragg could endorse recommendations for promotion, his endorsement was not final, and he was just as willing to recommend West Pointers for promotion (e.g., Stewart) as he was non-West Pointers (e.g., Anderson).

Of the 15 West Point alumni in the high command, six officers – roughly 19% of the high command – had positive LMX-MDM scores. Eight – roughly 26% - had negative scores. One – roughly 3% - had a score of 0. Of the 16 non-West Pointers, five officers – roughly 16%
of the high command – had positive LMX-MDM scores. Six officers – roughly 19% - had negative scores. Five officers – roughly 16% - had scores of 0. West Point alumni, then, were slightly more likely (3%) to have positive LMX-MDM scores than non-West Pointers, but they were also more likely (6%) to have negative LMX-MDM scores than non-West Pointers. Interestingly, while one of the most intensely anti-Bragg officers – Hill – was a West Point alumnus, the other most intensely anti-Bragg officer – Cheatham – and the most intensely pro-Bragg officer – Anderson – were not. Anti-Bragg and pro-Bragg sentiment, therefore, seemed to be rather evenly distributed among West Pointers and non-West Pointers.

Classification by rank

Perhaps the most damning observation to emerge from the LMX analysis of the high command, at least from an organizational effectiveness standpoint, is the distribution of anti-Bragg sentiment among the most senior members of the high command. All of Bragg’s lieutenant generals and five of his 12 major generals – a group that included both of Bragg’s wing commanders and all of his permanent infantry corps commanders – identified with the anti-Bragg faction of the army. With the exception of Wheeler, Bragg’s cavalry corps commander, and Walker, who temporarily commanded Bragg’s reserve corps, Bragg’s most intense supporters were division commanders. Bragg did enjoy considerable support at the brigade level and below, but officers commanding at that echelon level did not meet the operational definition’s requirement for inclusion in the high command and were, therefore, beyond the scope of this study (McWhiney, 1969).

The most intense Bragg opposition was, therefore, located at the top of the high command of the Army of Tennessee. For whatever reason, those officers who were expected to
work closest to Bragg proved the least able to do so efficiently. Some of the most monumental failures of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga – e.g., Hill’s failure at McLemore’s Cove, Polk’s failure at Lee & Gordon’s Mill, Polk’s failure to launch the pre-dawn assault on September 20, and Longstreet’s failure to prevent the permanent establishment of a Federal supply line into Chattanooga, etc. – were directly attributable to interpersonal/dyadic dysfunction between Bragg and the most senior members of his high command.

**Implications and Leadership Lessons**

Beyond identifying and describing the features of LMX that were at work in the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, the purpose of this case study was to derive a series of implications and leadership lessons that would benefit current leaders and/or leadership preparation programs. Other leadership theorists have identified many of the lessons that emerged from this study, but the discussion of these lessons in this context (after having been illustrated by the Army of Tennessee in 1863) underscores the universal nature of leadership principles, at least in the variform universal sense (Bass, 1997; Lonner, 1980).

1. **Leaders must have some discretion in building cohesive teams.** This research illustrated the dyadic observation that factions are features of virtually all organizations (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Kadushin, 2012). According to Liddell (1997): “Napoleon selected the best men he could find for his purposes. Bragg had to take only such as were given him” (p. 117). While Liddell doubted Bragg’s innate ability to select good officers, based on a supposed character flaw that blinded him to
potentially effective officers and inclined him to favoritism, Bragg never had an
opportunity to choose those officers who would constitute his closest colleagues and
confidants. His closest colleagues were predetermined. This was problematic
because, as this research demonstrated, these colleagues came to represent an
extremely subversive faction within the army.

When he assumed command, Bragg lamented to the Confederate War
Department that he lacked suitable commanders, and he made efforts, unsuccessfully,
to remove a list of specific officers he found to be particularly problematic (OR, ser.
1, vol. 17, part 2, p. 628). On multiple occasions, he sought the removal of officers
that he found to be insubordinate – e.g., Polk and Hindman – only to have President
Davis either reject his request or overturn his decisions, thereby undermining his
ability to improve unit cohesiveness by extracting particularly divisive officers.
While Bragg could influence decisions regarding promotions and transfers, his advice
was, by no means, decisive or axiomatically accepted.

It may be the case that Bragg, had he been given extensive latitude in the
selection of his team members, would have, nevertheless, still proven himself to be
interpersonally incompetent, but that cannot be known conclusively. What is known,
however, is that President Davis’s indecision regarding the command structure in the
Army of Tennessee was damaging (McMurry, 2012). While armies are unique
structures and are dissimilar to other organizations when it comes to member
selection and advancement (army officers advance in rank through a combination of
experience and merit, and are, in democratic societies, appointed and confirmed by
civilian leaders), President Davis, as Confederate Commander-in-Chief, had
extraordinary power in determining officer selection and advancement. He was critically aware of the dysfunctional interpersonal climate in the Army, and he made efforts, on multiple occasions, to mollify the discontent, first by sending Johnston to the army to observe the climate and make appropriate recommendations, then by sending Hardee back to the army (after a transfer to another department) to encourage civility in the high command, and then be visiting himself to observe, first hand, the discontent and to act to diffuse it. It was not until the final month and a half of Bragg’s tenure, however, that Davis finally gave Bragg the latitude to organize the army in the way he saw fit, but by then, it may have been too late.

President Davis’ indecision deprived the commander of his discretion in building his team, but it also deprived the team members of having a leader in whom they could be confident. While discretion in team building was not the only factor in the ultimate failure of the Army of Tennessee – the army’s mission may have been impossible, the cause of the Confederacy might have been doomed from the start, the lack of a cohesive Confederate strategy at the executive level may have undermined the very possibility of Confederate independence, etc. – the inability of the leader of the Confederacy’s second-largest field army to surround himself with the officers he regarded to be the most capable and compatible certainly did not make the army’s task any more manageable.

LMX underscores the importance of relationships in building cohesive teams (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Owners, CEOs, and high-level administrators must be sensitive to the fact that organizational cohesion requires much more than training and experience, though these factors are, in their own right, important as well. It
requires team members who are relationally compatible and leaders who are able to fit to situations of varying degrees of favorability (Fielder, 1967). This research underscored not only the apparent relational incompatibility of Bragg with his lieutenants, but it also suggested that, from a dyadic perspective, either Bragg or his senior lieutenants might not have been best suited to their developing military situation (at least from mid-1862 to late 1863). When Bragg assumed command of the army, many were optimistic about his leadership (McWhiney, 1969). Cracks in the high command began to appear, however, during the Kentucky campaign, and they only deepened as the Army of Tennessee’s strategic situation grew worse. By contrast, in the early days of the war, Bragg developed a supportive faction among the members of his Pensacola cohort, and these officers appeared to have remained loyal to him up to the point of his resignation.

While avoiding the obvious pitfalls of favoritism, this research supports the practice that unit managers and leaders be given some amount of discretion in selecting team members who, while possessing an adequate level of training and experience, also possess a personal disposition that will enable them to fit in a situation and work cohesively and collaboratively in an organization. In recruiting, assessing, and selecting prospective team members, technical and tactical competence are important, but “they must function well on an individual and team level, displaying cooperation, trust, and integrity” (Boe, Woolley & Durkin, 2011, p. 348). Braxton Bragg had little ability to surround himself with officers who were willing to demonstrate cooperation, trust, and in some cases, integrity. Nearly 1/3 of the high command expressed low levels of affect toward Bragg and nearly 1/2, including all of
his lieutenant generals and five of his major generals, demonstrated low levels of
professional respect for him. This clearly had a significant effect on the formation of
a subversive out-group within the high command.

2. *Organizational leaders must work with their team members to create and articulate a
vision/mission or to engage in mission-supporting planning and preparation.* One of
the monumental defects in the Confederate war effort was the lack of a coherent
strategy developed at the executive level (McMurry, 2012). President Davis, at first,
observed an unsustainable, but politically expedient cordon defense. From time to
time he dabbled in offensive operations (e.g., the 1862 Kentucky campaign, the
Antietam campaign, and the Gettysburg campaign). He, ultimately, seemed to have
settled on an offensive-defensive strategy, involving the movement of troops within
interior lines in order to preemptively strike at positions that appeared most
susceptible to Federal attack (McMurry, 2012). He never, however, adopted a
formal, strategic policy according to which his army commanders could plan and
execute mission-supporting operations (Stoker, 2010).

Bragg, therefore, commanded an army in a conflicted, indecisive, and at
times, contradictory broad strategic context. To make matters worse, the operations
that he executed lacked the kind of collaborative development and organizational
buy-in that would have given those operations the best opportunities for success.
While Bragg was, by all accounts, an effective administrator, and while his major
operations were certainly undertaken after extensive logistical preparations had been
made, he did not seem to engage in the kind of mission-oriented planning and
preparation, with his subordinates, which transformed a mission or a set of goals into
a collaborative, organizational vision (Woodworth, 1996). According to this research, most of the LMX dimensions, but particularly levels of affect, loyalty, and professional respect, were directly influenced by Bragg’s ability to effectively communicate a vision or engage in adequate mission planning or preparation.

Much of the potential success of the 1862 invasion of Kentucky, for instance, hinged on the willingness of native Kentuckians to rally to and join the invading Confederate army (Connelly, 1971; Harrison, 1975; Noe, 2001). Many of Bragg’s officers, particularly the native Kentuckians, were aware that this was one of Bragg’s operational goals. The Kentucky support, however, never materialized, partly because Kentucky officers, like Breckinridge, did not act with adequate enough enthusiasm to encourage their fellow Kentuckians to rally. A formal propaganda and recruitment program was not developed or implemented (Bragg seemed to believe that the mere presence of the army would be adequate to generate grass-roots support). Those officers with the most familiarity with Kentucky and with the best chance of recruiting Kentuckians – e.g., Breckinridge, Buckner, and Preston – were not particularly involved in setting goals and objectives, determining mission-essential tasks, and establishing campaign priorities (McWhiney, 1969; Stoker, 2010). Bragg, in others words, failed to collaborate, with his most valuable and relevant organizational stakeholders, in generating a coherent mission, in establishing objectives and tasks to support the mission, and in generating the enthusiasm critical to mission success. The Kentucky campaign, which could have had positive war-deciding implications, proved to be an operational failure and, among his Kentucky
officers, a political failure from which Bragg, from a dyadic standpoint, would never recover (Stoker, 2010).

This research indicates that a similar lack of coherence, objective-setting, and organizational enthusiasm characterized his operations in Middle Tennessee, his operations following the evacuation of Chattanooga in early September 1863, and in his operations leading up to the climactic battles for Chattanooga in November 1863. Bragg not only failed to collaborate to generate a coherent strategy for his operations in Kentucky in 1862, but he did not comply with the Kentucky bloc’s desire to remain in Kentucky following Perryville. Repeatedly, during the Tullahoma Campaign, he frustrated many of his lieutenants with his unwillingness to make a stand in middle Tennessee. Without the knowledge of each of his senior-most lieutenants, he reorganized his army during the middle of the battle of Chickamauga and concocted a battle plan, the success of which depended on effective communication and precise coordination.

While team members are often obligated to follow orders or conform to organizational expectations, organizational leaders have some responsibility to collaborate with their team members in establishing a vision (or end state) for the organization, in setting broad goals and objectives, in establishing and assigning the tasks that support those goals and objectives, and in formulating vision-supporting priorities. Collaboration, after all, generates collective ownership, and ownership generates mission-essential enthusiasm (Hansen, 2009). This research indicates that Bragg’s leadership, to a large degree, represented the counter example to the kind of collaboration and vision-building necessary for success. Whether due to Bragg’s
ineffective decision-making or his lieutenant’s insubordination, the Army of Tennessee’s operations were almost uniformly characterized by a significant lack of subordinate understanding and support (McWhiney, 1969; Woodworth, 2010b). While this feature did not single-handedly undermine the army’s success, this research demonstrates that it was certainly a significant contributing factor in the army’s ultimate failure.

3. **Organizational leaders must ensure an open stream of communication with organizational members as a means of monitoring organizational cohesion.**

According to his chief of staff, BG William W. Mackall, Bragg was oblivious to the fractured and dysfunctional state of his command climate. The anti-Bragg petition of October 4 “gave [Bragg] much distress and mortification. I do believe he thought himself popular…Bragg has the misfortune of not knowing a friend from a foe, and taking subserviency as evidence of friendship” (quoted in McWhiney, 1969, p. 97). Bragg had, in the past year and a half, received explicit statements of no-confidence from a large portion of his senior leadership, alienated all of his senior Kentucky officers and half of his senior Tennessee officers, had made powerful enemies of some of his most popular and influential subordinates (i.e., Polk, Longstreet, Hill, etc.), and had nearly been replaced by Johnston. Nevertheless, he was shocked when he learned of the anti-Bragg petition and seemed genuinely unaware of his own unpopularity.

This extraordinary disconnect from reality is one of the most mystifying features of Bragg’s personality, and it further illustrates one of Bragg’s flaws highlighted by this study, either an inability to divine the concerns of his subordinates.
or, perhaps, a perceived lack of interest in them (J. Ogden, personal communication, February 7, 2013). This research corroborates Scandura’s (1999) observation that LMX, as a theoretical framework, is fundamentally concerned with perceptions of organizational equity. This research further indicates that Bragg’s perceived insensitivity to his subordinates’ concerns – concerns of both equity and decision-making – was one of the most debilitating factors handicapping him throughout most of his tenure as army commander, from the ill-fated Kentucky campaign in 1862 (where his denunciation of local Kentuckians and his stubborn refusal to commute the death sentence of Asa Lewis permanently alienated his Kentucky officers), to the aftermath of Chickamauga (where, for right or wrong, his refusal to pursue the Federals on September 21 further damaged his credibility, even among officers who, like Walker, who were inclined to support Bragg).

Bragg would have benefited from regular “sensing sessions,” in which team members were permitted and encouraged to voice frustrations and concerns, in a respectful and professional manner, without fear of reprisal (Holloway, 2009). Not only would these sessions have provided Bragg with frequent “pulse checks” or “doses of reality,” keeping him abreast of the state of morale in the organization, but it would have provided regular occasions for the organization’s key leaders to recommend and discuss, with the commander, potential solutions and courses of action that could have been taken to alleviate some of the discontent in the high command. Sensing sessions, like those used by contemporary military and civilian organizations, build trust among organizational members, improve perceptions of organizational equity, and allow members to “vent” without having to resort to
extreme measures like discussions of mutiny, antagonistic coalition-building, and petitions against the organization’s leader (Holloway, 2009). While it is not certain that the use of sensing sessions would have eradicated the interpersonal dysfunction in the army’s high command – many of Bragg’s lieutenants had their own ambitions and character flaws – their adoption would have removed some of the major criticisms leveled against Bragg’s character.

For all of Bragg’s abilities as a strategist and a disciplinarian, his inability or unwillingness to effectively communicate with his subordinates, particularly about personal or professional grievances, was clearly one of his most undermining and self-destructive flaws. Fortunately, contemporary leaders can learn from Bragg’s mistakes in this area. Even if leaders possess interpersonal deficiencies like Bragg’s that undermine effective communication, those deficiencies can be largely mitigated by the regular use of structured forums, like sensing sessions, in which problems can be openly discussed, remedies considered and, in the best case scenarios, solutions applied.

4. Leaders must assume the responsibility for guaranteeing the dissemination of operational plans, particularly if organizational success depends upon those plans. While Hill and Polk may have been responsible for the failure to launch the pre-dawn attack on September 20, the ultimate blame falls on Bragg. It must be acknowledged that battlefield conditions, like the ones experienced by Bragg or, in contemporary contexts, by military leaders, first responders, and law enforcement, are not always conducive to efficient dissemination of information. Conditions do not always permit key leaders to exchange information efficiently or to engage in face-to-face planning
and preparation (Pfeifer & Merlo, 2011). This research suggests, however, that beyond the obvious tactical implications, dissemination of information can have tremendous dyadic implications, particularly upon perceptions of distributive justice. Hardee’s perceptions of distributive justice, for example, were influenced by Bragg’s failure to include him in the planning process for troops in his command assigned to a special mission.

In the tactical situation facing Bragg on September 20, many of his senior leaders were widely dispersed over the battlefield and, in one case, was just arriving from another department (Cozzens, 1992). Holding a council of war, with all of his senior commanders, would have been inconvenient and impractical. Nevertheless, Bragg staked the success of September 20 on a reorganization of the army into two wings and a pre-dawn sequential attack. The opening attack would signal the other units, from right to left, to initiate their own attacks. The entire operation, of course, hinged upon the opening, pre-dawn attack by Bragg’s right-most unit. Unfortunately, the attack did not occur as planned because some key leaders were not adequately informed of the operation and others were offended by perceived distributive slights.

The circumstances surrounding this communication breakdown are the subject of much controversy and have been debated exhaustively in a number of other studies (Bridges, 1961; Cozzens, 1992; Woodworth, 1998). This research indicates that, regardless of where the communication breakdown occurred – with Bragg, Polk, or Hill – Bragg should not have, for example, gone to sleep on the night of September 19 without assurances that each of his commanders understood the reorganization of the army and the scheme of maneuver for the next day’s operations. Bragg could
have conferred with Hill and Polk personally, sent aides to communicate the plans to them and to return with verifications that the plans had been understood, or summoned each of his commanders to a council of war. The communication breakdown was not an inevitable consequence of the leadership malpractice of Bragg’s lieutenants.

The failure of September 20 is another example of broader communication dysfunction in Bragg’s command. Though the Army of Tennessee would, ultimately, win the day, the Confederate victory at Chickamauga occurred in spite of this dysfunction. The failure, resting ultimately with Bragg, to adequately ensure the dissemination of operational plans should serve as an example to leaders in other organizational context of, not merely the importance of communication, but the necessity of it. Leaders are responsible, even in adverse conditions, for guaranteeing the communication and understanding of operational plans. Failure to do so can adversely affect battlefield operations and relationships.

5. At particularly critical moments in an organization’s operations, it is sometimes necessary for leaders to provide direct supervision, especially if the organization is characterized by strained relationships. On multiple occasions during Bragg’s tenure as army commander, the Army of Tennessee was presented with opportunities to strike potentially decisive blows against the federals. Bragg had opportunities (at McLemore’s Cove and Lee & Gordon’s Mill) to destroy substantial portions of isolated Federal units, to seize initiative and take advantage of an imperiled foe (at Chickamauga on the morning of September 20), and to permanently deprive (at Wauhatchie) besieged Federals of much needed supplies (Hallock, 1998; Woodworth,
2010a). The failure to accomplish each of these objectives is largely attributable to gross mismanagement and blatant disobedience to orders. In each case, Bragg’s subordinates cited a number of reasons – logistical, numerical, or even meteorological – for the inability to execute these plans, though the plans were, according to a number of contemporary officers cited in this research (e.g., Anderson, Martin, Stewart, and Walker), reasonable and tactically sound. This research suggests that, from a dyadic perspective, in most of these instances relationships had become so strained that some members of the high command no longer felt that Bragg’s orders were worth following.

When Bragg’s subordinates failed to execute Bragg’s operational plans, Bragg either investigated the operational delays or sent messengers to impress upon his subordinates the need to initiate their attacks expeditiously. Occasionally, Bragg arrived in person to order the attacks or to assume personal command of the operation, but the delay wasted opportunities for success.

The multiple examples of leadership breakdowns at these critical points illustrate another valuable lesson. At such critical points, particularly when potentially decisive results are at stake, it is sometimes important (and, in organizations characterized by the lack of effective partnerships, necessary) for leaders to assert their positional authority by being present to supervise or even direct operations. Bragg’s mere presence at McLemore’s Cove, Lee & Gordon’s Mill, and Wauhatchie would likely have accomplished a number of things: (1) prompted more diligence from his subordinates; (2) enabled Bragg to make real-time operational adjustments based on battlefield conditions, obstacles, or changing circumstances; (3)
enabled him to personally supervise and, when necessary, correct the scheme of maneuver; (4) enabled him to direct, by his own authority, operations when his subordinates proved incapable of doing so; and as a result of each (5) enabled him overcome some of the adverse tactical affects of his strained relationships with his subordinates. Bragg’s presence, of course, would not have guaranteed operational success, but in such a challenging dyadic context, would likely have increased the chances.

6. **Leaders must have systems in place to enable them to build and sustain competent teams.** One of the advantages of twenty-first century armies over nineteenth century ones is the presence and use of formal counseling programs, evaluation instruments, and professional development tools. While the United States, in the nineteenth century, had formal, established paths toward military commissions (e.g., West Point appointments, attendance at state military institutes, etc.), appointments and promotions were too often a result of one’s connections rather than one’s abilities or accomplishments. The nineteenth century army, in other words, was more an aristocracy than a meritocracy (Glatthaar, 1994; Skelton, 1992).

This research indicates the fact that Bragg’s high command certainly had a number of officers who earned the appointments and promotions through personal merit, and that these merit-based promotions had a direct impact upon perceptions of distributive justice. Stewart and Cleburne, for instances, earned their promotions through demonstrable excellence as battlefield commanders. Even Cleburne, an Irishman (in a deeply anti-Irish society) who had not attended West Point, could not be long denied a position of high rank and influence.
Unfortunately, these merit-based promotions were the exception to the rule. Bragg’s officer corps was plagued by a number of political generals who had attained high rank due to associations or friendships with powerful allies. Some of these officers, like Polk, whose deep personal friendship with President Davis made him virtually autonomous (essentially above the authority, influence, or censure of Bragg), were placed in such high positions that their incompetence had tactical and strategic implications. Polk, many argue, was almost single-handedly responsible for the violation of Kentucky’s neutrality early in the war and, consequently, for Kentucky’s decision not to secede from the Union (Woodworth, 1990). The fact that Polk was sustained in command and placed in such influential positions as the de facto second-in-command of the Army of Tennessee was a mistake of criminal proportions, but it was attributable to President Davis, not Bragg (Woodworth, 1990).

The Army of Tennessee’s history is a very telling case study of the dangers that may beset an organization when privilege and favoritism are factors in the selection and advancement of team members. This research suggests that, had Bragg possessed the advantage of a formal system of counseling, evaluation, and professional development, he may have the tools to remediate, salvage, or remove officers like Polk. He may have had the ability to dramatically improve perceptions of distributive justice within the army. He may have also been better equipped to facilitate out-group to in-group mobility. Such a system, of course, would not guarantee the success of the army, but it would enhance the chances of the army’s success by elevating the most competent, training the emerging and teachable, and removing the obstinate and ineffective. Bragg, himself, acknowledged that there
were subordinate officers more deserving of the positions that many of his current, ineffective officers possessed: “I want to get rid of all such generals. I have better men now in subordinate stations to fill their places” (Liddell, 1997, p. 152). What Bragg needed, and what contemporary organizations need as well, is a system for ensuring that competent members are recruited, selected, developed, and promoted (Boe, Woolley, & Durkin, 2011; Zaccaro, Weis, Hilton, & Jefferies, 2011).

7. *There are times when organizations require clearly defined hierarchies with clearly defined leaders* (Karrasch, Levine, & Kolditz, 2011). As discussed in Chapter II, leadership is a highly ambiguous concept and there is nothing approaching a consensus on what or who constitutes it. Conceptions of leadership are widely varied, ranging from highly centralized and authoritarian approaches, to highly diffused and democratic approaches. Each of these approaches is arguably appropriate, depending on the situation. In organizations with dangerous missions, like the military, law enforcement, or first responders, a clearly delineated hierarchy is appropriate. Collaboration and consensus-building are often time and resource-intensive, and military leaders, who regularly operate in adverse conditions, do not always have the advantage of being able to democratically formulate operations plans and build consensus around them. Time and resources can mean the loss of life, territory, or even national security (Pfeifer & Merlo, 2011).

Unfortunately, Confederate authorities in Richmond, including President Davis, unintentionally undermined Bragg’s authority as army commander. Daniel (2012), for instance, notes that, following the 1862 Kentucky campaign, when anti-Bragg sentiment in the army was beginning to intensify, Bragg and Polk were
individually summoned to Richmond to meet with President Davis and discuss the growing discontent in the high command. Affording each officer an equal venue to discuss army dissension communicated a sense of equality between the two. To make matters worse, after complaining to President Davis of Bragg’s incompetence, Polk (and his anti-Bragg ally, Hardee) was promoted to lieutenant general. Though Bragg was retained as Army commander, the equal venue given to Polk and the promotions given to Hardee and Polk emboldened them in their opposition to Bragg, to the extent that they even dared to recommend a mutiny against Bragg during the Tullahoma campaign (OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, part 1, pp. 623-624). This research indicates that, in Bragg’s case, the apparent diffusion of authority by President Davis undermined Bragg’s leadership and sanctioned and solidified the out-group.

Whether dealing with the likes of Polk, Hardee or Longstreet (who considered himself on detached duty to Bragg, and never formally under Bragg’s authority), Bragg, for all of his faults, deserved the support of the government that had entrusted him with the command of the Confederacy’s second-largest army. If the government viewed Bragg as unfit for command, he should have been replaced. To allow his subordinates to operate in such insubordinate and mutinous ways ensured that Bragg would always be facing a two-front war: one against his Federal adversary, and another against the adversaries within his own high command who, in being canonized by President Davis, became a permanent out-group (Connelly & Jones, 1973; Wood, 1997).

8. Leaders must be aware of the dyadic dimension of leadership, and they must be cognizant of the potential for dyadic coalition building within their organizations.
Though LMX, as a theoretical framework, is in constant revision, its greatest value, perhaps, lies in the emphasis it places on the role of interpersonal relationships within the leadership dynamic. Stage 1 and Stage 2 LMX research demonstrates that leadership attitudes and styles vary from dyad to dyad. Stage 4 LMX research, however, suggests that dyads can coalesce into inter-dyadic coalitions within organizations (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).

Anecdotal experience certainly bears this out. In virtually all kinds of organizations – military, corporate, educational, etc. – organizational members, for a variety of reasons, align with others until cliques or factions emerge (Kadushin, 2012). Bragg’s high command is a stark example of inter-dyadic coalition building. Kentuckians, for instance, formed coalitions because of a common heritage and a common opposition to Bragg. Many of the Tennesseans formed coalitions for similar reasons. The Kentuckians and Tennesseans, furthermore, formed an even larger coalition due to their common opposition to Bragg. Polk and Hardee formed a coalition because of their status as Bragg’s two senior-most lieutenants and because of a common opposition to Bragg, and they augmented the coalition of the anti-Bragg Kentuckians and Tennesseans. When Bragg alienated the Kentuckians, by denouncing them in the Kentucky campaign and by refusing to commute the execution of Asa Lewis, he also alienated those who had formed coalitions with the Kentuckians.

Bragg, of course, had his own coalition of supporters. Officers who had served with him in Pensacola tended to be more favorably disposed toward him, and they tended to resent the machinations of the various factions of the anti-Bragg
coalition. Knowledge of dyadic coalitions can be a valuable tool in building grassroots support within an organization. The forming of a faction within an organization does not necessarily imply the forming of opposition. Factions, after all, form for a variety of reasons: similar personalities, similar interests, common relatives, common skill sets, similar philosophies, or common grievances. The knowledge of factions can, in fact, enhance a leader’s ability to build organizational cohesion. Rather than meeting the concerns of each individual organizational member, leaders can multiply their efforts by identifying factions (and, perhaps, factional leaders), learning their values and concerns, and by building a sense of identification with and sympathy for them (a kind of meta-dyad) (Kadushin, 2012).

9. **Leaders must understand the multidimensional nature of dyads.** Since the Civil War, historians have described officers within Bragg’s command as being either anti-Bragg or pro-Bragg (Connelly, 1971; Connelly & Jones, 1973; Martin, 2011; McWhiney, 1969; Woodworth, 1990; Woodworth, 1998). This case study has demonstrated that such divisions are reductionistic. Some officers were, indeed, intensely opposed to Bragg, but in most cases, Bragg’s lieutenants demonstrated both anti-Bragg and pro-Bragg characteristics. Hardee, for instance, demonstrated low levels of professional respect for Bragg, but he demonstrated a high perception of contribution. Walker demonstrated a high level of affect for Bragg, but a mixed level of professional respect.

Leaders, then, must not assume that opposition in one area implies complete and total opposition. Rather than view organizational members as either supporters or adversaries, or even as in-group members or out-group members, it might be
helpful to consider support as a continuum. Some organizational members will
support their leader across multiple dimensions and might intensely identify with the
members of the leader’s inner circle. Others might oppose their leader across
multiple dimensions and might have an intense identity with the members of the
leader’s opposition (if an organization is unfortunate enough to have such a group).
Others might support the leader in some dimensions but oppose him/her in others,
might be ambivalent in their support or opposition (“earning a paycheck” or
“punching a time card”), or might even experience mobility from the in-group to the
out-group. Relationships, after all, even in organizations as dysfunctional as the
Army of Tennessee, are complex.

These various leadership lessons are each important in their own right, but they are far
more valuable, from a dyadic perspective, if they are considered mutually supporting
components of a network. Being of aware of the multidimensional nature of dyads (lesson #9),
for instance, and deliberately attempting to engage in dyadic coalition-building (lesson # 8) by
effectively communicating (lessons #3-5) and building cohesive (lesson #1) and competent
(lesson #2) teams, will enable a leader to foster a sense of shared vision and mission (lesson #2),
even in situations requiring direct leadership (lesson #5).

It is appropriate to state that, at times, improving relationships is a simple matter of
being nice, showing tact, and being willing to forgive and forget. When Bragg and Polk were
summoned to Richmond following the battle of Perryville to conference with President Davis on
the nature of the leadership dysfunction within the army, MG Edmund Kirby Smith was also
called to conference. Smith and Bragg had become enemies because of the lack of cooperation
between the two during the Perryville campaign. Each held the other to blame, and though
Smith commanded an independent department, if he had been a member of Bragg’s high command, he would likely have been associated with the emerging out-group. While in Richmond, the two met by accident. During that meeting, they exchanged warm pleasantries and assurances of mutual respect. Daniels (2012) notes that, before the encounter, Bragg and Smith were avowed enemies. Afterwards, the two never spoke ill of one another again.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

Several questions arose from this study that are worthy of further research:

1. This study dealt strictly with those officers who, at some point during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga, held a position within the Army of Tennessee’s high command. An understanding of the dyadic dimension of leadership could be further enhanced by similar case studies in other independent organizations, particularly those that are generally believed to have possessed high levels of organizational cohesiveness (e.g., the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Northern Virginia). These studies need not be limited to Civil War organizations. One of the methodological assumptions in this study, after all, is that leadership principles are, in some sense, universal. The approach used in this study could, therefore, be applied to other historical organizations or could be used to support an LMX meta-analysis of several historical organizations.

2. It is apparent that the more senior the commander, the more likely the commander was to oppose Bragg on some significant level. In order to create a more detailed picture of LMX within the army’s high command, and in order to better understand why lower level commanders supported Bragg where higher level ones did not, a
comparison of LMX at the army’s division level and above with LMX at the brigade level and below might be informative.

3. A number of researchers have attempted to describe or demonstrate relationships between LMX and organizational performance (i.e., stage 3 research) (Butler & Reese, 1991; Cogliser, Schriesheim, Scandura, & Gardner, 2009; Dirks, 2000). Stage 3 research could be enhanced by a correlational study of LMX-level and performance in the Army of Tennessee. Did officers with high-LMX levels experience greater battlefield successes, and vice versa? Are high LMX levels in certain dimensions (affect, professional respect, contribution, etc.) greater indicators of success than others? Did the Army of Tennessee, as a whole, experience greater success when LMX-levels were generally higher?

4. LMX research has, historically, been dominated by stage 1 (vertical dyad linkage) or stage 2 (dyadic characteristics) studies (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). The Army of Tennessee is a highly appropriate organization for a potential stage 4 study (dyadic coalition-building). What were the various factors – natural networks, peer influences, mutual dependencies, etc. – that contributed to the rise of dyadic coalitions within the army? Why were some coalitions less inclined to support Bragg than others? What are the possible implications and lessons that can be derived from an understanding of these coalitions? Are there similarities between coalition-building in Bragg’s army and coalition building in other historical or contemporary organizations. Do cross-organizational themes emerge in examples of the formation of coalitions in historical and contemporary organizations?
5. Memory has played a role in the perception of Bragg’s reputation. While Bragg had few close friends, he certainly had advocates. Modern students of the Civil War, however, are often led to believe that Bragg was, in his own time, universally despised. As a matter of fact, the primary source record reveals that Bragg is more unpopular today then he was in 1863. A study on how Bragg’s enemies dominated the post-war accounts of Bragg’s leadership, thereby shaping modern perceptions of Bragg, would be a welcome addition to more recent historiography attempting to reexamine Bragg’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee.

Closing Remarks

In concluding his remarks at a recent Battle of Stones River Symposium, McMurry (2012) said: “Bragg was a despicable, wretched, warped, putrid, stinking, rotten excuse of a human being…but he was probably the best army commander the Confederacy had in the west.” McMurry was speaking in jest, but his sarcasm was a tongue-in-cheek acknowledgement of the overwhelmingly negative press that Bragg has received over the years, not only from lay historians and students, but also from Bragg’s own biographers (McWhiney, 1969; Seitz, 1924).

Because of the degree to which Bragg has been maligned, his organization was an ideal context for a case study on the relational dimension of leadership dynamics. If, after all, relationships are as critical to leadership as the LMX framework suggests, and if lessons can be drawn from history for the improvement of leadership dynamics in contemporary organizations, what better place to look than Bragg’s Army of Tennessee? As it turns out, Bragg may not have been the monster that he has often been portrayed to be. Perhaps there were other difficult personalities that polluted the army’s high command. Perhaps there were factors, beyond
Bragg’s personality flaws, that contributed to the overall leadership dysfunction in the army. Perhaps LMX has as much to do with personal ambition as it does with leadership competence. Perhaps the very notion of an “in-group” or an “out-group” is too simplistic.

In my anecdotal experience, I have vivid memories of leading visitors on tours of Chickamauga battlefield. Most visitors had minimal background knowledge of the battle or of the personalities involved, but often, informed visitors would literally react in disgust (some even filed complaints) at the slightest suggestion that Bragg ought to be given serious consideration as an organizational leader. In fact, Bragg was, in many ways, a competent commander. He was arguably, as McMurry (2012) suggested, the most competent Confederate commander in the west. This research demonstrates that he was, however, a deeply flawed character who, unlike GEN Robert E. Lee, was never quite able to unite the various personalities and ambitions in his high command into a single, unified team. Modified LMX-MDM scores for members of the high command ranged from -11 to 10, with a much high level of anti-Bragg intensity than pro-Bragg enthusiasm. With few exceptions, Pro-Bragg sentiment, in fact, can best be described as, in Liddell’s (1997) words, “indifferent.”

Bragg was a mixed bag. In this sense, he is similar to every leader. Even Lee couldn’t overcome every personality conflict (e.g., when he decided he couldn’t coexist with LTG D.H. Hill, he simply transferred him west…to Bragg). The same can be said of leaders like George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffet. I can even say the same for myself. In my own experiences as a military and educational leader, I have had strained relationships, edifying relationships, and perplexing relationships. Relationships are complex. Even the most dysfunctional organizations – like the Army of Tennessee – do not uniformly consist of out-group members. Even allegedly efficient organizations – like the Army
of Northern Virginia – do not uniformly consist of in-group members. They consist of people whose personalities, ambitions, and beliefs are at times consistent with those of other organizational members, but at other times contradictory. Bragg’s were consistent with some of his colleagues, but probably not enough. Fortunately, his example remains to instruct current leaders, at least those who are teachable.
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APPENDIX A

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS
MEMORANDUM

TO: Robert D. Stinson
Dr. John Freeman

FROM: Lindsay Pardue, Director of Research Integrity
Dr. Bart Weathington, IRB Committee Chair

DATE: December 20, 2012

SUBJECT: IRB Application # 12-201: Braxton Bragg on Leadership: A Historical Case Study on Leader-Member Exchange in the Army of Tennessee During the 1863 Campaigns for Chattanooga

The IRB Committee Chair has reviewed and approved your application and assigned you the IRB number listed above. You must include the following approval statement on research materials seen by participants and used in research reports:

The Institutional Review Board of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga (FWA00004149) has approved this research project # 12-201.

Since your project has been deemed exempt, there is no further action needed on this proposal unless there is a significant change in the project that would require a new review. Changes that affect risk to human subjects would necessitate a new application to the IRB committee immediately.

Please remember to contact the IRB Committee immediately and submit a new project proposal for review if significant changes occur in your research design or in any instruments used in conducting the study. You should also contact the IRB Committee immediately if you encounter any adverse effects during your project that pose a risk to your subjects.

For any additional information, please consult our web page http://www.utc.edu/irb or email us at: instrb@utc.edu.

Best wishes for a successful research project.
APPENDIX B

THE LMX-MDM SCALE QUESTIONAIRRE
LXM-MDM SCALE QUESTIONNAIRE

(Liden & Maslyn, 1998)

Each of the following questions, grouped according to the dimension they measure, are answered on a scale of 1 to 7, with “1” indicating strong disagreement and “7” indicating strong agreement. On the modified scale used for the purpose of this study, a 3-point continuum is used, with “-1” indicating disagreement, “0” indicating that there is not enough conclusive data to answer the question, and “+1” indicating agreement.

Dimension 1: Affect

1. My supervisor is the kind of person one would like to have as a friend.
2. I like my supervisor very much as a person.
3. My supervisor is a lot of fun to work with.

Dimension 2: Loyalty

4. My supervisor defends my work actions to a superior, even without complete knowledge of the issue in question.
5. My supervisor would come to my defense if I were “attacked” by others.
6. My supervisor would defend me to others in the organization if I made an honest mistake.

Dimension 3: Contribution

7. I do work for my supervisor that goes beyond what is specified in my job descriptions.
8. I am willing to apply extra efforts, beyond those normally required, to meet my supervisor’s work goals.
9. I do not mind working my hardest for my supervisor.

Dimension 4: Professional Respect

10. I am impressed with my supervisor’s knowledge of his/her job.
11. I respect my supervisor’s knowledge of and competence on the job.

12. I admire my supervisor’s professional skills.
APPENDIX C

TIMELINE OF CRITICAL EVENTS
TIMELINE OF CRITICAL EVENTS

1862

• April 6-7 – The Confederate Army of Mississippi under GEN Albert Sydney Johnston, numbering approximately 45,000, attack Federal forces, numbering 67,000, under MG Ulysses S. Grant at Pittsburg Landing along the Tennessee River in southwest Tennessee. The Federals win the battle of Shiloh (named after a church on the battlefield) at the cost of 13,500 casualties. The Confederates suffer 10,600 casualties, including GEN Johnston (who becomes the highest ranking casualty of the Civil War). GEN P.G.T. Beauregard assumes command of the Confederate army.

• June 17 – Citing poor health, GEN Beauregard takes a two-week leave of absence from the army, without permission, at the Bladen Springs resort near Mobile, AL. Beauregard gives temporary command of the army to GEN Braxton Bragg. President Davis, in response, formally removes Beauregard from command and elevates Bragg to permanent command.

• July 21 - In order to relieve the strategic city of Chattanooga, TN from a perceived Federal threat, Bragg orders the Army of Mississippi to be transferred to Chattanooga. The army’s main body arrives in Chattanooga in less than three weeks.

• August 27 – In cooperation with a separate Confederate force under MG Edmund Kirby Smith, Bragg initiates a campaign into Kentucky to (a) destroy the Union Army of the Ohio under MG Don Carlos Buell, (b) recapture Tennessee, (c) liberate Kentucky and inspire Kentuckians to rally to the Confederate army. In anticipation of the campaign, Bragg requests that influential Kentucky statesman-soldier MG John C. Breckinridge, for
Vice President of the United States, join the army to assist in promoting the Confederate cause in Kentucky.

- October 2 – Bragg orders his senior corps commander, MG Leonidas Polk, to attack an isolated Federal force moving in the direction of Frankfort, KY. Polk calls a council of war with his fellow corps commander, MG William Hardee, and his division commanders to discuss the wisdom of Bragg’s orders. With the support of these officers, Polk decides to disobey Bragg’s order to attack.

- October 8 – The Confederate Army of Mississippi, numbering approximately 16,000, fights a portion of the Union Army of the Ohio, numbering approximately 22,000, to a tactical draw at the battle of Perryville in central Kentucky. With the imminent arrival of overwhelming Federal reinforcements, however, Bragg decides to withdraw from the battlefield and begin a retreat out of Kentucky and back into Tennessee. The decision to retreat from Kentucky marks the beginning of intense, outspoken criticism of Bragg from members of Bragg’s high command, politicians, and the press. Much of the criticism within the army comes from Polk, Hardee, and the Kentuckians on the staff who had come to resent Bragg for (a) denouncing local Kentuckians for failing to rally to the Confederate army and for (b) severely criticizing MG Breckinridge for failing to sufficiently promote the Confederate cause to his fellow Kentuckians during the campaign.

- October 24 – MG William S. Rosecrans is given command of the Union Army of the Ohio, and the army is redesignated the Army of the Cumberland.

- October 25 – November 7 – Bragg and Polk are each summoned to Richmond, VA to discuss, with President Jefferson Davis, the Kentucky campaign and the growing,
increasingly public rift between Bragg and the members of the army’s high command. Polk uses the occasion to express their lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership. Davis retains Bragg in command, but Polk (and his ally, Hardee) is promoted to the rank of lieutenant general.

- November 20 – The Army of Mississippi is redesignated the Army of Tennessee.
- November 24 – The bulk of the Army of Tennessee reaches Murfreesboro, in middle Tennessee. The location is selected as the army’s new headquarters.
- December 26 – Bragg orders the execution of Asa Lewis, a corporal in the 6th Kentucky Infantry Regiment, for desertion. Several Kentucky officers, including MG Breckinridge, appeal to Bragg to commute the death sentence, but Bragg refuses. Lewis’ execution irreparably alienates Bragg from his Kentucky officers.
- December 31 – January 2 – Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, approximately 35,000 strong, attacks Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland at the battle of Stones River near Bragg’s headquarters at Murfreesboro. Though the Confederates nearly defeat the Federals on December 31, and though the two armies fight to a standstill on January 2, Bragg’s high command advises him to retreat from Murfreesboro.

1863

- January 3 – Acting on the advice of his high command, Bragg orders the Army of Tennessee to begin the retreat to Tullahoma, TN, nearly 40 miles south of Murfreesboro. In the subsequent days, the press criticizes Bragg’s decision to retreat from Murfreesboro. The Chattanooga Rebel even publishes an article claiming that Bragg retreated against the advice of his subordinates.
January 8 – Bragg, in order to publicly refute the charges of The Chattanooga Rebel, sends a circular to the members of his high command, asking (a) whether or not they had advised the retreat from Murfreesboro and (b) whether he still retained their confidence as the army’s commander. Bragg pledges that, if he had lost the confidence of the high command, he would resign his position as army commander. Many of his officers respond, confirming that they had, indeed, advised a retreat, but several, including LTG Hardee, MG Breckinridge, MG Cleburne, state that they no longer had confidence in Bragg’s leadership.

June 23 – July 3 – Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland initiates the Tullahoma Campaign (or the Middle Tennessee Campaign), successfully maneuvering the Army of Tennessee out of middle Tennessee. Though a few skirmishes occur (e.g., Hoover’s Gap and Liberty Gap on June 25), Rosecrans is able to establish control of middle Tennessee without fighting a major battle. In the final days of the campaign, with the Army of Tennessee positioned near the town of Cowan, TN, Hardee suggests, to Polk, the possibility of a mutiny against Bragg.

July 3 – Bragg orders the Army of Tennessee to retreat to Chattanooga. The Army of Tennessee crosses the Tennessee River on July 4, and the bulk of army arrives at Chattanooga by July 7.

July 19 – LTG D.H. Hill, formerly of the Army of Northern Virginia, reports to Bragg at Chattanooga and is given command of a corps (replacing LTG Hardee who was transferred to Mississippi).

August 16 – September 9 – Rosecrans’s separates the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland and orders them to move, at widely dispersed distances (at times over 40
miles apart), along multiple columns (one corps advancing north of Chattanooga, one
corps directly on Chattanooga, and one corps below Chattanooga), using a combination
of deception and feint in order to maneuver Bragg out of Chattanooga. The first elements
of the Army of the Cumberland cross the Tennessee River on August 29. The operation
initially convinces Bragg that the imminent Federal assault on Chattanooga would come
from the north. By September 6, Bragg realized that a large Federal presence to his south
threatened to interpose itself between Bragg and Atlanta, potentially severing the Army
of Tennessee’s vital supply line, the Western & Atlanta Railroad.

• September 5 – President Davis orders the First Corps of GEN Robert E. Lee’s Army of
Northern Virginia, commanded by LTG James Longstreet, to be transferred to Bragg’s
Army of Tennessee.

• September 8 – In order to meet the Federal threat to the army to his south, Bragg
evacuates the city of Chattanooga and retreats to LaFayette, GA. The next day, the Army
of the Cumberland occupies the city, thereby capturing the landmark city of the campaign
without a major battle. Believing that Bragg is retreating rapidly to the south, possibly as
far south as Atlanta, Rosecrans again orders his three corps to pursue Bragg in widely
dispersed multiple columns.

• September 10 – Bragg realizes that Rosecrans has separated his three corps and has
maneuvered them at dangerously wide distances from one another. A single Federal
division, commanded by MG James Negley, moves into the natural cul-de-sac of
McLemore’s Cove in northwest Georgia, formed by the convergence of Lookout
Mountain and Pigeon Mountain. Sensing a rare opportunity to destroy an entire Federal
division, Bragg orders Hill and MG Hindman to attack Negley’s division. Though the
Confederates held a significant numerical advantage (nearly 3 to 1), Hill’s and Hindman’s forces inexplicably fail to attack. By the time Bragg renews the orders to attack on September 11, the opportunity had passed. Realizing the precariousness of his position, Negley withdrew his division out of McLemore’s Cove, narrowly averting disaster.

- September 13 – A second Federal division, commanded by MG Thomas Wood, is detected in the vicinity of Lee & Gordon’s Mill. Bragg, sensing another opportunity to destroy a Federal division, orders Polk to attack Wood. Overestimating the strength of the opposing Federal force, Polk refuses to attack. By the time Bragg arrives to personally direct the attack, Wood’s division had joined the other divisions of his corps and the opportunity, the second of its kind in four days, had passed. The two events, at McLemore’s Cove and Lee & Gordon’s Mill, bring Rosecrans to the realization that Bragg is now pursuing the dangerously dispersed Army of the Cumberland. Over the next week, Bragg and Rosecrans both begin moving north along each side of Chickamauga Creek, Rosecrans (on the western side of the creek) attempting to withdraw to the relative safety of Chattanooga, and Bragg (on the eastern side of the creek) attempting to interpose his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, cut off the Federal supply line, and bring Rosecrans to battle.

- September 18 – The Army of Tennessee attempts to cross the Chickamauga Creek, at Reed’s Bridge and Alexander’s Bridge, in order to position itself between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. Federal forces, however, delay the crossings long enough to allow Rosecrans to consolidate his army and more far enough north to prevent Bragg from blocking the escape route to Chattanooga.
• September 19 – Elements of a Federal brigade under COL Daniel McCook clash with Confederate cavalry under BG Nathan Bedford Forrest. The clash initiates the battle of Chickamauga, as Bragg and Rosecrans continuously feed reinforcements to support their engaged troops. The first day of fighting ends with Rosecrans’ army separated from Bragg’s army by the LaFayette Road. During the day, the lead elements of Longstreet’s First Corps arrive on the battlefield, with Longstreet arriving personally by midnight. By day’s end, the Confederates outnumber the Federals, approximately 65,000 to 60,000. Bragg reorganizes his army into two wings, with Longstreet commanding the left wing and Polk commanding the right (Hill is functionally demoted and placed under the supervision of Polk). Bragg’s plans for the following day call for an attack before dawn, beginning with the right-most unit and moving sequentially southward to the left-most unit. Unfortunately, Hill, who was to initiate the pre-dawn attack, never receives instructions regarding his role in the next day’s operations.

• September 20 – When the pre-dawn attack fails to begin as ordered, Bragg orders Polk to initiate, but is told that the soldiers are receiving morning rations. The attack doesn’t get underway until approximately 9:30 a.m., giving the Federals adequate time to improve their field fortifications. In a heavy firefight, elements from Polk’s wing temporarily succeed in crossing the LaFayette Road and blocking Rosecrans’ route to Chattanooga before being driven back. At approximately 11:00 a.m., LTG Longstreet launches an attack, fortuitously hitting a hole in the Federal line. That attack prompts a Federal retreat to Chattanooga. After two days of fighting, the Army of Tennessee wins its first major battle at the cost of approximately 18,500 casualties. The defeated Federals suffered approximately 16,000 casualties.
• September 21 – Several members of Bragg’s high command, including Longstreet, Forrest, and MG Walker, encourage Bragg to pursue the retreating Federals. Bragg, however, refuses to pursue, claiming that such a pursuit was logistically and tactically unfeasible. Many of Bragg’s subordinates denounce the decision, including Longstreet, who writes a letter to Confederate authorities in Richmond, complaining of the decision and requesting that Bragg be removed from command. When Bragg’s army finally seizes control of the high ground around Chattanooga (i.e., Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge), the Army of the Cumberland was well fortified within the city. Rather than attempting to storm the city, Bragg plans to lay siege to the Federals inside the city, cut off all supplies going into the city, and force the Federals to surrender.

• September 23 – President Lincoln orders the 11th and 12th Corps of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by MG Joseph Hooker, to come to the relief of the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga.

• September 29 – Polk and Hindman are both relieved of command and subsequently arrested, Polk for his failure to launch the pre-dawn attack on September 20, and Hindman for his failure to attack in McLemore’s Cove on September 10.

• October 4 – Several members of Bragg’s high command conference together and draft a petition for Bragg’s removal. The anti-Bragg petition, written by either Hill or MG Simon B. Buckner, is signed by over a dozen of Bragg’s subordinates, including Hill, Buckner, Longstreet, MG Patrick Cleburne, BG Bushrod Johnson, and BG William Preston.

• October 9-14 – President Davis arrives at Lookout Mountain to conference with Bragg and members of Bragg’s high command. At one meeting, attended by Davis, Bragg, and
Bragg’s senior-most lieutenants, Davis asks whether or not each officer had confidence in Bragg’s leadership. Several officers, including Longstreet and Hill, openly declare their lack of confidence in Bragg’s leadership. Despite the lack of cohesion among the army’s senior officers, Davis reaffirms his support for Bragg and gives Bragg the authority to reorganize the army and remove any officers whom he felt undermined the good order and discipline of the army.

- October 13 – Bragg removes Hill from command, citing his personal incompatibility with Hill and the damage to the army’s discipline and morale caused by Hill’s leadership.
- October 17 – Grant is elevated to command of all Federal forces in the western theater.
- October 23 – Grant arrives in Chattanooga to direct the operations of Federal forces there. He relieves Rosecrans of command (replacing him with MG George H. Thomas), and orders the Federal Army of the Tennessee, commanded by MG William T. Sherman, to bring his army to the relief of Federal forces besieged in Chattanooga.
- October 27 – At the battle of Brown’s Ferry, Federal forces successfully establish a supply line, called the “Cracker Line,” into Chattanooga.
- October 28-29 – Bragg orders Longstreet to close the Federal supply line. In a nighttime assault known as the battle of Wauhatchie, Longstreet fails to attack with an adequate enough force and is repulsed by Federal forces. The “Cracker Line,” therefore, becomes a permanent reality, and any hope of starving the Federals in Chattanooga into submission is removed.
- November 4 – Bragg, in an effort to meet a Federal threat in East Tennessee and to rid himself of one of his most influential adversaries, orders Longstreet and his First Corps detached to conduct operations against MG Ambrose Burnside in the vicinity of
Knoxville, TN. The detachment significantly reduces the size of Bragg’s army, at a time when Federal forces were growing in numerical superiority. Longstreet and the First Corps never return to the Army of Tennessee. After a failed attempt to capture Knoxville, Longstreet returns to Virginia and reunites with the Army of Northern Virginia.

- November 15 – Sherman arrives in Chattanooga with the Army of the Tennessee.

- November 23-25 – Grant’s combined Federal forces, the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and elements of the Army of the Potomac, break the siege of Chattanooga after three consecutive battles (the battle of Orchard Knob on November 23, the battle of Lookout Mountain on November 24, and the battle of Missionary Ridge on November 25). The Army of Tennessee is driven from its positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and is forced to retreat.

- November 29 – After establishing his new army headquarters at Dalton, GA, Bragg offers his resignation to President Davis. Davis accepts the resignation on November 30 and orders Hardee to assume temporary command of the army.
APPENDIX D
ORDERS OF BATTLE
The Army of Tennessee
Order of Battle – July-August 1863 – The Tullahoma Campaign

GEN Braxton Bragg
Army Commander

LTG William J. Hardee
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Cavalry Corps Commander

MG P. Cleburne
Division Commander

LTG Leonidas Polk
Corps Commander

BG Nathan B. Forrest
Cavalry Division Commander (Independent)

MG A.P. Stewart
Division Commander

MG J.M. Withers
Division Commander

MG J.A. Wharton
Division Commander

BG W.T. Martin
Division Commander
The Army of Tennessee
Order of Battle – September 19-20, 1863 – The Battle of Chickamauga

GEN Braxton Bragg
Army Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

LTG James Longstreet
Left Wing Commander

MG W.H.T. Walker
Reserve Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG W.H.T. Walker
Reserve Corps Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG W.H.T. Walker
Reserve Corps Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG W.H.T. Walker
Reserve Corps Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

MG W.H.T. Walker
Reserve Corps Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Corps Commander

MG Leonidas Polk
Right Wing Commander

MG D.H. Hill
Corps Commander

MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander
The Army of Tennessee
Order of Battle – November 1863 – The Battles for Chattanooga

GEN Braxton Bragg
Army Commander

LTG William J. Hardee
Corps Commander

MG L. McLaws
Division Commander

MG Joseph Wheeler
Cavalry Corps Commander

BG S.R. Gist
Division Commander

LTG James Longstreet
Corps Commander

MG L. Massey
Division Commander

MG P. Cleburne
Division Commander

MG A.P. Stewart
Division Commander

MG C.L. Stevenson
Division Commander

BG Patton Anderson
Division Commander

BG M. Jenkins
Division Commander

BG J.A. Wharton
Division Commander

BG W.T. Martin
Division Commander

BG J.K. Jackson
MG B.F. Cheatham
Division Commander

Division Commander

BG B. Johnson

BG W. Bate

BG J. A. Hardee

MG John C. Breckinridge

MC Joseph Wheeler

Army Commander

GEN Braxton Bragg
APPENDIX E

INFORMED CONSENT FORM
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga Informed Consent Form

Braxton Bragg on Leadership: A Historical Case Study on Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) in the Army of Tennessee During the 1863 Campaigns for Chattanooga

PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY. YOUR SIGNATURE IS REQUIRED FOR PARTICIPATION. YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OF AGE TO GIVE YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM FOR YOUR RECORDS.

The policy of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga is that all research participation is voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw at any time, without prejudice, should you object to the nature of the research. You are entitled to ask questions and to receive an explanation for your participation.

Principal Investigator:
The research will be conducted by Robert Daniel Stinson.

Faculty Supervisor:
The chairman of the dissertation committee overseeing this project is Dr. John Freeman.

Purpose and Background of the Study:
You are being asked to participate in a research study exploring features of Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) in the high command of the Army of Tennessee during the 1863 campaigns for Chattanooga. The research will consist primarily of content analysis of primary source records, guided by the Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theoretical framework.

Procedures:
In qualitative research, validity and reliability, or more accurately "trustworthiness" of the study is established by various triangulation techniques, such as member checks and in this instance, review panels. Participants in this portion of the research study are normally identified by their expertise. You have been selected to participate because of your unique expertise in the content area. Should you agree, you will review the data analysis findings and critique the results in a form of interrater reliability. If the critique results in findings that are consistent with the researcher then it is felt that the researcher's findings are trustworthy.

You will be asked to participate in up to two interviews. The interviews will consist of open-ended questions in which you will be asked, based on your expertise in the content-area, to confirm, correct, or augment the findings of the researcher’s analysis. You will then be asked whether or not you agree with the researcher’s descriptions of various aspects of the research subjects’ relationship with the organization’s leader, General Braxton Bragg. You might, for example, be asked: Do you agree with the researcher’s finding that Lieutenant General James
Longstreet had a low perception of distributive justice within the Army of Tennessee (please explain your answer)?

**Risks and/or Discomforts:**
There are no known risks associated with your participation in this aspect of the study being conducted.

**Confidentiality:**
Although the researcher has every intention of crediting your participation, any requests for anonymity will be completely respected and observed.

**Benefits:**
While participation in this research will provide no direct benefit to you, the knowledge gained will benefit current and future leaders who seek to improve their organizations through a better understanding of the dyadic forces involved in leader-member relationships.

**Costs/Financial Considerations:**
Aside from the time involved in participating in the interviews (each interview can be expected to last between 1-2 hours), there are no costs or financial considerations associated with participation.

**Reimbursement/Payment:**
Again, while participation in this research will provide no direct benefit to you, monetary or otherwise, the knowledge gained will benefit current and future leaders who seek to improve their organizations through a better understanding of the dyadic forces involved in leader-member relationships.

**Questions:**
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the principal investigator, Robert Stinson, by calling (423) 802-5006 or by email at jqf169@mocs.utc.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the UTC Institutional Review Board Director, Lindsay Pardue, at (423) 425-4443 or by email at instrb@utc.edu.

**Consent:**
Again, your participation is strictly voluntary and you may discontinue participation at any time without penalty. By signing below, you are consenting to be a research participant and are acknowledging that you have received a copy of this form.

Dated this ______ day of (month) ________________________, 20 ____.

_______________________________  ______________________________
Signature of Participant  Signature of Person Obtaining Consent
VITA

Robert Stinson was born in Dalton, Georgia. After graduating from Northwest Whitfield High School, he attended Toccoa Falls College where he completed his bachelors degree in Secondary Education: History and graduated summa cum laude in 1998. After college, he joined the U.S. Army, was commissioned an infantry officer, and participated in multiple operations in support of the Global War on Terror. After leaving the army, he began a career in education and spent three years as a history teacher and Commandant of Cadets at Chamberlain-Hunt Academy in Port Gibson, Mississippi. In 2006, he accepted a position as a social studies teacher at Rossville Middle School in Rossville, Georgia. In 2009, Robert completed a masters degree in Educational Leadership at Covenant College in Lookout Mountain, Georgia. In 2010, he was named Walker County Schools Teacher of the Year. He served from 2010 – 2011 as the Teacher-Ranger-Teacher for Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park and, in 2011, was awarded the Civil War Trust Chairman’s Award for Excellence in Education. In May 2013, Robert completed his Ed.D. in Learning and Leadership at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. He is currently employed as an administrator at Rossville Middle School.